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ABSTRACT 
 
 
‘You shall not follow a crowd to do evil; nor shall you testify in a dispute so as to turn aside 
after many to pervert justice. You shall not show partiality to a poor man in his dispute.’ 
(NKJV: Exodus 23: 2-3) 
 
This thesis is concerned with the question of whether the Korean competition authority is 
well prepared for the open market with regard to vertical restraints. This further brings some 
issues such as of whether the authority partially scrutinises enterprises without proper 
evidences based on economics. This question has come from the following, ‘what is the 
fundamental matter in competition laws of Asian developing countries which have different 
economic development backgrounds than western developed countries?’ This subject has 
brought a question, even now, to the point the relationship between macroeconomic and 
microeconomic policies in the middle of competition law. Most of competition scholars focus 
on microeconomic way of competition law and policy but, in fact, it often seems that 
macroeconomic concerns have influenced competition laws in developing countries such as 
the Republic of Korea.  
 
Because the Korean economy is still fledging and experiencing further challenges for 
development, the Korean competition law should be more experimented in order to adjust to 
the rapid changes in global economy. This task should be done in both macro- and 
microeconomic levels and also a critical analysis of competition law of the Republic of Korea 
with reference to the US and the EC since these regimes have diverse legal techniques. 
Furthermore, since the Korean competition law was heavily influenced by the Japanese 
antimonopoly law, a comparative study of the Japanese law is necessary. This thesis aims to 
develop the Korean competition law on vertical restraints through a critical assessment by 
economics and comparative studies. This is, therefore, the first means for testing concerning 
vertical regulation that is probably still controversial in the Korean market. Lastly, 
translations of titles, authors, and publishers from the Korean works are unofficial, and the 
laws in this thesis are up to date at May 2009. 
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1.1. Global and Comparative Perspectives in Competition Policy on Vertical Restraints 
 
Competition policy on vertical relations has come to assume an important position, not only 
for domestic competition concerns, but also international economic concerns, because 
business activities commonly transcend national borders.
1
 There is no perfect industrial sector 
without distribution, and the commercial world is becoming increasingly interdependent. 
Multinational Corporations (MNC) look for distributors to sell their products in foreign 
markets, and spend enormous effort to develop strategies and improve their distribution 
systems. This activity can be highlighted in the field of competition law. A competition 
authority should consider the effects of global competition through international trade, 
influencing vertical levels in the domestic market. This influence of globalisation from 
foreign competition awakens competition authorities’ interest, since this issue is also related 
to the state economy. Therefore, states have made efforts to create a framework of 
competition law to solve the problems, not only of public trade restraints, but also private. 
However, this is not an easy task.  
 
In particular, regimes in small market economies face a dilemma, whereby the aims of 
their competition laws are in conflict with national macroeconomic policies of trade. For this 
reason, competition policy on vertical relations remains one of the most difficult subjects for 
competition authorities in small market economies, because vertical relations can influence 
domestic and international competition. Moreover, the issue of whether vertical relations are 
                                                 
1
 See Eleanor Fox, ‘Competition Law’ in Andreas Lowenfeld, International Economic Law, 2nd edn, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2008, p. 418. For further discussion about complementaries between international 
trade and competition law, see also Kevin Kennedy, Competition Law and The World Trade Organisation: The 
Limits of Multilateralism, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2001, pp. 2-5. 
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problematic has long been disputed, based on diverse microeconomic theories. Therefore, 
vertical arrangements in domestic and global markets are directly related to macro- and 
microeconomic policy. The competition regime in the Republic of Korea (hereafter referred 
to as Korea), as a small market economy, has faced the task of implementing a sound 
competition law for all of these reasons.  
 
Vertical relations can be divided into two areas, vertical integration and vertical 
restraint. Vertical integration can be thought of as integration between firms at different 
levels of transaction. This can inhibit competition, where it forecloses the market by means of 
extension of monopoly, or raising rivals’ costs. It can also expand market concentration, 
thereby creating a monopolistic or oligopolistic market. This anti-competitive result is more 
likely to occur where a market is highly concentrated. However, vertically integrated firms 
normally get some benefits from legal exemptions, compared with the horizontal merger. 
Despite some negative views on vertical integration, competition authorities generally take a 
less strict approach, because of their expectation of positive effects. Vertical integration may 
be crucial in some industrial sectors, especially those in their early stages. It is beneficial for a 
national economy regarding efficiency concerns, when a firm performs some functions for 
itself, and should otherwise purchase goods from foreign firms with higher prices.
2
 Therefore, 
the incentive of vertical integration occurs when the integration of the manufacturer and 
distributor relationship is advantageous, such as from reduction of transaction costs,
3
 and this 
incentive encourages a national economic policy on vertical integration.  
 
Vertical restraint is also related to the supply of goods or services between two or 
more firms, located at different stages of the production and distribution level. A firm might 
be a manufacturer, industrial purchaser, distributor, or local retailer. Whilst the main aim of 
anti-competitive horizontal restraints is a collusive strategy, the concern arising from vertical 
restraints is exclusive or foreclosure,
4
 which may block international rivals. Vertical restraint 
                                                 
2
 See Herbert Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy: The Law of Competition and Its Practice, 3rd edn, West 
Publishing, St. Paul, MINN, USA, 2005, p. 374. 
3
 See Kip Viscusi, Joseph Harrington, Jr., and John Vernon, Economics of Regulation and Antitrust, 4th edn, 
The MIT Press, Cambridge MA, USA, 2005, p. 236. 
4
 See Peter Zweifel and Roger Zäch, ‘Vertical Restraints: The Case of Multinationals’, The Antitrust Bulletin, 
Vol. 48, No. 1, 2003, p. 273; Michael Whinston, Lectures on Antitrust Economics, The MIT Press, London, 
2006, p. 133. A manufacturer may consider selling products to an independent distributor, or integrating the 
distribution function entirely. Vertical restraints are, thus, an intermediate solution between full independence 
and vertical integration.  
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is an essential feature of commercial life, and to some extent a substitute for vertical 
integration.
5
 Vertical restraints impose restrictions on the commercial freedom of enterprises, 
according to certain agreements. Moreover, these practices can make consumers pay higher 
prices.
6
 However, vertical restraints may enhance competition where they improve 
competition between brands; thus, controlling them is still one of the most controversial areas 
in competition law. Competition law scholars have debated whether vertical relations should 
be always defined as restrictions of competition, if these restraints have some negative effects 
on competition. If these are not always anti-competitive, many argue that it is necessary to 
ask to what degree competition authorities should allow them, according to research based on 
the market structure, and degree of entry barriers.  
 
The academic issue of balancing effects from vertical restraints, therefore, increases 
the demand for revolutionary vertical regulations in developing countries, not only for 
eliminating trade barriers, but for the benefits from pro-competitive results. A competition 
authority needs to re-examine and reform its legal measures if its competition law allows 
excessive exemptions or, on the other hand, unnecessary restrictions on vertical restraints. 
Some may argue that, although economic analyses are essential to assess the effects of 
vertical restraints, competition law and policy still come in diverse forms, since policy-
makers do not unanimously express one opinion on vertical practices. Furthermore, a mere 
legal reasoning or defective economic theory sometimes results in harm to competition and 
public policy.
7
 It is thus not an easy task for a competition authority with a short history of 
competition legislation such as Korea. The Korea Fair Trade Commission (KFTC) is often 
criticised for its lack of experience of vertical restraint examination.
8
 As the economics of 
vertical restraints improve, the KFTC needs to reassess diverse applications of competition 
laws.  
 
                                                 
5
 See Mark Furse, Competition Law of the EC and UK, 6th edn, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008, p. 163. 
6
 See Mat Hughes, ‘The Economic Assessment of Vertical Restraints under UK and EC Competition Law’, 
European Competition Law Review, Vol. 22, No. 10, 2001, p. 424; Alison Jones and Brenda Sufrin, EC 
Competition Law: Text, Cases, and Materials, 2nd edn, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004, p. 604. 
7
 See Oliver Williamson, ‘Assessing Vertical Market Restrictions: Antitrust Ramifications of The Transaction 
Cost Approach’, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 127, No. 4, 1979, p. 953. 
8
 See Ho Young Lee, ‘Su-Jik-Jok-Jae-Han-Go-Rae-Ui-Kyu-Jae (Regulations on Vertical Restraints)’ in 
Ohseung Kwon (ed), Gong-Jung-Go-Rae-Wa-Bub-Chi [Fair Trade and Regulation], Bubmunsa, Seoul, 2004, 
pp. 621-2. 
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Some may then question whether the Korean authority can adopt and apply various 
competition law techniques from such large, developed countries such as the US, the EC, and 
Japan. If it can, how much can it modify particular legal techniques, considering its own 
economic, political, and social consequences? In general, it can be assumed that competition 
authorities with a short history should adopt legal and economic structures from advanced 
competition regimes, regardless of their different economic and social structures. In particular, 
this assumption seems plausible when competition authorities rely heavily on the 
universalism of economic theories.
9
 Nevertheless, each country has different economic and 
competition policies from each other. The Korean competition policy-makers have, of course, 
to examine their unique market features when they suggest better ideas, in reference to legal 
and economic theories in other regimes. They can learn other regimes’ legal practices, which 
may give guidance on better paths for development,
10
 and modify them to fit their own 
economy and market. Examining and criticising current working regulations is, therefore, 
important to find whether the existing regulations are satisfactory. If they are not, a 
comparative study is beneficial to solve the problems that cannot be solved by its own 
method, and this is what the KFTC needs to begin. This comparative analysis can offer a 
larger variety of solutions than could be made in a system in one country. However, the 
suggested reform should be tempered by the approach of a micro-comparative legal study,
11
 
because of its different circumstances in economy and cultural jurisprudence.
12
 
 
 
1.2. Korean Brand Competition Law, Economic Growth and International Trade 
 
The evolution of a national competition policy involves two different types of concerns. The 
first issue is the manner of competition law application, in order to make domestic firms 
compete vigorously with foreign firms for domestic competitiveness improvement. At the 
                                                 
9
 See Damien Neven, Pénélope Papandropoulos, and Paul Seabright, Trawling for Minnows: European 
Competition Policy and Agreements Between Firms, Centre for Economic Policy Research, London, 1998, p. 
17; Wolfgang Kerber and Oliver Budzinski, ‘Competition of Competition Laws: Mission Impossible?’ in 
Richard Epstein and Michael Greve (eds), Competition Laws in Conflict: Antitrust Jurisdiction in the Global 
Economy, AEI Press, Washington D.C., 2004, pp. 36-40.  
10
 See Eleanor Fox, ‘Harmonization of Law and Procedures in a Globalized World: Why, What, and How?’, 
Antitrust Law Journal, Vol. 60, 1991, p. 595. 
11
 See Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kötz, An Introduction to Comparative Law, 3rd edn, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 1998, p. 3. 
12
 See Ki-Su Lee and Jin-Hee Ryu, Kyoung-Jae-Bub [Anti-trust and Consumer Law], 7th edn, Sechang 
Publishing, Seoul, 2006, p. 14. 
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same time, competition law should ensure fair benefits for consumers and Small and 
Medium-sized Enterprises (SME) from competition, as well as encouraging efficiency and 
innovation. Hence, globalisation through free trade eventually requires domestic competition 
laws and policies, which must not unsuitably weaken the potential for competitiveness of 
domestic enterprises in global markets. The second issue concerns the opportunity for foreign 
firms to increase their market shares in the domestic market. Domestic consumers may get 
benefits from tough competition through international interaction, but domestic firms are put 
in danger of losing their market shares, as their international rivals gain a foothold.
13
 Thus, a 
different type of foreign restraint has been implemented to attract the attention of policy-
makers in Korea. Market access restraints by private enterprises foreclose their markets to the 
foreign.
14
 This can happen where domestic firms have power to establish entry barriers in the 
vertical level.  
 
Because of all these concerns, the KFTC should take distinct policies on vertical 
restraints for the different market structures and different aims of competition laws. It should 
be concerned about domestic competition policy regarding international trade and economic 
growth, whilst simultaneously examining current regulations of vertical practices. The rapid 
economic growth of Korea made policy-makers consider adopting the models and methods 
applied in the leading competition regimes such as the US, the EC and, mainly, Japan. Some 
commentators even argue that the Korean competition policy on vertical relations gets its 
influence largely from US antitrust law.
15
 However, Korean competition policy differs from 
the US, due to its unique economic characteristics and concentrated market structure, which 
have influenced Korean competition policy as well as macroeconomic policy. Certain 
                                                 
13
 See Carl Green and Douglas Rosenthal, Competition Regulation in the Pacific Rim, Oceana Publications Inc., 
New York, 1996, Foreword. 
14
 Eleanor Fox, Supra., note 1, p. 428. 
15
 See John Haley, Antitrust in Germany and Japan: The First Fifty Years, 1947-1998, University of 
Washington Press, Seattle and London, 2001, p. 3; Ohseung Kwon, Kyoung-Jae-Bub [Economic Law], 5th edn, 
Bubmunsa, Seoul, 2005; Cassey Lee, ‘Model Competition Laws’ in Paul Cook et al (eds), Competitive 
Advantage and Competition Policy in Developing Countries, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton 
MA, USA, 2007, p. 29. Lee states that, for example, Thailand in drafting its competition law borrowed from 
Korea, which in turn was influenced by Japanese and German competition laws. Moreover, Japanese and 
German authorities implemented their laws during the occupation period by the US. The historical contexts out 
of which competition policy developed in Japan and Germany appear in many respects to be similar. However, 
there are some differences between the two regimes. Germany chose competition, the free market, and single 
market integration. Japan opted for pervasive governmental guidance, industrial policy, and trade protection. 
Each regime has developed its own competition law based on its economic and cultural background. As a 
unique feature, therefore, the Korean competition law whose legal technique is different from others can also 
influence other countries. 
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competition techniques which work successfully in other regimes simply do not apply to the 
Korean market. Besides, the increase in international trade and the demand for economic 
development raises apprehensions about the Korean vertical structure, since the market is 
highly dominated by a few large enterprises. In particular, their strategic vertical relations 
have demonstrated noteworthy influence in the market and national economy. 
 
The outcome of economic development policy in Korea caused the problem of market 
concentration through coordination with large conglomerates, the so-called Chaebols.
16
 
Korean competition policy has focused on fairness, in other words, equality of opportunity 
for all businessmen. However, most Korean Chaebols have used forms of vertical integration 
and distribution channels, and this structure has restricted competition. This has made Korean 
competition policy on vertical relations different from other countries. The historical 
development of Korean competition law through amendments shows that the KFTC has 
strengthened regulations on business conglomerates.
17
 Because the influence of Chaebol has 
been very significant in the Korean market, the amendments have, until recently, been 
intended to reduce their inefficient and unfair business practices. Chaebols have a unique 
corporate structure, only existing in Korea, and have also played an important role in the 
business environment of the market. They have practised market dominant positions through 
vertical integration and restraints in order to increase shares in the foreign market, such as by 
leverage strategies. The government caused the emergence of Chaebols, coordinating with 
them and supporting their export-led policy during the 1960-70s, allowing Chaebols’ total 
monopolies, for the benefit of rapid economic growth. Chaebols, from their inception, have 
generated considerable side-effects, creating an oligopolistic market. However, since 
competition law legislation in 1980, their business strategy has been changed, as Korean 
government economic policy has been amended. They could no longer stick to old-fashioned 
business practices, even though these had brought them their past success.  
 
Since the beginning of Korean competition law legislation, the KFTC has sought to 
rein in the law, by providing consumer and SME protection, rather than efficiency. This was 
practical in the early days of legislation, since there were significant restraints on 
administration in international trade, and the only thing the KFTC had to do was to restrict 
                                                 
16
 Infra., Chapter 2 and glossary. 
17
 The first amendment to the Korean competition act in 1986 already confirmed its aim of competition policy of 
prohibition on market concentration. 
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large firms, disregarding the influx of foreign competition. However, because public 
restraints have been very much reduced since then, the KFTC should reconsider the aims of 
Korean competition law. It needs, of course, to investigate whether the current law is 
sufficient to eliminate or reasonably reduce the problem of market access restraints, hence 
creating a welfare increase through a fair share for consumers. Excessive relaxation of 
restrictions on vertical arrangements may increase anti-competitive problems in the Korean 
market. It should, however, reassess the benefits from efficiency-improvement by vertical 
restraints. The KFTC needs to allow efficiency-enhancing vertical restraints where they do 
not harm domestic competition and international trade. In conclusion, the KFTC is required 
to trade-off between the positive and negative effects of vertical restraints on micro- and 
macroeconomic levels. The crucial technique to balance them is a sufficient degree of 
tolerance within the criteria to prohibit anti-competitive practices. Considering all of these 
issues, the KFTC has to create a new vertical regulation through reforms.  
 
 
1.3. Research Questions and Structure of Thesis 
 
This thesis intends to examine current Korean competition law and policy on vertical 
relations, particularly vertical restraints. This eventually aims to suggest a regulatory reform 
of Korean type vertical regulation, thereby preventing the Chaebols’ anti-competitive effects, 
and also to improve efficiency and international trade. This thesis reflects two aspects of 
study of Korean vertical regulation. The first is the stress placed on an explanation of why 
Korean vertical regulation should be different from other regimes, based on historical 
perspectives. The second element is the exposure to benefits from vertical restraints and 
changing ideas about them. It is time for the KFTC to prepare a new vertical regulation that 
fits into the market and economy, which will trade-off the negative and positive effects by 
vertical restraints. This thesis, therefore, brings some questions to bear on this research 
outcome. First, how and why did Chaebols emerge in the Korean market, and what are the 
main anti-competitive concerns about their abusive conduct through vertical relations? 
Second, what are the distinctive approaches of the KFTC to vertical restraints, and what are 
the problems in its policy and regulation, as reviewed in the cases? Third, how can the KFTC 
and the courts develop competition law, through amendments and case law, which fit into the 
Korean market and economy?  
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In this thesis, the following major issues should be brought to bear on these questions: 
(i) fear of unwieldy size and market foreclosure; (ii) failure to apply proper provisions; (iii) 
development of clear guidance; (iv) balance and trade-off tests; and (v) implementation of 
appropriate objectives of competition law. These issues can be explained as following: first, 
Chaebols have tried to set up, or already established, domestic market entry barriers through 
vertical integration and restraints, which can be called a ‘market containment effect,’ since 
Chaebols, or even large foreign firms, can foreclose the Korean market geographically, 
without high costs of predation.
18
 Second, although the Korean market becomes more open, 
the KFTC does not expect more vigorous competition, and is heavily concerned about market 
dominance. This anti-largeness policy makes the KFTC fail to implement proper provisions. 
Third, the KFTC has not given clear guidance on the application of relevant provisions, e.g., 
market share threshold, which could result in legal certainties. Fourth, reasonable balance and 
trade-off tests by rule of reason will be necessary in vertical cases to foster competition. All 
of these new approaches may achieve the aims of competition law. This thesis, therefore, 
focuses on the most recent developments in Korean competition policy on vertical restraints 
and suggestion of a new idea.  
 
This thesis consists of eight chapters, including an Introduction and Conclusion. 
Chapter 2 introduces the historical development of the Korean economy and competition law 
with a comparison with the Japanese case, since Korean economic and competition models 
were influenced by the Japanese. The objective of this chapter is to provide a brief overview 
of the historical development of Korean competition law through government economic 
policy, focusing on international competence by large firms. It discusses how and why the 
Korean economy was developed through the Chaebol policy, and depicts the evolution of 
competition law legislation. It also clarifies why rapid economic growth brought negative 
side-effects, such as economic concentration, and a danger of domino effects of Chaebol’s 
failure.
19
 These problems were caused from the lack of well-equipped competition law during 
the period of economic growth policy fuelled by export fever. This chapter illustrates the 
                                                 
18
 E.g., Intel Corp., Intel Semiconductor Ltd, and Intel Korea, KFTC Decision 2008-295, 2007Dokgam1790 and 
2008Sijang1126, Nov. 5, 2008. Intel’s market share in Korea was even larger than that in the world market. 
19
 Chaebol’s affiliated enterprises brought high risks of their groups’ failure from the cross-debt guarantee 
system.  
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legislation of competition law in 1980 and amendments to control Chaebol. This will give an 
idea about the objectives of Korean competition law.  
 
Chapter 3 analyses the rationales of vertical relations, which discusses the arguments 
of pro- and anti-competitive effects, mainly from vertical restraints. Economic explanations 
are necessary to articulate problems such as extension of monopoly, commitment and 
restoration of market power, raising rivals’ costs, and, also, benefits of inter-brand 
competition and blocking free-riding. Economic theories are, therefore, very useful to explain 
why competition authorities have a less strict application of legal approaches to vertical 
arrangements, and this debate is helpful in comparing various competition policies on vertical 
practices. This chapter thus has a comparative overview of historical development in other 
competition regimes, such as the US and the EC because these regimes have developed their 
enforcements on vertical restraints by means of diverse legal methods. These can help the 
KFTC and the courts attempt to experiment economic theories to vertical cases. After this 
explanation, it provides a summary of substantive statutory provisions, the Monopoly 
Regulation and Fair Trade Act (MRFTA), particularly Articles 3-2, 19, 23, and 29 MRFTA
20
 
and guidelines with a comparison with the Japanese Antimonopoly Law (AML). The 
MRFTA was heavily influenced by the AML. Therefore, this comparison will be helpful to 
analyse the current laws in these two regimes whether they are pro-competitive and result in 
efficiency outcomes. 
 
Chapter 4 explains the case law, and also the KFTC’s practices. This demonstrates 
how the KFTC and the courts in Korea have been cautious to deal with vertical restraints, and 
how they have developed justifications in vertical cases. This chapter compares the case law 
development with other jurisdictions. This chapter intends to explore the essential 
implementation of the law. This is critically reviewed, and it is necessary to explain the 
problems of existing Korean vertical regulation for the proposal of reform in the following 
chapters. The main part of this chapter is concerned with a discussion of the economics-
justification methods in case law.  
 
                                                 
20
 MRFTA, amended by the law no 9554, Mar. 25 2009, Article 3-2 (Prohibition of Abuse of Market 
Dominance); Article 19 (Unfair Concerted Act); Article 23 (Unfair Business Practices); Article 29 (Resale Price 
Maintenance).  
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The emphasis shifts, in Chapter 5 and 6, to the problems of regulatory structure in 
vertical regulation, then amendments. Chapter 5 continues critical analyses of the current 
Korean competition law of vertical restraints from the cases studied in Chapter 4. In this 
chapter, the problem of application of law as a technical matter is discussed. It examines the 
issues in Article 3-2 MRFTA, the provisions of abuse of market dominance, application of 
Articles 19 and 23 regarding concerted and unilateral problems, and Article 29 of resale price 
maintenance. This chapter also discusses the problems according to the relevant guidelines, 
which do not give legal certainty, but only create strait-jacket effects. To establish a model of 
Korean brand vertical regulation and case law development, Chapter 5 also deals with legal 
ideas on vertical restraints as well as economic theories. Therefore, it discusses controversial 
legal arguments in interpretation of relevant provisions regarding the achievement of 
purposes of Korean competition law. Chapter 6 then introduces a regulatory reform of 
Korean vertical regulation by an amendment, which can be thought as revolutionary. Chapter 
6 suggests various ideas of reform regarding presumption of abuse of market dominance in 
Articles 3-2 and 4 MRFTA, application of Articles 19 and 23, and withdrawal of Article 29. 
This chapter also proposes new vertical guidelines, which include market share threshold test. 
This mainly argues that the current MRFTA is very strict and may not satisfy the aims of 
Korean competition law.  
 
Chapter 7 critically assesses the new model that is suggested in Chapter 6. This 
chapter examines the issues for small market economies of developing countries and 
competition policy, including concerns about opening the domestic market. On theoretical 
grounds, there are number of reasons why the KFTC should follow a more economics-
justification approach in vertical restraints, where the market is becoming mature, and open 
to international competition. This chapter focuses on the development of Korean vertical 
regulation as a model of balancing negative and positive effects, based on these grounds. This 
gives an example of how competition authorities in small market economies, which have  
similar experiences or circumstances in micro- and macroeconomic policies, should provide 
legal measures, and apply their laws in order to enhance economic efficiency and pro-
competitive effects. Finally, Chapter 8 concludes the ideas in the thesis. 
 
Various elements are comprehensive factors in the determination of anti- and pro-
competitiveness of vertical restraints, depending on the degree of market concentration and 
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international trade. This thesis attempts to examine the Korean case as an example of a 
developing country, regarding competition law, and also international trade. This thesis 
provides insight into the historical development of economic and societal changes which 
influence competition culture. As the Korean economy presumably grows gradually, the 
Korean competition authority should and will develop regulatory techniques more quickly 
than expected. The KFTC has been one of the most active authorities, particularly amongst 
Asian countries. Therefore, because developing countries can have a similar experience of a 
highly concentrated market with the pursuit of export-enhancing policy, the study of Korean 
competition law and policy on vertical restraints will be valuable to anticipate or suggest 
development and changes in their competition laws. In conclusion, this thesis will trace and 
forecast the development of Korean competition law and policy, and also give an example of 
development of vertical regulations.  
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2.1. Korean Economic Policy of Rapid Economic Growth and Its Costs 
 
In many developing countries in East Asia, including Korea, competition policy will tend to 
lose out if there is a conflict with other government policy objectives. Government policies, 
which influence the competitiveness of their domestic firms in international markets as well 
as the welfare of consumers, involve not only traditional trade policy, but also competition 
policy.
1
 Governments frequently intervene in business activities to promote certain industries. 
Such an environment makes it difficult to establish a culture of competition. Competition 
laws thus vary in terms of their coverage and content, reflecting diverse social, political,
2
 
cultural and legal contexts.
3
 Therefore, the important factor to understand competition policy 
is what the underlying economic problem is. At almost all points, economic theories are 
usually part of social or political philosophy.
4
  
 
There are some reasons to believe that less mature markets, especially in developing 
countries, tend to be more vulnerable to anti-competitive practices. The reasons include high 
entry barriers
5
 due to inadequate business infrastructure, such as distribution channels of 
                                                 
1
 See Jonathan Eaton and Gene Grossman, ‘Optimal Trade and Industrial Policy under Oligopoly’, The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 101, No. 2, 1986, p. 383. 
2
 See Bruce Doern, ‘Comparative Competition Policy: Boundaries and Levels of Political Analysis’ in Bruce 
Doern and Stephen Wilks (eds), Comparative Competition Policy: ational Institutions in A Global Market, 
Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1996, p. 34.  
3
 See Ping Lin, ‘The Evolution of Competition Law in East Asia’ in Erlinda Medalla (ed), Competition Policy in 
East Asia, Routledge, London and New York, 2005, p. 16. 
4
 See Eleanor Fox, ‘Economic Concentration, Efficiencies, and Competition: Social Goals and Political 
Choices’ in Eleanor Fox and James Halverson (eds), Industrial Concentration and the Market System: Legal, 
Economic, Social and Political Perspectives, ABA Publishing, USA, 1979, p. 140. 
5
 See Sigrid Stroux, US and EC Oligopoly Control, Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 2004, pp. 23-4. The 
author illustrates 3 types of entry barriers: (i) legislation; (ii) technology; and (iii) strategies set up by firms.  
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large firms. High entry barriers make it easier to achieve market power, and can also prevent 
the erosion of monopoly power in the long run. Therefore, once achieved, concentration may 
not be easily undone in a short period.
6
 In general, consumers and Small and Medium-sized 
Enterprises (SME) in these countries could be harmed by anti-competitive practices. For this 
reason, there are increasing demands to protect them against abuses of market dominance.
7
 
 
 The Korean case conforms to this model. Korean competition enforcement cannot be 
separated from the economy’s historical, social, and political background.
8
 The outstanding 
economic development of Korea over the six decades after the Korean War was surprising, 
and became legendary to other developing countries. Since the early 1960s, Korea has 
demonstrated remarkable economic growth and change in economic structure.
9
 During the 
time of its economic growth, government intervention influenced the allocation of resources 
amongst market entities.
10
 Although this intervention seemed to be similar to other Asian 
countries, especially Japan, fundamental Korean government policy was slightly different, 
due to its unique strategy of export-led industrialisation policy.  Selective industrial policies 
for export contributed to Korea’s rapid economic success and international competitiveness 
in several industries.
11
 To achieve this export-led economic goal, the government had to rely 
on the specific enterprises that could give best effort for export, and compete with other 
Multinational Corporations (MNC). This policy eventually led to significant economic 
improvement, with market concentration by several business groups, Chaebols, which have 
                                                 
6
 See Michal Gal, Competition Policy for Small Market Economies, Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA, 
USA and London, 2003, p. 75. 
7
 See Robert Anderson and Frédéric Jenny, ‘Competition Policy, Economic Development and the Possible Role 
of a Multilateral Framework on Competition Policy: Insights from the WTO Working Group on Trade and 
Competition Policy’ in Erlinda Medalla (ed), Competition Policy in East Asia, Routledge, London and New 
York, 2005, p. 63. 
8
 See David Round, ‘Regional Cooperation in Competition Policy’ in Erlinda Medalla (ed), Competition Policy 
in East Asia, Routledge, London and New York, 2005, p. 252. 
9
 See Ha-Joon Chang, The Political Economy of Industrial Policy, St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1994, p. 92; 
Paul Kuznets, ‘Causes, consequences, relevance: Korea’s industrialization’ in Yun-Shik Chang and Steven Lee 
(eds), Transformations in Twenties Century Korea, Routledge, 2006, New York, p. 102. Between 1965 and 
1986, Korea’s annual per capita GNP growth showed 6.7 per cent that was significantly high compared with that 
of 2.9 per cent of the developing world as a whole. 
10
 See Larry Westphal, ‘Industrial Policy in an Export Propelled Economy: Lessons From South Korea’s 
Experience’, The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 4, No. 3, 1990, p. 41. These were taxes and subsidies, 
credit rationing, various licensing, and creation of public enterprises. 
11
 Ibid., p. 41; Paul Kuznets, Supra., note 9, pp. 89-92. 
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numerous affiliates.
12
 They were always associated with governmental interference in 
production and distribution.
13
 
 
This policy meant heavy reliance on a few large enterprises at the cost of their anti-
competitive activities, and was later criticised heavily. It was also obvious that the closed 
domestic market for foreign competitors could not improve international competitiveness, 
because there was less foreign interaction. In the end, the state-aided domestic large 
enterprises chosen as national champions could not be transformed into competent 
international firms.
14
 This economic policy for rapid growth eventually brought economic 
distortions, and also created government resource allocation and an artificially-structured 
market concentration.
15
 During this period, many argued that this was essential to develop the 
Korean economy in order to provide economic competence. Therefore, it was inevitable that 
this export-motivated nature brought a high level of centralisation to achieve scale economies 
for future international competition. It was unquestionable that the government-sponsored 
export-led policy accelerated growth maximisation by coordinating the advantages of market 
intervention.  
 
Although this policy brought growing exports in a large number of foreign markets, as 
planned, the state-supported enterprises achieved tremendous market dominance in the 
domestic market. Whilst the government emphasised the gains from large enterprises’ 
competitive advantages in the foreign market, it ignored the importance of competition law. 
A large number of domestic industries were restrained by them, and the domestic market 
became monopolistic or oligopolistic.
16
 In addition, the government instructed individual 
enterprises as to which industries were open to them, and used the banking system to 
implement its policy. This allowed them to enjoy market dominance to increase their market 
                                                 
12
 For further details about Chaebol structure, see Myoungsu Hong, ‘Features of Chaebol’, Journal of Korean 
Competition Law, Vol. 9, 2003, pp. 170-71. 
13
 See Paul Kuznets, ‘Government and Economic Strategy in Contemporary South Korea’, Pacific Affairs, Vol. 
58, No. 1, 1985, p.55; Seung-Wha Chang, ‘Competition Law and Policy in Transaction’ in Carl Green and 
Douglas Rosenthal (eds), Competition Regulation in the Pacific Rim, Oceana Publication. New York, 1996, p. 
263; Ho Young Lee, ‘Regulation of Undue Internal Dealings under the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade 
Act’, Journal of Korean Law, Vol. 4, No. 2, 2005, p. 87. 
14
 See Tat Yan Kong, The Politics of Economic Reform in South Korea: A Fragile Miracle, Routledge, London 
and New York, 2000, p. 109. 
15
 See Un-Chan Chung, ‘The Korean Economy Before and After the Crisis’ in Duck-Koo Chung and Barry 
Eichengreen (eds), The Korean Economy Beyond the Crisis, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton 
MA, USA, 2004, pp. 25-6.  
16
 Seung-Wha Chang, Supra., note 13, p. 263.  
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power,
17
 although market power should have been viewed as tending to damage efficiency 
and economic progress.
18
 
 
The Korean government, in a word, granted licences to Chaebols to operate in various 
fields of businesses, particularly those seen to be strategic to economic development. This 
demonstrated its tendency of protecting producer’s interests over those of consumers. Since 
the dominant concern for the policy-makers was how to achieve rapid growth, it was easy to 
understand the relative imbalance in the government’s focus. One example of economic 
policies favouring producers over consumers was the restriction on imports, which prevented 
most imports of consumer goods. This restriction has recently been phased out for the most 
part. However, the entry barriers against foreign enterprises in the Korean market during this 
period can be seen to have led to a resulting lack of competition, which ultimately brought 
inefficiency to the market.
19
  
 
As a result, the Korean economy became very vulnerable, even to a small external or 
internal economic shock, and could easily go into an economic crisis when there is a loss of 
confidence in its economic prospects. This is what Korean policy-makers learned, at a 
considerable cost, in 1997, when they received loans from the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF). They recognised a considerable and harmful market distortion from the high 
economic concentration.
20
 In fact, a concern about the oligopolistic market structure arose 
from the view of competition aspects in 1980. As the Korean public demanded more 
democratic procedures to accompany economic growth and globalisation, the politics-
                                                 
17
 Un-Chan Chung, Supra., note 15, pp. 25-6. On the financial side, poor monitoring practices and the 
politicisation of funding increased non-economic performing loans. This was the core figure amongst the large 
business groups, which was similar to the concerns brought in Japanese competition law. See also Masako 
Wakui, Antimonopoly Law: Competition Law and Policy in Japan, Arima Publishing, Suffolk, 2008, p. 20.  
18
 Some scholars distinguish market power from monopoly power as the latter is often defined in the cases as the 
power to control price or to exclude competition and understood as a significant degree of market power. 
However, in the Korean system, these two terms seem to be treated as the same. For further discussion about the 
definition, see William Shepherd, ‘Theories of Industrial Organization’ in Harry First, Eleanor Fox, and Robert 
Pitofsky (eds), Revitalizing Antitrust in Its Second Century: Essays on Legal, Economic, and Political Policy, 
Quorum Books, New York, 1991, p. 37; Phillip Areeda, Louis Kaplow, and Aaron Edlin, Antitrust Analysis: 
Problems, Text, and Cases, 6th edn, Aspen Publishing, New York, 2004, p. 368; Luc Peeperkorn and Vincent 
Verouden, ‘The Economics of Competition’ in Jonathan Faull and Ali Nikpay (eds), The EC Law of 
Competition, 2nd edn, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007, p. 9. 
19
 For discussion about inefficient results by Chaebol, see Sung-Hee Jwa, A ew Paradigm for Korea’s 
Economic Development: From Government Control to Market Economy, Palgrave, New York, 2001, pp. 12-3; 
Myoungsu Hong, Supra., note 12, pp. 155-61. 
20
 Un-Chan Chung, Supra., note 15, pp. 25-6. The author explains that inefficient and unprofitable firms were 
supposed to be shut down, and only efficient firms should survive, but the Korean large firms continued to 
develop by taking advantages from governmental protection. 
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business practices became untenable.
21
 The concept of unfairness in competition has 
influenced competition law and policy in Korea, which resulted in a unique Anti-Chaebol 
policy.
22
 The market has been affected by tough competition, which was dependent on 
competition law. This historical development of the Korean economy and competition law 
has influenced competition in the Korean market.  
 
Before moving to the substantive Korean competition laws, it is thus important to get 
an idea of the variety of competition aims from the historical background. This will provide a 
grounding knowledge of the relationship between macroeconomic and competition policies in 
Korea. This will also give explanations for the problems in competition law of vertical 
restraints. This chapter will address how the Korean competition system has been identified, 
based on national economic development and the fear of large firms, which resulted in an 
extreme treatment by Anti-Chaebol policy. 
 
 
2.2. Historical Context of Competition Law Development 
 
2.2.1. Chaebol and Problems of Market Concentration: Comparative Perspective 
 
There were two notable features of Korea’s economic development. One was the economic 
leadership of the government, and another was the emergence of Chaebols.
23
 These large 
family-owned conglomerates had roots in the colonial period. The government leadership 
was a part of Korea’s colonial inheritance from the 1930s, when the Japanese colonial 
administration used private banks to direct resources towards heavy industries, under the 
large business groups, Zaibatsu.
24
 To Korean policy-makers, the Japanese government-led, 
Zaibatsu-driven development was considered suitable for the Korean economy. The Japanese 
                                                 
21
 See Uk Heo and Sunwoong Kim, ‘Financial Crisis in South Korea: Failure of the Government-Led 
Development Paradigm’, Asian Survey, Vol. 40, No. 3, 2000, p. 503.  
22
 See Kwangshik Shin, ‘Kyoung-Jae-Wi-Ki-Wa-Kyoung-Jaeng-Jeong-Chaek (Economic Crisis and 
Competition Policy and Law)’ Journal of Economic Policy, Vol. 20, No. 1 and 2, 1998, p. 8. 
23
 See Gerardo Ungson, Richard Steers, and Seung-Ho Park, Korean Enterprise: The Quest for Globalization, 
Harvard Business School Press, Boston, 1997, pp. 24-7; Tat Yan Kong, Supra., note 14, p. 168. See also 
glossary. 
24
 For further discussion about Zaibatsu, see Eleanor Hadley, Antitrust in Japan, Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, 1970, pp. 20-21; John Haley, Antitrust in Germany and Japan: The First Fifty Years, 1947-1998, 
University of Washington Press, Seattle and London, 2001, p. 9; David Flath, The Japanese Economy, 2nd edn, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005, pp. 46-9. See also glossary. 
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case hints at a valuable description for development of Korean competition law and policy on 
large business groups.  
 
Zaibatsu were groups of powerful enterprises from the banking, coal, steel, heavy 
industry, trading, securities, and other sectors.
25
 In particular, sales of plants, contracts and 
subsidies from the Japanese government helped to concentrate the development of 
transportation and heavy industry in the hands of a small group of families. Zaibatsu were the 
main economic tools for Japanese economic growth during the 1930-40s, correspondingly for 
the Korean case in the 1960-70s.
26
 They were restructured during post-war US military 
occupation and evolved into the present-day Keiretsu
27
 by the legislation of the 
Antimonopoly Law (AML).
28
 This was introduced in 1947 as part of the occupation policy 
after the Second World War, and has often been seen as one of the main issues concerning 
the Japanese economy.
29
 The AML is an inheritance of US occupation, and thus has some 
features in common with US antitrust law. For example, some features of the Sherman Act 
and the Clayton Act were incorporated into the Japanese statute, such as ‘conspiracy in 
restraint of trade’ and ‘tend to monopolise’.
30
 The AML has been often the focus of political 
controversy, although it seems an important tool in the Japanese government’s efforts to 
make the market more compatible with other countries.
31
  
 
                                                 
25
 See Mitsuo Matsushita, Introduction to Japanese Antimonopoly Law, Yuhikaki Publishing, Tokyo, 1990, p. 1; 
Kenji Suzuki, Competition Law Reform in Britain and Japan: Comparative Analysis of Policy etworks, 
Routledge, London and New York, 2002, p. 37. 
26
 For further information about emergence of Zaibatsu and the AML, see Hiroshi Iyori and Akinori Uesugi, The 
Antimonopoly Laws of Japan, Federal Legal Publications, Washington, 1983, pp. 4-10; Mitsuo Matsushita, 
Supra., note 25, preface; Hidemasa Morikawa, Zaibatsu: The Rise and Fall of Family Enterprise Groups in 
Japan, University of Tokyo Press, Tokyo, 1992, Chapter 2. 
27
 See Kenichi Miyashita and David Russell, Keiretsu: Inside the Hidden Japanese Conglomerates, McGraw-
Hill, New York, 1994, Chapter 1; Akira Goto and Kotaro Suzumura, ‘Keiretsu’ in Leonard Waverman, William 
Comanor and Akira Goto (eds), Competition Policy in The Global Economy: Modalities for Cooperation, 
Routledge, London and New York, 1997, pp. 362-7. See also glossary. 
28
 The AML was first named as ‘Law Relating to Prohibition of Private Monopoly and Methods of Preserving 
Fair Trade’. This seems that Japan took the pure microeconomic concept of competition rather than 
macroeconomic idea. For further discussion, see Masako Wakui, Supra., note 17, pp. 12-3. 
29
 See Peter Beck, ‘Revitalizing Korea’s Chaebol’, Asian Survey, Vol. 38, No. 11, 1998, pp. 1018-9. 
30
 David Flath, Supra., note 24, pp. 250-1. Although the MRFTA adopted a number of provisions in the AML, it 
did not adopt ‘monopolisation clause’. 
31
 See Mitsuo Matsushita, ‘The Antimonopoly Law in Japan’ in Edward Graham and David Richardson (eds), 
Global Competition Policy, Institute for International Economics, Washington D.C., 1997, p. 151; Kenji Suzuki, 
Supra., note 25, p. 35. 
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Chaebols can be compared with Zaibatsu or present-day Keiretsu,
32
 in that direct 
industrialisation reappeared in the 1970s, when the administration tried to establish and 
develop Heavy and Chemical Industries (HCI). Government-driven Chaebolisation was 
generated to avoid the risk of entering new and risky industries, through its financial 
support.
33
 By the end of the 1970s, the most successful of those favoured business groups 
developed into highly diversified Chaebols. The 1970s represented the decisive stage in the 
formation of the Chaebols. Many of the economic and social distortions commonly 
associated with Chaebols originated during this time. This was detrimental to competition.
34
 
They possessed features that have contributed to their longevity.
35
 Chaebols grew larger, 
generating the common sentiment and theory of ‘too big to fail’.
36
 One may ask why they 
diversified into many economic activities through affiliates, although there was often a loss, 
instead of specialisation. A possible answer might be that such expansion helped to spread 
the risk, allowing the slack in one sector to be compensated for by the others. However, 
instead of spreading risk, their affiliates were so intertwined through cross-shareholdings
37
 
that the collapse of one was likely to trigger a domino effect throughout the groups. Another 
answer for diversification could be the desire for vertical integration within the group, to 
ensure the supply of critical parts of manufacturing,
38
 and also to foreclose the market.
39
  
 
Vertical integration or diversification into unrelated areas took the form of creation or 
acquisition of enterprises, which resulted in entry barriers.
40
 Based on this consideration, the 
government started focusing on SMEs, because most of its Chaebol policy during the 1960-
70s drove anti-competitive effects onto the market. The growth of Chaebols soon became a 
                                                 
32
 Chaebol has its structural similarity with Keiretsu and also Konzern but it is still very unique and some 
scholars argue that it cannot be compared with the large groups in other regimes. See Myoungsu Hong, Supra., 
note 12, pp. 186. 
33
 Paul Kuznets, Supra., note 9, pp. 93-5; Seung-Ho Kwon and Chung-Sok Suh, ‘Transformations in Korean 
capitalism: A case study of the Hyundai Business Group’ in Yun-Shik Chang and Steven Lee (eds), 
Transformations in Twenties Century Korea, Routledge, New York, 2006, pp. 127-8.  
34
 See Jongwoo Han and L.H.M. Ling, ‘Authoritarianism in the Hypermasculinized State: Hybridity, Patriarchy, 
and Capitalism in Korea’, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 42, No. 1, 1998, pp. 67-8; Tat Yan Kong, 
Supra., note 14, pp. 47-51. 
35
 Paul Kuznets, Supra., note 9, p. 94. 
36
 Sung-Hee Jwa, Supra., note 19, pp. 10-11. 
37
 Un-Chan Chung, Supra., note 15, p. 27.  
38
 See Gary Hamilton and Nicole Biggart, ‘Market, Culture, and Authority: A Comparative Analysis of 
Management and Organization in the Far East’, The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 94, 1988, p. S65; Tat 
Yan Kong, Supra., note 14, pp. 88-90. 
39
 For further discussion about vertical foreclosure in the oligopolistic market, see Esther Gal-Or, ‘Vertical 
Integration in Oligopoly’, Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, Vol. 8, No. 2, 1992, p. 393. 
40
 See Sea Jin Chang and Unghwan Choi, ‘Strategy, Structure and Performance of Korean Business Groups: A 
Transactions Cost Approach’, The Journal of Industrial Economics, Vol. 37, No. 2, 1988, pp. 429-30.  
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burden to economic policy. Accountable as they were for a large share of the Korean 
economy’s assets, sales and debts, Chaebols inevitably influenced the majority of industrial 
policy measures. From their privileged positions, Chaebols initiated large-scale projects 
without fear. Their strategic concerns in oligopolistic markets forced them to expand their 
capacity through ‘market containment power’.
41
 This market structure sufficiently satisfied 
the first legislation of Korean competition law, to solve Chaebols’ dominating situations so 
that the free market system works well.
42
 This was different from the Japanese case, since 
there was no foreign pressure for competition law legislation. 
 
2.2.2. Establishment of Korean Competition Policy 
 
In the 1950s and 60s, after liberalisation from Japanese rule, and the Korean War, both 
Presidents Rhee and Park aimed to establish heavy industries that could produce more 
industrialisation,
43
 and put economic development as a top priority. That was what most 
people wanted. The government-business relationship was created during this time, and 
private sector cooperation with government administrators arose from a combination of 
nationalism and shared interests.
44
 The government actively participated in the public and 
private sectors of the economy, achieving its position through government-driven economic 
planning.
45
 This targeted certain industries during the 1960-70s for their implementation and 
execution.
46
 The case of the ‘Flour, Sugar, and Cement’ price cartels in 1963, however, 
brought public concerns about abusive conduct of monopolists and demanded competition 
law legislation.  
 
                                                 
41
 Sung-Hee Jwa, Supra., note 19, pp. 10-11; Hyun Yoon Shin, Kyoung-Jae-Bub [Korean Competition Law], 
2nd edn, Bubmunsa, Seoul, 2007, p. 32. Shin explains that this ‘unbalanced economic growth policy’ brought 
the wide government’s control. 
42
 In general, the primary purpose of the competition law should be to remedy situations in which the free 
market breaks down. See Mark Furse, Competition Law of the EC and UK, 6th edn, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2008, p. 1.  
43
 See Steven Lee, ‘Introduction: Korea’s twentieth century transformation’ in Yun-Shik Chang and Steven Lee 
(eds), Transformations in Twenties Century Korea, Routledge, New York, 2006, p. 17. 
44
 Ha-Joon Chang, Supra., note 9, pp. 110-11; Tat Yan Kong, Supra., note 14, pp. 140-41. A number of the 
features of anti-competitiveness could be seen even after competition law legislation, such as shared interests 
between the government and Chaebols. 
45
 Gary Hamilton and Nicole Biggart, Supra., note 38, p. S77. 
46
 In the 1960-70s, the government was strong enough to resist the societal pressures that might have 
undermined its long-term economic priorities. See Steven Lee, Supra., note 43, p. 17.  
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For this reason, the government first attempted to propose price stabilisation 
legislation. Following this government’s attempt, the Law Institute of Seoul National 
University submitted the ‘Fair Trade Act Proposal’ in 1964. However, because Chaebols 
strongly hindered this proposal, policy-makers could not enact competition law.
47
 In the 
1970s, concerns about domestic competition arose again due to the problems of inflation, 
distortion of competition, and concentration of economic power. In particular, worries about 
the monopolistic market increased significantly. Therefore, the government reconsidered 
legislation. Although the first legislation effort was made in 1964, the most significant 
endeavour was implemented in 1972 for stabilising prices and controlling inflation caused by 
the oil shock,
48
 which could make policy-makers re-evaluate competition law legislation, 
because of the oil shock’s effect on industry. 
 
Direct price controls were provided under the Price Stabilisation Act in 1973 for the 
surging prices. This act was legislated to establish fair trade by forbidding refusal to sell and 
achieve price control on goods and services. After this, the government implemented further 
legislation, the Price Stability and Fair Trade Act,
49
 enacted in 1975. By revising the Price 
Stabilisation Act, this clarified the prohibition of unfair business practices, and provided a 
legal groundwork for issuing corrective measures for violation of the law. This act also 
provided price settings, such as maximum prices, and prices for some products, including 
utilities. Furthermore, it stipulated directions for the supply and distribution of goods and the 
implementation of measures for coordinating supply and demand in the case of emergency. 
This statute was principally aimed at controlling price inflation rather than enhancing 
competition in the market, which was different from the Japanese legislation. These 
legislations, however, remained at an immature stage.  
 
These acts created external issues, such as preventing proper functioning of the price 
mechanism, because the purpose of the statutes was mainly focused on attaining price 
stability. The attempted statutes eventually distorted competition and created the possibility 
                                                 
47
 See Yong-Duk Jeon, ‘Kyu-Jae-Ui-Ie-Ik-Jib-Dan-Ie-Ron-Kwa-Gong-Jung-Go-Rae-Bub (Theory of Regulated 
Interest Groups and Competition Law)’, Journal of Social Science Research Vol. 6, No. 4, 1999, pp. 173-83; 
Ohseung Kwon, Kyoung-Jae-Bub [Economic Law], 5th edn, Bubmunsa, Seoul, 2005, p. 93. 
48
 See Ohseung Kwon, ‘Dok-Jom-Kyu-Jae-Bub-Ui-Hyun-Hwang-Kwa-Kwa-Jae (Current Competition Law and 
the Problems)’ in Ohseung Kwon (ed), Gong-Jung-Go-Rae-Bub-Kang-Ui Vol. II [Lectures on Competition Law 
Vol. II], Bubmunsa, Seoul, 2000, p. 3. 
49
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Chapter 2 
Historical Development of Korean Economy and Competition Law 
21 
 
of inflation, which resulted in the refusal of production and creation of higher prices. In the 
end, the acts generated these external factors deepening the problems of the monopolistic and 
oligopolistic market. Whilst focusing on the failure of price regulation, the policy-makers 
saved the sections involving fair trade in the Price Stability and Fair Trade Act, and brought 
in new legislation.
50
 This effort of modification became a cornerstone of the Monopoly 
Regulation and Fair Trade Act (MRFTA) in 1980. This effort on macroeconomic policy, 
which was not completely abandoned in the 1980s, exerted strong political pressure on the 
Korean competition system at the beginning of MRFTA legislation.
51
 This legislation was 
only the first step towards the fully effective competition statute in the 1990s.
52
  
 
Although economists have long advocated free trade as an ideal, nearly all market 
economies protect at least some industries from foreign competition. Korea was not an 
exception. Korea provided higher levels of protection in the 1960-70s than developed 
countries. In protecting a domestic industry from import competition, Korea risked imposing 
costs of market concentration, which was the increase of domestic monopolists’ power.
53
 
This made the Korean public criticise the practices of Chaebols for their historical abuses of 
market power, thinking ‘small is beautiful’.
54
 Therefore, the MRFTA has been developed in 
order to restrict market concentration, rather than efficiency improvement, and has been 
supported by consumer groups and SMEs. The Korea Fair Trade Commission (KFTC) has 
implemented the law with stringent measures, focusing less on efficiency than protection of 
consumers and SMEs.
55
 This seems influenced by the idea that competition law was not 
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Institute, Seoul, 1999, pp. 30-31. 
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adopted to maximise the greatest possible efficiency outcome and, therefore, it should help 
consumers rather than penalise them.
56
  
 
2.2.3. Modification of Policies through Financial Crisis: Competition Law Experiment 
 
Chaebols’ economic influence became even more pervasive in the 1980s, due to their 
expansion and leading role in the frontier industries.
57
 Implementations such as increasing the 
number of large scale economies through mergers in the 1980s continued, resulting in entry 
barriers. The ultimate privilege of economic power had already been obtained to assure their 
survival, regardless of how incompetent and inefficient they might be.
58
 Furthermore, they 
could still create erosion of economic freedoms.
59
 This feature of market concentration was 
seen in Korea in the 1980s. The main reasons were the short history of competition law 
implementation and policy-makers’ misunderstandings. They were extremely concerned 
about excessive competition between domestic enterprises, and assumed severe competition 
in the domestic market might cause social waste from ‘destructive competition’,
60
 for 
example, by price wars that could be harmful to enterprises. The fear of excessive 
competition allowed the policy-makers to provide laws in the form of entry restrictions.
61
  
 
This implication was wrong, because the policy-makers did not fully understand 
competition as a means to achieve efficiency. This eventually made the society demand 
vigorous social aims in competition policy, such as protection of consumers and SMEs.
62
 
Competition law came into being in 1980, after four abortive attempts at legislation in 1964, 
1966, 1969, and 1971. However, the MRFTA in 1980 claimed to be concerned mainly with 
restricting unfair or anti-competitive behaviours rather than market concentration, which 
could not solve foreclosure by large firms. Not until 1986 did criticism and concerns about 
the concentration of economic power of large business groups bring the first amendment to 
                                                 
56
 See Eleanor Fox and Lawrence Sullivan, ‘Antitrust-Retrospective and Prospective: Where Are We Coming 
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 Tat Yan Kong, Supra., note 14, pp. 131-2. 
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the MRFTA, with stronger restrictions on cross-investments between affiliates of the same 
business group.
63
 Domestic pressures for thoroughgoing reform of economic policies also 
grew. To improve technology, finance, and market structure, further effort for vigorous 
competition was needed.  
 
One can observe the transition of the 1990s by looking at official policy orientation, 
and the pace and scope of change. Economic policy was refined during this time, notably 
through functional support, and economic deconcentration measures. These performances 
brought more effective competition law, with the correction of imbalances that underpinned 
the economy’s high cost and low efficiency.
64
 The government found that government 
intervention was incompatible with liberalised policy, and that traditional economic controls 
restrained outward expansion of Korean businesses. To compete with foreign firms, Korean 
firms also had to maximise their efficiency, by taking advantage of opportunities for global 
production.
65
 The Chaebol reform was attempted by successive governments in the 1980s, 
but in each case the effort ultimately failed because of lack of consent within the economic 
bureaucracy, i.e., the businessmen with vested interests. The Korean government, at last, 
acted on the external crisis in 1997, and subsequent IMF assistance to bring real reform.
66
 In 
fact, the financial crisis provided Korea with an opportunity to re-examine its overall 
economic policy. In this process of reflection, the importance of competition policy was 
highlighted.
67
  
 
In particular, many argue that the open market was necessary in order to improve the 
international competitiveness of domestic firms, and this could be achieved through the 
adoption of a global standard and principle of market economy.
68
 With the financial crisis, a 
broad consensus seemed to be reached that the economy should be driven by market 
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competition. The KFTC took bold steps to eliminate the old structural inefficiencies of the 
Korean economy, and aimed at strict enforcement of competition law to restructure the 
Korean economy. Following the financial crisis, Korea, like other countries in Asia, has been 
working towards eliminating entry barriers and other anti-competition elements, hastening 
the transformation of previously government-led economies into more market-based ones. 
The weakness of market discipline allowed Korean firms to pursue growth rather than 
profitability in the 1960-70s.
69
 In this context, the MRFTA has been amended significantly, 
with a view to supporting restructuring of the economy.
70
 However, the KFTC already 
demonstrated signs of progress in implementing competition law before the financial crisis, 
and this accelerated reform after 1997.
71
 
 
The historical development of Korean economic and competition policy is similar to 
that of Japan. Japanese industrial policy also played a crucial role in achieving Japan’s 
economic miracle during the 1960-70s. This was the prime reason for the government’s lack 
of interest in enforcing the AML. To enhance the competitiveness of Japanese firms in 
international markets and to catch up with more advanced economies, Japanese ministries, 
particularly the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), encouraged measures 
that contradicted the principle of competition. Japanese firms had to be as large as other 
foreign competitors in order to compete with them effectively. The Japanese government 
gave more weight to industrial policy than competition. Since the early 1990s, however, the 
AML has been significantly strengthened and enforcement has improved.
72
  
 
Looking at law enforcement, Korea and Japan have had a similar approach. At the 
beginning of legislation, they did not seem to be strict in controlling market power, but since 
the 1990s both have tried to increase restrictions on large firms. However, the financial crisis 
in 1997 was the crucial period for the KFTC to balance the macro- and microeconomic 
approaches to its competition policy. The financial crisis was instrumental in alerting its 
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economy to the desirability of regulating firms through both trade and competition policies.
73
 
Furthermore, Korean competition policy has been treated slightly differently from the 
Japanese. Korea legislated competition law without any foreign compulsion, whilst Japan 
adopted the law due the influence of the US.
74
 This different historical origin caused a 
tremendous difference in application, because the public recognised the problem of market 
concentration, demanding vigorous enforcement without foreign pressure.  
 
With the conclusion of Japanese occupation and the Korean War, the Korean 
economy entered a period of unparalleled growth. This seems to be similar to other 
developed countries.
75
 The government-led economic policy was considered efficient and 
essential for the small scale Korean economy at the beginning of development, and other 
considerations about social welfare and competition law were disregarded. However, Korean 
market structure in the 1980s became more complicated than in the 1960-70s. Moreover, the 
public started taking into account the necessity of competition legislation for the Korean 
market.
76
 Nevertheless, this atmosphere of competition was a social objective, such as 
equality in wealth rather than efficiency, which has been influenced by competition scholars 
in Korea.  
 
The ideal competition law for efficiency has long been regarded as a secondary 
objective, because of other social ideals for protection of consumers and SMEs. This social 
objective has hindered development of Korean competition law. This has also brought 
tensions between liberty and equality, which can be observed in other regimes.
77
 Generally, 
the political fate of the competitive free-market ideal is heavily involved with developments 
in competition law. The struggle between economic freedom and regulation thus reflects and 
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reacts upon the tension in society between the ideals of liberty and equality. Korean 
competition policy, such as that of other regimes, has also experienced the dilemma of 
preventing monopolists in a manner that did not excessively interfere with their freedom to 
transfer property.
78
 In summary, there are three features reviewed in the history of Korean 
competition legislation: first, the government deeply intervened in market competition at the 
beginning of industrialisation, causing market concentration by Chaebols; second, market 
dominance by Chaebols awakened the fear of large companies, ultimately resulting in strict 
enforcement; and third, this has created an emphasis on competition law enforcement aimed 
at achieving social objectives. 
 
 
2.3. Framework of Korean Competition Law and Policy 
 
2.3.1. General Features of Korean Competition Law  
 
Most competition laws, including the MRFTA, contain rules that prohibit agreements and 
prohibit or control the conduct of dominant firms, and mergers. Horizontal cartels are the 
major concern and target of competition law, because these unambiguously harm competition 
through raising prices or lowering output. Competition may also be harmed by acts of 
monopolisation and attempts to monopolise,
79
 or abuse of dominance, and, more rarely, by 
vertical restraints. The term ‘competition’, however, has diverse meanings in the competition 
law of different jurisdictions. In the US, lessening of or harming competition is found when 
the conduct creates or increases market power. The harm is revealed not only in higher prices 
or lower output, but in lessening innovation in highly concentrated markets to the detriment 
of buyers, and ultimately, consumers.
80
 Other systems for the protection of competition have 
somewhat different points of focus.
81
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In particular, the meaning of competition in Korea is different from the US. The 
MRFTA provides terms, ‘unfairness’ and ‘unreasonableness’ which probably originated from 
historical concerns about the economic power of Chaebols. Unequal bargaining power 
brought by Chaebols could often be called unfair. In the Korean jurisdiction, competition 
may promote fairness in the setting of prices close to cost, and of alternatives for buyers and 
sellers, although it is a vague claim.
82
 The major function of Korean competition law 
mistakenly regarded the tool in order to maximise the total amount of content in society for 
equality of wealth
83
 as limiting the power of Chaebols. This idea originated from the 
emphasis on equality or fairness through government intervention in the 1980 Constitution 
amendment.
84
 This was from fear of too large companies, and the desire for dispersal of 
power, although the efficiency of such a move must have been doubted.
85
 Although the 
KFTC and the courts have tried to define these terms through the cases, it is not easy to apply 
them in practice concurrently. However, the KFTC and courts have recently started 
examining cases under the measure of anti-competitiveness, rather than unfairness.
86
  
 
Korean competition law is often considered as an example of a public-policy process 
in which it is still widely assumed that government is motivated by the goal of serving the 
public interest in current court judgments.
87
 A number of court judgments in Korea use this 
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term, public interest, as a criterion to determine the legitimacy of public intervention into the 
private sector.
88
 This means that intervention can be legitimised, although some sacrifice of 
private right is assumed during the public procedure.
89
 Based on this, the Korean policy-
makers started to consider legislation of competition law known as Kyoung-Jae-Bub (literally, 
‘Economic Law’).
90
 Economic law or the Korean competition law
91
 was primarily legislated 
and amended to guarantee a sound market order. It includes the MRFTA, the main and 
crucial statute, and also consists of other supplementary statutes regarding advertising, 
electronic commerce, and subcontracting.
92
 Since the MRFTA is the essential statute as the 
major competition measure against other legal provisions, it is regarded as the fundamental 
competition law in Korea.
93
  
 
The MRFTA aims to promote creative business activities and protect consumers by 
facilitating fair and free competition in the market, and comprises all fundamental issues of 
competition policy. In particular, the MRFTA rules on matters of undue subsidies, debt 
guarantees, and equity investment amongst affiliates of large business groups, which are 
unique to Korea and Japan.
94
 It also gives the KFTC the authority to investigate possible 
violations, including rights to investigate, order submission of information, maintain custody 
of materials, and impose surcharges and corrective measures.
95
 The MRFTA, including 
                                                                                                                                                        
Consequences of Antitrust: The Public-Choice Perspective, University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 
1995, pp. 8-11; Michal Gal, Supra., note 6, p. 51; Keith Hylton, Antitrust Law: Economic Theory and Common 
Law Evolution, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003, pp. 37-9.  
88
 This is probably the influence of Arts. 2(5) and (6) AML. These prohibit business activities that are contrary 
to the public interest. 
89
 See Seong Wook Heo, ‘The Concept of “Public Interest” Demonstrated in Korean Court Precedents’, Journal 
of Korean Law, Vol. 6, 2006, p. 93. 
90
 Hyun Yoon Shin, Supra., note 41, p. 5. This Korean term is brought from the German word, ‘Wirtschaftrecht’.  
For further details about Wirtschaftrecht, see also Doris Hildebrand, The Role of Economic Analysis in the EC 
Competition Rules, 2nd edn, Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 2002, p. 3. 
91
 Korean scholars call the Korean competition law literally as economic law. However, this will refer to the 
Korean competition law. 
92
 For further details of these supplementary provisions, see Ho Young Lee, Dok-Jum-Kyu-Jae-Bub [Monopoly 
Regulation and Fair Trade Act], Hongmunsa, Seoul, 2005, pp. 300-302. 
93
 Ohseung Kwon, (Current Competition Law and the Problems), Supra., note 48, p. 4; Ohseung Kwon, Supra., 
note 47, p. 14. 
94
 The special provisions regarding prevention of further growth of market power are: Arts. 8-2 and 8-3 MRFTA 
(Restrictions on Holding Company); Art. 9 (Prohibition of Cross-Shareholding); Art. 10 (Ceiling on Total 
Amount of Shareholding in other Domestic Companies); and Art. 10-2 (Prohibition of Debt Guarantees for 
Affiliated Company). For a comparison with the Japanese AML, see also Hideaki Miyajima, ‘Regulatory 
Framework, Government Intervention and Investment in Postwar Japan: The Structural Dynamics of J-Type 
Firm-Government Relationships’ in Hideaki Miyajima, Takeo Kikkawa, and Takashi Hikino (eds), Policies for 
Competitiveness: Comparing Business-Government Relationships in the ‘Golden Age of Capitalism’, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 1999, pp. 47-8. 
95
 For further explanation, see Nam-Kee Lee, Supra., note 67, p. 103.  
Chapter 2 
Historical Development of Korean Economy and Competition Law 
29 
 
regulation of monopolies and consumer protection, is generally considered to be an integral 
part of competition policy as emphasised in Articles 3-2, 19, 23 and 29 MRFTA.
96
 Some 
scholars have shown that authorities in some developing countries clarify that they are 
interested in competition rules primarily to foster economic development.
97
 Other countries 
focus on the implications of competition policy for market access.
98
 However, the MRFTA’s 
legislative history demonstrates its predominant concern for consumers and SMEs, which 
was solely intended as a means of protecting them from large firms.
99
 
 
The authority of the MRFTA comes from the Constitution of Korea.
100
 The 
Constitution guarantees human rights,
101
 freedom of labour,
102
 protection and limits of 
personal property rights,
103
 and free market economic order based on a respect for the 
freedom of enterprises
104
 and individuals in Korea.
105
 In particular, the establishment of the 
MRFTA was made in accordance with Article 119(2) of the Constitution. It states that the 
state may regulate and coordinate economic affairs to maintain balanced economic growth 
and stability and to ensure proper income distribution,
106
 prevent market dominance and 
abuse of economic power, and also to democratise national economy through harmony. This 
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sets a foundation of legal assurance and limitation of individual possessory rights to 
implement competition law.
107
  
 
Finally, Korean competition law was somewhat influenced by the Japanese and 
German acts. For example, the priority of the KFTC’s policy was upon supervising and 
addressing Unfair Business Practices (UBP) that might impair competition.
108
 This idea of 
the UBP provision under Article 23 MRFTA is an influence from Japan. The MRFTA has a 
similar structure to the AML. As enacted, the AML reflects its US origins. Combining 
features of the US Sherman, Clayton, and Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Acts, the AML 
contains broadly worded general and specific prohibitions. Unlike the US legislation, 
however, the AML and also the MRFTA depend more on administrative than judicial 
interpretation.
109
 There are three basic categories of conduct prohibited by the AML,
110
 
namely (i) private monopolisation,
111
 (ii) cartels or unreasonable restraint of trade,
112
 and (iii) 
unfair trade practice (hereafter also called UBP).
113
 The MRFTA however has four pillars: (i) 
prohibition of market dominance, (ii) control of economic concentration such as Merger and 
Acquisition (M&A) and holding companies, (iii) restriction of improper concerted acts 
(horizontal agreements), and (iv) restriction of UBP.
114
 In overall, the MRFTA was legislated 
mainly under the influence of the AML, the German Act, Gesetz gegen 
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Wakui, Supra., note 17, p. 5. 
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Wettbewerbsbeschänkungen (GWB), and also US law.
115
 The MRFTA has a unique 
provision of UBP, influenced by the AML, which is actively implemented. This originates 
from the ideal of protecting fairness rather than competition.
116
 
 
2.3.2. Purposes of Korean Competition Law and Comparative Outlook 
 
The MRFTA has taken legal frameworks from other competition regimes. However, the 
MRFTA is not only a copy of other competition laws, but has had to be modified for the 
unique market structure and economy. The major domestic markets were already dominated 
by a few large business groups by the late 1970s.
117
 Hence, the competition authority had to 
tackle the concerns over concentration of the economic power of Chaebols, although in 
initially legal implementation was not easy. The currently amended MRFTA in 2009 makes 
clear its aim as inhibition of dominance. The Constitution also states the purpose of 
restrictions and intervention of public authorities as mentioned above. These goals can 
presumably be achieved through fair and free competition with regulatory intervention. 
However, the language of free and fair competition in the MRFTA is unclear.
118
 The KFTC 
does not distinguish differences between free and fair competition in practice because of its 
difficulty of interpretation.
119
  
 
The concept of free competition can support a commitment to individual liberty and 
freedom from government power. However, if the public wants to regulate private economic 
power because private power corrupts, political oversights can be justified. Therefore, 
competition policy has long been regarded as a way of mediating tensions between 
commitments to freedom and equality.
120
 This rhetoric has influenced Korean competition 
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policy. There are also several major concepts in Article 1 MRFTA such as workable 
competition,
121
 Ordoliberalism,
122
 and efficiency.
123
  
 
In general, the main objective of competition law should be to perfect the operation of 
the competitive market.
124
 The competitive market can be described as one in which (i) every 
good is priced according to the cost of production and (ii) every buyer, who is willing to pay 
the price, can buy it. To create these circumstances, certain requirements to obtain an 
economic model of ‘perfect competition’ are necessary. This is the model of an industrial 
structure in which many small enterprises compete in the supply of a single product. The 
perfect competition model can be viewed as a central target of competition law. However, 
competition law does not always grant the conditions for perfect competition. Korean 
competition law also aims at perfect competition, although its analysis inevitably emphasises 
the complex imperfections of actual markets.
125
 In other words, the MRFTA aims to create 
‘workable competition’, because perfect competition can be a theoretical model, and also 
may be harmful to the market if an authority tries to create perfect competition artificially.
126
  
 
In addition to this principle, Article 1 MRFTA articulates its aims as preventing the 
abuse of market dominance by excessive concentration of economic power of enterprises,
127
 
and regulating undue concerted acts and UBPs to promote fair and free competition. The 
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ultimate aim is to ensure creative enterprise activities, protect consumer interests, and pursue 
a balanced economic development in order to provide workable competition. Therefore, 
Korean competition law also implemented the concept of Ordoliberalism,
128
 whose goal of 
competition law was based on the concept of fairness. Under the form of economic law with 
regards to the ideal of the Constitution, in conjunction with Ordoliberalism, the MRFTA 
aims at correcting market concentration and anti-competitive market structure, with limits set 
by government intervention.
129
 This aims for the market to best achieve fair distribution of its 
benefits.   
 
Economic approaches to competition policy also proceed on the assumption that the 
goal of competition should be to foster resource allocation that is optimally efficient in 
satisfying a society’s needs. In Korea, the analysis proceeds on the assumption that the goal 
of competition policy is to maximise net national welfare.
130
 The definition of efficiency 
implicitly stated in Article 1 MRFTA is the key point. The law aims to achieve the goals of 
protection of consumers and SMEs, which do not necessarily harm large firms, by means of 
allocative or Pareto efficiency improvement. It also aims to achieve balanced economic 
growth through the improvement of productive and dynamic efficiencies. In short, the clause 
for protecting consumers and SMEs implies the improvement of allocative efficiency, and the 
concepts of economic growth and creative enterprises activities explain productive and 
dynamic efficiencies.
131
  
 
                                                 
128
 For details about Ordoliberalism, see Giuliano Amato, Supra., note 59, pp. 98-9; David Gerber, Law and 
Competition in Twentieth Century Europe: Protecting Prometheus, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1998, pp. 239-52; 
John Haley, Supra., note 24, p. 4; Steven Anderman and John Kallaugher, Technology Transfer and the ew EU 
Competition Rules: Intellectual Property Licensing after Modernisation, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006, 
pp. 46-7; Robert O’Donoghue and Jorge Padilla, The Law and Economics of Article 82 EC, Hart Publishing, 
Oxford and Portland Oregon, USA, 2006, pp. 8-9; Giorgio Monti, EC Competition Law, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 2007, p. 23; Alison Jones and Brenda Sufrin, EC Competition Law: Text, Cases, and 
Materials, 3rd edn, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008, pp. 34-5. 
129
 Ki-Su Lee and Jin-Hee Ryu, Supra., note 84, pp. 12-3. 
130
 See Janusz Ordover, ‘Transnational Antitrust and Economics’ in Barry Hawk (ed), Antitrust and Trade 
Policy in International Trade, Matthew Bender, New York, 1985, pp. 237-8. The author defines the net national 
welfare standard aggregates the citizens’ consumer surplus and the profits of domestic firms earned in their 
domestic and export operations.  
131
 For further discussion about efficiencies, see Dominick Armentano, Supra., Note 87, pp. 15-7; Robert Bork, 
Supra., note 78, pp. 91-106; Roger Van den Bergh and Peter Camesasca, European Competition Law and 
Economics: A Comparative Perspective, Intersentia, Antwerpen, Belgium, 2001, pp. 5-6; Phillip Areeda, Louis 
Kaplow, and Aaron Edlin, Supra., note 18, p. 5; Kip Viscusi, Joseph Harrington, Jr., and John Vernon, 
Economics of Regulation and Antitrust, 4th edn, The MIT Press, Cambridge MA, USA and London, 2005, p. 
79; Giorgio Monti, Supra., note 128, p. 45; Richard Whish, Competition Law, 6th edn, Oxford University Press, 
New York, 2009, pp. 4-6. 
Chapter 2 
Historical Development of Korean Economy and Competition Law 
34 
 
The Korean economy, which is relatively smaller than other regimes, creates a 
complex trade-off amongst these three efficiencies.
132
 When multiple goals are acknowledged, 
there can be confusion, and trade-offs should be made. However, it is not easy to know when 
or how to mix these various goals.
133
 Although maximising economic efficiency or other 
social objectives may be touted by economists as the objective,
134
 in practice it is not what 
policy-makers choose to pursue.
135
 Therefore, establishing a goal or priority of multiple goals 
cannot be permanent, but rather should reflect a temporary consensus that is likely to change, 
according to changing political and economic realities.
136
  
 
Korean competition law cannot, therefore, escape the political economy. The former 
KFTC chairman Professor Kwon argues that enforcement in Korea should aim at balancing 
several purposes such as (i) balanced economic growth
137
 and distribution of wealth,
138
 (ii) 
protection of SMEs and consumers,
139
 and (iii) improvement of international trade.
140
 Korean 
competition law and policy were established to harmonise these objectives based on the 
political economy.
141
 This may be the influence of the Japanese AML, which observes that 
social and economic values of economic growth and democratic economy are best served by 
fair and free competition.
142
 However, sometimes the balance or trade-off test seems very 
unclear, especially when lawyers contemplate the term, fairness. Protection of SMEs can be 
understood as the means of establishment of fair competition in exchange for dynamic 
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 Masako Wakui, Supra., note 17, p. 40. This may be interpreted as the aim of economic growth by industrial 
policy in Japan and Korea. 
Chapter 2 
Historical Development of Korean Economy and Competition Law 
35 
 
efficiency by large firms in practice.
143
 This hinders balance of efficiencies. The efficiency 
issue in Korea is, therefore, alternately powerful and weak. As argued by competition 
scholars, it is powerful because it is the minimum necessary condition of the ideal economic 
system’s equilibrium, but weak because it is not the most important value in the society.
144
  
 
2.3.3. Arguments for Modernisation 
 
Korean competition law may have been used as a policy to achieve distributional objectives 
simultaneously whilst achieving greater social equity. This still remains controversial in 
Korea. Different governments give dissimilar weight to considerations of efficiency and 
equity when formulating their competition laws, depending on their political preferences.
145
 
Competition is an essential feature of the system for reasons both political and economic.
146
 
Korean competition law should be a form of government intervention that principally intends 
to increase economic efficiency in order to improve total economic welfare. It regulates 
excessive aggregation of market power via anti-competitive behaviours, ensuring that firms 
are continually subject to the discipline of competition.
147
 There is one major reason why 
Korean competition law is still regarded as the main political feature to maximise total 
welfare. Although Korea achieved a high rate of economic growth, its market principles 
became unable to function properly.
148
 Many believe this has not changed. After competition 
law legislation, the main competition policy has been revised to control the market 
dominance of Chaebols and reflect the interests of SMEs, because the government accepted 
public sentiment against Chaebols as a serious social issue.
149
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When production and distribution channels become dominated by them, competition 
can be harmed, and consumer welfare decreases. However, there are some arguments about 
an adequate approach to regulation on market concentration. Effective competition involves a 
mutual striving amongst comparable rivals, on the basis of competitive parity. Competitive 
parity should be thus regarded as fundamental for effective competition in the Korean 
market.
150
 The current approach of the KFTC is, nonetheless, derived from the ideology that 
price control by a monopoly is harmful,
151
 since it may result in loss of economic efficiency. 
Nevertheless, product quality and diversity should also be considered. It is unquestionable 
that society could potentially be better off if limitations were imposed on the operation of 
large firms or similar kinds of concentrated industry.
152
  
 
The policy of protecting individual or SME competitors at the expense of competition 
and of large competitors is, however, not desirable if it results in inefficiency.
153
 Since the 
law has focused mainly on competitive parity from the historical background of the Chaebol 
problem, the competition policy has also disregarded the meaning of competition law, as the 
means of protection of competition rather than competitors. The primary function of 
competition law should be to protect and promote pro-competitive conduct, rather than 
competitors.
154
 This overall problem has come from a misunderstanding of the term ‘fairness’. 
It has been generally understood that free competition refers to protection of competition, and 
fair competition means protection of fairness in business practices, which can be also 
understood as protection of competitors.
155
 The KFTC has faced the dilemma of choosing 
whether the law should protect competition or competitors. This problem is often observed in 
the case of vertical restraints.  
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2.4. Problems of Vertical Restraints: Market Power and Trade Barriers in Korea and Japan 
 
2.4.1. Foreclosure of Vertical Restraint as Private Trade Barrier 
 
Firms such as Chaebols may rely on vertical arrangements to overcome some trade policy 
provisions. For example, a firm’s vertical control over the distribution system can allow it to 
prevent foreign competitors from penetrating the domestic market. This includes foreclosing 
access to distribution channels, refusal to deal, and control of access to essential facilities. 
Markets will be less contestable or competitive if domestic distribution channels are 
restricted.
156
 Such barriers will be a substantial deterrent to foreign firms, especially if there 
are significant costs of setting up a distribution channel.
157
 Vertical foreclosure to foreign 
firms can be a strategic method of Chaebols. This could be comparable to vertical Keiretsu in 
Japan. The sale system through vertical Keiretsu grew in the late 1950s. They formalised a 
system in which their products were carried almost exclusively by distributors under their 
control. Large firms also provided affiliated retail stores with something more valuable than 
money.
158
 Since these firms controlled their own retailing networks, they could also control 
prices and profit margins. Through their distribution, the large firms closed the market and 
protected it from penetration by domestic rivals and foreign competitors alike.
159
 Because the 
number of market entrants was essentially fixed, competition amongst Keiretsu came to 
centre on (i) increasing the quality and improving the features of products to steadily improve 
public images and (ii) developing larger distribution networks.
160
  
 
Although the Chaebol system is different from vertical Keiretsu, its strategy may be 
considered as similar to the Keiretsu. Since Chaebols normally have diversified structure, 
whether horizontal or vertical, they may have foreclosed the domestic market not only against 
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foreign firms, but also domestic SMEs. This brought the attention of the competition policy-
makers. The fear of largeness in the Korean market takes shape in stringent implementation 
of law and policy on vertical arrangements. The KFTC has viewed monopolistic tendencies 
as deeply rooted, surviving from the open market, and as something that could be redressed 
only with active policies to counteract the Chaebols’ market dominance. It reasons that, even 
under liberalised trade, there is always the possibility that importers and producers can 
collude to control the price of products and keep them high at the expense of the consumer
161
 
when the market is vertically foreclosed. This thought lingers as long as the KFTC’s concerns 
about the market concentration fade away.  
 
There are, however, some arguments against this competition policy. In particular, 
since the late 1990s, there has been a significant change in the competition environment. 
Some commentators argue that only controlling the concentrated domestic market is not 
favourable for the state economy, because this curbs large enterprises from expanding their 
businesses abroad.
162
 In fact, the KFTC is mistakenly applying discriminatory rules against 
Chaebols, although their threat in the vertical level is less than before. Vertical control by 
large firms in Korea and Japan has a long history and influenced competition. Competition 
laws in major countries generally have not, however, succeeded in establishing a clear 
standard towards vertical cases. Their standards are at an evolutionary stage. Standards 
regarding vertical restraints in Korean and Japanese competition laws are, in particular, less 
clear than in the US and the EC. Lack of clearness emanates from the cover-all-case 
provision, the Korean and Japanese UBP clauses whose coverage extends beyond vertical 
arrangements.
163
  
 
2.4.2. Global Aspects of Korean Competition Law  
 
The problem of lack of globalised competition in Korea originates from the long-established 
market intervention of the state, which caused the emergence and expansion of the 
monopolistic market. As a result, it is widely thought that Korean competition policy should 
focus on eliminating economic concentration, especially regarding two major problems: (i) 
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Chaebols’ significant economic concentration, itself, which can be used as a private power, 
so-called Il-ban-jib-jung (general concentration); and (ii) Chaebols’ market power, that may 
impede market function, called Si-jang-jib-jung (market concentration).
164
 It is thus not 
surprising that current competition policy focuses intensively on restricting market power 
from the fear of further economic concentration, which influenced politics and the 
economy.
165
  
 
Each competition regime has a different set of ideas on vertical restraints. This can 
come from the market disciplines during the time of economic development-priority. The 
dominant-firm setting through vertical integration in Korea and Japan involves a steep 
variation in competitive pressure. The SMEs must endure extreme degrees of risk, whilst the 
dominant firm faces only light pressure. Competition can then be unbalanced and weak.
166
 
Competition law study has, nevertheless, changed how people think about this problem. One 
major consideration is not simply how large a firm is, or what its market influence is, but 
whether there is a possible market entry. The behaviour of a monopolist can be influenced by 
the number of entrants.
167
 Nevertheless, the common objectives for competition laws in 
Korea and Japan, in reality, focus on the following: (i) fairness to preserve a society for 
SMEs; (ii) fairness to all market entities; and (iii) a selective fairness rule to regulate 
dominance
168
 rather than vigorous foreign competition. The advent of globalisation has, 
however, forced economies to recognise that trade and competition issues are not only 
important, but inseparable. They are not substitutes but complementary. If there is a 
fundamental characteristic of globalisation, it is the competition for growth. It is the race to 
be succeed that drives firms to make new products, technologies, and into the new markets, 
facing new rivals and competitive pressures.
169
  
 
In other words, globalisation along the lines of competition policy represents a 
generally pro-competitive process, because new competitors emerge. This effect implies a 
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changing situation for incumbent large enterprises such as Chaebols. They face new 
challenges and opportunities, driven by globalisation. On the one hand, they may lose their 
market positions. On the other hand, globalisation offers opportunities to internationalise 
their activities and improve their competitive profits.
170
 The elimination of barriers to 
international trade is a powerful instrument in promoting competition and efficient market 
functioning. Thus, domestic competition law is important. The potential benefits of market-
opening measures cannot be achieved unless countries take steps to prohibit anti-competitive 
practices and structural barriers, such as private monopolies and restrictions on entry.
171
 
Therefore, although competition law represents a method to protect competition, it can be 
misused strategically to allow domestic enterprises to restrict competition in the domestic 
market. A strategic competition policy is, thus, an analogue to ‘strategic trade policy’, 
treating competition law in a discriminatory way, causing an anti-competitive impact in 
domestic and global markets.
172
 
 
In Korea, however, the circumstances are different from this point of view. Korean 
competition law was legislated in order to prohibit the problems of market concentration, 
especially large business groups which had influenced the economy and the market. 
Therefore, the aims of Korean competition law are so radical as to prevent anti-competitive 
or unfair behaviour of domestic large firms. It has not discriminated against foreign firms but 
against Chaebols. It is not difficult to obtain a consensus for having competition law in Korea. 
Korea has not been blamed for regarding globalisation along with competition law as a means 
of strategic legislation for trade. This is different from the Japanese case.
173
 When explaining 
the success of Japanese firms in export markets, commentators often mention the advantage 
of a protected domestic market. Whilst charging high prices in the domestic market, Japanese 
                                                 
170
 See Oliver Budzinski, The Governance of Global Competition: Competence Allocation in International 
Competition Policy, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton MA, USA, 2008, p. 13. 
171
 See Frédéric Jenny, ‘Globalization, Competition and Trade Policy: Convergence, Divergence and 
Cooperation’ in Clifford Jones and Mitsuo Matsushita (eds), Competition Policy in the Global Trading System, 
Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 2002, p. 305; Robert Anderson and Frédéric Jenny, Supra., note 7, p. 72. 
International trade and competition policies are complementary because whereas international trade policy 
eliminates public barriers to trade, competition policy can eliminate private restraints which could defeat the 
objective of market access. 
172
 Oliver Budzinski, Supra., note 170, pp. 53-4. 
173
 See Mark Tilton, Restrained Trade: Cartels in Japan’s Basic Materials Industries, Cornell University Press, 
Ithaca NY, USA and London, 1996, pp. 27-8. The Japanese government has a long history of actively 
encouraging and administering cartels. In particular, in the 1980s the government became more optimistic about 
economic growth and less concerned about excessive competition. Most trade associations engaged in cartels 
that the government actively helped set up. 
Chapter 2 
Historical Development of Korean Economy and Competition Law 
41 
 
firms could penetrate foreign markets with low-priced products.
174
 Consequently, through the 
leverage strategy, they could foreclose the domestic market, and vertical Keiretsu were the 
centre of this strategy.
175
 Japanese competition enforcement regarded as a strategic trade 
policy. 
 
The KFTC, however, actively works in its enforcement. It is time then to move on to 
the next step which a mature economy should consider. It needs to examine whether the 
current law is so strict as to create an inefficient market environment in Korea. Understanding 
competition law in Korea should be, thus, not only about prohibiting large firms in legislation 
and judicial decisions, but also about understanding particular theories that can influence the 
direction of competition policy, since the purpose of laws can change over time. Its objective 
should not only be protection of consumers or SMEs. The KFTC has to examine whether the 
further step of liberalising the law on large firms may create artificial private barriers in 
vertical level. Market-entry barriers can be erected by a monopolist through combining 
distribution systems, or requiring financially linked buyers to refuse to deal with foreign 
sources of supply. However, although a sound presumption of market dominance is a 
controversial issue, firms without monopoly power imposing vertical restraints are likely to 
be acting for efficiency rather than from anti-competitive purposes.
176
 Liberal trade under 
Free Trade Agreements (FTA) with large economies will reduce the problems of private 
barriers, therefore creating an open market.
177
 The KFTC can then adopt more lenient rules of 
vertical restraints where there is no expectation of harm from them. 
 
 
 
                                                 
174
 See Paul Krugman, ‘Import Protection as Export Promotion: International Competition in the Presence of 
Oligopoly and Economics of Scale’ in Henry Kierzkowski (ed), Monopolistic Competition and International 
Trade, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1984, p. 180. Firms with a secure domestic market have a number of 
advantages. They are assured of the economies of large scale production, selling enough over time to move 
down the learning curve, and earning enough to recover the costs of R&D. 
175
 For further discussion, see Sylvia Ostry, ‘Globalization, Domestic Policies and The Need For 
Harmonization’ in Leonard Waverman, William Comanor, and Akira Goto (eds), Competition Policy in the 
Global Economy: Modelities For Competition, Routledge, New York, 1997, pp. 35-6.  
176
 See Eleanor Fox and Janusz Ordover, ‘The Harmonization of Competition and Trade Law: The Case for 
Modest Linkages of Law and The Limits to Parochial State Action’ in Leonard Waverman, William Comanor 
and Akira Goto (eds), Competition Policy in The Global Economy: Modalities for Cooperation, Routledge, 
London and New York, 1997, pp. 420-21. 
177
 The KFTC seems to recognise the impact of the FTA on the Korean market although it does not fully 
consider its policy change according to this. A number of publications regarding FTA are on the KFTC website 
in Korean: www.ftc.go.kr/news/fta/fatalist.jsp (accessed 10 Mar. 2009). 
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2.5. Concluding Remarks 
 
This chapter attempted to highlight the issues and criticisms raised regarding the development 
of the Korean economy and competition law. In particular, it sketched out the market 
structure and approaches of the authorities, dealing with complex issues such as market 
concentration and competition policy for market access. Pro-competitive systems provide 
important checks and balances on monopoly power. Monopoly power is often seen as a 
correlation with politics. Open and competitive market systems are, therefore, commonly 
considered as a result of democracy.
178
 Chaebols may mean the side effects of 
macroeconomic achievements. If they continue to improve their competitiveness in foreign 
markets, this may improve state economic development. However, when their domestic 
market power is unnecessarily large, the risk of state economy failure can increase. Therefore, 
the authorities have sought to reduce the negative effects from business groups’ activities
179
 
rather than focusing on positive consequences from them.  
 
The KFTC has doubled its efforts to make the domestic market structure even more 
transparent and competitive, through controlling Chaebols. It went further, to amend 
Chaebol-dominated monopolistic or oligopolistic structure, redressing abuses of market 
dominance. However, faced with the current trends of deepening interdependency and 
integration of the world economy, the KFTC has an assignment of further strengthening its 
competition advocacy task to create an open economy. To that end, the KFTC has 
strenuously tried to redress competition law, carry out regulatory reforms, and introduce 
competition from overseas,
180
 without a full consideration of the market economy 
principle.
181
 Korean competition law and policy, which are discriminatory against domestic 
                                                 
178
 See Thomas Jorde and David Teece, ‘Innovation, Market Structure and Antitrust: Harmonizing Competition 
Policy in Regimes of Rapid Technological Change’ in Leonard Waverman, William Comanor, and Akira Goto 
(eds), Competition Policy in the Global Economy: Modelities For Competition, Routledge, New York, 1997, p. 
290. 
179
See Dong-Won Suh, ‘Dae-Ki-Up-Jib-Dan-Ae-Dae-Han-Kyu-Jae (Regulations on Big Business Groups) in 
Ohseung Kwon (ed), Gong-Jung-Go-Rae-Wa-Bub-Chi [Fair Trade and Regulation], Bubmunsa, Seoul, 2004, p. 
313. 
180
 Soon-Sik Ju, Supra., note 108, p. 184. 
181
 There is a dispute about the market economy system in Korea. Some scholars argue that the Korean market 
system is a ‘social market economy’ or ‘Sa-Hwe-Cho-Wha-Jok-Si-Jang-Kyoung-Jae (socially harmonised 
market economy)’ as held by the Constitutional Court of Korea judgment 2001Heonma132, June 28, 2001. This 
is named after the German idea, ‘Soziale Marktwirschaft’, which was developed under Ordoliberalism of the 
Freiburg School. See Ohseung Kwon, Supra., note 47, pp. 43-55; Ki-Su Lee and Jin-Hee Ryu, Supra., note 84, 
pp. 6-7.  
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business groups, may harm the economy and competition in Korea, and commentators have 
criticised this policy.
182
 
 
Unlike many Asian countries, Korea has not received external pressure, or even direct 
intervention from foreign countries, to trigger the introduction of competition policy. 
Although there were no significant pressures or intervention from foreign powers, the 
authority created a competition policy for the reason of internal pressure and desires for 
prohibition of economic power, and fair shares for consumers and SMEs. There has been 
concern amongst developing countries that competition policy may adversely affect 
economic growth by imposing restrictions on the size of domestic firms. Some scholars hold 
the view that competition policy should be implemented only after economic growth is 
achieved. The Japanese success of creating a miracle economy might support this argument 
that industrial policy should come before competition policy.
183
 Competition policy is 
sometimes assessed not just on a law-alone basis but also on how it integrates with other 
aspects of industrial policy.
184
  
 
Competition law is an indispensable element of a modern market system.
185
 As the 
economy matures, Korean policy-makers should be more conscious of the need to promote 
economic efficiency in its economy. The pro-competition legislative instruments, together 
with aggressive enforcement policy, have been in evidence during the last several years.
186
 
However, there is still a dilemma in the MRFTA provisions of vertical restraints (hereafter, 
vertical regulation). If the Korean competition authority had a less strict vertical regulation, it 
would harm international trade. In contrast, if it keeps a strict measure in application of law to 
efficient vertical practices, it might prevent pro-competitive outcomes and efficiency. Thus, it 
creates the assignments of providing a sound regulation of vertical restraints in order to trade-
off the positive and negative effects of vertical practices. This issue should bring more 
                                                 
182
 See Sung-Hee Jwa, ‘The Way to Save the Korean Economy from the Trap’ in Sung-Hee Jwa (ed), Thoughts 
of Amendment of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act, Korea Economy Research Institute, Seoul, 2004, 
pp. 33-7. 
183
 See William Tabb, The Postwar Japanese System: Cultural Economy and Economic Transformation, Oxford 
University Press, New York and Oxford, 1995, p. 37.  
184
 Thomas Jorde and David Teece, Supra., note 178, pp. 298-9.  
185
 Ping Lin, Supra., note 3, p. 35. 
186
 Sung-Hee Jwa, Supra., note 19, p. 46; Mark Williams, Competition Policy and Law in China, Hong Kong 
and Taiwan, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005, pp. 30-31. 
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attention to the KFTC, and economic theories and comparative studies can give the benefits 
of better solutions, which will be discussed in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 3 
 
Economics and Comparative Competition Laws of  
Vertical Restraints 
 
 
 
3.1. Fundamental Issues in Vertical Relations 
 
Vertical relations (integration and restraints) are at the heart of the economic system 
worldwide.
1
 Some of them may be regarded as anti-competitive at first glance, where they 
can limit the choices of buyers. However, they can also turn out to be non-detrimental to 
competition, through close examination of economics. Therefore, it is necessary to scrutinise 
economic theories that have widely influenced vertical regulations, and also individual 
regimes’ applications of these theories, to gain mutual understanding. The previous chapter 
reviewed laws regarding vertical relations in Korea in the wider macroeconomic context. 
This chapter focuses broadly on the subjects of vertical relation at a microeconomic level, 
and through a comparative study. In this chapter, some questions will be posed such as: (i) 
what interests are affected by the development of economic theories, especially suitable for 
the Korean market; and (ii) what other regimes’ approaches to vertical restraints are. These 
are crucial to properly develop the legal techniques of the Korea Fair Trade Commission 
(KFTC). The former part will be explained through theoretical arguments in two major 
schools in competition policy, Harvard and Chicago, although Post-Chicago theoretical 
developments are not ignored. The latter issue will be made through comparative research of 
the US, the EC and Japan. In particular, the historical development in the US and the EC will 
be separately discussed, and the Japanese law will be discussed by the comparison with the 
Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act (MRFTA). Because of the similarity between the 
Korean and Japanese laws, a close comparison can be beneficial. 
                                                 
1
 See Maurizio Gambardella and Francesco Salerno, ‘Vertical Agreements:  Was the Commission’s Response 
Adequate? On the Commission’s Ability to Reform Long-standing Policies’ in Giuliano Amato and Claus-
Dieter Ehlermann (eds), EC Competition Law: A Critical Assessment, Hart Publishing, Oxford and Portland, 
USA, 2007, p. 176. 
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A comparative study from historical development will demonstrate how competition 
authorities’ views on vertical relations have changed. For example, a few decades ago, almost 
all vertical restraints were regarded as anti-competitive in the US courts. However, nowadays, 
all vertical restraints benefit from the rule of reason.
2
 Most competition authorities accept that 
vertical restraints without market power can make markets more efficient by benefiting 
consumers, despite possible anti-competitive effects. Their task is, therefore, how to achieve 
a trade-off of efficiency gains and anti-competitive losses in vertical cases. The assignment 
which the KFTC and the courts face is how to decide whether particular types of vertical 
restraints possibly promote economic efficiency without significant anti-competitive 
outcomes. This topic has been a subject of extreme argument. Despite difficulties in solving 
this question, current economic studies have introduced various solutions.  
 
In particular, the Chicago School, in the mainstream of competition policy, maintains 
that vertical integration and restraint are not the sole reasons for abuse of dominant positions 
in up- and downstream levels (or manufacturing and distributing).
3
 According to the Chicago 
scholars, these practices are efficient and do not lower total welfare,
4
 due to no monopoly 
reason for vertical control.
5
 According to the Post-Chicago scholars,
6
 however, vertical 
restraints may have anti-competitive effects. For example, in some cases which depend on the 
number of firms in the market,
7
 vertical integration leaves the remaining upstream firm in a 
position of market power vis-à-vis the remaining downstream firm. The non-integrated 
upstream firm may have no incentive to compete aggressively with the integrated firm, in 
                                                 
2
 The rule of reason test was first introduced in the US, e.g., Standard Oil Co. of ew Jersey v. United States 
221 US 1 (1911). See most recently, Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKs, Inc, 551 US (2007). 
3
 See Robert Bork, ‘Vertical Integration and the Sherman Act: The Legal History of an Economic 
Misconception’, The University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 22, No. 1, 1954, pp. 194-201. 
4
 See Robert Bork and Ward Bowman, Jr., ‘The Crisis in Antitrust’, Columbia Law Review, Vol. 65, No. 3, 
1965, p. 370; Robert Bork, The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself, The Free Press, New York, 1993, 
p. 226; Robert Hahn (ed), Antitrust Policy and Vertical Restraints, AEI, Washington D.C., 2006, p. 3. 
5
 This is often explained as the improvement of aggregate welfare. For further discussion, see Jean Tirole, The 
Theory of Industrial Organization, The MIT Press, MA, USA, 1989, pp. 169-70. 
6
 See William Kovacic and Carl Shapiro, ‘Antitrust Policy: A Century of Economic and Legal Thinking’, The 
Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 14, No. 1, 2000, pp. 55-8; Kip Viscusi, Joseph Harrington, Jr., and John 
Vernon, Economics of Regulation and Antitrust, 4th edn, The MIT Press, Cambridge MA, USA and London, 
2005, pp. 234-6. Utilising game theory, the theories of the Post-Chicago School have been developed since the 
1980s. This has shown that the conclusions of the Chicago School are plausible but only in certain cases. Under 
more general conditions, vertical restraints, such as tying, exclusive dealing, and predatory pricing, can be both 
profitable to incumbents and also welfare-reducing. 
7
 See Martin Perry, ‘Vertical Integration: Determinants and Effects’ in Richard Schmalensee and Robert Willig 
(eds), Handbook of Industrial Organization, Vol. I, Elsevier Science Publisher B.V., Amsterdam, 1989, p. 200. 
This is important because ease of access or the diversity in the choice amongst retailers affect consumer welfare. 
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which case it may choose to align its prices to the vertically integrated firm. This can lead to 
anti-competitive effects.
8
 Overall, this demonstrates that US antitrust law has seldom suffered 
from a shortage of economic theories. These schools’ debates suggest whether and why 
certain behaviour should be unlawful.
9
 The US conclusions from economics can thus give the 
KFTC and the courts better legal techniques.  
 
Nevertheless, there have been many changes of competition authorities’ and courts’ 
views worldwide, and this topic has remained one of the hardest for Korea. It seems that 
academic literature on competition law and economics has offered little guidance for the 
KFTC to achieve a proper assessment of vertical relations in practice. When challenges under 
law have involved vertical restraints, the KFTC and the courts often seem to lose their ways 
in economic theories. This is certainly because of the experience of total monopoly by 
Chaebols, which has influenced economy and competition policy. The KFTC understands 
how vertical relations, under specific circumstances and market structure, are likely to distort 
competition rather than improve competition or efficiency. Besides, the courts have tried to 
examine suitable measures of competition law, to only prohibit vertical practices that are 
expected to do harm, whilst leaving other beneficial practices.
10
 However, the issue of 
economics’ appropriate role in Korean competition law evokes two questions: (i) what kind 
of economic theories (if any) Korean competition policy should use; and (ii) whether 
economic efficiency should be the major goal of competition law.
11
 Therefore, when 
discussing vertical restraints, it is helpful to begin with an overview of economic arguments 
                                                 
8
 See Janusz Ordover, Garth Saloner and Steven Salop, ‘Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure’ The American 
Economic Review, Vol. 80, 1990, p. 127; Giorgio Monti, EC Competition Law, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2007, p. 71. Such as raising barriers to entry and vertical or margin squeezes can also bring anti-
competitive results. See also William Shepherd, The Economics of Industrial Organization, 3rd edn, Prentice 
Hall, Englewood NJ, USA, 1990, pp. 366-8; Robert O’Donoghue and Jorge Padilla, The Law and Economics of 
Article 82 EC, Hart Publishing, Oxford and Portland, USA, 2006, pp. 304-7. 
9
 For general discussion about economic views, see Herbert Hovenkamp, ‘The Reckoning of Post-Chicago 
Antitrust’ in Antonio Cucinotta, Roberto Pardolesi and Roger Van den Bergh (eds), Post-Chicago 
Developments in Antitrust Law, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton MA, USA, 2002, p. 1; 
Lawrence Sullivan and Warren Grimes, The Law of Antitrust: An Integrated Handbook, 2nd edn, Thomson 
West, St. Paul MINN, USA, 2006, pp. 318-23. 
10
 Vertical restraints pose competition law issues of two kinds: (i) price may be adversely affected; and (ii) the 
condition entry may be impaired. See Oliver Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust 
Implications: A Study in the Economics of Internal Organization, The Free Press, New York, 1975, p. 115.  
11
 These are not the issue only in Korea. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy: The Law of 
Competition and Its Practice, 3rd edn, Thomson West, St. Paul, MINN, USA, 2005, p. 71; Luc Peeperkorn and 
Vincent Verouden, ‘The Economics of Competition’ in Jonathan Faull and Ali Nikpay (eds), The EC Law of 
Competition, 2nd edn, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007, p. 4.  
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regarding pro- and anti-competitive effects. This chapter presents some basic reminders of 
economics before moving on to a comparative study. 
 
 
3.2. Arguments of Economic Theories of Vertical Relations 
 
3.2.1. Chicago School vs. Harvard School in Theory Debates
12
 
 
The Chicago School has offered competition law diverse views that few legal disciplines ever 
attained. Its fundamental principles are: (i) markets are extremely robust and competitive 
outcomes are highly likely to emerge without any significant governmental intervention; and 
(ii) competition authorities are imperfect decision makers.
13
 In particular, by using simple 
price theoretical or monopoly models, the Chicago School has argued that the traditional 
concern in vertical restraints is illogical. Rational firms would not engage in vertical practice 
for anti-competitive reasons. They also suggest efficiency-enhancing reasons for vertical 
restraints.
14
 According to them, vertical practices can increase production and distribution, 
and also minimise transaction costs from uncertainty in supply or over consumer demand.
15
 
The main assertion is that a supplier is willing to impose vertical restraints only where the 
restraints can increase sales and promote inter-brand competition, based on the free-riding 
                                                 
12
 Much of the current debate in competition policy has been amongst three groups: (i) Harvard, (ii) Chicago, 
and (iii) Post-Chicago schools. Whilst these schools’ thoughts have diverse origins and historically different 
ideas about the complexity of the economy and the appropriate role of government, they have also converged on 
a number of important points. For further discussion, see Rudolph Peritz, Competition Policy in America: 
History, Rhetoric, Law, Oxford University Press, New York, 1996, pp. 182-7; Herbert Hovenkamp, The 
Antitrust Enterprise: Principle and Execution, Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA, USA and London, 
2005, pp. 32-9; Lawrence Sullivan and Warren Grimes, Supra., note 9, p. 9. 
13
 See Richard Posner, ‘The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis’, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 
Vol. 127, No. 4, 1979, p. 928. According to Posner, Director formulated this key of the Chicago School and it 
was conservative antipathy to the government intervention. See also Aaron Director and Edward Levi, ‘Law and 
the Future: Trade Regulation’, orthwestern University Law Review, Vol. 51, No. 1, 1956, pp. 281-96. 
14
 For further description about the Chicago School’s propositions, see Herbert Hovenkamp, ‘Antitrust Policy 
After Chicago’ Michigan Law Review, Vol. 94, 1985, p. 213; Herbert Hovenkamp, Supra., note 9, p. 4; Herbert 
Hovenkamp, Supra., note 11, pp. 62-4; Michael Whinston, Lectures on Antitrust Economics, The MIT Press, 
Cambridge MA, USA and London, 2006, p. 134. 
15
 See Kenneth Arrow, ‘Vertical Integration and Communication’, The Bell Journal of Economics, Vol. 6, No. 1, 
1975, p. 173; Raymond Deneckere, Howard Marvel, and James Peck, ‘Demand Uncertainty, Inventories, and 
Resale Price Maintenance’, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 111, No. 3, 1996, pp. 885-9; Raymond 
Deneckere, Howard Marvel, and James Peck, ‘Demand Uncertainty and Price Maintenance: Markdown as 
Destructive Competition’, The American Economic Review, Vol. 87, No. 4, 1997, pp. 634-5. 
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justification.
16
 In the absence of vertical restraints, distributors are unwilling to pay the cost 
of pre-sale services because other distributors will be able to take free-riding on its service 
investment.
17
  
 
In particular, Telser argues that this free-riding problem plays a fundamental role in 
explaining the need of vertical restraints such as minimum Resale Price Maintenance (RPM). 
An increase in pre-sale services as the result of RPM can enhance the value of products to 
consumers and increase demand. This can help to recoup the fixed cost of the investment. If 
there is no vertical restraint, consumers are willing to buy the products from the distributors 
that provide less service, with a lower price, so as not to pay the pre-sale service charge.
18
 
Without RPM, the higher-cost distributors would not be willing to sell the products, because 
the dealer margins would be too low for profitability.
19
 Suppliers may thus have incentives of 
imposing vertical restraints such as exclusive dealing, territorial restrictions, or RPM on 
distributors to prevent this negative externality.
20
 This debate has been extended to products 
for which a distributor offers quality certification,
21
 especially in the luxury product 
markets.
22
 The theory describes how a certain distributor that carries the luxury product 
signals it is of high quality. Prominent distributors are willing to set up high reputations for 
luxurious and distinctive items. Such a distributor is willing to engage its brand reputation by 
selling a given product only if the product is sufficiently rewarding, and not carried by cheap 
discount distributors. Vertical restraint is therefore one method of persuading consumers not 
                                                 
16
 See Alison Jones and Brenda Sufrin, EC Competition Law: Text, Cases, and Materials, 2nd edn, Oxford 
University Press, New York, 2004, p. 604; Herbert Hovenkamp, Supra., note 12, p. 185; Mark Furse, 
Competition Law of the EC and UK, 6th edn, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008, p. 183. 
17
 However, whether restraints will induce retailers to incur the cost of providing pre-sale service is somewhat 
uncertain. See Alden Abbot, ‘Paradox Regained: Towards a “New Economic Approach” to Vertical Restraints 
Policy’, George Washington Law Review, Vol. 48, 1980, pp. 575-6. 
18
 See Lester Telser, ‘Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?, Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 3, 
1960, pp. 86-90.  
19
 See Pauline Ippolito and Thomas Overstreet, Jr., ‘Resale Price Maintenance: An Economic Assessment of the 
Federal Trade Commission’s Case against the Corning Glass Works’, Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 39, 
No. 1, 1996, p. 325. 
20
 Jean Tirole, Supra., note 5, p. 173; Herbert Hovenkamp, Supra., note 12, pp. 184-5. 
21
 See Benjamin Klein, ‘Transaction Cost Determinants of “Unfair” Contractual Arrangements’, The American 
Economic Review, Vol. 70, No. 2, 1980, pp. 360-61. 
22
 This argument is most persuasive when a manufacturer invests resources to create a product image of quality 
where price reductions may actually reduce sales volume. Some suppliers dislike seeing their product used as a 
‘loss leader’ to induce customers to come into a store and stay to buy other products. See Russell Warren, 
Antitrust in Theory and Practice, Grid, Columbus Ohio, USA, 1975, p. 154; Andy Chen and Keith Hylton, 
‘Procompetitive Theories of Vertical Control’, Hastings Law Journal, Vol. 50, 1999, pp.604-6; Phillip Areeda 
and Herbert Hovenkamp, Fundamentals of Antitrust Law, Vol. II, Aspen Law & Business, New York and 
Gaithersburg, USA, 2002, pp. 592-3; Robert Pitofsky, Harvey Goldschmid, and Diane Wood, Trade Regulation: 
Cases and Materials, 5th edn, Thomson West, New York, 2003, p. 623. 
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to purchase from a discount store.
23
 Consequently, the focus of competition law should not be 
on vertical restraints but on horizontal cartels and mergers.
24
 For this reason, free-riding and 
efficiency justifications have been popular theories, and given attention by lawyers and 
economists for a long time.
25
 These arguments have influenced competition policies on 
vertical restraints worldwide, which started in the US courts. However, it seems that the 
Chicago School economic theory is not always the best, and certainly not the only analytical 
tool.
26
 
 
Some commentators from Harvard have argued that vertical practices should not be 
allowed unless these restraints bring greater efficiency, because exclusionary restraints will 
harm consumers where a supplier has significant market power.
27
 In particular, they assert 
that the free-riding or efficiency justification does not sufficiently provide empirical evidence 
of which vertical restraints encourage distributors to afford more pre-sale services.
28
 Hence, it 
is uncertain whether, through vertical restraints, distributors will have the incentive to provide 
pre-sale services that suppliers expect. Distributors with restraints may only enjoy the high 
margins without providing the services.
29
 In particular, Comanor criticises the free-riding 
theory.
30
 He argues that the Chicago School’s theory fails to consider different preferences of 
consumers for distributors’ extra pre-sale services. The Chicagoans’ theory does not 
distinguish between marginal and infra-marginal consumers. Consumer welfare loss and gain 
through changing products depend on the preferences of all consumers, and general 
consumers’ interest is not considered in the Chicagoans’ justification. The alterations do not 
                                                 
23
 Jean Tirole, Supra., note 5, pp. 182-4.  
24
 See Richard Posner, ‘The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis’ in Thomas Sullivan (ed), The Political 
Economy of the Sherman Act: The First One Hundred Years, Oxford University Press, New York and Oxford, 
1991, pp. 195-6. 
25
 See Richard Posner, Antitrust Law, 2nd edn, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2001, pp. 172-3. 
Vertical restraints may even promote market entry. For instance, a pioneer dealer may fear that the manufacturer 
will designate other dealers before he recovers his investment in developing the market for that brand. Without 
restraints, a new manufacturer may find no dealers willing to make the pioneering investment and may thus be 
dissuaded from entry. See also Phillip Areeda and Herbert Hovenkamp, Supra., note 22, p. 597. 
26
 Herbert Hovenkamp, Supra., note 9, p. 5. 
27
 See Joseph Brodley, ‘Post-Chicago Economics and Workable Legal Policy’, Antitrust Law Journal, Vol. 63, 
1995, p. 689; Valentine Korah and Denis O’Sullivan, Distribution Agreements Under the EC Competition Rules, 
Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2000, p. 2.  
28
 See William Bohling, ‘A Simplified Rule of Reason for Vertical Restraints: Integrating Social Goals, 
Economic Analysis, and Sylvania’, Iowa Law Review, Vol. 64, 1979, pp. 474-5. 
29
 See Benjamin Klein and Kevin Murphy, ‘Vertical Restraints as Contract Enforcement Mechanisms’, Journal 
of Law and Economics, Vol. 31, 1988, p. 265; David Butz and Andrew Kleit, ‘Are Vertical Restraints Pro or 
Anticompetitive? Lessons from Interstate Circuit’, Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 44, 2001, pp. 132-3. 
30
 See William Comanor, ‘Vertical Price-Fixing, Vertical Market Restrictions, and the New Antitrust Policy’, 
Harvard Law Review, Vol. 98, 1985, pp. 991-2.  
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reflect the infra-marginal consumers’ preferences.
31
 In other words, some consumers do not 
need the pre-sale service but should pay for that, especially when they have already obtained 
sufficient product information. Comanor stresses that vertical restraints are mostly beneficial 
to the manufacturer, and these restraints may not always improve economic efficiency.
32
 
However, some also argue that these marginal and infra-marginal theories cannot be used by 
courts to distinguish between efficient and inefficient systems of vertical restraints, because 
courts cannot obtain and process the information required for making this distinction.
33
  
 
Rey and Stiglitz further criticise the Chicago School, in that the gains to 
manufacturers and distributors in vertical restraints are mostly at the cost of consumer 
welfare. Therefore, vertical restraints may not be socially desirable. They argue that vertical 
restraints may increase inter-brand competition, but some can still reduce it.
34
 They consider 
the oligopolistic situation which reduces the incentive of competition by, for example, 
absolute territorial restriction. Territorial restriction can allow distributors to have a degree of 
dominant position to enjoy market power. This practice discourages manufacturers from 
reducing the price of supplying goods. Therefore, vertical restraints are harmful to consumers, 
and can make little changes in price-cutting, but only increase suppliers’ profits. Nevertheless, 
to satisfy this argument, the existence of barriers to entry is critical in every market power 
analysis.
35
 Because the Korean market has been considered as oligopolistic, Rey and 
Stiglitz’s argument seemed plausible to assess the effects from the vertical restraints. Where 
the market is highly oligopolistic and also vertically integrated, firms may easily coordinate 
and successfully exploit their market power.
36
 These market conditions, especially for a small 
economy, may have an adverse impact on prices and output levels of many goods and 
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‘Anchoring Antitrust Economics – A Lexicon’ in Harry First, Eleanor Fox, and Robert Pitofsky (eds), 
Revitalizing Antitrust in Its Second Century: Essays on Legal, Economic, and Political Policy, Quorum Books, 
New York, 1991, pp. 77-8; Richard Posner, Supra., note 25, p. 176.  
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 See Patrick Rey and Jean Tirole, ‘The Logic of Vertical Restraints’, The American Economic Review, Vol. 76, 
No. 5, 1986, pp. 921-39; Patrick Rey and Joseph Stiglitz, ‘Vertical Restraints and Producers’ Competition’, 
European Economic Review, Vol. 32, 1988, pp. 561-8. 
35
 See ABA, Market Power Handbook: Competition Law and Economic Foundation, ABA Publishing, Chicago, 
2005, p. 119. 
36
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services, which can carry over to vertically inter-connected industries. This creates additional 
barriers to entry.
37
 However, these arguments are also problematic. Whilst the theoretical 
models against positive results from vertical restraints suggest that the conclusions of the 
Chicago School are open to question, these do not establish clear-cut rules for determining 
when vertical relations are anti-competitive in a small economy. Moreover, even when 
monopolists use vertical restraints for anti-competitive reasons, the welfare implications of 
the theories are ambiguous.
38
 More service, even standing alone, may or may not be 
beneficial.
39
 
 
3.2.2. Economics-Theoretical Approaches to the Korean Market 
 
It seems that the Harvard School’s argument has been the basic rationale of Korean 
competition policy on vertical restraints, disregarding efficiency justification. The dominant 
fear has been that vertical restraints would foreclose a source of supply to rivals and thereby 
drive and fence out competitors, as had happened in the US.
40
 The KFTC has, moreover, 
taken considerations of other challengers to the Chicago School, who have based their attacks 
on underlying assumptions and conditions. For example, vertical restraints can provide a 
means for firms to raise their rivals’ costs and profitably reduce market output. This theory 
can be considered as one of the major assumptions that vertical restraints of large firms may 
inhibit competition in small market economies. They may raise foreign and domestic 
enterprises’ costs by reducing supplies or by foreclosure.
41
 In an imperfectly competitive 
upstream market, an enterprise with market power may also be able to exploit its market 
power by raising prices in the downstream level. There is one more reason why the KFTC 
does not easily accept the Chicagoans’ theories. The analysis of vertical control is difficult at 
both theoretical and practical levels. Because of this, although the Chicago School offered an 
elegant, pro-market and largely anti-government vision of competition policy, the KFTC and 
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38
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1984, p. 149. 
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the courts would not accept its theories. The implementation in Korea has not ensured the 
Chicago theory as a dogma that is applicable to the market. 
 
There are some issues of the incentives, which the KFTC and the courts should not 
ignore in both sides of economics schools, such as a number of interesting issues of vertical 
foreclosure
42
 and transaction cost.
43
 Vertical control can allow the foreclosure of the 
intermediate goods market by raising rivals’ costs, resulting in the prevention of market entry. 
This can also facilitate collusion amongst producers and distributors. Such practices increase 
a firm’s profits but at the expense of reduced competition and welfare.
44
 The argument is 
whether this anti-competitive suspicion can be justified under the rationale given by the 
Chicago School.
45
 Theoretical arguments from both sides are crucial for the Korean market to 
create better ideas. It can help the KFTC understand how to both achieve the benefits of 
tougher competition, and limit the negative impact. It also produces more coherent creative 
competition policy, as complementary instruments to foster economic growth. Competition is 
mainly growth-enhancing, because it forces enterprises to reduce costs and innovate in order 
to survive, through reducing transaction costs.
46
 Lastly, the KFTC should not take one 
negative effect from one model, but take into account other aspects. For example, vertical 
relations assure the supply and efficiency results through transaction cost savings, but also 
create forms of market foreclosure.
47
 It should balance the arguments of both Chicago and 
Harvard to find a marginal solution. This will bring a better outcome of trade-off, through 
seeking rents between efficiency, and anti-competitiveness by vertical restraints.  
 
3.2.3. Theoretical Debates of Vertical Foreclosure in Korea 
 
Vertical market foreclosure is more clearly anti-competitive than other subjects, as illustrated 
in the previous chapter. Vertical relations may give rise to market foreclosure by depriving 
                                                 
42
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43
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MIT Press, MA, USA, 2005, pp. 3-4.  
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competitors of a distribution network if a producer merges with a distributor.
48
 In such cases 
there may be concerns when rivals at the horizontal level, either up- or downstream, do not 
have any alternative means.
49
 Foreclosure or entry barrier also arises through contractual 
relations amongst independent firms.
50
 When buyers and sellers agree to deal only with each 
other or impose costs for dealing with others, their rivals are excluded from suppliers or 
distributors with whom they might deal. Purchasers will be, thus, harmed by the elimination 
of other sellers.
51
 Other types of vertical restraints may also create vertical foreclosure. For 
example, a primary reason for the criticism against tying is the leverage theory.
52
  
 
Tying can be a profitable strategy for a monopolist because of its potential for 
excluding rivals. This exclusionary effect arises because of the strategic foreclosure.
53
 In 
particular, once one allows for scale economies and strategic interaction, tying can make 
continued operation by a monopolist’s rival in the tied market unprofitable by the foreclosure 
of tied good sales. Such a strategy can be profitable for a monopolist in the Korean market 
because of the exclusionary effect on the market structure.
54
 A vertically integrated firm, or 
alternatively an exclusively contracted firm,
55
 can have the power of either denying 
downstream rivals intermediate goods, or upstream competitors in the distribution. The 
integrated enterprise may attempt to squeeze a monopolistic price only at an excessive 
                                                 
48
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price.
56
 Such a foreclosure effect may reduce competitiveness in both the up- and 
downstream markets. This is the reason why most competition authorities, including the 
KFTC, examine vertical integration and restraint based on foreclosure theory.
57
  
 
The controversy surrounding the anti-competitive effects from foreclosure has, 
however, been cast in the context of vertical relations. Critics of the vertical foreclosure 
theory have raised a number of objections. Their theory implies that the strategy of 
foreclosure of supply will not increase the overall profitability of the integrated enterprise, 
because a vertically integrated firm will have no incentive to exclude its competitors, since 
rivals can protect themselves by merging or contracting with other un-integrated firms.
58
 This 
will make them obtain the products at a competitive price level, thus reducing their 
disadvantage. If this is correct, the KFTC should reasonably assume that a vertical integration 
or contract will not have anti-competitive effects on the market, focusing on other possible 
functions of vertical relations such as reducing transaction costs
59
 and controlling 
opportunistic behaviour in commercial relationships.
60
 In a word, market entry might be 
hindered by the monopolist, but there are two strong objections to a rule forbidding such 
vertical relations of the firm. First, delaying new entry will have no anti-competitive effect if 
the market is competitive. Then, prices will be at the competitive level, whether or not entry 
is about to happen. Second, the simultaneous movement of a number of un-integrated 
producers to acquire suppliers reflects the existence of the economies of integration regarding 
transaction costs rather than an anti-competitive purpose, unless enterprises are already 
colluding.
61
 This theory is plausible only if there are enough competitors in the market both 
up- and downstream, which means that the up- and downstream markets remain fairly 
competitive.
62
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An important setting where this problem can arise is in international trade. When 
vertical relations result in foreclosure, a foreign supplier may be unable to distribute his 
products effectively. The alternatives, then, become either to leave the market or to construct 
his distribution channel. In either case, costs can increase and foreign firms may be placed at 
a substantial disadvantage. On the contrary, if established distribution is open to all suppliers, 
there will be greater prospects for international trade and competition. How vertical relations 
are evaluated is thus an important matter in the Korean market.
63
 Integration by Chaebols can 
be the means of market foreclosure, and this can give them more profits. That is why the 
KFTC heavily emphasises foreclosure and entry barriers, because these protect the exercise 
of market power over time.
64
 In the current vertical merger decision, POSCO/POSCOA,
 65
 the 
KFTC stated that the merger would foreclose the market, thus strengthening horizontal 
market power and influence supply of the relevant products. Focusing on vertical foreclosure 
and entry barriers, the KFTC emphasised that a vertical merger would inhibit competition for 
the merging firm’s market power.  
 
Although vertical integration, by itself, has no immediate effect on market 
concentration at any stage, it can have entry-impeding consequences if the entry were to be 
inhibited to any but a fully integrated firm. Where the market is not highly concentrated, this 
anti-competitive potential is much less severe. Therefore, the presumption that vertical 
relationships are innocent or beneficial should be generally appreciated. Vertical control, 
once accomplished, does not commit the firm to continue the integrated relationship 
indefinitely.
66
 Therefore, vertical integration and restraint other than foreclosure have little 
impact on international trade and competition.
67
 The crucial point here is that the Korean 
market is much more open to foreign rivals, and the activities and competition from foreign 
firms can become vigorous. It is certain that, although the Korean market structure is 
concentrated, the real impact from it in the vertical level is not very significant. More entry 
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may be possible from trade. Furthermore, Korean competition law is not discriminatory 
against foreign firms, but domestic large firms.  
 
 
3.3. Comparative Study: Development of Competition Laws in the US and the EU 
 
3.3.1. The United States 
 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits any contract in restraints of trade such as RPM, 
territorial restrictions, and tie-in sales amongst the states, or with other foreign nations. In 
analysing vertical arrangements, it is important to take particular care to distinguish 
acceptable unilateral conduct from agreements that are part of a scheme of concerted anti-
competitive conduct.
68
 Section 1 condemns unreasonable vertical agreements, and has been 
applied to vertical price and non-price restraints. Section 2 of the Sherman Act, which 
condemns monopolisation and attempts to monopolise, also prohibits vertical practices by an 
enterprise that has significant market power. Monopolisation normally requires exclusionary 
conduct. Exactly what kind of conduct is judged to be exclusionary remains a subject of 
vigorous debate in recent US litigation.
69
 Under the MRFTA, this is not a concern, since it 
prohibits abuse of market or monopoly power. It simply applies the law based on effects of 
market power and anti-competitive or unfair practices, rather than proving intent.
70
 Section 3 
of the Clayton Act and section 5 of the FTC Act prohibit any conduct affecting competition, 
such as tie-in sales.
71
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Economic and legal debates in the US have brought the question of whether section 1 
of the Sherman Act should prohibit vertical restraints that lack significant market power. 
However, it is unclear to which degree vertical restraints should be prohibited. Some 
commentators influenced by the Chicago School argue that all vertical restraints, even with 
market power, should be treated as legal per se.
72
 The US antitrust authorities, therefore, do 
not provide market share threshold test legislation for this.
73
 There has been quite a 
development in the US courts in vertical cases, influenced by the Chicago School. In the 
early stages of judgements on vertical restraints, the US courts condemned maximum RPM 
and territorial restrictions as illegal per se. However, at this time, the US Supreme Court 
found no section 1 of the Sherman Act violation by these restraints. The Court even recently 
overruled a thirty year precedent of minimum RPM, judging it under the rule of reason.  
 
In the 1911 Dr. Miles case,
74
 the US Supreme Court declared that RPM was a per se 
violation of section 1, thus placing RPM in the same position as horizontal price-fixing. The 
Court repeatedly upheld that position in subsequent cases, although in the 1980s it raised 
evidentiary standards for finding a defendant guilty of RPM. It declared that maximum RPM 
was a per se violation, reaffirmed in Business Electronics.
75
 However, an important 
development was made in the 1997 State Oil case
76
  involving maximum RPM.
77
 The Court 
held that maximum RPM should be judged under the rule of reason.
78
 Moreover, the Court 
recently abandoned per se rules on minimum RPM, and held that the Dr. Miles precedent 
should be overruled in the Leegin case.
79
 The Court emphasised that minimum RPM can 
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stimulate inter-brand competition by reducing intra-brand competition. It also pointed out 
RPM may give consumers more options to choose amongst (i) low-price, low-service brands; 
(ii) high price, high-service brands; and (iii) brands falling in between. This case enables 
manufacturers to implement minimum RPM on the ground that the Court admitted the benefit 
of suppliers, considering consumer benefits by inter-brand competition. The Court agreed this 
arrangement can improve efficiency and competition through pre-sale services, just as the 
Chicago scholars argued. The Court has recognised that overall vertical restraints have real 
potential to stimulate inter-brand competition and has considered them unlawful only if they 
fail a rule of reason analysis,
80
 the fundamental enquiry being whether or not the challenged 
restraint enhances competition.
81
 
 
These remarkable judgments have been developed from precedents in non-price 
restraints. In the Sylvania case,
82
 the US Supreme Court reversed the earlier precedent of per 
se illegality in territorial restriction. It held that US antitrust law must be driven by economic, 
not social or political, concerns. Furthermore, it observed that vertical restraints may be 
efficient and thereby enhance inter-brand competition, which are out of the concern of the 
law. This held the promise of fundamental reform, not only in the law of vertical restraints, 
but in antitrust law in general.
83
 One of the considerable virtues in this case was its 
recognition that significant efficiencies could arise from vertical restraints, and thus to move 
antitrust law analysis to the point where it can take into account the relevant factors.
84
 The 
Court’s position has remained unchanged since then. Except for territorial restrictions, the 
Court and enforcement agencies were generally hostile towards tying, exclusive dealing, and 
other non-price vertical restraints until the mid-1970s. Since the 1970s, their approaches have 
become more sophisticated. The Court has added successive exceptions and evidentiary 
burdens to plaintiffs to win in a tying case, and other vertical restraints are judged under the 
                                                 
80
 Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 485 US 717, 724 (1988). See also ABA, Antitrust Law 
Developments, Vol. I, 6th edn, ABA Publishing, Chicago, 2007, p. 131. 
81
 California Dental Association v. FTC, 526 US (1999) at 780. See also ABA, Antitrust Law and Economics of 
Product Distribution, ABA Publishing, Chicago, 2006, p. 25. 
82
 Continental T.V. v. GTE Sylvania, 433 US 36 (1977). 
83
 See Robert Bork, ‘Vertical Restraints: Schwinn Overruled’, The Supreme Court Review, Vol. 1977, 1977, p. 
172. 
84
 See Robert Pitofsky, ‘The “Sylvania” Case; Antitrust Analysis of Non-Price Vertical Restrictions’, Columbia 
Law Review, Vol. 78, No. 1, 1978, p. 9. 
Chapter 3 
Economics and Comparative Competition Laws of Vertical Restraints  
60 
 
rule of reason, although the Court clearly stepped back from this trend in its Kodak 
judgment.
85
  
 
The enforcement agencies have also moved away from a formalistic focus on 
restrictions and foreclosure. Instead, they have focused on practices that seem likely to raise 
rivals’ costs or barriers to entry.
86
 Exclusive dealing agreements are presumptively lawful, 
because they are deemed likely to be a means to increase efficiencies. Tying agreements, as 
noted, are subject to a modified per se rule. Tying and exclusive dealing can have net 
negative effects if they fence off so much that efficient rivals cannot survive. In such cases, 
prices can be raised and the practices likely to be found to be illegal under an effects-based 
rule of reason scrutiny.
87
 Moreover, franchising agreements of vertical restraints hardly 
violate federal antitrust law, because these agreements are mostly justified in that they do not 
affect competition.
88
 
 
To summarise, US antitrust law concerns about distribution have historically been 
great, and every substantive antitrust provision has been applied to the vertical practices. 
Furthermore, territorial restrictions in the Sylvania case, and also RPM in Leegin, are 
generally held as rational or justified by the rule of reason, unless the supplier abuses its 
market power. The Leegin judgment was revolutionary, since the US Court struck down the 
per se ban on the last of the hard-core restraints, minimum RPM, in view of its possible pro-
competitiveness. Nevertheless, it seems that, more than the other vertical restraints, minimum 
RPM can still have harmful effects, such as facilitating a cartel, and thus remains illegal 
under the rule of reason.
89
 The US courts have increasingly looked not only at the 
characteristics of the agreement, but also at the circumstances.
90
 The US development in 
vertical cases has influenced the Korean regime. For instance, the RPM provision in the 
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MRFTA seemed to be added when the MRFTA was legislated around 1980, due to the 
influence of US judgments on several RPM cases during the 1950-70s.  
 
3.3.2. The European Union 
 
The European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the EC Commission consider minimum RPM and 
absolute territorial restriction as unacceptable restrictions under Regulation 2790/99 OJ 
L336/21 (EC vertical regulation).
91
 Where suppliers appoint a single distributor to supply one 
or several Member States, a territorial restriction with export bans may prevent inter-State 
trade. Since one of the main policies of EC competition law is market integration,
92
 it has 
expressed its concerns about absolute territorial restriction. Competition law helps market 
integration by preventing private undertakings creating impediments to trade.
93
 Although 
these can bring the efficiency of inter-brand competition with a small risk of inhibiting intra-
brand competition, the EC Commission is unwilling to take the threats of hindering market 
integration.
94
 In the early stages, the EC Commission was more concerned about vertical 
restraints than horizontal ones, because of the negative effects on trade between Member 
States.
95
 However, it has adopted the economic justification for efficiency and shown its 
tolerance of vertical restraints.  
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 See Mark Furse, ‘The Role of Competition Policy: A Survey’, European Competition Law Review, Vol. 17, 
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Where inter-brand competition is vigorous, without threat of inhibiting market 
integration, it is unlikely that a vertical restraint will have a significant anti-competitive effect, 
even if it reduces intra-brand competition. Therefore, the most important factor is the 
distinction between inter- and intra-brand competitions in EC vertical regulation.
96
 When 
both inter- and intra-brand competition are vigorous, there is even less danger of a vertical 
restraint having an anti-competitive effect. However, where inter-brand competition is weak, 
the vertical restraint can potentially lead to foreclosure or reduce price competition.
97
 This is 
distinctive, since the EC Commission has developed its legal techniques in applying rules on 
vertical restraint through amending its regulations and adopting guidelines. Its current 
approach seems to be based on the belief that the main negative effect of vertical restraints is 
foreclosure by raising entry barriers, reduction of inter-brand competition, and obstacles to 
market integration, including limitations on the consumers’ freedom to purchase goods and 
services.
98
 The changing structure and techniques of distribution has pleaded for more market 
analysis based on economic rationale.
99
  
 
The EC Commission applies the Article 81 EC Treaty so as to prohibit only vertical 
restraints that may have significant negative effects on the market. With a few major hard-
core restrictions, vertical restraints are not viewed as positive or negative per se, and the 
analysis depends largely on the economic context in which they operate. However, 
restrictions on inter-brand competition, such as non-competitive clauses, are generally viewed 
as more likely to raise anti-competitive problems.
100
 Article 81(1) EC prohibits all 
agreements which may affect trade between Member States and which prevent, restrict, or 
distort competition within the common market. Nevertheless, Article 81(3) EC, the EC 
vertical regulation,
101
 and Guidelines on Vertical Restraints (EC vertical guidelines)
102
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provide exemptions from specific categories of vertical agreements.
103
 The Commission’s 
adoption of EC vertical regulation marked a shift in the policy towards vertical agreements. 
The EC Commission abandoned its formalistic approach and embraced a more economics-
based assessment of vertical restraints.
104
 The logic of prohibition and exemption in the 
enforcement of Article 81 EC towards vertical agreements can be seen to have remained at 
the centre of the enforcement, notwithstanding the changes that have been undertaken to 
make it more responsive to pressures from business and the legal community.
105
 The EC 
Commission is aware that vertical restraints can have negative effects on competition only 
where significant market power exists,
106
 although market power is not decisive where low 
entry barriers may render access to the market easy.
107
 Therefore, the system of EC vertical 
regulation is relatively simple. All arrangements, where the market share of the supplier is not 
above 30 per cent safe harbour,
108
 are permitted, except when the arrangement contains one 
of the blacklisted clauses. Article 4 of EC vertical regulation summarises the hard-core 
restrictions. The main type of such clauses concerns vertical price-fixing. Further, this 
category includes absolute territorial restrictions or limits on delivery to certain customers. 
Arrangements that contain such restrictions are void in their entirety.
109
  
 
In addition to the application of the market share test, a vertical agreement will not be 
caught by Article 81(1) EC if it does not have an appreciable impact on competition or upon 
inter-State trade. The EC Commission has given guidance on its application in a series of 
Notices, and one of these regarding minor effects on the market is known as de minimis 
doctrine.
110
 The notice is based on a market share test, and differentiates between horizontal 
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110
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and vertical agreements. Paragraph 7 of de minimis Notice states that an agreement will not 
appreciably restrict competition if the aggregate market share of the participating 
undertakings does not exceed 15 per cent of the relevant market for a vertical agreement. For 
mixed agreements of horizontal and vertical, the 10 per cent threshold is applicable, and the 
market share threshold is reduced to 5 per cent where a market is affected by networks of 
similar agreements.
111
 The EC Commission allows agreements between Small and Medium-
sized Enterprises (SME), which will be rarely capable of affecting trade between Member 
States.
112
 However, although an agreement falls below the thresholds in the Notice, the 
agreement may still be considered to be appreciable if it contains one of the hard-core 
restrictions set out in paragraph 11, such as price-fixing, limitation of output, or allocation of 
markets.
113
 If a vertical agreement falls within the scope of Article 81(1) EC, it requires 
exemption as provided for under Article 81(3) to be legal and enforceable. Hence, the 
undertaking can get exemptions granted (i) through block exemption of the EC vertical 
regulation; or (ii) by satisfying the four substantive criteria of Article 81(3). The market share 
threshold test is therefore important to prevent possible abuses from vertical agreements, 
since it is more likely for undertakings to get exemptions by the EC Commission’s tolerance 
on vertical arrangements. This approach is clearly explained in paragraph 116 of the EC 
vertical guidelines. The EC Commission recognises the free-riding problem enough to justify 
vertical restraints that do not harm competition in the market.  
 
With understanding of the market share threshold and free-riding justification, it is 
important to be aware of hard-core restrictions such as minimum RPM and absolute territorial 
restrictions. The ECJ and the EC Commission are hostile to these restrictions as mentioned 
above,
114
 unlike the US authorities. The hard-core provisions are based on the EC 
competition aims of market integration. The key judgment was Consten and Grundig,
115
 
which remains one of the most important cases to be considered under Article 81 EC. This 
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judgment demonstrated the application of most aspects of Article 81, by verifying the EC 
Commission’s strict approach to territorial restrictions.
116
 Nevertheless, recently, the ECJ and 
the EC Commission have adopted economic justifications for vertical restrictions. This 
allowance of special consideration has been established through case law, despite the 
rejection of the US rule of reason approach.
117
 This economic justification has been stated in 
cases such as ungesser,
118
 Pronuptia,
119
 Remia,
120
 and Erauw-Jacquéry Sprl.
121
 The 
consequence of adopting this economic justification was drawn from critiques by lawyers, 
economists, and business practitioners against the EC Commission’s hostile attitude to 
vertical restraints.
122
 Finally, through the provision of market share threshold, the EC 
Commission gives legal certainty to undertakings that practise vertical restraints. This 
guidance gives sufficient notice for undertakings to prevent them from abusing market power. 
Although it is not easy to define relevant market and measure market share, undertakings and 
competition authorities have recently practised and developed market definition and market 
share measurement.
123
  
 
The importance of the block exemption is that it further reduces the scope of the 
principles in Consten and Grundig, and shows the appreciation of the law of vertical 
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agreement economics.
124
 Along with EC vertical regulation, Article 81 EC also remains as a 
competition device forming a framework for the balance of anti- and pro-competitive 
effects.
125
 Similar to, but unlike the US rule of reason approach, each agreement prohibited 
under Article 81 could only operate if it fulfilled the conditions for granting an individual 
exemption under Article 81(3). An alternative way from individual to block exemption solves 
the problems of lack of legal certainty as to whether the agreement would be given 
exemption.
126
 Therefore, along with Article 81 EC, EC vertical regulation and guidelines 
prevent anti-competitive practices, at the same time allowing economic efficiency by vertical 
restraints.  
 
 
3.4. Substantive Korean Competition Law 
 
3.4.1. Prohibition of Abuse of Dominant Position: Chapter 2 of the MRFTA 
 
In order to understand the Korean competition law of vertical restraints (hereafter, vertical 
regulation), it is necessary to explain the framework of the MRFTA. To begin with, the 
MRFTA’s control of economic power is one of the cornerstones of the MRFTA regarding 
vertical restraints. The concern about economic power has brought three major issues. First, 
the concentration of economic power by a few large firms has allowed a significant private 
influence on society including politics. Second, most of their affiliates have had dominant 
positions and created entry barriers that might cause distortion of competition. Third, these 
firms normally have a family-owned structure which brought problems of X-inefficiency,
127
 
which was only beneficial to the owner families.
128
 This is because firms in a protected 
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market have insufficient incentives to keep their costs to a minimum.
129
 Therefore, the KFTC 
has revised the MRFTA to prohibit any abusive practices of market dominance through 
providing the clauses of the presumption of market dominant enterprises where 
Concentration Ratio (CR) 1 is 50 or CR3 is 75 per cent under Article 4 MRFTA. The 
MRFTA does not directly prohibit the possession or acquisition of monopoly power.
130
 
Instead, it proscribes unreasonable or anti-competitive behaviour by large enterprises with 
substantial market shares.  
 
In particular, Article 3-2 MRFTA forbids abusive conducts rather than 
monopolisation,
131
 where a firm possesses a significant market share, whilst the US Sherman 
Act prohibits monopolisation or attempts to monopolise.
132
 The Japanese Antimonopoly Law 
(AML) is similar to the US, but the Korean Law is closer to Article 82 EC. In the US Alcoa 
case,
133
 the court sets out a two-pronged test for violation of section 2 of the  
Sherman Act as following: (i) a firm must have achieved monopoly power; and (ii) the power 
must have been achieved or maintained by means other than superior skill, foresight, and 
industry. By contrast, the EC standard under Article 82 EC follows that (i) the undertaking 
must have a dominant position; and (ii) it must have abused its dominant position. Therefore, 
Article 82 EC and Article 3-2 MRFTA only apply to firms in a dominant position.
134
 In short, 
the text of these two provisions does not consider the concept of attempted monopolisation 
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such as in US law, but rather seems to prohibit only abuses of existing market dominance. It 
does not appear to cover abusive conduct to create a dominant position.
135
 However, another 
Korean provision, Article 23 MRFTA, seems to appear to prohibit practices which can be 
defined as somewhat similar to ‘attempted monopolisation’ in the Sherman Act. Article 23 
covers more details than Article 3-2 does, and is characterised by the detailed specification 
under the Enforcement Decree of the MRFTA (Enforcement Decree),
136
 and the Guidelines 
for the review unfair business practices (UBP Guidelines).
137
 
 
In summary, the KFTC specifically identifies market dominant enterprises under 
Article 4 MRFTA criteria, although Article 23 applies regardless of market share. Thus, 
business activities by SMEs, which do not fall within the criteria, are not normally covered 
by Article 3-2, although such conducts may fall within the category of UBP prohibited under 
Articles 23 and 29.
138
 An enterprise that the KFTC has deigned as a market dominant 
enterprise receives KFTC’s special scrutiny. The following conduct by market dominant 
firms constitute an Article 3-2 violation:
139
 (i) determining, maintaining, or surcharging 
prices unreasonably for goods or services;
140
 (ii) unreasonably controlling the sale of goods 
or services; (iii) unreasonably interfering with the business activities of other enterprises; (iv) 
unreasonably impeding the participation of new competitors; and (v) unfairly excluding 
competitive enterprises, which might considerably harm consumers’ interests.
141
 Article 3-2 
describes types of illegal abusive activities, but those activities are not treated as illegal per se. 
Instead, the statute speaks in subjective terms, such as ‘unreasonably’ and ‘unfairly’, which 
are vague. The logical implication is to require the KFTC first to demonstrate that the 
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challenged conduct falls within one of the enumerated categories in Article 3-2 after 
examining whether the enterprise is market dominant. It should, then, prove the conduct is 
‘unreasonably’ or ‘unfairly’
142
 anti-competitive. The KFTC has also developed Guidelines 
for reviewing the abuse of market dominant positions (Market Dominance Guidelines)
143
 for 
determining whether a challenged activity falls within any one of the activities listed above. 
 
3.4.2. Unfair Horizontal Concerted Acts: Chapters 4 and 6 of the MRFTA 
 
The MRFTA proscribes a broad range of collusive activities of competitors. It contains 
provisions that specifically address anti-competitive conduct by trade associations. Article 
19(1) in Chapter 4 of the MRFTA prohibits any agreement, whether by formal contract or 
otherwise, whereby enterprises engage in collaborative activity that substantially restricts 
competition. It specifically lists prohibited collusive activities: (i) fixing, maintaining, or 
changing prices; (ii) determining terms and conditions or payment of prices; (iii) restricting 
production, delivery, transportation, or transaction; (iv) limiting territory of trade or 
customers; (v) preventing establishment or extension of facilities or installation of equipment; 
(vi) restricting types or specifications in producing or transacting goods or services; (vii) 
jointly carrying out main parts of a business; and (viii) substantially lessening competition in 
a particular business area.  
 
In general, competition requires uncertainty, and risks that a firm does not know how 
its competitors, trading partners, and consumers will act in the future. This uncertainty can 
make firms engage in competitive struggle at the horizontal level. However, a concerted 
practice enables them to act with greater knowledge and expectations about their rivals.
144
 In 
order to prohibit these anti-competitive and collaborative activities, the KFTC must first 
prove that the allegedly improper conduct falls within at least one of the eight activities stated 
above. The KFTC should, then, prove the existence of an agreement to engage in the conduct. 
Because it is often difficult to prove an agreement of collusion, the 1992 amendment reduced 
the burden of proof for the KFTC by creating a statutory presumption of an agreement if it is 
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shown that two or more firms in fact engaged in any anti-competitive activities on the list.
145
 
Any agreement to engage in anti-competitive activities is null and void between the parties 
under Article 19(4). In addition to being subject to the other prohibitions, enterprise 
organisations (or trade associations) are expressly prohibited from restricting membership 
size and unreasonably restricting members’ business activities under Article 26 in Chapter 6 
of the MRFTA. All enterprise organisations are also required to report to the KFTC when 
they are formed or dissolved. The KFTC has issued Enterprise Organisation Guidelines
146
 in 
order to ensure compliance with the law. The Guidelines illustrates types of enterprise 
organisation activities that may constitute Article 26 violations.
147
 However, this provision is 
only applicable to horizontal cases, and never applied to vertical ones, although there is no 
language limiting its scope within horizontal agreements. Furthermore, the courts have not 
developed a wider definition of this provision, unlike the EC and the Japanese.
148
 
 
3.4.3. Vertical Restraints: Chapters 5 and 7 of the MRFTA 
 
3.4.3.1. Prohibitions of Unfair Business Practices  
 
The MRFTA regulates a variety of anti-competitive restraints on distribution. A separate 
statute addresses restrictive practices in distribution or contract relations. It addresses the 
majority of restraints under the rubric of Unfair Business Practice (UBP) provision under 
Article 23 MRFTA, and specifically prohibits RPM under Article 29. However, these legal 
provisions are not only limited to unilateral restraints on distribution. In particular, UBPs can 
take the form of vertical or horizontal restraints, or any other types of restraint of trade. UBPs 
can also constitute violations of other sections of the MRFTA, such as those prohibiting 
unreasonable joint conduct, or abusive activities of market dominant positions.
149
 Because 
most of the UBPs in the MRFTA are classified as vertical restraint, they are discussed in this 
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[1966] ECR 299, 339-40, [1966] CMLR 418 in the EC and Toppan Mua K.K. v. JFTC, Tokyo High Court, Dec. 
14, 1993, 840 Hanreitimes 81 in Japan. 
149
 E.g., sec. III.1.A.(3) UBP Guidelines. ‘Unreasonable’ rather than ‘unfair’ UBPs will be regarded as quasi-per 
se violation. Such restraints are: (i) collective refusal to deal; (ii) discriminatory practice favouring affiliates; 
and (iii) predatory pricing in continuous business. See also Ki-Su Lee and Jin-Hee Ryu, Kyoung-Jae-Bub [Anti-
trust and Consumer Law], 7th edn, Sechang Publishing, Seoul, 2006, pp. 206-7. 
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section.
150
 The list of prohibited acts specified in Article 23(1) establishes the scope and the 
determination criteria of UBPs. 
151
  
 
Any entrepreneurs shall not commit any act falling within the following list under 
Article 23, which is likely to impede competition or make an affiliate or other enterprises 
perform such conduct: (i) unfairly refusing any transaction, or discriminating against a certain 
partner; (ii) unfairly excluding competitors; (iii) unfairly coercing or inducing customers of 
competitors to deal;
152
 (iv) making  trade with a transacting partner by unfairly taking 
advantage of position; (v) trading under terms and conditions which unfairly restrict or 
disrupt business activities; (vi) assisting with a special interest by providing advanced 
payment, loans, manpower, immovable assets, stocks and bonds, or intellectual properties 
thereto, or by transacting under substantially favourable terms therewith; and (vii) threatening 
to impair trade by other means. The list of forbidden activities is, however, exhaustive where 
business practices do not fall within one of the enumerated categories.
153
 
 
The KFTC is authorised to define types and elements of UBPs in more detail. The 
main reason is that the KFTC is in the best position to evaluate and specify the various forms 
of anti-competitive practices that its enforcement should encompass. As a practical matter, it 
is important to know the current requirements of Appendix 1 of the Enforcement Decree, 
since the KFTC’s scrutiny of questionable conduct relies heavily on the criteria that the 
                                                 
150
 Seung-Wha Chang, Supra., note 138, p. 277. 
151
 This category seems to be influenced by the Art. 19 AML whose types of UBPs are similar to the MRFTA: 
(i) concerted refusal to deal; (ii) other refusals to deal; (iii) discriminatory pricing; (iv) discriminatory treatment 
of transaction terms, etc; (v) discriminatory treatment in a trade association; (vi) unjustly low price sales; (vii) 
unjustly high price purchasing; (viii) deceptive customer inducement; (ix) customer inducement by unjust 
benefits; (x) tie-in sales, etc; (xi) dealing on exclusive terms; (xii) resale price maintenance; (xiii) dealing on 
restrictive terms; (xiv) abuse of dominant bargaining position; (xv) interference with a competitor’s transaction; 
and (xvi) interference with the internal operation of a competitor’s company. For details, see also Akira Inoue, 
Japanese Antitrust Law Manual: Law, Cases, and Interpretation of Japanese Antimonopoly Law, Kluwer Law 
International, Alphen aan den Rijn, 2007, p. 2. 
152
 The wording, ‘coercion’ often appears as an important factor in the Korean enforcement. The rise of 
neoclassicism in economics and law effected a substantial change in the meaning of coercion. Someone who is 
merely asked to pay a high price for a particular commodity was not coerced. However, neo-classicists viewed 
the problem of free choice and restraint in a more subtle way. Coercion is something that can exist in degrees, 
and the market itself can coerce. In US antitrust history, most agreed that certain kinds of agreements were 
coercive and ought to be condemned, but determining where the line should be drawn between competitive and 
coercive activities proved to be very difficult. In Korea, this problem has not been discussed fully but the 
meaning of coercion under the MRFTA was added in order to protect SMEs and consumers from large firms. 
See Herbert Hovenkamp, ‘The Sherman Act and the Classical Theory of Competition’ in Thomas Sullivan (ed), 
The Political Economy of the Sherman Act: The First One Hundred Years, Oxford University Press, New York 
and Oxford, 1991, p. 151.  
153
 Seung-Wha Chang, Supra., note 138, p. 278. 
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provision enunciates. In addition, the KFTC articulates formulated criteria for certain 
practices such as offers of premiums, bargain sales, and large retail businesses by issuing 
some guidelines
154
 for assessing the legality of practices through categorised details. This 
overall implementation of the law indicates that the Korean policy-makers seemed to adopt 
the provisions of UBP of the AML. Article 23 MRFTA follows the main structure of the 
AML.
155
 Therefore, it would be better to compare the AML with the MRFTA.
156
 The Japan 
Fair Trade Commission (JFTC) is authorised to designate UBPs, and such conduct is subject 
to prohibition under Article 19 AML.
157
  
 
The UBP provision in the AML was expected to play a supplemental role in the 
enforcement. However, it has long been considered as the core provision of the enforcement 
in Japan. It has also caused substantial confusion regarding the application of law.
158
 
Regarding the matter of vertical restraints, this provision refers to individual refusal to deal 
(unreasonable discrimination), tie-ins (unreasonable coercion), exclusive dealing,
159
 RPM 
(unreasonable restriction of business activities),
160
 and territorial restriction (other 
restrictions).
161
 There is a sharp contrast between the form and substance of policy measures 
towards vertical restraints in Japan. Under the AML, most practices are adjudicated under the 
rule of reason, and vertical restraints constitute UBPs if they have ‘a tendency to impede fair 
competition’.
162
 However, there is a common implementation of UBP provisions in both 
                                                 
154
 E.g., Notification on the Types of and Criteria for Special Unfair Business Practices Relating to Large Retail 
Store Business, KFTC Notification No. 2001-9 amended on July 6, 2001; Notification of Types of and Criteria 
for Unfair Business Practices and Abuse of Market-Dominant Position Relating to Newspaper Business, KFTC 
Notification No. 2003-3 amended on May 27, 2003. 
155
 Jungwon Song, Supra., note 70, p. 203.  
156
 Art. 2(9) AML defines UBPs as ‘any act, coming under any one of the following paragraphs, which tends to 
impede fair competition and which is designated by the authority.’ The provision goes on the list (i) 
unreasonable discrimination, (ii) unreasonable price, (iii) unreasonable inducement or coercion of customers, 
(iv) unreasonable restriction imposed on the other party to a transaction, (v) unreasonable use of bargaining 
position, and (vi) unreasonable interference in the affairs of a competitor.  
157
 See Mitsuo Matsushita, Introduction to Japanese Antimonopoly Law, Yuhikaki Publishing, Tokyo, 1990, p. 
54. 
158
 Akira Inoue, Supra., note 151, p. 8. 
159
 There is no general rule concerning the minimum market share to invoke exclusive dealing provision. 
However, 25 per cent of market share can be assumed as an evidence of substantial power, which can infringe 
Japanese UBP provision. See Mitsuo Matsushita, Supra., note 157, p. 61. 
160
 The MRFTA has a separated provision of RPM. This is different from the AML. However, RPM under the 
AML is also per se violation. For further comparison, see Ulrike Schaede, Cooperative Capitalism: Self-
Regulation, Trade Associations, and the Antimonopoly Law in Japan, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000, 
pp. 130-34. 
161
 Mitsuo Matsushita, Supra., note 157, p. 62. 
162
 ‘Tendency’ can be normally defined as the possibility of impeding fair competition. William Comanor and 
Patrick Rey, Supra., note 51, p. 353. For further details, see also Jiro Tamura, ‘Competition Policy in Japan: A 
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regimes. The AML also emphasises fairness in competition. For example, in the large retailer 
cases in Japan of Lawson
163
 and Uny,
164
 the JFTC stressed bargaining position could be 
regarded as unfair pressure inhibiting fundamentals of fair and free competition under Article 
1 AML.
165
 To summarise the common features of UBP provisions in Korea and Japan, these 
regulations can be characterised as following: (i) a detailed definition of the unlawful 
conduct; (ii) less scrutiny for impact on competition; (iii) a lighter penalty compared with the 
provision of abuse of market dominance.
166
  
 
Besides, the KFTC has a unique procedure of examining UBPs. In 2005 the KFTC 
established the UBP Guidelines, which clarify the standards for reviewing UBPs and thereby 
ensure the transparency of the review process. The Guidelines are based on the KFTC’s 
administrative decisions and court judgments. If the KFTC determines that an enterprise has 
engaged in UBP, the KFTC may impose a corrective measure such as discontinuation of the 
practice, and an administrative fine not exceeding two per cent of the enterprise’s total sales 
turnover.
167
 Where the case is related to unfairness, the KFTC first examines whether the 
practice satisfies the condition falling within UBP types. Then, it defines the market and 
examines whether the market share is less than 10 per cent,
168
 and also whether the effect of 
the practice is trivial. If the conduct can distort competition, the KFTC scrutinises whether 
the practice may enhance efficiency or improve consumer welfare. However, the KFTC does 
not have to follow this procedure.
169
 If the enterprise meets one of the exemption conditions 
with sufficient evidence, the KFTC may drop the case. This procedure can be regarded as 
efficiency justification procedure, although the burden of proof is on the defendants.
170
  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
New Necessity for A Mature Economy’ in Carl Green and Douglas Rosenthal (eds), Competition Regulation in 
The Pacific Rim, Oceana Publications, New York, 1996, p. 207.  
163
 Lawson Inc., JFTC Decision, July 30, 1998, Shinketushu 45-136. The JFTC found that the second largest 
convenience chain store, Lawson, abused its buying power. 
164
 Uny Co. Ltd., JFTC Decision, Jan. 7, 2005, Shinketushu 51-543. Uny held a bargaining position and abused 
its power. 
165
 For discussion, see also Masako Wakui, Antimonopoly Law: Competition Law and Policy in Japan, Arima 
Publishing, Suffolk, 2008, pp. 171-5. 
166
 Ibid., p. 103. 
167
 Arts. 24 and 24-2. See also Sai Ree Yun and Dae Sik Hong, ‘Korea: Overview’, Global Competition Law 
Review: http://www.globalcompetitionreview.com/sr/sr_fullpage.cfm?page_id=622 (accessed 20 April 2008). 
168
 Sec. III.2. of the UBP Guidelines. 
169
 Jungwon Song, Supra., note 70, p. 221. 
170
 Ibid., pp. 213-4; Ki-Su Lee and Jin-Hee Ryu, Supra., note 149, pp. 206-7. 
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Nonetheless, if the conduct is defined as unreasonable, it shall be regarded as a near-
per se violation. Examples of per se illegal conduct are collective refusal to deal, 
discriminatory transactions to affiliates, and successive predatory pricing.
171
 In addition, 
often the KFTC does not examine whether the enterprise has any intention of abusive UBP 
conducts, but only considers violation of the law based on the outcome and effect of the 
conduct,
172
 because intentions are often unknowable or ambiguous.
173
 The UBP Guidelines 
define a ‘safety zone’ as an exemption based on 10 per cent market share, where an 
enterprise’s business practice does not affect the market. However, the KFTC may also find 
per se violation of conduct although market share is below 10 per cent, where the conduct 
inhibits competition significantly without any efficiency gains. This safety zone provision 
applies to each type of UBP except abuse of dominance, coercing consumers, and coercing 
transaction.
174
  
 
Compared with this, US antitrust agencies do not offer any legal measures of market 
share threshold exemption, although the EC Commission sets a safe harbour of 30 per cent 
with the hard-core restrictions. The Korean safety zone provision can be, however, regarded 
as merely de minimis provision rather than an EC-style block exemption regulation. There is 
another issue with regards to defining the wording in Article 23, ‘unfairness’ and ‘harming 
fair competition’. Unfairness enforcement under Article 23 is often covered as a catch-all 
measure, although Article 3-2’s interpretation of unfairness is treated somewhat differently. 
Many also agree on a possible rule of reason enforcement in Article 23. A UBP conduct 
‘without proper reason’ can be treated as a quasi-per se violation. However, if the enterprise 
satisfies a rational reason for this conduct, its practice is likely to be justified.
175
 Nevertheless, 
it is still difficult to define the criteria of violation of the law under the terms ‘unfairness’ and 
‘proper reason’. The KFTC seems to define ‘without proper reason’ narrowly when applying 
it to cases of discriminatory practices favouring affiliates, and collective refusal to deal 
                                                 
171
 Ki-Su Lee and Jin-Hee Ryu, Supra., note 149, p. 206. 
172
 Jungwon Song, Supra., note 70, pp. 204-5. However, the courts often examine intentions of the firm, e.g., 
Coca-Cola Co. v. KFTC, Supreme Court 98Du17869, Jan. 5, 2001. 
173
 For further discussion about wilful conduct element in the US regime, see Phillip Areeda, ‘Monopolization, 
Mergers, and Markets: A Century Past and the Future’ California Law Review, Vol. 75, No. 3, 1987, p. 963; 
Einer Elhauge, ‘Defining Better Monopolization Standards’, Stanford Law Review, Vol. 56, No. 2, 2003, p. 261. 
174
 Jungwon Song, Supra., note 70, pp. 211-2. 
175
 See Ohseung Kwon, Kyoung-Jae-Bub [Economic Law], 6th edn, Bubmunsa, Seoul, 2008, p. 279. 
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only.
176
 Nonetheless, the case law or statute law does not give clear definitions of these terms. 
Some Korean lawyers argue that this provision can create misapplication of the law since 
Article 23 can blame all possible business practices regardless of market power.
177
 This can 
result in administrative abuses of competition law enforcement.  
 
3.4.3.2. Prohibitions of Resale Price Maintenance 
 
Article 29 in Chapter 7 of the MRFTA proscribes RPM which could fall into one or more of 
the categories constituting UBPs.
178
 Article 29(1) seems to be a per se rule on minimum RPM 
according to Guidelines of the review resale price maintenance (RPM Guidelines).
179
 This 
legislation may be the influence of ex Article 14 of the German Gesetz gegen 
Wettbewerbsbeschänkungen (GWB). This provision is unique since there are not many 
regimes which have RPM provisions. The criteria of violation of RPM provision are: (i) a 
price arrangement between up- and downstream firms;
180
 and (ii) a degree of coerciveness in 
the practice.
181
 However, this provision shall not apply to a case where there exist justifiable 
reasons in terms of maximum RPM. Moreover, the provisions of Article 29(1) shall not apply 
to literary works prescribed under the Article 43 of Enforcement Decree.
182
 In addition, an 
enterprise can get exemption through KFTC authorisation where its products meet the 
following conditions: (i) the uniform quality of the commodity concerned is easily 
identifiable; (ii) the commodity concerned is used daily by ordinary customers; and (iii) free 
competition exists with respect to the commodity concerned.
183
  
 
                                                 
176
 E.g., Jungsan Co v KFTC, Supreme Court 89DaKa29075, Apr. 10, 1990. The Court stated that the 
reasonableness shall be assessed by the perspective of fair competitiveness rather than the need of business 
practice. See also Meong Cho Yang, Kyoung-Jae-Bub-Kang-Ui [Lectures on Competition Law], 6th edn, 
Shinchosa, Seoul, 2008, p. 199.  
177
 See Young-Chul Lim, Gong-Jung-Go-Rae-Bub [Korean Competition law], Bubmunsa, Seoul, 2007, p. 301. 
178
 Seung-Wha Chang, Supra., note 138, p. 279. 
179
 Guidelines for review resale price maintenance, KFTC Established rule No. 34 enacted on Aug. 30, 2006. 
180
 The KFTC only articulated the criteria of deciding independent agency relationship in up- and downstream 
levels, e.g., Daeha Fashion Corp., KFTC Decision 96-193, 9607Choil1105, Aug. 21, 1996. 
181
 See Won-Ki Kim and Su-Young Park, Dok-Jum-Kyu-Jae-Bub [Korean Anti-trust Law], Daemyoung 
Publishing, Seoul, 2007, 409; Ohseung Kwon, Supra., note 175, pp. 345-6. Kim and Park illustrate the examples 
of coercive means in the Korean regime, such as warning, imposing fines of breach of contract, refusal to supply, 
termination of contracts, or rebates. 
182
 Art. 29(2) MRFTA and Category of RPM Literary Works of KFTC Guidelines No. 2002-15, Dec. 2002. This 
provision is similar to Art. 23(4) AML, the exemption of RPM on literary works. 
183
 Arts. 29(2) and (4) MRFTA.  
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Upon petition by an interested party, the KFTC will designate in advance the products 
that fall within these exemptions, and can publish that determination. However, the resale 
pricing of products on the KFTC’s exempted list is still subject to KFTC supervision. When a 
seller has determined the RPM and wishes to enter into a contract specifying the price, he 
must inform the KFTC of the contract’s details.
184
 The KFTC may order the seller to change 
the contract if it may harm the interests of consumers or otherwise be adverse to public 
interest. This individual exemption becomes scaled down. Only two products, cosmetics 
(1981) and pharmaceutical products (1985), were authorised by the KFTC as falling under 
exemptions. However, the KFTC later rescinded both designations, in 1985 and 1987 
respectively. Since then, the KFTC has virtually applied a per se rule to RPM of all 
products.
185
 
 
 
3.5. Concluding Remarks 
 
This chapter observed general issues and problems in vertical restraints based on economics 
and a comparative study. Article 3-2 MRFTA prevents vertical practices such as refusal to 
deal, exclusive dealing, and tying. Article 23 also sets a yardstick for vertical restraints by 
categorising certain types of UBPs. The problem of implementation arises whether the KFTC 
shall apply Article 3-2 or 23 if a large enterprise violates both. Most commentators agree that 
the KFTC puts a higher priority on applying Article 3-2 to cases of abusive conduct than 
Article 23, therefore Article 3-2 should be applied foremost. There are two rationales as 
grounds for this.
186
 First, Article 3-2 is provided for actual abusive conduct limited to large 
enterprises with dominant market positions. Korean competition policy has developed for and 
focused on preventing large business groups’ abusive conduct. Hence, Article 3-2 is the 
special provision prior to Article 23. Second, the Article 3-2 has a limited category of 
application, especially for large enterprises. Since the penalty for violation of Article 3-2 is 
heavier than that in Article 23, it can be plausible for the KFTC to apply Article 3-2 to 
effectively prevent anti-competitive effects that are more influential on the market. In 
addition, the KFTC generally considers RPM as a per se violation with some exemption 
conditions such as Articles 43 (publications) and 44 (procedures for designating products) of 
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 Art. 44 of the Enforcement Decree. 
185
 Seung-Wha Chang, Supra., note 138, pp. 279-80. 
186
 See Ohseung Kwon, Kyoung-Jae-Bub [Economic Law], 5th edn, Bubmunsa, Seoul, 2005, p. 335. 
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Enforcement Decree. Article 29(1) MRFTA also states that the law shall not apply to the case 
of maximum RPM. The anti-competitiveness of recommended RPM shall be, then, decided 
on whether the price scheme is coercive.
187
 However, minimum RPM is prohibited as illegal 
per se.  
 
The KFTC has focused on the development of competition law measures in order to 
regulate the market power of large enterprises. Large business groups could leverage their 
powers to enter a market or strengthen their position in the global market. If the Korean 
market is somewhat closed and the entry barriers are not a reflection of government restraints, 
they can be a reflection of private restraints. Therefore, if the KFTC does nothing to eliminate 
these restraints, other regimes may sue offending Korean enterprises in their territories under 
their competition laws, such as happened between the US and Japan.
188
 Considering all of 
these, the ideology of economics and a comparative study give further indication of the 
current implementation of the MRFTA. Most of the legal provisions on vertical restraints and 
case law were left rather underdeveloped in Korea, although the aims of both regulating 
concentration of market power, and enhancing competition, are featured. The major task of 
the competition authority is how to make the domestic market more competitive without 
hindering international trade. The next chapter will discuss this issue through a critical 
assessment of case studies. 
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 E.g., Daeha Fashion Co., KFTC Decision 96-193, 9607Choil1105, Aug. 21, 1996; amyang Co., KFTC 
Decision 98-112, 9804Dokkwan0559, June 9, 1998. The KFTC examined the actual coercive conducts of the 
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188
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4.1. Overview 
 
The Korea Fair Trade Commission (KFTC) used to be attacked for its lethargic application of 
Article 3-2 Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act (MRFTA). It has not set sufficient 
guidance and application of the relevant law on vertical restraints. The total number of 
Article 3-2 cases for the last ten years is 51, and 37 of them were made in 2007, as shown in 
the table below. On the other hand, the number of Article 23 violations is 3,065 during the 
same period. 
 Article 3-2 MRFTA Article 19 MRFTA Article 23 MRFTA 
1998 5 37 407 
1999 2 34 172 
2000 - 47 121 
2001 4 42 169 
2002 - 47 210 
2003 1 23 123 
2004 - 35 298 
2005 - 46 481 
2006 2 46 369 
2007 37 44 715 
Total 51 401 3,065 
 
Figure 4.1. umber of cases by types of violation (Source: The KFTC 2008 Annual Report)
1
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 KFTC, 2008 Annual Report, p. 112: http://eng.ftc.go.kr (accessed 5 Dec. 2008). 2008 data are not available. 
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This indicates that the KFTC relies heavily on Article 23 application rather than 3-2, 
because Article 23 catches all cases, which appears to be without economic rationale. 
Economic theories on vertical restraints have evolved and influenced Korean competition 
policy as much as other competition regimes. These theories helped the KFTC provide the 
Unfair Business Practice (UBP) and the Resale Price Maintenance (RPM) guidelines. In 
addition, the Seoul High Court (appeal court) and the Supreme Court of Korea started 
considering economic principles that have been discussed in the competition courts in other 
countries. It seems, however, that the KFTC and the courts have not established sufficient 
level of economic thought in vertical cases. In particular, economic arguments can be hardly 
observed in the vertical case decisions and judgments although anti-competitive harm is most 
likely to occur in markets where the gains from vertical restraints are ignored. Before 
encountering the problems in vertical regulation in the MRFTA, this chapter will present a 
critical analysis of KFTC decisions and case law regarding practices to which both Articles 3-
2 and 23 could be applicable, such as refusal to deal, tie-ins, exclusive dealing, territorial 
restriction, and RPM. This chapter will assess the implementation of the law on vertical 
restraints and court judgments in Korea through economics, and a comparative study with 
reference to the US, the EC, and Japan. It will be discussed how and by what means the 
KFTC and the courts have been able to establish the approach to vertical restraints, and what 
the outcomes will be from current legal approaches, such as development of the rule of 
reason and per se rule. This chapter will then conclude with a question of desirable proposal 
reform to the vertical regulation. The requests and proposals for reform will be further 
discussed in the next two chapters.  
 
 
4.2. Refusal to Deal  
 
4.2.1. Establishment of Relevant Provisions and Problems 
 
Refusal to deal can be attacked under Article 3-2 MRFTA, accordingly ‘the provision of 
unfair interfering business clause’.
2
 There is a problem of application of Articles 3-2 and 23 
                                                 
2
  A breach of contract in franchising without proper reason can also infringe the law, e.g., Lotteria Ltd v KFTC, 
Supreme Court 2002Du332, Mar. 10, 2006. 
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MRFTA because Article 23 can be also applied in a refusal to deal case regardless of market 
power. The KFTC prevents refusal to deal mostly under Article 23, because it is easier for the 
KFTC to apply this catch-all provision.
3
 In particular, these provisions do not distinguish 
between horizontal or vertical and unilateral or concerted practices. Section 1 of the 
Enforcement Decree
4
 Appendix 1 defines that an unreasonable refusal to transact under 
Article 23 implies two kinds of refusal to deal, collective and other types of refusals to deal.
5
 
The collective refusal to deal is mostly related to horizontal arrangements,
6
 and the other 
types of refusal to deal can be considered as unilateral vertical restraint. The unilateral refusal 
to deal is defined as an unreasonable refusal to initiate business, suspend transaction, or 
significantly restrict the quantity, nature of commodities, and services in transaction with 
regard to a certain enterprise in a continuous transaction relation.
7
  
 
The KFTC adopts the rule of reason to this type of refusal to deal.
8
 Under UBP 
Guidelines, the KFTC examines whether there is any anti-competitive effect in that practice 
such as essentiality of supply, difficulties in finding substitute goods, potential entry barrier, 
and methods of coercing other anti-competitive behaviours.
9
 If there is any objective 
justification, such as lack of supply ability or improvement of efficiency and consumer 
                                                 
3
 See Jae-Hyoung Lee, Regulations on Refusal to Deal and Economic Analysis, Korea Development Institute, 
Seoul, 2005, p. 21; Sang-Yong Park and Ki-Sup Um, Kyoung-Jae-Bub-Wol-Lon [The Principle of Economic 
Law], 2nd edn, Parkyoungsa, Seoul, 2006, p. 274. 
4
 Enforcement Decree of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act amended by Presidential Decree, Dec. 3, 
2008. 
5
 This is stipulated in the first half of subpara. 1 of Art. 23(1) MRFTA. 
6
 Most collective refusal cases have been covered by Art. 19 MRFTA since Art. 19 is foremost applied under the 
sec. V.1.A.(2) of the UBP Guidelines, e.g., Four Department Stores, KFTC Decision 2002-340, 
2002Yougo1083, Nov. 28, 2002; Eight Cosmetics companies, KFTC Decision 2002-369, 2002Danchae1701, 
Dec. 24, 2002. Some scholars argue that there is a difference between Arts. 19 and 23 regarding collective 
refusals since Art. 19 covers agreements which inhibit competition between competitors but Art. 23 covers 
acquiescence of hindering third parties regardless horizontal or vertical. However, in practice, this distinction is 
not very significant. The KFTC considers that a collective refusal to deal creates serious distortion of 
competition. Thus, the KFTC regards it as quasi-per se violation, e.g., Seven Banks refusal to deal against 
Samsung Card Co., KFTC Decision 2002-001, 2001Dokjom2503, Jan. 8, 2002. In this case, the KFTC decided 
banks’ collective refusal to deal against Samsung Card as quasi-per se illegal by considering serious effects of 
raising rivals’ cost. See also Ki-Su Lee and Jin-Hee Ryu, Kyoung-Jae-Bub [Anti-trust and Consumer Law], 7th 
edn, Sechang Publishing, Seoul, 2006, pp. 208-9. 
7
 E.g., Hanil Co., KFTC Decision 94-196, 9405Kusa326, July 14, 1994, affirmed by the Seoul High Court 
94Gu34120, Dec. 14, 1995; Coca-Cola Korea Co., KFTC Decision 97-133, 9704Kyungchok0614, Aug. 27, 
1997 and appealed Coca-Cola Korea Co. v. KFTC, Seoul High Court 97Ku53139, Oct. 1998; Supreme Court 
98Du17869, Jan. 5, 2001. The KFTC examined the anti-competitive refusal to deal as an essential facility 
strategy in Coca-Cola. The Seoul High Court upheld the KFTC’s decision. However, the Supreme Court 
reversed the High Court’s ruling. 
8
 See Jungwon Song, Ca-Ru-Tel-Mit-Bul-Gong-Jung-Go-Rae-Hang-Wi-Kyu-Jae [Regulations on Cartels and 
Unfair Business Practices], Pakyoungsa, Seoul, 2005, p. 225. 
9
 Sec. V.I.B.(2)(C) of the UBP Guidelines 
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welfare, which weighs over anti-competitive harms, the refusal to deal can be investigated 
under the rule of reason. Moreover, if an enterprise satisfies the threshold of 10 per cent 
market share or two billion Korean Won (KRW) of yearly turnover, it may get benefits of 
exemption according to the safety zone.
10
  
 
The criteria of exemption clauses, however, do not clarify how much the degree of 
anti-competitiveness shall be prohibited. Thus it is difficult for firms to presume benefits 
from exemption. The only way to understand the degree of exemption criteria is to observe a 
case-by-case basis.
11
 In particular, there is no sufficient guidance as to whether Article 3-2 or 
23 should be applicable under current law, which may confuse practitioners. In the most 
recent cases, enterprises with a significant market share were not blamed for Article 3-2 
violation. The reason is that the courts do not explicitly state the evidence of market share to 
decide whether an enterprise violated Article 23 or not. They implicitly assess market power 
of the enterprise as a crucial element in the case, only where its practice would make a certain 
enterprise bear business difficulties or create significant anti-competitive effects.
12
 With 
regards to abuse of dominance in vertical cases, it is questionable why there are not many 
cases of application of Article 3-2 to refusal to deal. Article 3-2 would prevent more anti-
competitive conduct at the vertical level. However, the KFTC is not keen to implement 
Article 3-2 rather than Article 23, for its convenience of catching all the possible 
infringement of competition law.
13
 This has caused problems of application of law.  
 
4.2.2. Critical Assessment of Current Application of Article 23 MRFTA: Coca-Cola 
 
A leading case of refusal to deal scrutinised under Article 23 MRFTA is Coca-Cola, Co. 
(present Coca-Cola Korea Co., hereafter Coca-Cola).
14
 In this case, the KFTC concluded that 
Coca-Cola infringed Article 23 for its refusal to deal with Bumyang Co. Bumyang was a 
Korean distributor of Coca-Cola. It had produced Coca-Cola products under the ‘bottler 
                                                 
10
 Sec. V.1.B.(4) of the UBP Guidelines. Collective refusal to deal may also get a safety zone exemption under 
sec. V.1.A.(4) of the Guidelines. 
11
 Jungwon Song, Supra., note 8, p. 225. 
12
 See Ho Young Lee, Dok-Jum-Kyu-Jae-Bub-Ui-Ie-Ron-Kwa-Sil-Mu [Theories and Practices in Monopoly 
Regulation and Fair Trade Act], Hongmunsa, Seoul, 2006, p. 223. 
13
 See Kwangshik Shin, Innovating Korea’s Competition Policy, Nanam Publishing, Seoul, 2006, pp. 79-101. 
14
 Coca-Cola Korea Co., KFTC Decision 97-133, 9704Kyungchok0614, Aug. 27, 1997. 
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contract’
15
 which allowed four Korean enterprises to produce and distribute the Coca-Cola 
product under a patent agreement since 1974.  In 1991, Coca-Cola agreed to supply the cola 
syrup to Bumyang until 1996 without any further repeated extensions. Since 1993, Coca-Cola 
had tried to take over the assets of four domestic bottler contractors. However, Bumyang did 
not accept Coca-Cola’s offer because of disagreement on the suggested price for the 
acquisition. Hence, Coca-Cola stopped supplying the cola syrup and trademark as required 
by the 1991 contract.
16
 After Coca-Cola terminated Bumyang’s distributorship, Bumyang 
requested the KFTC’s investigation against Coca-Cola for its violation of Article 23. On 
appeal, the Seoul High Court affirmed the KFTC’s decision, based on the rationale that Coca-
Cola simply abused its position by seeking to obtain Bumyang’s assets.
17
 The High Court 
concluded that Coca-Cola’s conduct was unlawful under Article 23, because it abused its 
position in refusing to supply, and created distortion of competition. The High Court based its 
holding on the fact established at trial that Coca-Cola terminated Bumyang in response to or 
following complaints about the take-over by Coca-Cola.  
 
The Supreme Court, however, overruled the Seoul High Court’s judgement, rooted in 
the reason that refusal to deal in itself does not infringe Article 23, because freedom of 
contract is the basic market principle.
18
 The Court stated that a business practice which has a 
high possibility of driving out or impeding a certain enterprise’s practice by the means of 
anti-competitive intention and its coercion from dominant position constitutes Article 23. In 
this case, however, the contract in 1991 clearly stated that the bottler agreement would expire 
in 1996 and would not be extended. Bumyang also established its own beverage company 
producing its own brand cola after disagreement over an acquisition negotiation with Coca-
Cola. There was no sufficient evidence that Bumyang had no choice but to close its factory 
when Coca-Cola stopped supplying the product. In a word, although Coca-Cola did not 
supply cola syrup, Bumyang could still have produced its own product. Thus, Coca-Cola’s 
refusal to deal was not enough to be blamed as unfair or anti-competitive because Bumyang 
had a capacity of beverage production despite discontinuity of supply. The Court corrected 
                                                 
15
 This ‘bottler contract’ was an agreement between Coca-Cola and the domestic enterprises. Coca-Cola 
supplied beverage source for production, and the domestic manufacturers produced and supplied Coca-Cola in a 
certain area with a monopolistic position. See also Ho Young Lee, Supra., note 12, p. 221. 
16
 However, Bumyang could purchase the product source from Coca-Cola for the court procedure based on the 
KFTC decision until 1998. 
17
 Coca Cola Korea Co. v. KFTC, Seoul High Court 97Ku53139, Oct. 1998. 
18
 Coca Cola Korea Co. v. KFTC, Supreme Court 98Du17869, Jan. 5, 2001. 
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the judgment of the High Court by interpreting the meaning of competition law. The Court 
suggested following three conditions to satisfy Article 23 infringement regarding refusals to 
deal: (i) a high possibility of exclusion of ‘a certain enterprise’ resulting in difficulty of 
business practice; (ii) an intention of abuse of a dominant position, which is different from 
the meaning under Article 3-2; and (iii) a UBP by means of achieving a coercive contract. 
This judgment has influenced the KFTC to create a rule of reason examination under section 
V.1. of the UBP Guidelines.  
 
In the SKC Co. Ltd case,
 19
 the Supreme Court also confirmed the judgment of the 
Seoul High Court, based on the grounds that there was no sufficient evidence that SKC 
ordered its agencies not to supply the relevant products. In the case, SKC supplied raw 
materials and manufactured final goods through its agencies. The KFTC examined whether 
SKC infringed Article 23 by forcing its agents to refuse to supply raw materials to its rivals 
competing in foreign markets. However, the Seoul High Court overruled the KFTC’s 
decision on the grounds that SKC’s competitors received the relevant goods from alternative 
suppliers without any difficulties, after its refusal to supply. Moreover, considering 
production capability of its competitors and market conditions, SKC’s refusal to deal did not 
infringe Article 23 because it did not prohibit competition in the market, nor impede the 
actual business practice of rivals. The courts looked at the effect and reality of the market 
structure and conditions. In Hite Beer Co.,
20
 the Supreme Court also upheld that Hite’s 
refusal to deal did not satisfy the three conditions stated in the Coca-Cola case to be blamed 
as unfair. According to the case law, the courts seem to consider the real impact of refusal to 
deal and market conditions. The courts have defined the meaning of the terminology, 
unfairness, in Article 23. A mere refusal to deal cannot be blamed as anti-competitive 
practice but should satisfy the criteria.  
 
This courts’ approach, however, still seems to focus on unfairness, rather than anti-
competitiveness based on economic theories. In E.I. du Pont de emours & Co. (DuPont 
                                                 
19
 SKC Co. Ltd v. KFTC, Seoul High Court 2000u1494, Jan. 30, 2001; Supreme Court 2001Du1628, Jun. 12, 
2001.  
20
 Hite Beer Co. v. KFTC, Seoul High Court 2002Du11059, July 9, 2004; Supreme Court 2005Du746, May 27, 
2005.  
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Korea),
21
 the Seoul High Court confirmed the KFTC’s decision of DuPont’s violation of 
Article 23. In this case, DuPont’s sudden refusal to deal with its customer’s competitor could 
inhibit competition in the domestic and also the Asian markets. The High Court stated that 
DuPont’s refusal was, in effect, driving out a firm from the market, and the firm could not 
continue business because it would take at least one year to get alternative suppliers. This 
judgment seems to retreat towards unfairness-focus rather than economic principles, by 
emphasising the intent of driving out rivals. DuPont could have received benefits from 
objective justifications such as its lack of supply or unreasonable production for a certain firm 
at a loss. However, its argument was not granted and DuPont had to supply the relevant 
material despite incurring high costs. In conclusion, the courts have indicated that the three 
conditions should be met to attack refusal to deal under Article 23. Nonetheless, the rule of 
reason application was decided based on unfairness of the practice, without sufficient degrees 
of efficiency justification scrutiny from economics. 
 
4.2.3. Critical Assessment of Current Application of Article 3-2 MRFTA: POSCO 
 
The overlapping problems in implementation of Articles 3-2 and 23 MRFTA, especially in 
refusal to deal cases, have long been regarded a confusion to competition lawyers. In 
particular, there has been debate whether a large firm has a duty to deal.
22
 However, there 
was a noteworthy case based on presumption of market dominance. The POSCO judgment 
shows the current development of the case law by the courts.
23
 In this case, POSCO was the 
sole manufacturer of hot coil in the domestic market with a 79.8 per cent market share.
24
 
POSCO refused to supply the relevant product to Hyundai Hysco Co., Ltd, its downstream 
level competitor, despite Hysco’s several requests. Since POSCO possessed almost 80 per 
cent of market share and only 20 per cent of the goods were imported, the KFTC concluded 
that POSCO foreclosed the market and violated Article 3-2. In this case, Article 3-2 rather 
                                                 
21
 DuPont Korea, KFTC Decision 2002-363, 2002Kyoungchok0588, Dec. 23, 2002, appealed, Seoul High Court 
2003u11059, Nov. 25, 2004; Supreme Court 2005Du746, May 27, 2005. The Supreme Court affirmed the 
judgment of the Seoul High Court. 
22
 E.g., Youngil Chemical Corp., KFTC Decision 2001-22, 2000Kyoungchok0929, Jan. 11, 2001; Royal Info 
Tech Corp., KFTC Decision 2006-221, 2005Kyoungchok2649, Oct. 10, 2006. Youngil case was the typical Art. 
3-2 case of a refusal to supply raw materials regarding presumption of market dominance based on market share 
(54.6 per cent).  
23
 POSCO, KFTC Decision 2001-068, 2001Kyoungchok0389, Apr. 12, 2001; POSCO v. KFTC, Seoul High 
Court, 2001u5370, Aug. 27, 2001; Supreme Court, 2002Du8626, Nov. 22, 2007. 
24
 The relevant product was hot coil or hot rolled steel, the intermediary good, which was usually used for 
automotive parts production. 
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than Article 23 was applied since the KFTC relied on market share threshold under Article 4 
MRFTA. It seemed to conclude this because POSCO was one of the large business groups, 
which had to bear the burden of ‘special responsibility’.
25
 
 
 POSCO appealed and argued as followings. Firstly, the hot coil product was not a 
final product but an intermediary one.
26
 Therefore, the market definition of the KFTC was 
wrong. In addition, the geographic market should be defined as the Asian market rather than 
the domestic, because Hysco could import the product from other countries, such as Japan. 
Secondly, criteria of Article 3-2 violation under the Market Dominance Guidelines should be 
narrowed to a case of refusal to deal with an existing customer such as Article 23 
enforcement. Because POSCO did not have a business relationship with Hysco before, it 
should not be blamed for Article 3-2 infringement. Thirdly, POSCO had not sold the 
intermediary hot coil products for automobile manufacture to any other enterprises before, 
and did not discriminate against Hysco. Finally, POSCO’s refusal to deal should be 
objectively justified based on the freedom of trade, and there was a sufficient reason to refuse 
to supply for its incapability of supplying products to Hysco.  
 
The Seoul High Court however denied POSCO’s arguments by stating there were no 
objective justifications, based on the following reasoning. First, POSCO supplied hot coil 
products in the market for general purposes, which was an intermediary good, and had a 
similar characteristic to the hot coil for automotive parts. Therefore, the product market 
definition was correct. Second, the High Court interpreted that refusal to deal not only to 
existing consumers but also to an entrant to the market violates Article 3-2. Third, the 
appellant used to supply the relevant product to other enterprises but refused to supply to only 
Hysco, which constituted a discriminatory practice. Fourth, the appellant’s excuse for the 
scarcity of raw materials to supply could not be sufficient, based on the idea of special 
                                                 
25
 See Bong Eui Lee, ‘Prohibition of Abuse of Market-Dominant Undertakings under the Monopoly Regulation 
and Fair Trade Act’, Journal of Korean Law, 2005, p. 70. The author argues that market dominant enterprises 
are said to have a special responsibility in the Korean market such as in the EC. 
26
 Hot coil for general structure is slightly different from the hot coil for automotive parts in its usage. The 
former is produced for steel structures, bridges, ships, and automobiles, but the latter is solely used in 
automobile frames and wheels for its drawability and weldability. However, this technical argument was not 
deeply discussed. 
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responsibility.
27
 This is because Hysco had to bear a significant cost and risk in importing the 
relevant product.  
 
This High Court’s judgment was, however, reversed by the Supreme Court, since 
POSCO had no abusive practices, although it had a market dominant position. The Court 
focused in the enquiry on whether the practice was unfair. The Supreme Court held that it is 
insufficient to acknowledge unfairness in all cases where a market dominant enterprise 
refuses a specific enterprise. Unfairness should be acknowledged only where a refusal to deal 
can be deemed as perpetrated with intent or the objective of maintaining or reinforcing 
monopolistic status at the market. Therefore, the KFTC had to prove that the enterprise had 
had the intent and objective to cause these outcomes, harming innovation or decreasing a 
number of competitors. The Court concluded that a mere disadvantage suffered due to the 
refusal to deal was not sufficient, and that the practice was not likely to prohibit competition 
because Hysco could satisfy its demand through imports.  
 
This was a landmark judgement since the Court finally defined the scope of 
application of Article 3-2 and meaning of unfairness. The high market share does not, itself, 
infringe the law despite its special responsibility. The KFTC should not consider denial of 
access with market power as per se unlawful, and impose duty to deal that it cannot explain 
or adequately and reasonably supervise.
28
 In this case, the Court affirmed that the principle of 
a market economy is to guarantee the freedom of business activities. The courts and the 
KFTC, however, still need to refine the application of Articles 3-2 and 23. The lack of 
sufficient criteria of examining practices has created legal uncertainty. If the KFTC 
established clear market share threshold guidance, it would be better to apply the relevant 
provision to refusal to deal. It would be, then, easy for the courts to examine whether the 
refusal to deal creates more pro-competitive than anti-competitive effects. Moreover, the 
courts can scrutinise better the real impact of the practice on the market. In addition, they can 
establish the application of the rule of reason in refusal to deal by examining pro-
competitiveness rather than unfairness. 
                                                 
27
 This is the influence of the EC regime, e.g., Case 322/81, V ederlansche Banden-Industrie Michelin v. 
Commission [1983] ECR 3461. 
28
 See Phillip Areeda, ‘Essential Facilities: An Epithet in Need of Limiting Principles’, Antitrust Law Journal, 
Vol. 58, 1989, pp. 852-853. The author illustrates some principles that should limit application of the essential 
facilities concept in the US courts. This may have somewhat influenced the Korean courts. 
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4.3. Tie-in Sales
29
 
 
4.3.1. Critical Assessment of Current Application of Article 23 MRFTA: Korea Land 
 
A tying arrangement exists when a producer sells a product only to those who also buy a 
second product from it. It might foreclose other sellers of the tied product from an 
opportunity to compete.
30
 The KFTC normally recognises tying as a violation under Article 
23 rather than 3-2. Article 23 works as a catch-all provision without consideration of market 
dominance, although tying is theoretically considered as a violation of law, as an abuse of 
market dominance in other competition regimes.
31
 Section 5(1) of the Enforcement Decree 
Appendix 1 categorises tie-in sales as the type of coercion in dealing under Article 23.
32
 It 
defines tie-ins as forcing wrongfully to purchase goods or services.
33
 The KFTC scrutinises 
market power of an enterprise, distinctiveness of the products, and consumers’ behaviour in 
order to decide whether the practice is anti-competitive.
34
 To prove the existence of an illegal 
tying arrangement, the following conditions should be then examined: (i) two separate 
products;
35
 (ii) sufficient market power in the tying market; (iii) influence on substantial 
amounts of commerce in the tied good market; (iv) evidence of coercion;
36
 and (v) anti-
competitive effects.
37
 The KFTC seems to adopt these criteria applied in the US.
38
  
                                                 
29
 Bundling is similar to tying. However, this is a looser concept if an enterprise provides products together in a 
bundle but also sells at least some of the products separately as well. Therefore, only pure bundling can be 
regarded as tying. 
30
 See Phillip Areeda, Louis Kaplow, and Aaron Edlin, Antitrust Analysis: Problems, Text, and Cases, 6th edn, 
Aspen Publishing, New York, 2004, p. 587. 
31
 See Hwang Lee, ‘Tying Arrangement as a Kind of Unfair Trade Practices: Discussions About A Recent Case’, 
Journal of Korean Competition Law, Vol. 14, 2006, p. 247. 
32
 The second half of subpara. 3 of Art. 23(1) MRFTA. 
33
 Some scholars argue that this coercion element should not be applied in franchise tying. See Alan Meese, 
‘Antitrust Balancing in a (Near) Coasean World: The Case of Franchise Tying Contracts’, Michigan Law 
Review, Vol. 95, No. 1, 1996, pp. 160-61.  
34
 Sec. V.5.A.(1) of the UBP Guidelines.  
35
 Ibid., sec. V.5.A.(1)(A). Regarding technological innovation or new product markets, the KFTC shall 
consider overall present technological innovation and market conditions, but it is hard to observe a relevant case 
regarding this at this moment. See also Jungwon Song, Supra., note 8, p. 334.  
36
 This coercion to purchase products is the crucial element in tying litigation. This approach can be also seen in 
the US cases, Atlantic Ref. Co. v. FTC, 381 U.S. 357, 370, 375-376 (1965); FTC v. Texaco, 393 U.S. 223, 228-
229 (1968). See also Phillip Areeda, Louis Kaplow, and Aaron Edlin, Supra., note 30, p. 601. 
37
 For general arguments about criteria, see also Benjamin Klein and Lester Saft, ‘The Law and Economics of 
Franchise Tying Contracts’, Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 28, 1985, p. 345; Herbert Hovenkamp, 
Federal Antitrust Policy: The Law of Competition and Its Practice, 3rd edn, Thomson West, St. Paul, MINN, 
USA, 2005, pp. 397-8.  
38
 See Seung-Wha Chang, ‘Violation Criteria of Tying under the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act’, 
Seoul University Law Journal, Vol. 45, No. 4, 2004, p. 503. 
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In practice, evidence of coercion is the crucial element in Korea. To examine this, the 
KFTC questions whether a consumer may purchase the products or services separately.
39
 The 
KFTC also considers normal commercial practices
40
 and market power, including its anti-
competitiveness and unfairness. A tie-in conduct is not considered as anti-competitive itself 
where its commercial method is regarded as reasonable.
41
 If a tie-in sale is considered as 
common practice and does not create any potential anti-competitive effect or reduction of 
consumer welfare, it will not be regarded as violation. However, the view that tying contracts 
allow the wielding of monopolistic leverage is widely accepted, although wielding 
monopolistic leverage is an ambiguous phrase in the Korean market.
42
  
 
Despite some tying decisions of the KFTC, there have not been enough court 
judgments to guide whether the KFTC’s implementation is correct. Therefore, enterprises 
have problems in how far they can practice tying and not be found in infringement. A current 
judgment of the Supreme Court, however, established the criteria of violation of tying. In the 
Korea Land Corp. case,
43
  the enterprise was the real estate company which used to be a state 
corporation. Korea Land tied two different areas, one of which was popular, but another 
which was not when sold together to construction companies. The KFTC decided that Korea 
Land had a significant market share, 40 per cent, and this power made the construction 
companies purchase unpopular land in order to obtain the desired one. The Seoul High Court 
confirmed the KFTC decision that Korea Land infringed Article 23 for its tying practice. The 
Supreme Court also affirmed the High Court’s judgment, based on the market power of the 
appellant and unfair methods of business activity by tying.  
 
The Court reasoned it was not plausible to expect economic efficiency justifications 
from this tying practice, which might be created in other industries such as research and 
development (R&D), or technological products, since this practice was a simple tying of 
popular and unpopular properties. Korea Land merely coerced construction companies to buy 
                                                 
39
 E.g., Korea Land Corp.v. KFTC, Seoul High Court 2001u16288, Feb. 2004. 
40
 E.g., Carrefour Korea Co., KFTC Decision 97-51, Feb. 26, 1997. 
41
 See Ohseung Kwon, Kyoung-Jae-Bub [Economic Law], 5th edn, Bubmunsa, Seoul, 2005, p. 355. 
42
 This seems the influence from the US. See Ward Bowman, Jr., ‘Tying Arrangements and the Leverage 
Problem’, The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 67, No. 1, 1957, pp. 19-20.  
43
 Korea Land Corp. v. KFTC, Seoul High Court 2001u16288, Feb. 10, 2004; Supreme Court 2004Du3014, 
Mar. 24, 2004. The KFTC established the criteria of tying violation in OBC Gram Corp., KFTC Decision 92-
124, 9209Il438, Oct. 22, 1992. However, the confirmed set of criteria was made in Korea Land. 
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these together, which was considered unfair. The Court’s judgment made it clear by 
confirming criteria for infringement as illustrated above, adding one more condition. A tying 
practice should be considered unfair in light of sound market practices, and questioned 
whether consumers were deprived excessively of opportunities to make free choices.
44
 This 
judgment focused on unfairness by examining the restraint of freedom of choice rather than 
efficiency, which may also improve consumer welfare.
45
 It is difficult to define what 
unfairness means. This clause seems to protect competitors or customers rather than 
competition.  
 
In the case of foreclosure through tying, a firm may continue to earn the full 
monopoly profits and also achieve a dominant position. Efficient rival enterprises will not be 
able to enter the market.
46
 However, tying practices may also improve inter-brand 
competition, reduce transaction costs,
47
 and eliminate free-riding and deterioration in the 
reputation of franchises,
48
 despite anti-competitive effects such as foreclosure or entry 
barriers. Therefore, competition authorities should trade-off the anti- and pro-competitive 
effects. However, this issue was not discussed fully in the courts. Furthermore, the conditions 
of market power in tying violations are not clear. It is also unclear whether the authority 
needs to set another condition to distinguish Article 3-2 and 23 enforcements. To infringe 
Article 3-2 MRFTA, the firm should satisfy the criteria of Article 4 MRFTA. Nonetheless, 
the MRFTA does not clearly explain what the minimum level of market dominance is in 
order to apply Article 23 in a tying case. This problem has again caused overlapping issues in 
Articles 3-2 and 23, which may confuse the courts and lawyers,
49
 as has happened recently. 
  
4.3.2. Critical Assessment of Current Application of Article 3-2 MRFTA: Microsoft 
 
There was also a significant KFTC decision on a tie-in practice taken after the Supreme 
Court’s Article 23 judgment which eventually brought up the overlapping problem. The 
KFTC found that Microsoft Corp. infringed both Articles 3-2 and 23 based on the fact that it 
                                                 
44
 For further details, see Hwang Lee, Supra., note 31, p. 284. 
45
 Ho Young Lee, Supra., note 12, p. 255. 
46
 See Barry Nalebuff, ‘Exclusionary Bundling’, The Antitrust Bulletin, Vol. 50, No.3, 2005, p. 327.  
47
 In many cases, consumers are interested in the package or assembled product rather than individual parts and 
components, which reduces transaction costs. See ABA, Antitrust Law and Economics of Product Distribution, 
ABA Publishing, Chicago, 2006, p. 192. 
48
 Alan Meese, Supra., note 33, p. 119. 
49
 E.g., SK Telecom Corp., KFTC Decision 2007-044, 2006Sokyoung0785, Feb. 6, 2007. 
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tied (i) Windows server system and Windows Media Service, (ii) Windows XP and Windows 
Media Player, and (iii) Windows XP and MSN.
50
 The KFTC decided that Microsoft coerced 
consumers to buy other products by abusing its dominant position in the Windows PC system 
market, and restricted consumers’ choice to have a better quality product.
51
 Moreover, 
Microsoft impeded competition by tying and drove out its rivals by establishing entry barriers. 
This decision was similar to that of the EC. The Court of First Instance (CFI) affirmed the 
findings by the EC Commission that Microsoft abused its dominance and violated Article 82 
EC.
52
 The major findings of violation in Korea and the EC were, therefore, that Microsoft 
made its own media player and bundled it with its operating system, effectively foreclosing 
its rivals from the market.
53
  
 
The KFTC examined whether the efficiency benefits outweighed anti-competitive 
effects, and it concluded that Microsoft’s practice did not create a considerable efficiency-
improvement. This KFTC’s approach seemed to follow the criteria in Korea Land. Its 
rationale was that tying can be used to preserve a monopoly position in the tying market by 
deterring the entry of efficient suppliers as stated in Korean Land, although the Microsoft 
case was different, dealing with technological products in the new economy.
54
 Microsoft 
argued that its tying could create a significant efficiency from reducing transaction costs of 
distribution, improving other software programmes, thereby benefiting service providers and 
consumers. However, the KFTC denied these arguments, based on two main reasons. First, 
transaction costs could be reduced by installation of other media players or messenger 
programmes. Moreover, a transaction cost of software distribution is trivial nowadays. Thus, 
in the PC market, the transaction cost reduction should be ignored. Second, applied software 
                                                 
50
 Microsoft Co., KFTC Decision 2006-042, 2002Kyoungchok0452 and 2005Kyoungchok0375, Feb. 24, 2006. 
The KFTC ordered Microsoft to unbundle tied products and to install Media Centre and Messenger Centre, 
through which download links to competitors' products are provided, with a surcharge of 32.49 billion KRW.  
51
 For further discussion about consumer choice and quality disputes, see Benjamin Klein and Kevin Murphy, 
‘Vertical Restraints as Contract Enforcement Mechanisms’, Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 31, No. 2, 
1988, pp. 266; Robert Lande, ‘Consumer Choice As The Ultimate Goal of Antitrust’, University of Pittsburgh 
Law Review, Vol. 62, 2001, pp. 511-4; ABA, Supra., note 47, pp. 193-4.  
52
 Microsoft Corp v Commission, Case T-201/04, [2007] ECR II-000, [2007] 5 CMLR 846. For further 
discussion, see Robert O’Donoghue and Jorge Padilla, The Law and Economics of Article 82 EC, Hart 
Publishing, Oxford and Portland Oregon, USA, 2006, pp. 496-500. 
53
 See Eleanor Fox, ‘Competition Law’ in Andreas Lowenfeld, International Economic Law, 2nd edn, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2008, p. 436. 
54
 See Denis Carlton and Michael Waldman, ‘The Strategic Use of Tying to Preserve and Create Market Power 
in Evolving Industries’, The RAD Journal of Economics, Vol. 33, No. 2, 2002, pp. 150-51; Barry Nalebuff, 
‘Bundling as an Entry Barrier’, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 119, 2004, p. 183. However, the 
authors argue that the use of tying to preserve a monopoly position will be most important in industries 
characterised by substantial innovation where product lifetimes are short. 
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programme development from tying could have been also made where another enterprise tied 
Microsoft products with its own products.  
 
The KFTC’s rationale was not fully examined objectively. There were no sufficient 
data of transaction costs in software distribution, and it would thus be difficult to find 
whether the transaction cost reduction was trivial or not. Moreover, the assumption of tying 
Microsoft products with other firms’ products cannot be made normally in practice. Therefore, 
the decision was correct but the reasoning was wrong. It would be more rational if the KFTC 
had concluded that this was the dominant firm’s strategy of remaining dominant in a software 
industry undergoing rapid technological change in a newly emerging market, rather than 
mere tying based on non-plausible grounds. Microsoft could preserve its market power in the 
primary market.
55
 This tying could make the prospects of successful entry less certain, by 
discouraging rivals from investing and innovating. This practice might reduce consumer and 
total economic welfare.
56
 However, this anti-competitive rationale, based on economics, was 
not discussed. 
 
In addition, this decision was very remarkable in its application of both Articles 3-2 
and 23. The KFTC had never applied both provisions to a single case before. However, this 
decision proved that the KFTC can be confused in application of law, since there is no clear 
guidance of distinction for application. This implementation can be compared with that of the 
Japan Fair Trade Commission (JFTC). The AML contains two provisions for tying practices: 
monopolisation clause under the first half paragraph of Article 3 AML, and UBP clause 
under Article 19. The monopolisation clause basically follows the section 2 of the US 
Sherman Act. The UBP clause inherited unfair methods of competition, again, the US Federal 
Trade Commission (FTC) Act, section 5. The US FTC has for years been applying section 5 
of the FTC Act in a manner consistent with section 2 of the Sherman Act. In contrast, the 
JFTC and the KFTC have maintained UBP standards as being distinct from monopolisation 
standards, and thus more flexible. For the most cases, the JFTC, like the KFTC, applies the 
UBP clause rather than monopolisation. This legal provision can be applied to most 
enterprises that are lacking market power. However, it is not always the case. For example, 
                                                 
55
 Ibid., Dennis Carlton and Michael Waldman, pp. 209-16. 
56
 See Jay Pil Choi and Christodoulos Stefanadis, ‘Tying, Investment, and the Dynamic Leverage Theory’, The 
RAD Journal of Economics, Vol. 32, No. 1, 2001, pp. 52-4. 
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the Japanese case concerning Microsoft
57
 had market power but UBP provision was applied. 
Some critics argue that the JFTC had to apply the globally accepted monopolisation clause 
rather than the easier Japanese UBP rule.
58
 By comparison with the EC and the JFTC, the 
KFTC’s decision was unclear as to whether its application of both provisions was justifiable. 
Because there is no clear judgment of the courts, it will be a controversial matter. However, 
the KFTC should have applied only one of the provisions in the Microsoft case, and it had to 
be Article 3-2 rather than 23.  
 
4.3.3. Critical Assessments in Tie-in Sale Cases from Economic Debates  
 
In the US, illegal tying by a dominant firm has been easier to prove, because it has been 
subject to a modified per se rule. Plaintiffs prevail upon proof that the defendant had 
significant market power over the tying product, that it used this power to force buyers to 
accept a tied product, and that the tying involves a significant amount of commerce. This 
modified per se rule dispenses with the need to prove that competition in the tied product is 
distorted.
59
 In other words, a monopolist can leverage their monopoly power into another 
market and raise prices above the competitive level in the second market. The major 
competition law concern about tying is, therefore, whether a monopolist uses its market 
power in the tying product market to increase its power in the other markets.
60
 However, 
there are several potential pro-competitive benefits from tie-ins: (i) enhancing market entry; 
(ii) maintaining quality reputations;
61
 and (iii) improving producers’ informational flow on 
technologically sophisticated products.
62
  
 
                                                 
57
 In Microsoft Japan, JFTC Decision, Dec. 14, 1998, Shinketushu 45-153, the JFTC found that the firm had 
violated UBP provision rather than Art. 3 AML for its tying license of the word processing software and the 
license of scheduler. For further detail, see Masako Wakui, Antimonopoly Law: Competition Law and Policy in 
Japan, Arima Publishing, Suffolk, 2008, pp. 146-7. 
58
 See Toshaki Takiagawa, ‘A Comparative Analysis of U.S., EU, and Japanese Microsoft Cases: How to 
Regulate Exclusionary Conduct by a Dominant Firm in a Network Industry’, The Antitrust Bulletin, Vol. 50, No. 
2, 2005, p. 261. 
59
 Eleanor Fox, Supra., note 53, p. 435. 
60
 See Simon Bishop and Mike Walker, The Economics of EC Competition Law: Concepts, Application and 
Measurement, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2000, 109-11; Keith Hylton, Antitrust Law: Economic Theory and 
Common Law Evolution, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003, pp. 279-81.  
61
 See Richard Posner, ‘The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis’, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 
Vol. 127, 1979, p. 927.  
62
 See Lawrence Sullivan and Warren Grimes, The Law of Antitrust: An Integrated Handbook, 2nd edn, 
Thomson West, St. Paul MINN, USA, 2006, p. 426. 
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There are additional explanations of benefits from tying. Tying can be used by 
enterprises producing a wide variety of products and services, and used to sell products at the 
distribution level. The widespread use of tying by enterprises in highly competitive markets 
suggests that tying yields benefits for both enterprises and consumers. Tying can be also used 
as a means to reduce the transaction costs involved in purchasing, distributing, and selling 
goods and services. It can enable enterprises to achieve economies of scale or scope in 
production and distribution, and allow them to package and market integrated and compatible 
products to consumers. Moreover, tied products can be cheaper to produce or distribute 
together, or can be more valuable to the consumer if the supplier bundles them than if the 
consumer does.
63
  
 
In a market where enterprises can exercise monopoly power, tying can have anti-
competitive uses. If tying can generate efficiency-promoting functions, it could also promote 
the anti-competitive functions associated with such practices. The pursuit of profit-
maximising goals by a firm with market power can be, however, inconsistent with 
consumers’ interest,
64
 and this brought the KFTC’s concerns about consumer protection in 
Microsoft. Tying can be also a means of raising prices for the tied package or of being an 
entry barrier,
65
 which is one of the major concerns of the KFTC. Because tying can be an 
efficient practice in spite of market power, any rational competition evaluation of tying must 
simultaneously consider both the strategic anti-competitive and efficiency reasons for its 
use.
66
 Tying can be also used not just to extend market power into tied markets, but also to 
preserve and create market power in the tying market and newly emerging markets. In other 
words, tying can be one of the tools the firm employs to retain market dominance. To 
summarise, the welfare implication of tying is, in general, ambiguous. Therefore, there seems 
to be a consensus emerging amongst economists that tying should not be treated as violation 
                                                 
63
 See Einer Elhauge and Damien Geradin, Global Competition Law and Economics, Hart Publishing, Oxford, 
2007, pp. 504-5. 
64
 See Eleanor Fox, ‘The Modernization of Antitrust: A New Equilibrium’ in Thomas Sullivan (ed), The 
Political Economy of the Sherman Act: The First One Hundred Years, Oxford University Press, New York and 
Oxford, 1991, pp. 272-3. The author argues that a view of efficiency defined by business autonomy is 
inappropriate for competition policy. 
65
 See John Kwoka and Lawrence White (eds), The Antitrust Revolution: Economics, Competition, and Policy, 
4th edn, Oxford University Press, New York, 2004, p. 327. 
66
 Keith Hylton, Supra., note 60, pp. 283-4; Robert Hahn, ‘Introduction’ in Robert Hahn (ed), Antitrust Policy 
and Vertical Restraints, AEI, Washington D.C., 2006, p. 12. The Chicago and Post-Chicago Schools’ 
explanations also apply with equal force to the use of tying by enterprises with market power. Enterprises with 
market power can use tying for other reasons, for example, as a price discrimination device or a way to 
internalise pricing externalities in the presence of complementary goods. 
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per se, and the competition authorities should balance possible efficiency effects against 
potential anti-competitive ones.
67
 If a firm does not have market power, its tie-in practices 
should not be blamed for violation of the law. Nevertheless, the KFTC and courts do not 
establish the most important criteria for tie-in enforcement. Since tying by a firm without 
market dominance cannot create anti-competitive effects, the KFTC needs to sufficiently 
examine whether there are any leverage effects. For instance, in the Wedding Blanc case,
68
  
although the KFTC recognised the enterprise’s market power was not very significant in 
leveraging its power into another market, and there was no lock-in effect, it simply decided 
its tying wedding service with make-up and dress rental infringed Article 23. The KFTC 
should change its current approach. It should keep Article 3-2 for preventing anti-competitive 
tying practices, and withdraw the tying clause in Article 23. Besides, the courts should 
examine tying cases based on economics rather than fairness. Then, the courts can better 
develop the rule of reason. 
 
 
4.4. Exclusive Dealing and Territorial Restriction 
 
4.4.1. Transaction Based upon Restrictive Conditions under Article 23 MRFTA 
 
Section 7 of the Enforcement Decree Appendix 1 defines the prohibition on anti-competitive 
unfair practices based on restrictive conditions as exclusive dealing and territorial restriction. 
Because the MRFTA defines these as one category of enforcement, these practices will be 
discussed together. It explains that this type of restriction is as stipulated in the first half of 
subparagraph 5 of Article 23(1) MRFTA. Article 3-2 MRFTA also prohibits these. However, 
there have been fewer cases under Article 3-2 than Article 23.
69
 The MRFTA prohibits 
exclusive dealing as establishing conditions of not trading with competitors, including 
potential entrants. The KFTC investigates exclusive dealing under UBP Guidelines as to 
                                                 
67
 Denis Carlton and Michael Waldman, Supra., note 54, p. 197; Jay Pil Choi, ‘Antitrust Analysis of Tying 
Arrangements’ in Jay Pil Choi (ed), Recent Developments in Antitrust: Theory and Evidence, The MIT Press, 
Cambridge MA, USA and London, 2007, p. 81. 
68
 Wedding Blanc, KFTC Decision 2007-057, 2006Busa1966, May 26, 2007. 
69
 There are some Article 3-2 cases of exclusive dealing, e.g., Korean Air Lines Co., Ltd, KFTC Decision 90-14, 
July 6, 1990; Dongyang Beer Co., KFTC Decision 93106, 9306Dok343, July 22, 1993; Korea Tobacco and 
Ginseng Co., Ltd, KFTC Decision 98-51, Mar. 11, 1998. For further details about the cases, see Ohseung Kwon, 
Supra., note 41, pp. 173-4. 
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whether the practice creates vertical foreclosure.
70
 It also examines the enterprise’s market 
share, the number of competitors, the period of exclusive dealings, and its combination with 
other vertical restraints with exemption conditions. The UBP Guidelines thus provide 
objective justifications that exclusive dealing does not violate competition law where it is 
necessary to maintain its technical and specialised character of goods and services, or to 
improve inter-brand competition and enhance consumer welfare. Moreover, if an enterprise 
provides obvious evidence of preventing free-riding and creating efficiency, its practice will 
be justified under the rule of reason.
71
 With regards to territorial restriction, the KFTC also 
examines improvement of inter-brand competition and investigates it by the rule of reason. 
As in exclusive dealing provisions, the KFTC shall scrutinise the market share and number of 
competitors in the market, considering this in combination with anti-competitive activities 
such as RPM and other non-price restraints.
72
 
 
The KFTC relies on market share as one of the important measures for deciding 
market power in these restraints. Although some scholars argue that the KFTC does not 
regard market share as crucial, market share threshold tests seem to function as the foremost 
measure for scrutiny for UBP enforcement. The KFTC also considers overall vertical 
foreclosure effects and possibilities of excluding competitors.
73
 However, there have not been 
enough cases to consider the KFTC’s consistent decision-making for these types of 
restraint.
74
 Some commentators criticise the UBP Guidelines for only listing the criteria of 
exemption which may result in strait-jacket effects. Therefore, the KFTC should refer to 
other competition regimes’ cases, and also consider market power of enterprises through 
apprehensible market definition
75
 and degree of entry barriers.
76
 However, it is burdensome 
for the KFTC to define the relevant market in every UBP case. It seems to create significant 
administrative costs whenever the KFTC has to do a clear market definition for applying 
Article 23.
77
 Whether it is appropriate to use market share as a proxy for market power 
                                                 
70
 Sec. V.7.A.(2) of the UBP Guidelines. 
71
 Sec. V.7.A.(2)(C) of the UBP Guidelines. 
72
 Secs. V.7.B.(2) and (3) of the UBP Guidelines. 
73
 E.g., sec. V.7.B.(4) of the UBP Guidelines, examples of violation. 
74
 Jungwon Song, Supra., note 8, pp. 424-6. 
75
 E.g., Muhak and Daesun Distilling v. KFTC, Seoul High Court 2003u2252, Oct. 27, 2004.  
76
 Jungwon Song, Supra., note 8, p. 429.  
77
 E.g. Interpark G Market Corp., KFTC Decision 2007-555, 2006Sukyoung4846, Dec. 18, 2007. The firm 
argued that the market definition was wrongful in the KFTC’s narrow definition of the internet open market. 
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strongly depends on the quality of definition of the relevant market,
78
 and it is riskier for the 
KFTC to lose in the appeal court than not provide a good definition. Furthermore, there are 
many criticisms against this unclear practice of a 10 per cent safety zone for exemption. 
Some commentators argue that the KFTC should increase the market share threshold to 30 
per cent as applied in the EC, or 25 per cent as in most US courts.
79
 Therefore, the KFTC has 
two tasks, developing market definition and clear market share threshold. 
 
4.4.2. Exclusive Dealing as Transaction of Restrictive Condition: Korean Air Lines 
 
Exclusive dealing is a contract between a supplier and a buyer forbidding the buyer from 
purchasing a contracted good from any other seller, or requiring the buyer to place all of his 
needs in the contracted product.
80
 This can be defined as a contractual requirement by which 
retailers or distributors promise a supplier that they will not handle the goods of competing 
producers.
81
 Such agreements have possible anti-competitive effects, such as increasing the 
credibility of the threat to exclude rivals and entry deterrence,
82
 despite possibly promoting 
efficiency.
83
 One frequently cited motive for exclusive dealing is also the desire to create or 
enhance market power.
84
 The Korean Air Lines Co., Ltd (KAL) case demonstrates the 
KFTC’s approach to exclusive dealing, from these concerns.
85
 When KAL started a new 
marketing scheme, a mileage service called Sky Pass, it made agreements with credit card 
companies to increase and maintain its market share, which was slightly over 50 per cent of 
the domestic airline market.  
 
                                                 
78
 See Luc Peeperkorn and Vincent Verouden, ‘The Economics of Competition’ in Jonathan Faull and Ali 
Nikpay (eds), The EC Law of Competition, 2nd edn, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007, p. 58. 
79
 Jungwon Song, Supra., note 8, p. 440. 
80
 See Phillip Areeda and Herbert Hovenkamp, Fundamentals of Antitrust Law, Vol. II, Aspen Law & Business, 
New York and Gaithersburg, 2002, p. 835. 
81
 See Howard Marvel, ‘Exclusive Dealing’, Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 25, No. 1, 1982, p. 1. 
82
 See William Comanor and Harry Frech III, ‘The Competitive Effects of Vertical Agreements?’, The American 
Economic Review, Vol. 75, No. 3, 1985, p. 544. 
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 Einer Elhauge and Damien Geradin, Supra., note 63, p. 454. This can be observed in utility markets, e.g., 
Hanaro Communications Corp., KFTC Decision 2002-001, 2001Dokjom2656, Jan. 5, 2002; Thrunet Corp., 
KFTC Decision 2002-002, 2001Dokjom2658, Jan. 5, 2002. 
84
 See Douglas Bernheim and Michael Whinston, ‘Exclusive Dealing’, The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 
106, No. 1, 1998, p. 77. 
85
 Korean Air Lines Co., Ltd, KFTC Decision 2000-79, 2000YuGoe0018, May 25, 2000. There were similar 
cases of exclusive dealing through membership systems, e.g., Shinsegi Communications Corp., KFTC Decision 
2001-123, 2001Dokjom1510, Aug. 23, 2001; SK Telecom Corp., KFTC Decision 2001-127, 2001Dokjom1507, 
Sept. 10, 2001. 
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KAL then prevented its coordinating credit card enterprises from making a similar 
mileage plan with its competitor, Asiana Airlines Inc. KAL made an agreement with Samsung 
Card Co. with the condition that Samsung would terminate its business with Asiana. It also 
stopped a coordinated plan with Kookmin Card Co., and notified termination of an agreement 
with Korean Exchange Bank Card Ltd when these firms entered agreements with Asiana on a 
mileage scheme. The KFTC found that KAL infringed Article 23 for excluding and trying to 
drive out its rival from the market by exclusive dealing agreements. In fact, KAL had a 
slightly larger market share than its sole domestic competitor, Asiana; thus the domestic 
market was duopolistic. However, the KFTC reasoned that, because KAL’s market share was 
bigger, it was assumed to be a market leader. It stated that credit card companies which 
would make a coordination scheme with an airline had to choose KAL as a business partner in 
order to induce more customers.  
 
What competition laws should strive to do is to achieve economic efficiency through 
the process of competition.
86
 Merely having a greater number of competitors does not 
necessarily aid the process of competition. It is competition’s role to drive prices towards 
marginal costs, achieving greatest output with the least input. Therefore, even two 
competitors, as seen in this case, who are competing fiercely and have the capacity to 
increase services or products, will achieve these benefits. More competitors are not 
necessarily needed to keep the process of competition working effectively, because 
competition and free entry should promote efficiency and prosperity.
87
 Thus, the KFTC 
wrongfully decided that KAL’s exclusive dealing was anti-competitive. Furthermore, it 
mistakenly concluded there would be a high probability that the number of potential 
customers using this mileage service would increase in the near future, although the data 
indicated only 10 per cent of customers used the coordinated card mileage service at the time 
of investigation.  
 
                                                 
86
 See Robert Bork, ‘The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division’, The Yale 
Law Journal, Vol. 74, No. 5, 1965, p. 831; David Gerber, ‘Competition Law’, The American Journal of 
Comparative Law, Vol. 50, 2002, p. 272. The authors explain that competition is the name of process.  
87
 See Philippe Aghion and Rachel Griffith, Competition and Growth: Reconciling Theory and Evidence, The 
MIT Press, Cambridge MA, USA and London, 2005, p. 1; Ky Ewing, Jr., Competition Rules for the 21st 
Century: Principles from America’s Experience, 2nd edn, Kluwer Law International, Alphen aan den Rijn, The 
Netherlands, 2006, pp. 210-11. 
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This decision was wrong because there was no evidence of unreasonably preventing 
competition, thereby harming consumers. Although the KFTC did not describe the lock-in 
effect to conclude exclusive dealing in this case, it seemed to apply the theories of potential 
entry barriers
88
 and locking-in consumers to choose KAL and its credit card companies.
89
 The 
exclusive dealing practice of KAL could create vigorous competition rather than inhibit 
competition. The KFTC did not fully consider the effect of the practice. It did not consider 
that consumers use international travels to increase mileage points, rather than domestic flight. 
Furthermore, although Asiana could have alternative credit card enterprises, the KFTC 
concluded that KAL’s practice could foreclose the market and prove unfair. In this case, the 
KFTC moreover wrongfully applied Article 23 rather than Article 3-2, although KAL’s 
market share satisfied the presumption of market dominance.  
 
This Korean case can be compared with the recent US case, Dentsply
90
 regarding 
foreclosure and pro-competition problems. A manufacturer of artificial teeth, Dentsply, with a 
75-80 per cent market share, entered into exclusive dealing contracts with its dealers, who 
sold Dentsply teeth with other suppliers to dental labs. The US Department of Justice (DOJ) 
challenged the contracts under sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, maintaining that 
exclusivity had a foreclosure effect with no pro-competitive rationale. On appeal, the district 
court rejected Densply’s attempt to provide pro-competitive justifications for its exclusive 
dealing, but did not condemn the arrangements on either section 1 or 2, because sufficient 
alternative distribution channels were available for rivals. However, the Court of Appeal 
reversed the district court’s rejection of section 2 antitrust liability, concluding that Dentsply 
effectively foreclosed the preferred distribution channels without a valid pro-competitive 
rationale. Dentsply illustrated the narrow economic foundation of pro-competitive 
justifications such as free-riding and incentive of promotion of products.
91
  
 
                                                 
88
 E.g., Kangwon Land Corp, KFTC Decision 2002-038, 2001Dokwan1673, Jan. 17, 2002. The KFTC 
emphasised entry barrier based on its ex ante analysis in the exclusive supplying slot machines.   
89
 For further discussion about raising rivals’ costs, see Steven Salop and David Scheffman, ‘Raising Rivals’ 
Costs’, The American Economic Review, Vol. 73, No. 2, 1983, pp. 267-71; Thomas Krattenmaker and Steven 
Salop, ‘Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals’ Costs to Achieve Power over Price’, The Yale Law Journal, 
Vol. 96, No. 2, 1986, pp. 230-49. 
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 United States v. Dentsply Int’l, Inc., 277 F. Supp. 2d at 387 (D. Del. 2003), rev’d, 399 F.3d 181 (3d Cir. 2005), 
cert. denied, 126 S.Ct. 1023 (2006). 
91
 See Benjamin Klein and Andres Lerner, ‘The Expanded Economics of Free-Riding: How Exclusive Dealing 
Prevents Free-Riding and Creates Undivided Loyalty’, Antitrust Law Journal, Vol. 74, No. 2, 2007, pp. 474-6.  
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Some commentators criticise this judgment. In this case, the absence of any pro-
competitive rationale for exclusivity led the court to condemn the contracts, and this rationale 
worked as in KAL. In KAL, there was no really harmful impact of the large market share on 
the domestic airlines competition. There was, furthermore, a possible pro-competitive 
rationale for its exclusive dealing contracts, hence increasing vigorous competition which 
may result in better services to consumers. The US and Korean competition regimes rejected 
a rationale for exclusive dealing, emphasising the lack of evidence of pro-competition or 
efficiency grounds.
92
 In KAL, the authority did not consider inter-brand competition through 
exclusive dealing, and heavily focused on a large market share without consideration of 
vigorous competition. However, the big difference between these two cases is that the KFTC 
did not discuss pro- and anti-competitive effects based on economics, but came to its 
conclusion based on unfairness. 
 
4.4.3. Territorial Restriction as Transaction of Restrictive Condition: Domino Pizza 
 
Territorial restriction is another example of a vertical restraint that can give a downstream 
firm an incentive for greater investment in brand-specific practices that will enhance the 
brand’s competitive position.
93
 In a territorial restriction scheme, a manufacturer divides 
marketing areas into districts, agreeing with distributors in each district not to permit his 
product to be distributed by anyone else, having a monopoly position within the specified 
territory.
94
 If a dominant firm has this scheme, it certainly infringes Article 3-2. This can be 
observed in the Hyundai Motors
95
 which restricted business territories of its distributors. 
However, this type of practice is mostly examined under Article 23. Hostility towards 
territorial restrictions under Article 23 emerged in DPK International Co., Ltd (Domino Pizza 
franchisor).
96
 Domino restricted the territories within which its franchisees could sell. 
Domino restricted its franchisees’ area of pizza delivery and warned its franchisees not to 
offer delivery services beyond the appointed areas. The KFTC stated that the market share of 
Domino, 10 per cent, was comparatively smaller than its leading competitor, Pizza Hut Co., 
                                                 
92
 For further discussion based on economic rationale, see Howard Marvel, Supra., note 81, pp. 6-11. 
93
 ABA, Supra., note 47, p. 168. 
94
 E.g., Morning Glory Co., KFTC Decision 2002-163, 2000Yugo0069, Nov. 15, 2000. See also Christopher 
Stone, ‘Closed Territorial Distribution: An Opening Question in the Sherman Act’, The University of Chicago 
Law Review, Vol. 30, No. 2, 1963, pp. 286-311.  
95
 Hyundai Motors, KFTC Decision 2007-281, 2006Dokgam0746, May 18, 2007. 
96
 DPK International Co., Ltd, KFTC Decision 2000-163, 2000Yugo0069, Nov. 15, 2000. 
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at 50 per cent.
97
 However, it stated that Domino still had had significant market power by 
means of its brand name and unique delivery service.
98
 The KFTC admitted that territorial 
restriction could enhance inter-brand competition through inhibiting intra-brand competition. 
Nevertheless, it concluded that consumers would get harmed from this restraint. It reasoned 
that consumers had no choice but to purchase a product with a higher price and less quality 
because of this practice. The KFTC’s position was consistent with the rationale behind the 
other vertical restraint cases stated above.  
 
Although it recognised the justification of enhancing inter-brand competition, the 
KFTC still would not take the risk from trade-off between inter-brand competition and some 
consumer welfare loss. However, the restraint of Domino would not result in consumer 
welfare loss, since this non-price vertical restraint with its market share could not directly 
affect consumer welfare. Furthermore, based on the nature of the franchise business of 
monitoring free-riding,
99
 the KFTC should have justified its business strategy of franchise 
delivery service, which would improve competition. Territorial restriction does not impede 
competition significantly, unless the supplier has considerable market power. Arbitrage may 
also diminish the effectiveness of territorial restriction, where consumers have lower search 
and transport costs.
100
 This case, however, deviated from these justifications, unlike in the US. 
In the Sylvania case,
101
 the US Supreme Court overruled the per se rule stated in Schwinn.
102
 
Sylvania established that the per se rule would be moderated in cases of vertical market 
division.
103
 The US courts state that this vertical restraint may be reasonable if likely to 
promote inter-brand competition without overly restricting intra-brand competition, despite 
its some ambiguous statement of how the courts balance these.
104
 Compared to this approach, 
the KFTC’s rationale seems to be excessively strict. It does not have a sufficient degree of 
                                                 
97
 This wrongful approach has not been amended in territorial restriction cases, e.g., Ildong Corp., KFTC 
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98
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balance test. Furthermore, it often fails to measure the effects of efficiency improvement by 
vertical restraints. 
 
4.4.4. Critical Assessments in Restrictive Condition Cases from Economic Debates  
 
A manufacturer’s profits are typically an increasing function of rivals’ costs. Thus, a 
manufacturer is willing to take action that can raise rivals’ costs. A standard argument in the 
vertical restraints literature points to the role of foreclosure through exclusive dealing and 
territorial restriction as a means of this strategy.
105
 The major anti-competitive concern is that 
these practices might foreclose the market and inhibit competition. Such foreclosure might 
impede efficiency, entry, existence or expandability, any of which can anti-competitively 
increase the market power of the foreclosing enterprise. If foreclosure prevents a number of 
rivals from maintaining economy of scale, it impairs their efficiency. This can, therefore, 
enhance or maintain their market power.
106
 In challenging exclusive dealing competition 
authorities must normally show exclusion from critical input or distribution channels, such 
that the competitors are deprived of efficiency and price increases, such as shown in the 
Korean cases, KAL and Domino.  
 
In the KAL case, the KFTC seemed to adopt foreclosure theory, although KAL’s 
practice may have improved inter-brand competition. Even if KAL’s practice had not directly 
improved efficiency, it could have enhanced inter-brand competition. Furthermore, the KFTC 
did not consider a major benefit. Exclusive dealing potentially minimises the cost and risk of 
conducting business in uncertain markets, which in turn increases operating efficiencies, and 
decreases costs for the consumer. A primary benefit is a reduction in transaction costs. By 
entering into long-term contracts, both the up- and downstream enterprises can avoid the 
expense of reaching a new agreement for each individual transaction. Therefore, exclusive 
dealings may lower transaction costs and facilitate distribution simply by building a positive 
relationship between the parties to the exclusive arrangement.
107
 This practice may also allow 
                                                 
105
 See Michael Katz, ‘Vertical Contractual Relations’ in Richard Schmalensee and Robert Willig (eds), 
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106
 Einer Elhauge and Damien Geradin, Supra., note 63, p. 455-9. The authors explain that where network 
effects exist, foreclosure can impair rivals’ efficiency by denying rivals’ access to the number of buyers. 
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businesses to circumvent potential free-riders.
108
 Exclusive dealing can, consequently, 
improve welfare.
109
 This, therefore, has a possible efficiency improvement, which helps 
explain why they are often used even by enterprises without market power, which are not 
foreclosing a substantial share of any market.
110
 Furthermore, a monopolist would have no 
incentive to engage in exclusionary conduct, since it is costly, unless they were vulnerable to 
new entrants.
111
 However, the KFTC’s strict measure has not changed, and its current 
decision in Intel
112
 proved that economic efficiency rationale was not accepted. 
 
The main rationale of territorial restrictions is the free-riding justification. Posner 
asserts that a manufacturer introducing a new product will try to induce distributors to give a 
sufficient initial investment. Territorial restriction can ensure the distributors’ recoupment of 
pre-sale service investment of, for example, luxury goods.
113
 Without such protection, the 
distributor is unwilling to carry the untried product.
114
 These practices are observed with 
considerably greater favour in the US today. The Chicago School’s argument has led to the 
view that this business practice should be examined under the rule of reason.
115
 Free-riding of 
distributors can be reduced, because a geographical monopoly permits a distributor to recoup 
the benefits of its sales efforts. It tends, however, to increase a rival manufacturer’s cost of 
entering the market, as working for foreclosure.
116
 On the whole, the assignment of territorial 
restriction is also neutral from the vantage point of efficiency,
117
 and the KFTC and the courts 
should provide a clear guidance for that. 
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The potential both to create efficiency and inhibit competition has proven problematic 
for the courts interpreting competition law and applying it to exclusive dealing
118
 and 
territorial restrictions. The courts in Korea are no exception. These practices in particular 
introduce social costs. They sometimes block the entry of firms that may be more efficient 
than the incumbents.
119
 The results of foreclosure and entry barriers are high costs to 
consumers for the lack of real freedom of consumer choice. Thus, in the absence of provable 
efficiency justifications, the KFTC and the courts may recognise that these arrangements 
result in foreclosure and entry barriers that ultimately harm the consumer.
120
 However, 
balancing pro-competitive efficiencies against potential anti-competitive effects should be 
required in more vertical restraint cases than previously believed.
121
 In conclusion, the 
general modern view in competition law economics is that these arrangements have 
sufficiently mixed effects that they should be neither per se illegal nor per se legal. Instead, 
they should be judged under the rule of reason that weighs the likely or actual anti-
competitive effects against any efficiency or pro-competitiveness justifications.
122
 The KFTC 
and the courts should consider this to improve their economics-based rule of reason.  
 
 
4.5. Resale Price Maintenance  
 
4.5.1. Critical Assessment of Current Application of Article 29 MRFTA: Dairy Cases 
 
Article 29 MRFTA prohibits minimum Resale Price Maintenance (RPM) as per se illegal 
with some limited exemption conditions.
123
 To establish RPM violation, the practice should 
satisfy two conditions: (i) setting a vertical price; and (ii) coercing the RPM plan. The RPM 
Guidelines
124
 section 3 provides the procedure of the RPM scrutiny of maximum and 
minimum RPM. Maximum or recommended RPM can be normally justified where efficiency 
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or consumer welfare improvements outweigh the harm of anti-competitive effects.
125
 For 
example, if a non-dominant firm practises RPM arrangements in order to prevent high price 
setting by distributors, the practice can be regarded as legal. If a supplier makes an RPM 
agreement to prevent distributor cartels, the KFTC will also justify the practice. However, 
these illustrations do not give sufficient guidance to economic entities, and there have been 
no justified cases based on the rationale under the Guidelines. In particular, some argue that 
the KFTC has not established sufficient yardsticks to measure the objective justification or 
the rule of reason on maximum RPM.
126
 There are two major reasons for this criticism. First, 
the KFTC and the courts have not established clear criteria for Article 19 enforcement, which 
could be also applicable to vertical agreement. Second, they have treated RPM traditionally 
as illegal per se and disregarded efficiency justification.  
 
An RPM arrangement can be made through either an agreement or unilateral conduct. 
However, where there is price-fixing in distribution, Article 29 rather than Article 19 applies, 
despite its focus on agreement or acquiescence, rather than the unilateral. This is because 
Article 19 applies only to horizontal cases. Hence, the first condition for RPM violation 
should be met where there is any conduct regarding vertical price-fixing regardless of by 
agreement or unilateral. For that reason, coerciveness is an important factor to constitute 
illegality.
127
 Most RPM cases seem to be easily blamed as coercive, especially where 
regarded as a lock-in case, such as spare part distribution shown in Renault-Samsung 
Motors.
128
 This lock-in strategy for establishment of pricing practice or refusal to deal
129
 is 
also commonly blamed in Japan in Mitsubishi Building Techno
130
 and Toshiba Elevator.
131
 
The KFTC and the JFTC maintain that firms should supply goods at a reasonable price with 
non-discriminatory measures, as shown in these cases.  
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Therefore, although an RPM is recommended, if the firm controls retail price through 
regular checks and other vertical practices, such as refusal to deal, it is considered minimum 
PRM. For example, the Supreme Court in amyang Dairy Products Co, Ltd
132
 held that a 
recommended RPM could not be an infringement of Article 29 as long as it did not force a 
distributor to accept the supplier’s price-fixing. Although one of the amyang’s agents 
researched its product prices in the market after notice of a recommended price, it appeared 
difficult to believe that its check-up showed an intention to force its retailers to maintain the 
recommended price. Its agent proposed a recommended price, and notified that it would 
refuse to supply where the retailer did not comply with the suggested price. However, 
amyang’s agent did not have the power to not supply, and amyang would not stop 
supplying the goods to large retailers, although retailers lowered the price. Moreover, the 
retailers already knew the practice of amyang’s agent could not be effective, and there had 
been no history of stopping supply. Therefore, the retailers did not pay attention to the pricing 
recommendation since it was not made by amyang. Thus, the Court rejected the KFTC’s 
argument. It agreed that simply an independent decision of an agent to adhere to the price did 
not infringe Article 29.  
 
In the Maeil Dairy Industry Ltd case,
133
 however, a different judgment emerged. The 
Supreme Court upheld the Seoul High Court’s judgement that Maeil infringed Article 29, 
based on effect and its intention of prohibiting competition. Maeil notified recommended 
RPM to retailers, whilst threatening that it would discontinue supply where the retail price 
was inconsistent with the proposed one. Maeil’s managers also informed price maintenance 
to headquarter and distribution agents, to control and guide its price plan. The Court upheld 
the KFTC’s decision on the grounds that there was an actual anti-competitive effect observed 
from the price maintenance, and this meant in reality a minimum RPM. There are several 
issues in these cases.
134
 amyang did not actually force its retailers to accept its 
recommended price, and its retailers freely chose the prices.
135
 On appeal, therefore, the 
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Court rejected the KFTC’s narrow interpretation of RPM. It held that the amyang’s agent 
could not terminate or threaten to terminate contracts with non-complying dealers, although 
threat of termination might have induced retailers to adhere to the recommended RPM. It did 
not specifically state whether an agreement could have been based on the facts, leaving some 
ambiguity about whether it viewed amyang as going beyond the mere evidentiary 
requirement to find an agreement, and granting a substantive right to the supplier to engage in 
certain forms of vertical restraints. In Maeil, however, the Court reasoned that the enterprise 
in fact restrained the freedom of its retailers from setting the price, by coercive means. 
Moreover, Maeil made its retailers assume that it would discontinue supplying products if the 
retailers would not accept the price plan. Nevertheless, this distinction is vague. Since Article 
29 applies to RPM cases whether they are concerted or unilateral, it is a huge burden for the 
KFTC and the courts to prove the RPM is minimum or recommended, and even whether it is 
coercive. 
 
The findings in the Korean cases are therefore very different from the US judgments 
in Colgate
136
 and Monsanto.
137
 The US Supreme Court has held that a manufacturer does not 
engage in a concerted action with the meaning of RPM of the Sherman Act section 1, when it 
announced a pricing policy unilaterally, and refused to do business with distributors that 
failed to adhere to the policy. In general, a supplier does not infringe RPM provision if it 
engages only in exposition, persuasion and argument to encourage dealers to charge the 
recommended prices. This distinction is crucial.
138
 Thus, there is a significant difference 
between Colgate and amyang. The US case focused on whether the practice was unilateral 
or concerted. However, coerciveness was centred in the Korean judgements. This difference 
is caused from the problem of misapplication of Article 19 MRFTA, for its application only 
to horizontal agreements. As long as it is unclear whether Article 19 can be applicable to 
vertical agreements, the examination based on coerciveness causes difficulties for the courts 
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and lawyers. The line between what is permissible encouragement to adhere to a supplier’s 
suggestion, and aggressive and impermissible vertical price-fixing, is difficult to draw. Any 
attempt to persuade dealers to go along with recommended prices under the MRFTA should 
be carefully reviewed.
139
 If this rationale is understood, the only problem is why Article 19, 
as a provision of concerted agreements, cannot be applicable to RPM cases, and what Article 
29 is necessary for. 
 
4.5.2. Critical Assessments in RPM Cases from Economic Debates  
 
There is a major debate regarding the adoption of RPM. It can ensure the provision of high-
quality pre-sale service from retailers in order to prevent free-riders. Telser proposes a model 
of RPM that frequently has been considered benign, because retailers are the least-cost means 
of delivering valuable information to potential buyers.
140
 Despite some positive outcomes 
from RPM, there are still anti-competitive fears that the KFTC bears as following. RPM may 
be the result of collusion amongst small retailers to keep prices high. The most important 
reason for RPM is the wish of small retailers to compete with large discount stores. However, 
RPM might make tacit collusion amongst manufacturers easier to maintain. It is used to set 
prices to reflect the collusive price, either to make it easier to detect cheating, or to reduce 
incentives to cheat. This theory is one of the primary anti-competitive theories used to justify 
per se prohibition.
141
 Moreover, some argue that there are insufficient empirical data showing 
that RPM is effective in preventing free-riding, and RPM cannot solve the free-riding 
problem.
142
 For example, prevention of free-riding can be avoided through other vertical 
restraints, such as tying vertically price-fixed products with other separate items. Distributors 
may sell these tied products with discounts, and this conduct may result in the effect of free-
riding.
143
 Therefore, RPM can be considered as the means of restricting competition to obtain 
and retain monopoly power, rather than preventing free-riding where the supplier has a 
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dominant position.
144
 This has been brought to the KFTC’s attention, which seems to regard 
RPM as efficiency-detracting rather than enhancing.  
 
In some cases, the KFTC could have been more lenient, based on the efficiency 
justification. The suppliers of luxury products, KGC Corp. and Chongkeundang Corp,
145
 
struggled to keep their brand images through product certification
146
 by sustaining a certain 
level of price set. They tried to stop sales of their products as loss leaders by retailers. 
However, the KFTC decided their RPM arrangements were as a violation per se without 
further consideration. These RPM, whether maximum or minimum, could improve efficiency 
by eliminating free-riding and improving inter-brand competition, since the enterprises did 
not have market power. Furthermore, their RPM practices could guarantee quality of the 
products, since consumers prefer products sold by a reliable distributor, which might improve 
consumer welfare. According to the RPM Guidelines, the KFTC considers efficiency 
outcomes, but in practice these are hardly examined. This lack of economic rationale has 
caused ambiguous implementation of the per se rule and the rule of reason. 
 
Much economic analysis of vertical restraints is ambiguous, and such ambiguity and 
the complexity of cases suggests that a rule of reason rather than a per se approach to 
competition policy will produce more efficient results.
147
 This is distinct in the US, and the 
KFTC can learn from the American experience. The Dr. Miles
148
 prohibition of RPM 
affected the development of US antitrust law. Dr. Miles had involved contracts which 
undertook to prevent dealers from freely exercising the right to sell. The US Supreme Court 
concluded there was an impact on competition, largely because it believed that RPM was the 
product of a conspiracy of retail dealers, rather than representing a policy that served the 
interest of Dr. Miles itself.
149
 However, eight years later, the Court noted an important 
qualification in Colgate.  
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It held that the firm had only done what any firm might do, and also stated that in the 
absence of any purpose to create or maintain a monopoly, the antitrust law does not restrict 
the recognised right of the manufacturer engaged in an entirely private business. He is free to 
exercise his own discretion as to traders with whom he will deal. Of course, a firm may 
announce in advance the circumstances under which they will refuse to sell.
150
 This so-called 
Colgate rule continued to be extremely important.
151
 In Albrecht,
152
 the Court held that 
maximum RPM was a per se violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act, but overruled in State 
Oil.
153
 In this case, the Court stated that there was insufficient economic justification for per 
se invalidation of maximum RPM. Almost 75 years after Dr. Miles, the court could not 
resolve the controversy over the public interest impact of vertical restraints before the Leegin 
case.
154
 The Court’s view in Dr. Miles was challenged by the Chicago scholars, arguing that 
vertical restraints may stimulate inter-brand competition by inhibiting intra-brand 
competition, which may benefit consumers in the end.
155
 This was the central to the Court’s 
decision in the Sylvania case, and later, the Leegin case. 
 
 
4.6. Trade-Off and Balance Tests in the Korean Case Law 
 
4.6.1. Fairness and Pro-competitiveness: Market Foreclosure vs. Efficiency 
 
The issue of interpretation of fairness and pro-competitiveness has been one of the most 
controversial problems in Korea. The definition of fairness is, in fact, very obscure in market 
function. If the KFTC and the courts take a more market-friendly approach in their 
implementation of law, they should define the meaning of fairness as pro-competitiveness. 
Fairness in vertical cases should be, thus, understood as maximisation of balancing inter- and 
intra-brand competitiveness, and also of the trade-off between anti-competitiveness and 
efficiency. However, this approach has been hardly recognised in practice. There is a leading 
case showing how the KFTC’s trade-off test often fails. SK Inc., an oil refinery company, 
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vertically merged an oil pipeline conveyor firm, Dopco.
156
 In this case, the KFTC 
investigated whether SK intended to strengthen its market power through vertical foreclosure. 
SK had a market share of 30.1 per cent and its major competitors, LG Co., S-Oil Co., and 
Hyundai Co./ Incheon Refinery Co. had 24.6, 10.9, and 15.6 per cent respectively. The KFTC 
concluded that the refinery and distribution markets were oligopolistic, based on the fact that 
the relevant total market share of the top three enterprises was 83.3 per cent, which was 
sufficient to be blamed as market dominant under Article 4 MRFTA.  
 
Concerned about the possibility of anti-competiveness and market foreclosure through 
the stated essential facility, the KFTC held that the vertically merging firm would refuse to 
deal with its competitors and potential entrants. In addition, the firm would possibly 
discriminate against competitors, which could be considered unfair through delay of trade. 
The KFTC argued that there was a high cost of establishing an oil refinery business,
157
 which 
could possibly be an entry barrier. The KFTC implicitly indicated that it outweighed the harm 
from the ‘market containment effects’ over efficiency, especially where penetration of 
foreign firms into Korea was not expected.
158
 This rationale is somewhat similar to the 
Japanese vertical merger oil transport case
159
 in which the JFTC concluded the vertically 
merging firm might gain exclusive dealing in the downstream level, resulting in a substantial 
restraint of competition.
160
 However, this rationale was wrong, because there would be an 
alternative method of distribution in oil transport. Furthermore, these authorities disregarded 
efficiency outcomes from reduction of transaction costs from the vertical relations.  
 
As shown in this case, the KFTC is not very concerned about the efficiency 
enhancement from vertical cases. SK’s market share was approximately 30 per cent, which is 
hardly considered as market dominant firm in other regimes. Under wrongful application of 
the Concentration Ratio (CR) test, this firm was regarded as market dominant. The KFTC 
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could have scrutinised the real impact from vertical control. The enterprise could improve 
efficiency through reducing transaction costs. The KFTC could not foresee the pro-
competitive and efficiency results because of its narrow definition of fairness and unjust ex 
ante. Firm size does matter in Korea. In particular, the POSCO case
161
 evidenced that the 
KFTC heavily relied on the fact that the firm had been appointed as a dominant firm, 
disregarding other factors. POSCO could lose the chance of strategic management of cost 
savings and the incentives of potential investment on R&D. The firm’s know-how of hot coil 
production was the outcome of its twenty-year R&D efforts.
162
  
 
The KFTC, however, wrongfully decided that the argument in the case was merely 
about distribution rather than the productive and dynamic efficiency by intellectual property 
protection.
163
 In fact, Hysco, an affiliate of the Hyundai group, was also a potential 
competitor, and could foreclose POSCO’s distribution through vertical integration, since it 
was supplying automobile parts to Hyundai Motors and Kia Motors, POSCO’s largest 
customers. The Hyundai group could abuse its dominant position by its monopsony power. It 
could leverage its vertical power over the horizontal. However, the KFTC did not closely 
examine this problem. Furthermore, although the Supreme Court reversed the KFTC decision, 
which shows the judgment was right, it did not give the answer to this issue. The POSCO and 
SK cases explain how much the KFTC and the courts have established a measure, which is a 
high priority, of examining the size of firm and size of the relevant market. They focus more 
on unfairness of discrimination rather than pro-competitiveness. In the POSCO case, in 
particular, the KFTC did not examine the argument that Hysco could free-ride on a cheap 
supply from POSCO. POSCO could have supplied the product to its rival, bearing the cost of 
future risk of foreclosure. The courts still need to examine these issues in vertical restraints 
based on economics. 
 
The KFTC has also shown lack of legal technique regarding economic justification. In 
Charmzone Cosmetics Co.,
164
 the KFTC prohibited territorial restriction in the franchising 
agreement, although Charmzone did not have a sufficient degree of market power. The 
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enterprise had only 1.6 per cent market share, but the KFTC concluded that Charmzone 
violated Article 23, since the enterprise’s practice was simply anti-competitive and did not 
improve inter-brand competition.
165
 The KFTC did not allow the efficiency justification, 
although Charmzone tried to ensure pre-sale services against free-riders. Its practice could be 
essential to promote quality protection, since it was a justifiable practice for a producer of 
luxury goods such as cosmetics to protect its brand name. Charmzone’s territorial restriction 
could, thus, prevent free-riding and improve inter-brand competition. Furthermore, the KFTC 
sometimes does not scrutinise market structure. In the DPK International case,
166
 the market 
leader was Pizza Hut, and Domino was trying to improve its franchise service through 
territorial restriction by its ‘30 Minutes Delivery’ practice.
167
 The KFTC should have 
considered this territorial restriction as a promotional method for entering the market, 
because Domino’s practice could bring more pro-competitive effects between competitors.  
 
Compared to other relevant cases,
168
 the defendants in these two cases did not have 
significant market power to distort competition. Thus, consumers could have alternative 
choices of products than from the defendants, and there was no high degree of consumer 
welfare loss from this practice.
169
 The practices in these cases could, moreover, improve not 
only inter-brand competition, but also consumer welfare, since consumers could rely on 
product quality. If the enterprises in these cases had not restricted territories for product 
quality protection, consumers could have not relied on their brand names. The KFTC, 
however, never explains why this type of restraint is obviously damaging to competition. 
Although these restraints could diminish intra-brand competition, they might increase inter-
brand competition to the extent that such restraints enhanced the attractiveness of the 
supplier’s products.  
 
 
                                                 
165
For further discussion, see also Sung-Hoon Yoon, ‘Franchise-Wa-Kyoung-Jaeng-Jae-Han (Restraints on 
Competition and Franchise)’ in Ohseung Kwon (ed), Ja-Yoo-Kyoung-Jaeng-Kwa-Gong-Jung-Go-Rae [Free 
Competition and Fair Trade], Bubmunsa, Seoul, 2002, p. 501. 
166
 DPK International Co., Ltd, KFTC Decision 2000-163, 2000Yugo0069, Nov. 15, 2000. 
167
 The present Fair Franchise Transactions Act [amended by the law No. 8630, Aug. 3, 2007] covers franchise 
cases. Under Art. 12(1) of Franchise Act, refusal to deal, territorial restrictions and etc. are prohibited. This Act 
foremost applies under Art. 38 Franchise Act where both of Art. 23 MRFTA and Art. 12 Franchise Act are 
applicable. 
168
 E.g., Dongwon Co., KFTC Decision 92-81, 9203Dok082, July 1, 1992; Pusan Dairy Association, KFTC 
Decision 93-61, 930Il262, June 30, 1993. In these cases, the enterprises had more than 40 per cent of market 
share. 
169
 Korea Fair Trade Association, Supra., note 158, pp. 206-7.  
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4.6.2. Critical Argument of Case Law Development in Rule of Reason and Per Se Rule 
 
One of the competition courts’ functions is to formulate competition rules with active 
economic competitive goals.
170
 In particular, the US judges may come to the courts with 
ideologies, as well as formal training in economics, all of which lead them to be receptive to 
some economic ideas and unreceptive to others, because US courts have internal sources of 
economic ideas that may influence their antitrust judgments.
171
 The US does not solely 
benefit from economics. In particular, EC competition policy change towards an increasing 
understanding of economics in competition issues is a kind of revolution. Their economics-
based approach towards vertical agreement is an example. This policy change has its basis in 
case law.
172
 Therefore, the ideal rules should be both clearly predictable in their application, 
and economically rational. However, it seems that Korean courts have not developed case 
law as such, because it is often difficult for them to formulate rules that are both clear and 
economically rational. In the POSCO case, the Seoul High Court showed an immature 
judgment. The High Court did not take an ex ante approach. POSCO could have taken the 
risk of future uncertain demand. The vertically affiliated structure of Hyundai group could 
also strengthen its market power in up- and downstream levels. Nevertheless, the High Court 
did not closely examine this problem, and simply concluded the vertical structure problem 
was not related to abusive conduct in the case. The High Court did not take an ex ante and 
rule of reason approach.  
 
The courts have also misunderstood the rule of reason approach in some cases. 
Lotteria Co., Ltd,
173
 a fast food franchise giant in Korea, was justified in its tie-in sale by the 
rule of reason, and held no violation of Article 23. In this case, the enterprise tied cooking 
facilities and product ingredients. Lotteria had significant market power and was one of the 
large business groups. However, the Seoul High Court only considered the unique system of 
franchise and its product quality justification, by agreeing to Lotteria’s argument of 
                                                 
170
 See Donald Turner, ‘The Virtues and Problems of Antitrust Law’ in Theodore Kovaleff (ed), The Antitrust 
Impulse: An Economic, Historical, and Legal Analysis Vol. II., M.E. Sharpe, New York, 1994, p. 956. 
171
 See Andrew Gavil, ‘Competition Policy, Economics, and Economists: Are We Expecting Too Much?’ in 
Barry Hawk (ed), International Antitrust Law and Policy: Fordham Competition Law 2006, Juris Publishing, 
Huntington NY, USA, 2006, p. 581. 
172
 See Doris Hildebrand, The Role of Economic Analysis in the EC Competition Rules, 2nd edn, Kluwer Law 
International, The Hague, 2002, pp. 415-6. 
173
 Lotteria Co. Ltd v. KFTC, Seoul High Court, 2000u2183, Dec. 4, 2001; Supreme Court 2002Du332, Mar. 
10, 2006. The Supreme Court affirmed the most of the Seoul High Court judgment. 
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efficiency and quality assurance.
174
 The High Court held there was no evidence that Lotteria 
took any advantages or benefits from its tying practice. It stated Lotteria simply supplied 
additional ingredients with a lower price.
175
 However, its rationale was wrong. Lotteria 
abused its dominant position to make a tying arrangement. Its franchisees could have 
purchased cooking facilities and ingredients such as vegetables from other suppliers for a 
cheaper price, unless Lotteria had imposed a tying arrangement. Furthermore, its tying 
practice did not improve efficiency or guarantee quality of goods, since these tied facilities 
and ingredients were not really related to product quality improvement. If the High Court had 
recognised negative effects from the franchisor’s market power, it would not have allowed 
the tying practice of Lotteria. The essential aspect of a franchise distribution arrangement is 
the creation of a standardised product, which consumers can expect to receive at various 
retail locations.
176
 Because of free-riding and purposes of ensuring the goods quality, tying 
practice is essential. However, the practice of Lotteria was not certain to be justified by this 
rationale.
177
  
 
Both the POSCO and Lotteria cases illustrate that the courts applied economic 
justification wrongfully, and they need to examine vertical restraint under the clear 
economics principle, for rule of reason development. Vertical arrangements are likely to 
serve the socially useful purpose of economising on quality-policing costs. However, because 
these practices may also increase anti-competitive problems, the courts should develop 
balance tests based on economic theories. The case law concerning abusive practices have not 
sufficiently delineated the permissible boundary of firms’ activities. In light of legal certainty 
and predictability of market participants, they should develop more specific, consistent and 
legally sound criteria for distinguishing anti-competitive practices from competitive ones.
178
 
For Korean competition law development, the courts have not given a detailed guidance to 
the rule of reason analysis of vertical restraints. It is difficult for them to weigh one type of 
competition against the other, because there is no yardstick for assigning relative values to 
each. One can theorise at least two balancing mechanisms that the courts can attempt. They 
                                                 
174
 This case can be compared with the US case, Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971). 
The quality defence was not granted in the US case. 
175
 For further discussion, see also Sung-Hoon Yoon, Supra., note 165, p. 510. 
176
 Benjamin Klein and Lester Saft, Supra., note 37, p. 349. 
177
 In this case, the Supreme Court, however, held the tying practice of cash machines, electronic supplies and 
detergents were not justifiable for brand image improvement. 
178
 Bong Eui Lee, Supra., note 25, pp. 80-81. 
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may weigh reduced intra-brand competition against increased inter-brand competition. 
Another standard focuses on the question whether a restraint promotes an increase in inter-
brand competition. The underlying notion is that where inter-brand competition is enhanced, 
consumers ultimately benefit from the increase in rivalry.
179
 Then, the market power 
approach is the essential one.  
 
The possession of market power by a firm does not necessarily or even commonly 
suggest that its vertical arrangement is anti-competitive. However, the market power screen 
has the advantage of enabling courts to quickly assess cases where the defendant cannot 
adversely affect competition.
180
 Normally, if the leading enterprise has over 50 per cent 
market share, there is no close rival.
181
 Therefore, the Korean courts need to consider the 
market share a crucial yardstick to justify vertical restraints to develop the rule of reason, 
whilst considering the special responsibility of large firms. In order to fully develop the rule 
of reason approach, the courts should further build up criteria to justify vertical restraints. The 
judgements of the courts have been criticised, since the case law has not guided lawyers and 
enterprises properly, resulting in confusion between distortion of competition and efficiency. 
The courts, moreover, have not clearly demonstrated their understanding of the theoretical 
background of competition law, generally related to economic theories of vertical restraints, 
when they implement the law under per se rule or rule of reason. Since the markets which 
form the setting for vertical restraints are often very complex, the traditional modes of 
analysis in Korea are inappropriate. The choice between the per se rule and the rule of reason 
analysis makes an enormous difference to the way a case proceeds, and to its likely outcome, 
as seen in the US.
182
 Therefore, the courts need to adopt and develop the rule of reason 
standard, and give up the per se rule in vertical cases, as long as they find a necessity of 
flexible judgements to achieve the gains of efficiency. This is because disastrous judgments, 
without successful development of the rule of reason, will have painful consequences in the 
market.  
 
                                                 
179
 See Kevin Arquit, ‘Market Power in Vertical Cases’, Antitrust Law Journal, Vol. 60, 1992, p. 922. 
180
 Ibid., pp. 923-4.  
181
 See William Shepherd, The Economics of Industrial Organization, 3rd edn, Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, 
NJ, USA, 1990, pp. 17-8; William Shepherd, ‘Section 2 and the Problem of Market Dominance’ in Theodore 
Kovaleff (ed), The Antitrust Impulse: An Economic, Historical, and Legal Analysis Vol. II., M.E. Sharpe, New 
York, 1994, p. 1009. 
182
 See Marc Fajer, ‘Taming the Wayward Children of Monsanto and Sylvania: Some Thoughts on 
Developmental Disorders in Vertical Restraints Doctrine’, Temple Law Review, Vol. 68, 1995, p. 101. 
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4.7. Concluding Remarks 
 
The Korean market is opening outwards, and the importance of reforming competition law on 
vertical restraints increases. Since competition law is the crucial measure to ensure sound 
market mechanism and trade, the KFTC should develop its techniques of implementation and 
enforcement through reforming vertical regulation. Moreover, as stressed, vertical restraint is 
deeply related to economic efficiency, international trade, and economic growth. Therefore, 
not only strengthening Chaebols’ market foreclosure by tolerance in vertical regulation, but 
also lessening efficiency by an unnecessary restriction of pro-competitive practice is 
undesirable. The KFTC has already provided sufficient competition implementation to solve 
economic concentration, by preventing anti-competitive abusive conduct by Chaebols, such 
as controlling establishment of holding companies, cross-shareholding, debt guarantee, and 
ceiling shareholding.  
 
The current legal provision is disadvantageous to domestic enterprises where the 
KFTC wrongfully investigates their practices. It should thus reform implementation of the 
competition law, at least of vertical restraints. The KFTC needs to develop the rest of the 
legal provisions to improve competition through reforming vertical regulations such as 
Articles 3-2, 19, 23, and 29 MRFTA. This regulatory reform plan is beneficial to the national 
economy through sound competition. This will maximise efficiency from competitiveness. 
The next chapter will examine and assess the existing statute; whether it satisfies the aims of 
competition law, and improves competition by means of efficiency justification. It is crucial 
for the KFTC to establish a more accurate model of vertical regulation that may decrease 
errors in the courts, and reduce the costs of litigation. Furthermore, this will give guidance for 
the courts to develop the rule of reason. Its newly developed guidelines can also make for a 
simpler and easier application of law. Before suggesting this new rule in Chapter 6, the next 
chapter will examine problems in the MRFTA and the guidelines. 
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Chapter 5 
 
Critical Analysis of Competition Law on  
Vertical Restraints  
 
 
 
5.1. Demands for Vertical Regulation Reform 
 
When a country relies heavily on efficient and effective international competition in order to 
achieve the goal of economic growth, a sound approach to vertical regulation should play an 
important role.
1
 This is because vertical arrangements are the gateway of international trade, 
and competition in the global market. The Korea Fair Trade Commission (KFTC) should act 
in the pursuit of achieving efficient outcomes, with reference to appropriate economic 
principles. However, it has not properly established a sound structure of legal provisions on 
vertical restraints (hereafter, vertical regulation), as criticised in the case studies. The KFTC 
has demonstrated some effort in regulatory reform, through adopting guidelines with regard 
to vertical restraints. Nevertheless, its legal provisions do not give clear guidance to 
competition lawyers and enterprises regarding efficiency-improvement, which may improve 
domestic market competition. Without proper assessment of vertical restraints, Korean 
competition law on vertical restraints may create a discriminatory environment against 
domestic firms, and also prevent beneficial outcomes by vertical restraints.    
 
Efficiency is closely dependent on the operation of markets, because ideally it is a 
distributive or relational concept, which embraces the whole economy.
2
 Thus, the KFTC 
should seek the best way of efficiency-achievement for the state economy. However, the 
KFTC, and the courts also, have shown lack of ability in assessing pro- and anti-competitive 
effects by vertical restraints. Their misleading decisions and judgements from misguided 
                                                 
1
 Supra., Chapter 2. 
2
 See Carl Kaysen and Donald Turner, ‘Antitrust Policy: An Economic and Legal Analysis’ in Thomas Sullivan 
(ed), The Political Economy of the Sherman Act: The First One Hundred Years, Oxford University Press, New 
York and Oxford, 1991, p. 182. 
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enquiries have resulted in harm to competition, as well as to the state economy. In particular, 
the KFTC has been traditionally concerned about market dominance of large business groups. 
However, it is necessary to examine closely whether it needs to outweigh the efficiency and 
pro-competitive effects of vertical restraints, anticipating vigorous competition on opening 
the market to globalised competition. When the market is open to foreign competitors, this 
excessive concern may distort competition and the market economy. The relaxed application 
of vertical regulation can increase efficiency benefits. Nonetheless, a far less stringent 
enforcement also does not achieve this aim. A strategic enforcement favouring domestic 
firms may foreclose the domestic market against foreign firms, which can distort competition 
and trade. Therefore, the KFTC should take on the task of legislating regulatory provisions 
that may balance efficiency outcomes and promote international trade by vertical practices. 
 
The KFTC has applied strict legal measures on vertical restraints where the enterprise 
has a certain degree of market share, although its market power does not demonstrate 
significant harm to competition. Vertical practices of enterprises without significant market 
power, although they may promote competition, have been treated as a category of per se or 
quasi-per se violation of the law. There are several reasons why the KFTC has difficulties in 
dealing with vertical restraints. First, economists have not been consistently helpful, with a 
less than uniform approach to vertical restraints.
3
 Second, and most important, Korean 
competition policy has been trapped in the past by focusing on curbing market concentration. 
Part of the reason for the present problem is a reaction to this, which reflexively condemned 
any restraint fitting a predetermined definition of per se illegal abuse of market dominance. 
The KFTC has taken legal measures to deal with problems unique to the Korean economy, 
including those posed by Chaebols, with their excessive concentrations of wealth and internal 
transactions subsidising their affiliates.
4
 This problem, therefore, became attributable to the 
fear of according discretion to the KFTC.
5
  
 
                                                 
3
 See Patrick McNutt, Law, Economics, and Antitrust: Towards a #ew Perspective, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 
UK and Northampton MA, USA, 2005, p. 311. 
4
 See Sai Ree Yun and Dae Sik Hong, ‘Korea: Overview’, Global Competition Law Review:  
http://www.globalcompetitionreview.com/sr/sr_fullpage.cfm?page_id=622 (accessed 20 April 2008). 
5
 This problem is not only seen in Korea but also other regimes. See John Flynn and James Ponsoldt, ‘Legal 
Reasoning and the Jurisprudence of Vertical Restraints: The Limitations of Neoclassical Economic Analysis in 
the Resolution of Antitrust Disputes’ in Harry First, Eleanor Fox, and Robert Pitofsky (eds), Revitalizing 
Antitrust in Its Second Century: Essays on Legal, Economic, and Political Policy, Quorum Books, New York, 
1991, pp. 287-8. 
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The KFTC has wrongfully interpreted the law aimed at a balanced economic growth
6
 
as only meaning the protection of Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SME), rather than 
overall economic development of the state, which should have been considered as one of the 
most important purposes of competition law.
7
 The existing competition law has set a double 
standard, favouring SMEs and foreign competitors, by discriminating against domestic large 
enterprises. Market concentration may upset the ideology of a perfectly competitive market. 
However, it is not clear whether it inhibits the efficiency of the competitive process, 
especially in vertical restraints.
8
 It is not necessary to maintain the strict measure of existing 
competition law and policy on vertical restraints, particularly where they do not impede inter-
brand competition and international transaction.  
 
The KFTC seems to have lost its way to enhance competition in the domestic market, 
and promote economic growth, without an economics-basis. Over the past thirty years, 
Korean competition law has promoted social welfare and continuous economic development 
through various pro-competitive measures. As a result, Korea has improved market 
competition. Although the KFTC’s reform effort has established the foundation for a sound 
market economy, it needs to further reform and adopt measures in order to accomplish 
continuous economic growth through competition.
9
 To achieve the objectives of the 
competition and solve the problems stated, this chapter examines current legal provisions on 
vertical restraints. This chapter will also scrutinise whether Korean vertical regulation can 
satisfy the various tasks that should be achieved under the perspective of market opening to 
global competition.  
 
 
                                                 
6
 Art. 1 Japanese AML also illustrates this aim. The idea that Japan could use competition law to achieve 
economic progress and advance national economic welfare was accepted in 1947 out of an understanding that 
free competition was good for economic policy. This might influence the Korean regime. See Harry First, 
‘Antitrust’s Goals: Theories of Antitrust in the United States and Japan’ in Clifford Jones and Mitsuo 
Matsushita (eds), Competition Policy in the Global Trading System, Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 
2002, p. 193. 
7
 Art. 1 MRFTA and Art. 119(2) Constitution. 
8
 See Dominick Armentano, Antitrust and Monopoly, 2nd edn, The Independent Institute, Oakland CA, USA, 
1990, p. 40. 
9
 Sai Ree Yun and Dae Sik Hong, Supra., note 4. The authors argue that the past development of competition 
policy is sufficiently evidenced by 3 examples: (i) reduction of concentrations in industries; (ii) reduction of 
price provided to consumers through the effective regulation of cartel activities; and (iii) increase of economic 
efficiency and heightened concern for the welfare of the general public through regulatory reforms of 
deregulation and privatisation.  
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5.2. Purposes of Korean Vertical Regulation Revisited 
 
5.2.1. Total Welfare from Vertical Restraints 
 
Article 1 of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act (MRFTA) and Article 119(2) of the 
Constitution clearly state that the aim of competition law is to promote fair and free 
competition, which mainly focuses on restricting market dominance. By achieving this, 
competition law can attain the goals of (i) encouraging creative enterprises’ activities; (ii) 
protecting consumers; and (iii) balancing the development of the national economy.
10
 Free 
competition should be the process by which a nation committed to freedom and containment 
of government can organise its economic affairs efficiently.
11
 The MRFTA has been 
therefore understood as the means to guarantee proper distribution of wealth, to thwart 
market domination and the abuse of economic power, and to democratise the economy 
through harmony amongst economic entities. This aim has made the KFTC develop the law 
to prevent further market dominance at any cost, although its legal provisions may harm the 
whole economy. This section, therefore, brings some arguments that Korean vertical 
regulation is objectionable to the aims of total welfare achievement, (i) and (ii) stated above. 
The next section will consider the application of the law to achieve the aim (iii) balanced 
economic growth and stable national economy.  
 
First, Korean vertical regulation does not encourage enterprising activities in the 
market, because it does not provide a sufficient degree of tolerance on vertical restraints that 
may improve inter-brand competition and efficiency.
12
 The regulation strictly curbs efficient 
vertical arrangements in the market. Along with the concern about market concentration, the 
law also aims at encouraging enterprises activities overall, including large-scale enterprises. 
The current law is, however, so strict on vertical restraints that it does not properly implement 
efficiency-led ideas which may encourage enterprising activities through vigorous inter-brand 
                                                 
10
 Supra., Chapter 2. See also Ohseung Kwon, Kyoung-Jae-Bub [Economic Law], 5th edn, Bubmunsa, Seoul, 
2005, pp. 86-9. Kwon argues that the expression of aims in Art. 1 MRFTA is very unclear and cannot be 
ultimate objectives of the competition law. 
11
 See Harold Demsetz, ‘The Trust behind Antitrust’ in Eleanor Fox and James Halverson (eds), Industrial 
Concentration and the Market System: Legal, Economic, Social and Political Perspectives, ABA Publishing, 
USA, 1979, p. 45. 
12
 For further discussion of detrimental influence on business activities by vigorous enforcement, see Armando 
Rodriguez and Malcolm Coate, ‘Limits to Antitrust Policy for Reforming Economies’, Houston Journal of 
International Law, Vol. 18, 1996, pp. 352-5. 
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competition. If competition law is very strict on business activities based on the size of the 
enterprise, despite efficient activities which may reduce transaction costs, it is clear that 
enterprising activities will be discouraged. This problem can result from the absence of a 
sufficient and effective presumption of market dominance, based on a market share test that 
can scrutinise the balance test of inter- and intra-brand competitiveness by vertical restraints.  
 
Second, the current strict rules on vertical restraints do not protect consumers’ 
benefits in the sense of consumer welfare improvement. Some argue that, for instance, 
exclusionary restraints may harm consumers, where a supplier or distributor has significant 
market power. This contractual arrangement may be efficient, but the benefits can be at the 
expense of consumers and, thus, not be socially desirable.
13
 The precise meaning of consumer 
welfare should be discussed, although the recognition of the primacy of consumer interests or 
consumer welfare is important. It means that the KFTC and the courts implicitly define 
competition as a process that promotes the welfare of consumers.
14
 Under this definition, a 
practice is anti-competitive only if it harms consumers, and it is pro-competitive only if it 
benefits consumers. However, which consumers should benefit: consumers in the relevant 
market or in the economy as whole? Therefore, it is questionable whether the ultimate 
purpose of competition law is to promote economic efficiency, and thereby benefit 
consumers in the economy as a whole, or to protect consumers from exploitation.
15
 The 
KFTC seems to be more interested in preventing consumer exploitation than in advancing 
economic efficiency.  
 
Vertical restraints, however, provide consumers with valuable promotional 
information and services by decreasing intra-brand competition, which increase inter-brand 
competition, enhance sales, and thereby increase consumer welfare. Economic approach 
theorists argue that the benefits to consumers from free-riders with lower prices would be 
only in the short term.
16
 Without intra-brand restraints, the profits resulting from a 
                                                 
13
 See Patrick Rey and Joseph Stiglitz, ‘Vertical Pricing Schemes: Vertical Restraints and Producers’ 
Competition’ in Louis Philips (ed), Applied Industrial Economics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
1998, p. 189.  
14
 For the argument about the process of competition, see Richard Whish, Competition Law, 6th edn, Oxford 
University Press, New York, 2009, p. 1. 
15
 See John Kirkwood, ‘Consumers, Economics, and Antitrust’ in John Kirkwood (ed), Antitrust Law and 
Economics, Elsevier, Amsterdam, p. 29. 
16
 Nonetheless, some disagree with this assertion. See Alden Abbott, ‘Paradox Regained: Towards a “New 
Economic Approach” to Vertical Restraints Policy’, The George Washington Law Review, Vol. 48, 1980, pp. 
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competitive advantage could be lost.
17
 In other words, although consumers may get benefits 
from free-riding distributors for low price in the short term, it can harm the whole market and 
result in loss of consumer welfare in the long run. According to Williamson, the social 
welfare implications can be established by characterising the benefits and costs resulting from 
market structure. Therefore, the types of trade-offs that competition law must contend with in 
circumstances where market power and production economies may result in a fair share of 
efficiency.
18
 In conclusion, the consumer welfare implications of most vertical restraints are 
beyond most competition lawyers and economists.
19
 The implementation of law, which 
emphasises harm to consumers, is therefore wrong, because benefits such as guaranteeing 
quality of goods and services through vertical restraints will increase social, and also, 
consumer welfare.
20
 
 
5.2.2. Economic Growth and International Trade Improvement from Vertical Restraints 
 
Competition policy should be considered as part of microeconomic and also macroeconomic 
policies in general, including industrial and trade policies. It cannot be properly viewed in 
isolation. This general perspective is necessary in order to assess possible conflicts between 
the instruments of state economic policy, and consider which instruments are most 
appropriate to which targets of policy. In examining competition policy in terms of overall 
government policies, competition policy-makers should not only assess market power but 
also the consequences of regulations on pro-competitive vertical restraints.
21
 However, the 
KFTC hardly considers that the exercise of vertical restraints with some degree of market 
share may be used for pro-competitive purposes. The current vertical regulation has not been 
considered as the means of promoting development of national economy. It has been 
presumed that the achievement of balancing the national economy could be made mostly by 
                                                                                                                                                        
568-9. Because of imperfections in the market for consumer goods, there is no guarantee that restraints, by 
providing point-of-sale information and services, will necessarily increase consumer welfare.  
17
 See Peter Gerhart, ‘The “Competitive Advantages” Explanation for Intrabrand Restraints: An Antitrust 
Analysis’, Duke Law Journal, Vol. 1981, No. 3, 1981, p. 426. 
18
 E.g. Williamson’s ‘Naïve Trade-off Model’ such as exchange of deadweight loss and cost saving from merger. 
See Oliver Williamson, ‘Economies as an Antitrust Defence: The Welfare Tradeoffs’, The American Economic 
Review, Vol. 58, No. 1, 1968, pp. 21-3; Oliver Williamson, Economic Organization: Firms, Markets, and Policy 
Control, Harvester Wheatsheaf, Hertfordshire, 1986, p. 199. 
19
 See Frank Easterbrook, ‘Vertical Arrangements and the Rule of Reason’, Antitrust Law Journal, Vol. 53, 
1984, p. 153. 
20
 For further discussion about quality improvement, see Supra., Chapter 3. 
21
 See John Vickers and Donald Hay, ‘The Economics of Market Dominance’ in Donald Hay and John Vickers 
(eds), The Economics of Market Dominance, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1987, pp. 2-3.  
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protecting SMEs through preventing large firms’ practices. Nevertheless, vertical restraints 
with some degree of market power can improve competition, which may achieve the goal of 
national economic growth in the end. The KFTC has not sufficiently considered the 
improvement of international competition and economic growth through vertical restraints. 
The KFTC outweighs vertical foreclosure and entry barriers over the benefits by vertical 
restraints.
22
 This has created ignorance of pro-competitiveness in the market.  
 
In order to strive for balanced development of the national economy, a policy of 
international competition should be sought. This cannot be solved by prohibition of large 
enterprises, nor protection of SMEs, but a fair measure through trade-offs between pro- and 
anti-competitiveness. Therefore, legislation of competition law should establish a fair trade 
order without impeding the growth of enterprises.
23
 The KFTC should ask the right questions 
to elicit guidance for achieving the purpose of vertical regulation to achieve balanced 
economic growth. World trading agreements such as Free Trade Agreements (FTA) normally 
aim to open markets to trading countries. If government barriers in Korea recede, but the 
market is still not accessible to efficient foreign firms, there may be blockage by an illegal 
private restraint.
24
  
 
In the case of monopolistic exclusion, a single firm with dominant power may tie up 
the only available distributors in order to exclude competitors. In particular, monopolistic 
exclusion occurs when the dominant firm uses anti-competitive strategies, such as exclusive 
contracts unnecessary for its own efficiency, in order to fence out rivals. These practices are 
certainly illegal under the MRFTA, if imposed by firms with market power, and foreclose 
competitors and raise prices. The problem of market foreclosure by private restraints lies at 
                                                 
22
 E.g., Yongsan Chemical Co. Ltd/Korea PTG Co., KFTC Decision 2003-154, Sept. 24, 2003. The KFTC 
examined post-merger effects by vertical foreclosure and entry barrier in a raw material market and concluded 
there would be anti-competitive outcomes despite the Concentration Ratio (CR) 3 was only 56.2 per cent. There 
were also several decisions in which the KFTC outweighed foreclosure and entry barrier than efficiency, e.g., 
Dongyang #ylon Co. Ltd, KFTC Decision 96-51, Apr. 22, 1996. For further detail, see also Ohseung Kwon, 
Supra., note 10, p. 224; Seungwhan Oh, Gong-Jung-Go-Rae-Sim-Kyoul-So-Whe [Reviews on Decisions of the 
Fair Trade Commission], Sanhakyoun, Seoul, 2005, pp. 58-9. 
23
 See Young-Dae Lee, ‘How Many Magic Rings: Economic Review of Korean Antitrust Law’, Journal of 
Korean Competition Law, Vol. 9, 2003, p. 260. 
24
 See Dina Waked, ‘Competition Law in the Developing World: The Why and How of Adoption and Its 
Implications for International Competition Law’, Global Antitrust Law Review, Issue 1, 2008, p. 89. The author 
argues openness to trade plays an important role but the lower demand and supply that prevail in developing 
countries cannot be changed easily with the competition law legislation. 
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the intersection of trade and competition law,
25
 although the KFTC does not seem to consider 
this. Therefore, the KFTC should be concerned that the law does not prevent pro-
competitiveness, and also international transactions by excessively tolerant legal measures. 
On the contrary, a lenient policy on vertical restraints does not necessarily mean fostering 
foreclosure against foreign firms. If the KFTC allows only pro-competitive restraints, it 
would be non-discriminatory, and also improve domestic competition, since efficient foreign 
firms could penetrate the Korean market. The KFTC therefore needs to balance its 
implementation of law to improve competition and international trade, which will result in 
balanced economic growth. 
 
5.2.3. Pursuit of Better Vertical Regulation for Purposes of Competition Law Achievement 
 
Korean competition policy has been guided under Article 1 MRFTA to pursue two main 
objectives: (i) improving domestic market structure that is presumed as dominated by a few 
enterprises; and (ii) guaranteeing fair trade through prohibiting anti-competitive and unfair 
practices.
26
 The controls on mergers and holding companies under Chapter 3 of the MRFTA 
can be regarded as a means of achieving the first objective. Articles 3-2, 19, 23, and 29 
MRFTA are considered as the legal implementation for the second objective. In observing the 
Korean distribution system, the KFTC seems to consider it as mostly monopolistic or 
oligopolistic, with dominant enterprises that inhibit competition or harm consumers through 
driving out SMEs. The KFTC often concludes that the Korean distribution structure is 
irrationally multi-levelled, and controlled by a few dominant suppliers. It considers that this 
distribution system may have some inter-brand competition improvement, but far less intra-
brand competition, because big upstream enterprises possibly inhibit competition through 
vertical control, in order to strengthen their market power in manufacture and final 
distribution.  
 
When the KFTC examines the balance test, it therefore outweighs intra-brand 
competition, as analysed in the previous chapter. Within the category of intra-brand restraints, 
                                                 
25
 See Eleanor Fox, ‘Competition Law’ in Andreas Lowenfeld, International Economic Law, 2nd edn, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2008, pp. 453-4. 
26
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however, market power can be more readily tolerated in some manifestations.
27
 Therefore, 
the question facing the KFTC is how to decide whether particular types of vertical restraints 
are likely to promote inter-brand competition. This is not a simple task, as this area is the 
subject of heated debate. Vertical restraints are not always welfare enhancing, nor always 
anti-competitive. Thus, many agree that there is no one-size-fits-all solution for the issues 
involving vertical restraints. There are a lot of complex matters involved in designing and 
implementing regulation, and regulatory reforms at all levels of Korean competition policy. 
Therefore, it is not easy to give an absolute answer or solution to this problem. However, it is 
necessary for the KFTC to establish a scrutiny framework, to simplify the analysis of vertical 
cases to prevent the failures of sound enforcement, because of the increasing importance of 
vertical arrangements in the market. 
 
It is predictable that for some years, vertical restraints will be the main concern in 
competition lawsuits. Determining their legality in any given situation is a difficult task when 
the KFTC does not provide a clear vertical regulation based efficiency from competition. 
Competition optimises efficiency by inducing better resource allocation. Allocative efficiency 
is encouraged because investment is directed to the point where the highest returns or benefits 
exist. Furthermore, the gains from productive or dynamic efficiency through innovation, 
which competition fosters, enables the state economy to cope with global economic changes. 
The welfare and efficiency impact of competition are generally recognised as the main 
objectives of competition policy in most countries. Therefore, competition policy should 
promote competition, as long as it encourages efficiency and growth. In addition, competition 
policy should be consistent with non-economic objectives, such as consumer protection. 
These principles are, of course, more easily stated than applied in practice. These objectives 
can conflict with efficiency objectives, and the trade-offs are often difficult to resolve.
28
  
 
Whilst the divergent economic theories are useful in shaping analysis of vertical cases, 
the KFTC should move beyond a purely theoretical model, and reduce the conflict between 
legal and economic abstractions to a more practical level, to determine the proper application 
                                                 
27
 See Lawrence Sullivan and Warren Grimes, The Law of Antitrust: An Integrated Handbook, 2nd edn, 
Thomson West, St. Paul MINN, USA, 2006, p. 30. 
28
Some scholars argue that consumer welfare effect test rather than trade-off test gives benefits such as fewer 
potential errors in implementation. See Steven Salop, ‘Exclusionary Conduct, Effect on Consumers, and the 
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of law.
29
 In conclusion, the KFTC has two main tasks in its policy on vertical restraints: (i) to 
ensure that no economic entity can abuse its power; and (ii) to implement rules that would 
increase efficiency without any failure of the market to perform its function. In most 
instances, these rules may simply be about making the market more competitive, and 
prohibiting and disciplining clear restraints to trade. Where market power is inherent in the 
market structure, competition policy should prevent use or abuse of such power. This should 
require enforcing rules to guide economic entities not to abuse market power, and also 
improve efficiency.
30
 An improvement in vertical regulation based on more efficiency-focus 
will ensure balance of the purposes of competition law.  
 
 
5.3. Harmonising Purposes of Competition Law on Vertical Restraints: Practical Matters 
 
5.3.1. More Efficiency, More Gains 
 
It is not an easy task for the KFTC to develop the law where there are various aims to be 
achieved under certain conditions.
31
 Moreover, it is sometimes difficult to apply an 
economics-first policy. Although economists have demonstrated the importance of economic 
justification regarding vertical restraints, efficiency-improvement cannot be the only purpose 
of Korean competition law. Therefore, it would be too hasty to jump from the foregoing 
theoretical analysis to a consideration of policy based on efficiency in practice without first 
discussing what may be termed ‘trade-offs’. Competition policy should pursue the trade-off 
between the costs and benefits of various types of policy measure. In practice, policy-makers 
obviously have neither the power nor the information to bring about the optimal outcome 
from vertical restraints. However, they cannot ignore that trade-off is an essential part of the 
competitive market system. The question is, then, how best to promote and maintain the 
process of effective competition. The effects of competition and policy measures upon 
welfare are often ambiguous. It is not possible to deduce clear-cut results by theorising. 
Therefore, the factors in the real market do matter. However, when one considers the 
                                                 
29
 Courts should examine cases not only by economic theories. For further discussion, see Wanda Roger, 
‘Beyond Economic Theory: A Model for Analyzing the Antitrust Implications of Exclusive Dealing 
Arrangements’, Duke Law Journal, Vol. 45, No. 5, 1996, p. 1011.  
30
 See Erlinda Medalla, ‘Perspectives on Competition Policy: an Overview of the Issues’ in Erlinda Medalla (ed), 
Competition Policy in East Asia, Routledge, London and New York, 2005, pp. 4-5. 
31
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appropriate design of competition policy, it is unsatisfactory to say that it all depends on the 
particular circumstances at hand, and every case must be investigated in detail on its merits. 
Since competition policy is costly to administer, especially in a country without a common 
law tradition, the costs of in-depth investigations of every case would outweigh the possible 
gains. In a common law system such as the US, the courts develop antitrust policy,
32
 although 
the weakness of the common law approach to competition law is its legal uncertainty.
33
 The 
MRFTA is, however, the outcome of the civil law tradition. Korean vertical regulation, 
therefore, should be a set of rules and criteria that provide comprehensive examinations to 
give certainty. The first task should be reform for enhancing legal certainty in order to ensure 
efficiency in vertical regulation. Nevertheless, the KFTC should not ignore the benefits from 
flexible rule of reason enforcement from the common law antitrust. 
 
 The current law and policy highlights protection of consumers and SMEs rather than 
efficiency. This implementation has been criticised because of its protection of competitors, 
despite its inefficient outcome
34
 based on the unfairness concept.
35
 The KFTC should 
guarantee the principle of protection of competition rather than competitors. However, this is 
often ignored. Therefore, the KFTC needs to trade-off the positive and negative impacts by 
vertical restraints in order to reach the level of a mature market economy, rather than 
protection of SMEs. Vertical restraints can be beneficial to the economy where these 
arrangements can guarantee quality of goods, stabilise supply of goods, and prevent free-
riding. To consolidate the harmonisation or trade-off of competition goals regarding vertical 
restraints, the KFTC needs to shift its policy from the protection of consumers and SMEs to 
efficiency-improvement. Trade-off, the sacrifice of one aim to gain another, may be proper. 
Competition law devoted entirely to consumer welfare faces severe trade-off problems.
36
 
Therefore, more efficiency-focus provision in a developing country’s economy will give 
more benefits than other social objectives.  
                                                 
32
 See Phillip Areeda, Louis Kaplow, and Aaron Edlin, Antitrust Analysis: Problems, Text, and Cases, 6th edn, 
Aspen Publishing, New York, 2004, p. 3. 
33
 See Philip Areeda, ‘Monopolization, Mergers, and Markets: A Century Past and the Future’ California Law 
Review, Vol. 75, No. 3, 1987, p. 981. 
34
 See Kwangshik Shin, ‘Kyoung-Jae-Wi-Ki-Wa-Kyoung-Jaeng-Jeong-Chaek (Economic Crisis and 
Competition Policy and Law)’ Journal of Economic Policy, Vol. 20, No. 1 and 2, 1998, p. 35. The author argues 
Korean competition enforcement for protection of competitors may cause inefficiency outcome. 
35
 See Hyun-Ok Han, ‘Bul-Gong-Jung-Go-Rae-Haeng-Wi-Ui-Wi-Bub-Sung-Pan-Dan (Scrutiny of Infringement 
of Unfair Business Practices)’ in Ohseung Kwon (ed), Ja-Yoo-Kyoung-Jaeng-Kwa-Gong-Jung-Go-Rae [Free 
Competition and Fair Trade], Bubmunsa, Seoul, 2002, p. 447. 
36
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5.3.2. Criteria for Trade-Off Test 
 
The views on trade-off here reflect the following principles. First, policy should be framed 
with a view to minimise the cost of error, such as condemning desirable behaviour and 
permitting undesirable behaviour. Therefore, vertical regulation and guidelines are necessary 
to not make this error. Second, although competitive outcomes from vertical restraints are 
sometimes disadvantageous, the process of balancing of inter- and intra-brand competition is 
the most workable system for achieving the purposes of competition law. This may mean that 
the major concern of competition policy on vertical restraints should be the promotion and 
maintenance of the process of pro-competition and efficiency. However, that should not be 
the only concern of competition policy, because in some vertical cases it might be possible 
that the decrease of intra-brand competition is outweighed by market dominance. These 
considerations should be taken into account, but the burden of proof lies with those arguing 
that the lessening competition should be outweighed by efficiency. This test has been often 
practised in vertical merger cases, but not very often in vertical restraints.
37
 Third, it would be 
wrong to condemn vertical restraints without reason to believe that effective competition is 
absent, or would be absent if the conduct were permitted.
38
 Therefore, vertical restraint 
should be subject to investigation only if it appears that it might jeopardise competition. If it 
is found not to threaten competition, it should be allowed. To provide legal certainty in 
vertical restraints to enhance positive outcomes, the KFTC needs to revise a sound 
presumption of market dominance. 
 
Vickers and Hay suggest four criteria to be taken into account in determining the 
public interest from effective competition, and this can give an idea for Korean regulation.
39
 
These are (i) preventing exercise of market dominance that inhibits competition; (ii) 
promoting the interests of consumers in respect to the quality and variety of goods and 
                                                 
37
 The efficiency outcome should be greater than the anti-competitive in the scrutiny under sec. III.2 of the 
Guidelines for review M&A, Notification No. 2007-12 amended on Dec. 20, 2007. The burden of proof lies on 
parties, i.e., Hyundai Motors-Kia Motors/Wia Corp. KFTC Decision 2002-111, 2002Kikyoul0610, June 18, 
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the mergers outweighed the anti-competitive effects.  
38
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39
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services by preventing free-riding; (iii) reducing transaction costs and developing a new 
distribution and facilitating market entry, thereby enhancing inter-brand competition; and (iv) 
maintaining and promoting the balanced distribution of goods and services. The most 
important element of the criteria to be measured by the KFTC is to examine and weigh the 
various elements of the public demands. This should be a protection-of-competition way 
rather than competitors. The Unfair Business Practice (UBP) provision has been considered 
as a critical means of protecting competitors, trading partners, and also competition.
40
 This 
mixed concept is confusing, as to whether the aim of the UBP provision is to protect 
competitors rather than competition.  
 
The KFTC should be concerned about market conduct when scrutinising the UBP 
provision only if effective competition in the domestic market does not work properly, and 
this should be done through economic ideas. Although there are some limits of on the use of 
economics in competition analysis,
41
 the influence of economic thinking upon competition 
policy worldwide has grown considerably. Moreover, recent vertical restraint cases have been 
greatly influenced by the development of economic theory. Hence, defining proper standards 
regarding the illegality of vertical restraints is a global subject, which needs international 
comparative analysis.
42
 The preceding section demonstrates that the KFTC is not well 
equipped with a sound law for efficiency-improvement, unlike the US and the EC, as 
discussed in Chapter 3. This is because of the divorce of policies in its theory and practice of 
competition law in the context of global competition. Concern about international 
competition in vertical restraints should be observable. Therefore, the KFTC needs to 
consider and examine other competition regimes’ vertical regulations, along with economic 
theories to assure benefits from vigorous competition.  As a final point, the KFTC should be 
properly concerned about social interests. The fate of individual competitors, regardless of 
whether they are domestic or international, is relevant only as far as this relates to an 
assessment of whether the competitive process is operating in a reformed method for general 
                                                 
40
 See Yunjeong Kim, ‘The Meaning of Consumer Protection as the Purpose of the Korean Antitrust Act’ 
Journal of Korean Competition Law, Vol. 14, 2006, p. 310. 
41
 Lawrence Sullivan and Warren Grimes, Supra., note 27, p. 20. The economic analysis is limited because (i) 
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public interest.
43
 This should be the ultimate aim, the idea of trade-off in implementation of 
vertical regulation. The vital groundwork for this test is proper provision from clear guidance. 
 
 
5.4. Market Power in Korea: Special Responsibility vs. Efficiency in Korean Vertical Cases 
 
5.4.1. Problems of Market Power and Competition in Vertical Level 
 
The theme of this section focuses on market power at the vertical level, such as the power of 
a single enterprise over the distribution of goods or services in a market. Monopolistic market 
structure and its consequences have been a critical topic as part of established economic 
analysis for a long time. As a result, the KFTC has devised monopoly policies to deal with 
them in practice. Nevertheless, monopolies in the real world do not always fit the theoretical 
categories, and their persistence in the face of competition policies brings concerns about 
negative consequences generally.
44
 This argument about policy on large enterprises has been 
a problem in Korea, with its traditionally inadequate policy on monopolies. In particular, the 
important question relating to vertical restraints is how far the KFTC can exempt vertical 
restraints of enterprises with some degree of market power. The next question shall be how 
much market share of enterprises practising vertical restraints can be regarded as pro-
competitive rather than harmful to competition. This can be resolved through the economic 
rationale of vertical restraints, as well as a sound presumption of market dominance. Market 
power is commonly defined as the ability to raise and maintain price or reduce outputs 
significantly without losing profits. In particular, the term ‘market dominant enterprise’ under 
Article 2(7) MRFTA is defined as any enterprise holding market dominance who can 
determine, maintain, or change the prices, quantity or quality of goods and services or other 
terms and conditions of business.  
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 See Oliver Williamson, Antitrust Economics: Mergers, Contracting, and Strategic Behavior, Basil Blackwell, 
Oxford, 1987, p. 300; Masako Wakui, Antimonopoly Law: Competition Law and Policy in Japan, Arima 
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Most enterprises, in fact, have at least some degree of market power, because their 
products are not perfectly interchangeable with the goods of others. However, few enterprises 
have substantial market power over price. Therefore, enterprises without significant market 
power cannot harm competition, no matter how much they try. They may harm a few 
consumers or competitors by selecting anti-competitive strategies. When enterprises lack 
market power, they cannot sustain harmful activities.
45
 The possibly anti-competitive forms 
of vertical restraints can occur only if there is significant market power. Vertical 
arrangements with such market power may also facilitate cartels to make collusion 
plausible.
46
 Monopolistic enterprises under collusive conduct may raise rivals’ cost of entry 
as foreclosure. Where there is no market power, however, many entrants stand ready to 
supply goods.
47
 Therefore, it is crucial to assess the market power of an enterprise, along with 
scrutinising pro- and anti-competitive effects by vertical restraints. In other words, large 
enterprises in Korea should take their special responsibilities in vertical cases only when they 
have significant market power. The important assignment of the KFTC is thus to establish a 
proper market share threshold to prevent abuse of dominance. 
 
5.4.2. Pressure of Competitive Rivalry in Vertical Relations: Ex Ante Approach 
 
If a market is open to international competitors without any state-regulatory barriers, 
efficiency-seeking behaviour will increase, regardless of the size of enterprises. Despite its 
perspective of market opening to Korea, however, assessing market power is still important. 
That is because the consequences of market opening are sometimes ambiguous as to whether 
they will lead to vigorous competition or not. This ambiguity may create a considerable cost. 
Then, regarding the economic analysis of conditions of sale at the vertical level, there are two 
distinct questions
48
 whether: (i) the practices with some degree of market power are harmful 
to competition or to social welfare generally; (ii) these are indicative of a lack of effective 
competition in the Korean market. To solve the first question, it is necessary to examine the 
relevant provisions of vertical restraints with market power, the implementation of Article 3-
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 Frank Easterbrook, Supra., note 19, p. 159. 
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 See Harold Demsetz, ‘Industrial Structure, Market Rivalry, and Public Policy’, Journal of Law and 
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2. The general legal standards applicable to abuse of dominant position indicate that vertical 
restraints by a dominant enterprise are highly likely to be exclusionary. The problem with this 
is that competition authorities in the world fail to explain which of the exclusions impede 
competition, and which to condemn. If an enterprise has attempted to inhibit competition 
with an intention other than efficiency, it is fair to categorise its behaviour as anti-competitive 
abusive conduct.
49
 On the contrary, overaggressive use of competition enforcement against 
exclusionary conducts will inevitably reduce the incentive for beneficial competition.
50
 This 
concern has not been clearly discussed in the Article 3-2 cases. Moreover, the KFTC has not 
made clear that efficiency is the normative standard rather than just one factor in determining 
whether a justification is valid. Hence, it is crucial to provide sound guidance on how large 
market power can impede competition. Without this, it is difficult to obtain welfare gain.  
 
The second question of lack of effective competition from the vertical cases should be 
scrutinised under the ex ante approach. By exclusive dealing with market power, for example, 
an enterprise reduces the size of the entrants’ potential market, so that the probability of entry 
will decrease. As a result, consumers may have to accept higher prices.
51
 This rationale can 
often be observed in current KFTC decisions such as the Intel case.
52
 The KFTC decided that 
Intel abused its dominant position, thereby drove out its rival, Advanced Micro Devices 
(AMD) from the Central Processing Unit (CPU) market. In this case, Intel offered rebates in 
exchange for exclusive deals with the Korean computer makers,
53
 Samsung Electronics and 
Sambo computers, which rank first and second respectively in the Korean market. The KFTC 
focused on Intel’s market share, approximately 90 per cent, which was even higher than its 
worldwide market share, 79.6 per cent. The KFTC held that Intel’s action forced domestic 
manufacturers to buy the expensive CPU from it, causing consumers to pay higher prices.
54
 It 
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focused on market power of a single brand and the negative effects by restraints on 
consumers and the domestic market. The KFTC stressed that one of the major positive 
outcomes from its decision was the increased opportunity for consumers to select from a 
greater variety of products.
55
 This consumer-welfare-focused rationale was very similar to 
that in the 2005 Intel decision by the Japan Fair Trade Commission (JFTC), for its 
foreclosure through exclusive dealing by means of a rebate, a volume discount.
56
 In the Intel 
cases in Korea and Japan, AMD sold CPUs at a lower price than Intel thereby increasing its 
market share, and Intel merely reacted by means of the rebate practice in order to maintain 
the highest ratio of CPU adoption in the PC market. When a dominant firm decides to 
respond to its rival, competition law can be a flexible potential method to protect 
competition.
57
  
 
It seemed, however, that the KFTC focused on total market foreclosure, such as 
‘market containment effects’, which block market entry into the Korean market. Its argument 
of which vertical restraints may impede entry, by requiring entrants to have some degree of 
market power, was wrong. Anti-competitive outcomes should be decided depending on the 
condition of downstream level market concentration. Although the Korean PC makers at the 
downstream level had certain market power, they had a large number of foreign rivals, such 
as Sony and Toshiba etc. In other words, this rebate could increase price competition at the 
downstream level.
58
 Furthermore, Intel’s exclusive practice could increase efficiency by 
secure contractual tie-ins. This rationale illustrates economic advantages of vertical control of 
rigid long-term contracts, to supplement limited reputational capital to recoup Research and 
Development (R&D) investment.
59
 The KFTC did not distinguish the harm to competitors 
from harm to competition. Consumers could get benefits from the introduction of new 
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products in the new economy,
60
 where the monopoly profit expected from innovation creates 
an incentive to provide the gain to society.
61
 Since the downstream market was quite 
competitive, the KFTC could have considered ex ante vigorous competition in this new 
economy. The anti-competitive effects from Intel’s practice can also be plausible, based on 
economic theories. As argued in the Microsoft tying case
62
 in the previous chapter, the 
presence of economies of scale and network effects is the central feature of models of anti-
competitive tying and exclusionary contracts in technological products. This implies that 
depriving a rival of sales can weaken its future competitiveness. Given this point, Intel and 
Microsoft might accomplish this goal profitably using exclusionary and predatory practices.
63
 
However, the KFTC did not consider the balance of theoretical debates.
64
 
 
The KFTC disregarded the unique technology environment, and the necessity of 
exclusive dealing for the reduction of transaction cost. Furthermore, it did not fully discuss 
even whether these firms intended to drive out their rivals through anti-competitive strategies, 
or whether their rivals were harmed because Intel and Microsoft were highly efficient.
65
 The 
KFTC focused on fear of largeness and consumer protection, rather than the rivalry in the 
market. In short, its decision may have been right, but its reasoning was wrong. If a foreign 
monopolist has exclusive dealing contracts with domestic firms, the distribution network is 
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foreclosed to a potential entrant for only a short-term.
66
 What is basically required for 
contracts to constitute a barrier to entry as an indication of a lack of competition should be 
the post-entry profits for the incumbent, in other words, based on an ex ante analysis.
67
 
 
 If the AMD PC products of foreign rivals are competitive in the Korean market, the 
KFTC does not have to be concerned about market foreclosure. Under this ex ante 
examination, the KFTC can measure the degree of lack of effective competition in vertical 
cases, and properly implement the law. The problem is not only the lack of enforcement 
experience, but also unclear statements in the MRFTA.
68
 Where business practice in the new 
economy brings obvious consumer welfare,
69
 the KFTC and the courts should examine the 
restriction of intra-brand competition, and do a balance test.
70
 The current approach of the 
KFTC on leverage effects by tying or any other methods through market power seems 
stringent, although market shares are likely to lack predictive power when innovation is rapid 
in the new economy.
71
 In the SK Telecom Corp. case,
72
 for example, the KFTC focused on 
the firm’s market share, 60.2 per cent, rather than ex ante competition in the internet 
download market. There is always the possibility that a new product can replace the old one 
through vigorous rivalry in this new economy. However, it was not fully considered ex ante 
in the current cases.
73
 
 
5.4.3. Consideration for Global Standard: More Economic Notes 
 
Vertical restraints are usually pro-competitive, especially when these practices permit 
enterprises to compete on the level of global distribution as well as on the traditional terms of 
                                                 
66
 Frank Easterbrook, Supra., note 19, p. 162.  
67
 Philippe Aghion and Patrick Bolton, Supra., note 51, p. 399. 
68
 E.g., sec. V.5.A.(1)(A) of the UBP Guidelines (tie-in sales) illustrates that the KFTC examines the violation 
of tie-ins based on trends of technological innovation and product integration. However, this statement is not 
sufficient to guide the new economy issue. Moreover, there has not been any relevant case. 
69
 For further discussion, see John Lopatka and William Page, ‘Monopolization, Innovation, and Consumer 
Welfare’, George Washington Law Review, Vol. 69, 2001, p. 424. 
70
 See Seung-Wha Chang, ‘Violation Criteria of Tying under the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act’, 
Seoul University Law Journal, Vol. 45, No. 4, 2004, p. 516. 
71
 See Richard Schmalensee, ‘Antitrust Issues in Schumpeterian Industries’, The American Economic Review, 
Vol. 90, No. 2, 2000, p. 193. 
72
 SK Telecom Corp., KFTC Decision 2007-044, 2006Sokyoung0785, Feb. 6, 2007. 
73
 E.g., SK Telecom Corp., KFTC Decision 2001-183, 2001Kyoungchok1955, Oct. 8 2001. SK lost its market 
share in mobile phone industry significantly from 84.1 per cent to 41.9 per cent during the years 1997 to 2000. 
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intermediary and final goods in the global market.
74
 The more ways enterprises compete in 
the global market, the better they improve the state economy, thereby enhancing competition 
in the domestic market. Therefore, vertical restraints almost never threaten competition 
without significant market power in the context of the market opening to international 
competitors.
75
 If, however, the exercise of dominance tends to be detrimental to competition 
other than competitors, it should be a prima facie anti-competition case.
76
 Following this 
general economic consideration, the KFTC should prepare for a clear degree of efficiency-
enhancing policy on vertical restraints to meet a global standard where there is no harmonised 
competition law in the international perspective. There are two plausible suggestions to 
achieve the goal of meeting a global standard. The first is to attempt to balance the welfare 
gain from vertical restraint, and the welfare loss from market power. The second is that of 
inferring the cause of an enterprise’s market power. To achieve the second one effectively, 
the KFTC should consider whether the maintenance of a dominant position by means of 
exercise of vertical restraints is anti-competitive. Potential competition from the entry and 
expansion of international rivals has always been regarded in competition law studies. 
Dominance would rapidly be eroded by these international competitors if domestic large 
enterprises became inefficient when the market is open to foreign enterprises. Therefore, 
domestic enterprises must be encouraged not to abuse their market power if the potential 
competition from foreign enterprises is strong.
77
  
 
Some may argue about collusive problems by vertical restraints in the Korean market, 
in which foreign wholesalers have not successfully gained profits. Cartels are unlawful per se, 
and should remain so under Article 19 MRFTA. However, vertical restraints are not often 
used by cartels, and most vertical restraints are just a means by which one supplier competes 
with others.
78
 In particular, if there are more routes to distribute for international competitors, 
an increase in social welfare will be expected. The only reason why foreign wholesalers are 
not successful in the Korean market is their marketing failure.
79
 In the evolution of mass 
                                                 
74
 See David Fidler, ‘Competition Law and International Relations’, The International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly, Vol. 41, No. 3, 1992, pp. 572-3. 
75
 Frank Easterbrook, Supra., note 19, p. 168. 
76
 John Vickers and Donald Hay, Supra., note 21, p. 9. 
77
 Ibid., pp. 11-4. 
78
 Frank Easterbrook, Supra., note 19, p. 135. 
79
 See Wan-Soon Kim and You-il Lee, The Korean Economy: The Challenges of FDI-led Globalisation, Edward 
Elgar, Cheltenham, UK, 2007, pp. 87-90. A number of large discount wholesalers, Carrefour, Tesco (Homeplus: 
Samsung-Tesco), Wal-Mart, and Costco have set up their businesses in Korea. However, except Tesco, these 
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production and mass distribution interaction, the vertical mobility of most distribution 
functions and operations is very high today, with developed countries witnessing the 
consolidation of new methods of doing business both at up- and downstream levels.
80
 
However, this industrial change cannot be harmful to competition. Therefore, the Korean 
competition authority needs to consider the overall economic circumstances and market 
structure, based on more economic analyses from global competition.
81
 
 
 
5.5. Statutory Problems in Korean Competition Law and Policy on Vertical Restraints 
 
5.5.1. Overview of Problems in Substantive Statutes 
 
Following the understanding of aims of the Korean competition policy along with market 
dominance issues, it is necessary to examine whether the current legal provisions on vertical 
restraints are suitable to achieve the purposes of the law. This section contains an evaluation 
of the framework of the Korean competition law of vertical restraints. The evaluation is based 
on the principles of purposes set out in the previous chapter. This section concludes with a 
consideration of three main issues: (i) double standards of scrutiny under Articles 3-2 and 23 
MRFTA, grounded mainly in the wrongful presumption test of market dominance in Article 4 
MRFTA; (ii) confusion in application of Articles 19 and 23 MRFTA, which was already 
discussed in Chapter 4; and (iii) improper legal provisions to implement the Resale Price 
Maintenance (RPM) law, Article 29 MRFTA, of per se rule.  Korean competition law overall 
has been motivated by microeconomic considerations of efficient resource allocation and 
effective competition. In addition, macroeconomic concerns, such as international 
competitiveness and economic growth, have been adopted.
82
  
                                                                                                                                                        
distributors did not make a significant success. For example, in 2006 Carrefour withdrew from Korea for its 
maladjustment to local consumer tastes and challenges from competitors.  
80
 See Antonio Cucinotta, ‘The Vertical Price Fixing Controversy’ in Antonio Cucinotta, Roberto Pardolesi, and 
Roger Van den Bergh (eds), Post-Chicago Developments in Antitrust Law, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK and 
Northampton MA, USA, 2002, p. 264. 
81
 See Kwangshik Shin, Innovating Korea’s Competition Policy, Nanam Publishing, Seoul, 2006, p. 117. The 
author argues that the KFTC’s specialisation by economic analysis can improve its extraterritorial application, 
and this will protect consumers from anti-competitive practices by foreign firms. 
82
 The administrative policy of competition with macroeconomics has its long history. For example, a statute 
concerning price stability was legislated in the 1970s, the Price Stabilisation and Fair Trade Act (Law No. 2798, 
Dec. 31, 1975). This macroeconomic concern can be also observed in the merger control. Under Art. 7(2)1 
MRFTA and sec. VIII.1 of the Guidelines for review M&A [amended by KFTC notification No. 2007-12, Dec. 
20, 2007] (efficiency defence), the KFTC allows mergers that may contribute to the efficiency on the national 
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Accordingly, a loose and wide-ranging concept of total welfare was laid down by the 
MRFTA as the criterion by which the KFTC was to assess the effects of exercise of market 
dominance. However, the MRFTA on vertical restraints (vertical regulation) has not fully 
developed in its implementation, because it is very often curbed by the fear of large 
companies. The MRFTA offers the provision to measure market power regarding vertical 
restraints. Dominance exists in relation to a relevant market and the enquiry into market 
power. Therefore, the examination of dominance becomes central. The enquiry into 
dominance becomes divided into two parts: (i) relevant market definition; and (ii) 
investigation of dominance in that market. Once market dominance has been established 
under Article 4 MRFTA, there is the question of whether abuse has occurred. Therefore, 
without dominance, there cannot be abuse. If the enterprise does not belong to the category of 
market dominance, its practices may be scrutinised under Article 19, 23, or 29, regardless of 
market power. The KFTC tries to provide an illustration of the increasing importance of 
economics in the formulation of Korean competition policy regarding vertical restraints 
through the Market Dominance Guidelines and the UBP Guidelines. However, these do not 
clearly explain how far enterprises can use their power in the market, since the provision is 
obscure in its scope of application based on market share. 
 
5.5.2. Double Standard on Vertical Restraints: Article 3-2 or 23 of the MRFTA?  
 
5.5.2.1. Comparison between Articles 3-2 and 23 of the MRFTA 
 
If vertical restraints are pro-competitive most of the time, what is the appropriate course for 
competition policy? Certainly recognition of the competitive benefits of practices means 
elimination of per se condemnation, which is reserved for practices that are always anti-
competitive. The usual alternative to condemnation of a per se is evaluation of vertical 
restraints under the rule of reason.
83
 The common criterion of measuring the pro- and anti-
competitiveness for a rule of reason development is, therefore, assessing market power of an 
enterprise as stated in the Dairy Association case.
84
 In this case, the Constitutional Court
85
 
                                                                                                                                                        
economy such as: (i) job creation; (ii) development of regional economy; (iii) development in supply chain; (iv) 
stability of national supply (energy); and (v) elimination of pollution. 
83
 Frank Easterbrook, Supra., note 19, p. 153. 
84
 Dairy Association v KFTC, Constitutional Court of Korea 2005Heonma1209, Dec. 27, 2007.  
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clarified that the firm did not infringe Article 3-2 because its market share was far less than 
50 per cent, and could not satisfy market dominance presumption under Article 4. It was 
confirmed that, if an enterprise does not have significant market power, its vertical practice 
may give pro-competitive benefits. However, where the market power of the enterprise is 
significant, the probability of anti-competitiveness from its practices increases.  
 
Article 3-2 prohibits abusive conduct of a market dominant position. Therefore, it 
overlaps the scope of Article 23 in vertical cases such as; (i) refusal to deal, (ii) exclusive 
dealing, (iii) territorial restriction, and (iv) tie-in sales. This overlap problem stems from the 
influence of the Japanese Antimonopoly Law (AML).
86
 This overlap also occurs in the 
Japanese system, because the UBP provision in the AML rests vague regarding vertical 
arrangements.
87
 In particular, Article 3-2 MRFTA has its model from the first half paragraph 
of Article 3 AML in its prohibition of abuse of market dominance,
88
 and its similarity to 
Article 23 MRFTA to the Article 19 AML which prevents UBPs. Some scholars also explain 
that Article 23 is adopted from the influence of section 5 of the US Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) Act,
89
 because Article 19 AML was modelled on section 5, US FTC 
Act.
90
 Wherever these provisions have models from, Articles 3-2 and 23 enforcements, like 
the AML enforcement problem in Japan, are quite confusing to competition lawyers and 
economists, because of overlap where investigating vertical restraints; furthermore, the 
KFTC’s heavy reliance on Article 23 (or UBP) enforcement.
91
 However, stricter obligations 
                                                                                                                                                        
85
 The Constitutional Court of Korea deals with only the matters regarding the Constitution. Usually, the 
Supreme Court judgments cover the MRFTA cases. 
86
 See Mitsuo Matsushita, Introduction to Japanese Antimonopoly Law, Yuhikaki Publishing, Tokyo, 1990, p. 3; 
Akira Inoue, Japanese Antitrust Law Manual: Law, Cases, and Interpretation of Japanese Antimonopoly Law, 
Kluwer Law International, Alphen aan den Rijn, The Netherlands, 2007, p. 1. The original AML was modelled 
after US antitrust law, contained several unique features when compared with current legislation. However, the 
MRFTA is more similar to the current structure of the AML. 
87
 See Toshiaki Takigawa, ‘Prospect of Antitrust Law and Policy in 21st Century: In Reference to Japanese 
Antimonopoly Law and Fair Trade Commission’ Journal of Korean Competition Law, Vol. 8, 2002, pp. 171-2; 
Masako Wakui, Supra., note 43, p. 95. 
88
 However, some Korean scholars argue that the form of Art. 3-2 was borrowed from the German GWB. See, 
Jungwon Song, Ca-Ru-Tel-Mit-Bul-Gong-Jung-Go-Rae-Haeng-Wui-Kyu-Jae [Regulations on Cartels and 
Unfair Business Practices], Parkyoungsa, Seoul, 2005, p. 486. 
89
 Under the sec. 5 of the US FTC Act, unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce are declared 
unlawful. This provision was legislated for a quick response of the US FTC to the anti-competitive practice that 
is not stated under the Sherman Act. Therefore, this legislative intent is somewhat different from Art. 23 
MRFTA. See also Young-Dae Lee, Supra., note 23, p. 249; Sigrid Stroux, US and EC Oligopoly Control, 
Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 2004, p. 67; Ho Yul Chung, Kyoung-Jae-Bub [Competition Law], 2nd 
edn, Parkmunsa, Seoul, 2008, pp. 356-7. 
90
 See Ho Young Lee, Dok-Jum-Kyu-Jae-Bub-Ui-Ie-Ron-Kwa-Sil-Mu [Theories and Practices in Monopoly 
Regulation and Fair Trade Act], Hongmunsa, Seoul, 2006, pp. 208-9. 
91
 Supra., Figure 4.1 in Chapter 4. 
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and special responsibilities should be imposed on dominant firms to abide by competition 
rules,
92
 and the necessity to broaden the applicable scope of Article 3-2. The status of special 
provision of Article 3-2 would provide sufficient legitimacy to this stringent approach, and 
the KFTC is supposed to apply this, rather than both Articles 3-2 and 23, to a case, as some 
Korean scholars have discussed.
93
  
 
The current applications of Articles 3-2 and 23 in vertical cases is problematic, since 
these can still overlap each other,
94
 and there is no clear guidance of application in order to 
distinguish between these two. The KFTC thus has a choice of application of provisions. In 
practice, it seems to apply Article 3-2 to Chaebols or near-Chaebols,
95
 and Article 23 to 
smaller business groups, regardless of market share. This means that the KFTC applies 
Article 23 more than Article 3-2, where it is easier for it to catch a violation. In the refusal to 
deal cases, Korea Electricity Corp.,
96
 DuPont Korea,
97
 and Hite Co.,
98
 the KFTC did not 
apply Article 3-2, but Article 23, although these firms had dominant positions under Article 4 
(83, 100, 80, and 88.9 per cent respectively). The KFTC should have regarded these cases as 
Article 3-2 violations.  
 
Vertical restraints can be treated either harshly as abusive conducts under Article 3-2, 
or leniently, as UBPs under Article 23. This implementation of law may cause confusion in 
its provisions. Some Korean commentators argue that to solve this problem the KFTC should 
reduce the threshold of application of Article 23 to SMEs, through establishing clear 
guidance to distinguish the application of the two provisions.
99
 This provision seems to be 
                                                 
92
 This seems the influence of the EC law, imposing strict limitations on the behaviours of dominant firms. See 
Vassilis Hatzopoulos, ‘The EC Essential Facilities Doctrine’ in Giuliano Amato and Claus-Dieter Ehlermann 
(eds), EC Competition Law: A Critical Assessment, Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2007, pp. 371-2. 
93
 See Bong Eui Lee, ‘Prohibition of Abuse of Market-Dominant Undertakings under the Monopoly Regulation 
and Fair Trade Act’, Journal of Korean Law, Vol. 4, No. 2, 2005, p. 76. 
94
 Ho Yul Chung, Supra., note 89, pp. 354-5. The author argues there are problems of overlapping in its 
application of law in practice because the authority structures them as merely ‘special’ and ‘general’ provisions. 
95
 E.g., POSCO Co., KFTC Decision 2001-068, 2001Kyoungchok0389, Apr. 12, 2001; Microsoft Co., KFTC 
Decision 2006-042, 2002Kyoungchok0452 and 2005Kyoungchok0375, Feb. 24, 2006; Hyundai Motors, KFTC 
Decision 2007-281, 2006Dokgam0746, May 18, 2007; Intel Corp., Intel Semiconductor Ltd, and Intel Korea, 
KFTC Decision 2008-295, 2007Dokgam1790 and 2008Sijang1126, Nov. 5, 2008. 
96
 Korea Electricity Corp., KFTC Decision 2001-043, 2001Dokjom0265, Mar. 31, 2001.  
97
 DuPont Korea, KFTC Decision 2002-363, 2002Kyoungchok0588, Dec. 23, 2002.  
98
 Pusan and Kyoungnam Liquor Associations, Hite Co., and Daesun Distilling Co., KFTC Decision 2004-238, 
2004Busa0093, 2004Busa1025-27, July 31, 2004. 
99
 See Jae-Hyoung Lee, ‘Restrictions on Abuse of Market Dominant Position’ in So-Mi Sung and Kwangshik 
Shin (eds), Reviews on Amendment to the Korean Competition Law, Korea Development Institute, Seoul, 2003, 
pp. 144-7; Jin-Kook Kim, ‘Reviews on the Current Provision of Abuse of Market Dominant Position’ in Seung-
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very convenient for the KFTC, and this enforcement should be criticised as lazy. The KFTC 
has been blamed for excessive application of Article 23. The Article 23 enforcement should 
be clarified by narrowing the scope of Article 23. As stated, the JFTC seems to have the same 
trouble. For example, in the Oita Diary case,
100
 the JFTC applied the UBP provision, rather 
than monopolisation, despite the enterprise’s high market share, about 70 per cent. It is 
proven that this legislation structure in Korea and Japan causes confusion to the economic 
entities, who are accustomed to the regulatory systems in other competition regimes, which 
have clearer distinctions in enforcement.  
 
5.5.2.2. Origin of Double Standards: Special Provision and General Provision 
 
Enterprises in the Korean market should rely on vertical restraint enforcement, which should 
have a clear-cut between Articles 3-2 and 23. Some scholars argue that there is a clear 
difference between these two provisions based on the fact that Article 23 is based on an ex 
ante approach,
101
 but Article 3-2 is regarded as ex post provision.
102
 They argue that the 
wordings, ‘Teuk-Byol-Kyu-Jung’ (special provision) and ‘Il-Ban-Kyu-Jung’ (general 
provision) distinguish the application of the two.
103
 Article 3-2 is applicable only to 
enterprises with market dominance. Therefore, as a special provision, Article 3-2 is legislated 
to prevent market dominance. On the contrary, Article 23 applies to all enterprises, including 
those which are market dominant in the Korean market. Article 23 is therefore named as a 
general provision, because it can be generally applicable to any enterprise. Hence, there is a 
possibility that an enterprise with market power may infringe both Articles 3-2 and 23. There 
is no clear distinction between them despite the terms of special and general provisions. 
Another problem through unclear guidance leads to penalty incentives. The fine for Article 3-
2 violation is a maximum three per cent of yearly turnover, which is more than Article 23’s 
two per cent of turnover. Furthermore, the jail term for violation of Article 3-2 is three years, 
                                                                                                                                                        
Hee Jwa, Thoughts of Amendment of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act, Korea Economy Research 
Institute, 2004, pp.102-6; Young-Chul Lim, Gong-Jung-Go-Rae-Bub [Korean Competition law], Bubmunsa, 
Seoul, 2007, pp. 35-42; Ho Yul Chung, Supra., note 89, pp. 106-12. 
100
 Oita Diary, JFTC Decision, July 7, 1981, Shinketushu 28-56. For further detail, see Masako Wakui, Supra., 
note 43, p. 151. 
101
 E.g., sec. III.1.A.(4) of the UBP Guidelines. 
102
 Jungwon Song, Supra., note 88, p. 485. 
103
 Ibid., p. 486; Ki-Su Lee and Jin-Hee Ryu, Kyoung-Jae-Bub [Anti-trust and Consumer Law], 7th edn, 
Sechang Publishing, Seoul, 2006, p. 204. 
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and that for Article 23 two years,
104
 and both a jail term and fines may be imposed 
concurrently for Article 3-2 violation.
105
  
 
Because of these different measures of penalties, market dominant enterprises would 
have the incentive to be scrutinised under Article 23, rather than falling within the scope of 
Article 3-2, if there is no way to receive exemption. Despite these different penalties, the 
KFTC has not clearly demonstrated guidance. The argument of distinction between these two, 
as argued by some Korean scholars, is theoretical. They argue, where an enterprise infringes 
both provisions, Article 3-2 is foremost, because Article 3-2 is specially legislated in order to 
prevent market concentration in Korea. However, the KFTC opens a possibility of applying 
both provisions to one case in practice, as shown in Microsoft.
106
 The KFTC concluded that 
Microsoft infringed Article 3-2 by coercing consumers to buy products by abusing its 
dominant position in the Windows PC system market, and restricted consumers’ choice in 
having a better quality product. The KFTC also condemned its inhibiting competition by 
tying and driving out its rivals from the market by establishing entry barriers, which was 
violation of Article 23. This decision was unique to this case.
107
 In conclusion, this 
ambiguous enforcement can be used as a discriminatory and unfair measure against large 
firms. Despite this problem, it is yet very unclear what the criteria should be to distinguish the 
applications of these, because of no relevant case law. Since Microsoft dropped its appeal in 
2007,
108
 it is difficult to know the courts’ interpretations of the KFTC’s double imposition. 
 
 5.5.2.3. Presumption of Market Dominance: Unclear Statement Creates Uncertainty 
 
The first troublesome question in vertical cases is to find the most proper relevant market and 
market dominance. This is essential to examine whether or not vertical restraint harms 
competition. To infringe Article 3-2, an enterprise should be first presumed as a market 
dominant enterprise. The MRFTA states that an enterprise shall be presumed as market 
                                                 
104
 In order to impose jail term, the KFTC needs to prove not only effects of the business practice but also 
intention. See Sang-Yong Park and Ki-Sup Um, Kyoung-Jae-Bub-Wol-Lon [The Principle of Economic Law], 
2nd edn, Parkyoungsa, Seoul, 2006, p. 89. 
105
 Arts. 66 and 67 MRFTA. 
106
 Microsoft Co., KFTC Decision 2006-042, 2002Kyoungchok0452 and 2005Kyoungchok0375, Feb. 24, 2006. 
107
 E.g., Microsoft (COMP/C-3/37.792), 24 Mar. 2004. Microsoft infringed Art. 82 EC only on the ground of tie-
ins by abuse of dominant position. 
108
Microsoft submitted a letter for the withdrawal of the legal suit, and the KFTC settled this by agreeing to it. 
See KFTC, #ewsletter, Issue 4, Oct. 31, 2007, p. 10: http://eng.ftc.go.kr/bbs.do?command=getList&type_cd=10 
(accessed 11 March 2009). 
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dominant where (i) market share of one enterprise is 50 per cent or more under Article 4(1); 
or (ii) total market share of three enterprises is 75 per cent or more under Article 4(2). 
However, those whose market share is less than 10 per cent shall be excluded under the de 
minimis rule.
109
 In addition to this Concentration Ratio (CR) test, according to section III of 
the Market Dominance Guidelines,
110
 the KFTC considers the following factors to decide 
market dominance: (i) entry barriers; (ii) rivals’ market power; (iii) possibility of collusion; 
(iv) substitutability of goods and services; (v) market foreclosure; (vi) financial strength; and 
(vii) other considerations such as possibility of changing trading partners. However, it seems 
that the KFTC heavily relies on CR provision for presumption in the test of market 
dominance.  
 
To illustrate an example regarding market share consideration of this CR test, 
presume there are five enterprises whose market shares in a certain market are respectively,  
A: 45 per cent; B: 25 per cent; C: 16 per cent; D: 9 per cent; and E: 5 per cent. In this case, 
Article 4(1) cannot be applied, since there is no enterprise with market share over 50 per cent. 
Then, only Article 4(2) is applicable. Because the total market share of A, B, and C is 76 per 
cent, these enterprises are presumed market dominant. However, because D and E’s market 
shares are less than 10 per cent, they will not be presumed market dominant.
111
 This 
presumption of market dominance is not very practical to effectively prevent abuse of market 
dominance, nor improve efficiency by vertical restraints. For instance, enterprises B and C 
can be blamed for Article 3-2 violation, despite their small market shares, 25 and 16 per cent, 
which are not very influential in the market. This problem can be observed in several cases. 
The recent cases, Hyundai Motors
112
 and Interpark,
113
 show that even less than 40 per cent of 
market share can be presumed as market dominant. In Hyundai, the total market share of the 
top three firms was 78.8 per cent as, Hyundai Motors, 44 per cent, Kia Motors, 22.6 per cent 
and Renault-Samsung Motors, 12.2 per cent. Although Hyundai’s market share was less than 
50 per cent, it was considered market dominant. In Interpark, the firm’s market share was 
39.5 per cent, and it was the second largest in the relevant market. However, the KFTC 
                                                 
109
 This market share should include the affiliates’ share and if it is over 10 per cent, de minimis rule will not be 
applicable. For further explanation, see Sang-Yong Park and Ki-Sup Um, Supra., note 104, p. 73. 
110
 Notification No. 2002-6 of the KFTC, May16, 2002. 
111
 Sang-Yong Park and Ki-Sub Um, Supra., note 104, p. 72. The author illustrates a similar case. 
112
 Hyundai Motors, KFTC Decision 2007-281, 2006Dokgam0746, May 18, 2007.   
113
 Interpark G Market Corp., KFTC Decision 2007-555, 2006Sukyoung4846, Dec. 18, 2007. Some Korean 
scholars explain that even in an agreement case, when a firm has a 40-50 per cent market share, the KFTC often 
considers it has a market dominant position. See also Jungwon Song, Supra., note 88, p. 97. 
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considered this market share sufficient to be presumed as market dominant, regardless of 
other aspects of easy market entry in the internet shopping market.  
 
The Market Dominance Guidelines provide diverse methods to examine market 
dominance. However, since the market share guidance is the most important one to decide 
market dominance presumption, the supplementary criteria are not very helpful. The KFTC 
heavily relies on the CR test.
114
 There is no doubt that market share of an enterprise is a 
milestone to examine its market dominance, which a competition authority usually relies on. 
Although the market share test is the foremost criterion for presumption of market dominance, 
the KFTC has not established a clear statement of a threshold as a specific market share. This 
unclear market dominance test generates uncertainty in implementation. To estimate the 
margin from trade-offs between pro- and anti-competitive effects by vertical restraints, a 
market share threshold test is crucial for granting legal certainty.
115
 This test guarantees 
efficient and pro-competitive business activities by enterprises that are engaging in vertical 
arrangements. Besides, a substantive market share test is suitable for Korean competition law 
and its civil law tradition. Otherwise, the degree of uncertainty associated with the current 
presumption in the test of market dominance in question may increase.  
 
5.5.3. Implementation of UBP Guidelines in Theory and Practice 
 
Some economists’ view of an enterprise as an efficiency instrument demonstrates that 
enterprises seek to monopolise markets, sometimes by engaging in strategic behaviour, or by 
pursuing their own goals.
116
 However, there are conflicting economic theories in competition 
policies regarding this problem. Where an enterprise has dominant market power, 
competition law is more complicated than a simple explanation of enterprises as efficiency 
instruments, such as issues of the duty to cooperate with rivals. The doctrinal question is 
raised when such an enterprise’s unilateral practice is illegal.
117
 Because of the fundamentally 
                                                 
114
 This practice can be also seen in the UBP cases, e.g., Bohae Distrilling Co., KFTC Decision 98-125, June 29, 
1998; POSTEEL and POSCO, KFTC Decision 98-272, Nov. 25, 1998. 
115
 However, some scholars do not agree with this legal certainty justification. See Roger Van den Bergh, ‘The 
Difficult Reception of Economic Analysis in European Competition Law’ in Antonio Cucinotta, Roberto 
Pardolesi and Roger Van den Bergh (eds), Post-Chicago Developments in Antitrust Law, Edward Elgar, 
Cheltenham, UK and Northampton MA, USA, 2002, pp. 46-50. 
116
 Oliver Williamson, (Economic Organization), Supra., note 18, p. 163. 
117
 Einer Elhauge and Damien Geradin, Supra., note 49, p. 367. The underlying policy issue here is to what 
extent competition law should restrict rights to exclude. 
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different conceptual approaches of the Harvard and Chicago schools, some argue that 
economic theory has contributed relatively little to the development of corresponding legal 
doctrine.
118
 Nevertheless, it is obvious that this conflict does not create confusion, but a better 
understanding of vertical restraints. The KFTC should take into account the balance of costs 
and benefits to enterprises, based on the disciplines of these economic schools. However, the 
most important doctrine in its enforcement should be to take an Anti-trust policy rather than 
an Anti-Chaebol policy that would possibly hamper the growth of large firms whose greater 
efficiency threatened the SMEs.
119
  
 
Of course, a failure to do anything about Chaebols has raised, and will continue to 
raise, serious problems.
120
 In theory, the state can regulate economic affairs in the market to 
maintain balanced growth and stability of the economy, and to prevent abuse of market 
power.
121
 Therefore, it is essential for the KFTC to set up a net to catch unscrupulous big fish. 
Otherwise, it will hamper competition, as well as economic growth by efficiency-seeking 
enterprises, working as the means of efficiency instruments. The KFTC should establish a 
creative rule of what size of net is necessary for efficiency-enhancing enterprises. To sum up, 
the KFTC should be equipped with sound vertical guidelines to prevent exercise of 
monopolistic and oligopolistic power, as well as improve efficiency from the nature of 
enterprises. The KFTC therefore has to regard efficiency justification of vertical restraints as 
one of the important objectives in competition law. Although the KFTC has provided the 
UBP Guidelines by seeking to enhance inter-brand competition,
122
 it has not clearly stated the 
degree of tolerance. Therefore, the KFTC should provide new guidelines to include the 
method of market share threshold test of safe harbour for legal certainty. The UBP Guidelines 
already provide a safety zone, but the market share threshold is as low as 10 per cent, which 
cannot guarantee a sufficient degree of efficiency.  
 
                                                 
118
 See George Hay, ‘Oligopoly, Shared Monopoly, and Antitrust Law’, Cornell Law Review, Vol. 67, 1982, p. 
440. 
119
 See George Stigler, ‘The Origin of the Sherman Act’, The Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 14, No. 1, 1985, p. 
4.  
120
 Some scholars argue that competition law should do something on large firms to prevent externalities from 
market concentration. See Donald Turner, ‘The Scope of Antitrust and Other Economic Regulatory Policies’, 
Harvard Law Review, Vol. 82, No. 6, 1969, p. 1212. 
121
 Art. 119(2) Constitution of Korea. 
122
 E.g., sec.V.7.A.(2)(C) of the UBP Guidelines. 
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The KFTC does not have a broad concept of regulations or guidelines that are only 
provided for vertical restraints. This is because Article 23 MRFTA covers vertical restraints. 
Unlike other competition regimes, Article 19 MRFTA covers only horizontal agreements. 
The US antitrust law provides section 1 of the Sherman Act, which prohibits anti-competitive 
agreements, and section 2 of the Sherman Act, which prevents monopolisation and attempts 
to monopolise. EC competition law also has the provisions of Articles 81 and 82 EC and vice 
versa. In these competition regimes, regulations on anti-competitive agreements include both 
horizontal and vertical. In Japan, the second half paragraph in Article 3 AML used to cover 
only horizontal agreements, but currently the application of law seems to be applicable to 
vertical cases. Nevertheless, Korean competition law does not have this distinction. Article 
23 and the UBP Guidelines seem supplementary to Article 3-2 in vertical cases. If the KFTC 
provides vertical guidelines along with the amendment to Article 19 enforcement in order to 
cover all sorts of arrangements, it will ensure pro-competitive practices by the means of 
clearer guidance to lawyers and enterprises. In particular, the Korean market is becoming 
international, and therefore the KFTC must provide a globally understood vertical regulation 
that may not be discriminatory against domestic or foreign enterprises, and also give clear 
guidance. Although existing UBP Guidelines state various aspects also including efficiency 
justification, the Guidelines do not include the efficiency rationale, such as reduction of 
transaction costs, which is crucial for improvement of the global aspect. The KFTC needs to 
set a clear statement of efficiency justification and special responsibility of market dominant 
firms in vertical guidelines.  
 
5.5.4. Justifications for Inter-brand Competition in RPM: Per Se or Rule of Reason? 
 
As stated in Chapter 3, vertical restraints enhance efficiency and competition between brands, 
especially through restricting intra-brand competition as a method to solve the free-riding 
problem. However, there is a clear difficulty of distinguishing between the pro- and anti-
competitive explanations in particular cases when the market is concentrated. Korean 
competition policy has been often hostile to vertical restraints, despite their possible benefits, 
for this reason. Vertical restraints involving minimum RPM, thus, continue to be per se 
unlawful under Article 29 MRFTA, although a rule of reason approach is followed for 
vertical non-price restraints, under Article 23. Economic analysis supports this step in respect 
of vertical non-price restraints on intra-brand competition, and would justify a similar 
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approach for vertical restraints involving price, where the RPM is maximum or 
recommended.
123
 Free-riding retailers allow quality to deteriorate and ruin product 
reputation.
124
 Suppliers, therefore, have an incentive to extend their reach to include 
constraints on the condition of distribution.
125
  
 
This quality rationale of free-riding justification could have been discussed in quite a 
number of RPM violation cases in the Korean cosmetics market, such as LG Health Corp.,
126
 
L’Oreal Korea,
127
 Aekyoung Cosmetics,
128
 Koreana Cosmestics,
129
 Hankuk Cosmetics,
130
 
#amyang Aloe Corp.,
131
 and Amore Pacific Corp.
132
 This could also be observed in luxury 
import products that need pre-sale services such as Samsonite Korea,
133
 Mercedes Benz 
Korea,
134
 and Audi Volkswagen Korea.
135
 The brand image justification is well recognised in 
other regimes. For example, brand and quality rationale in the cosmetics industry was granted 
by the Supreme Court of Japan. In Shiseido,
136
 the Supreme Court of Japan held that the 
firm’s restriction of sales methods was reasonable, since it attempted to satisfy customers by 
providing its consultation service, and maintaining its distinguished reputation.
137
 In 
particular, an effective sales and marketing effort by a retailer does not involve simply being 
competitive on price with other distributors, but should help develop and enhance the 
product’s reputation, such as image, that is crucial for both ex post and ex ante sales. 
Sometimes, vertical restraints should be understood as an important component of a 
supplier’s marketing strategy for inducing its products.
138
 
 
                                                 
123
 John Vickers and Donald Hay, Supra., note 21, pp. 7-8. 
124
 This quality assurance was confirmed in the franchise case, BBQ Chicken Corp. v. KFTC, Supreme Court 
2003Du7484, July 9, 2005. For further case discussion, see also Hae-Shik Park, ‘Limits on Franchisor’s Control 
in Franchisee’ Journal of Korean Competition Law, Vol. 12, Aug. 2005, p. 351. 
125
 Oliver Williamson, (Economic Organization) Supra., note 18, p. 184. 
126
 LG Health Corp., KFTC Decision 2002-367, 2002Danchae1696, Dec. 24, 2002. 
127
 L’Oreal Korea, KFTC Decision 2002-368, 2002Danchae1700, Dec. 24, 2002. 
128
 Aekyoung Cosmetics, KFTC Decision 2003-002, 2002Danchae1699, Jan. 6, 2003.  
129
 Koreana Cosmetics, KFTC Decision 2003-003, 2002Danchae1697, Jan. 6, 2003. 
130
 Hankuk Cosmetics, KFTC Decision 2003-004, 2202Danchae1698, Jan. 6, 2003.  
131
 #amyang Aloe Corp., KFTC Decision 2005-184, 2005Teukbo0532, Sept. 26, 2005. 
132
 Amore Pacific Corp., KFTC Decision 2006-269, 2006Sokyoung0387, Nov. 28, 2006.   
133
 Samsonite Korea Corp., KFTC Decision 2002-213, 2002Yugo1369, Dec. 23, 2002. 
134
 Mercedes Benz Korea Corp., KFTC Decision 2007-164, 2006Sokyoung2420, July 6, 2007. 
135
 Audi Volkswagen Korea Corp., KFTC Decision 2008-477, 2008Kigan2004, Oct. 31, 2008.  
136
 Shiseido Co., Ltd., Supreme Court of Japan, Dec. 14, 1998, Saiko Saibansho Minji Hanreishu (Minshu) 52-9-
1866. However, this case was not an RPM case but restriction on sales method. 
137
 For detail, see Masako Wakui, Supra., note 43, pp. 166-7. 
138
 See David Scheffman, ‘Antitrust, Economics, and “Reality”’ in Malcolm Coate and Andrew Kleit (eds), The 
Economics of the Antitrust Process, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Norwell MA, USA, 1996, p. 241-2. 
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This rationale has not, however, been discussed in Korea because minimum RPM was 
a per se violation, even when some product markets were very competitive. Following the 
efficiency defence of free-riding and welfare gains,
139
 it is necessary to justify inter- and 
intra-brand distinction. Since the implication of extending justifications is in the direction of 
increased permissibility worldwide, it may be appropriate to RPM to hold that inter-brand 
violations should be illegal, whilst intra-brand restraints are presumptively legal. A potential 
justification for the inter- and intra-brand distinction is that plausibility of the efficiency 
arguments may be weaker by inter-brand restraints. This may be rational, relative to the 
higher potential costs of eliminating competition, because the externalities regarding point-
of-sale service, quality certification, and advertising would be less likely in inter-brand 
competition.
140
 Moreover, little empirical evidence is available to support a per se rule, even 
in vertical price restraints, when efficiency is adopted as the criterion.
141
 Although there 
could be some empirical evidence supporting the per se rule, this may not be easy for judges 
to apply.
142
 Therefore, the KFTC should regard RPM as one of the major justifications for 
vertical cases.  
 
 
5.6. Concluding Remarks 
 
The study of vertical cases has presented difficulties at both theoretical and policy levels of 
analysis. Vertical restraints are the response to expensive practices that are present under 
certain types of transaction, in other words, in order to reduce transaction costs. If the costs of 
operating competitive markets are zero, there is no reason to have vertical restraints such as 
exclusive dealing, which is often condemned under Article 3-2 or 23 MRFTA. Competition 
policy interest in vertical restraints has been concerned mainly with the possibility that these 
can be used strategically to achieve benefits from anti-competitive effects.
143
 Although an 
                                                 
139
 See Howard Marvel and Stephen McCafferty, ‘The Welfare Effects of Resale Price Maintenance’, Journal of 
Law and Economics, Vol. 28, No. 2, 1985, p. 371. 
140
 See Timothy Brennan, ‘“Vertical” Excuses for Horizontal Practices: Should There be Any Per Se Antitrust 
Rule?’, The Antitrust Bulletin, Vol. 45, No. 2, 2000, pp. 484-5. 
141
 See Peter Zweifel and Roger Zäch, ‘Vertical Restraints: The Case of Multinationals’, The Antitrust Bulletin, 
Vol. 48, No. 1, Spring 2003, p. 298. 
142
 See Richard Posner, ‘The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of Restrictive Distribution: Per Se Legality’ 
The University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 48, No. 1, 1981, p. 21. 
143
 Oliver Williamson, (Economic Organization), Supra., note 18, pp. 83-5. 
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enterprise is more than a simple efficiency instrument,
144
 the KFTC should consider the 
effects of efficient practices on the market and national economy.  
 
The contention in the next chapter is that the KFTC has much to learn from the US 
and the EC examples, rather than the Japanese. Their policies on vertical restraints have, in 
recent years, been much more willing to incorporate insights from economic analysis. These 
have fitted in well with the long history of US and EC legislation on the promotion of 
competition, in particular by the prevention of dominance, and by improving the efficiency 
rationale of vertical restraints.
145
 Some can argue the competition policies in these regimes 
may not fit Korea, for their different legal systems, and also, different goals. However, if 
competition law contains economic as well as non-economic goals, it is legitimate for the 
KFTC to reassess the relative weights of the objectives of other competition laws, just as it is 
legitimate for the courts to reassess the application of economic principles. The US antitrust 
law does not stand still on economic principles. The US system may give more flexible 
efficiency justification benefits. On the contrary, competition law such as in the EC may give 
a better legal certainty than US law.
146
  
 
Korea can get positive outcomes from both systems. Although the Korean legal 
tradition is not used to flexible application, many Korean scholars argue that the MRFTA 
implementation allows a rule of reason approach, especially in the UBP cases. In particular, 
the abundant numbers of UBP cases helped the KFTC and the courts develop the rule of 
reason.
147
 Therefore, the KFTC can adopt both methods from common law and also civil law 
in its implementation of competition law, grounded on economics. In conclusion, the KFTC 
needs to learn from other competition regimes, but modify them to the Korean system. 
Vertical restraints in Korea have been mostly regarded as a means of market foreclosure. This 
presumption can impede both international trade and efficiency. Vertical restraints may 
enhance inter-brand competition and efficiency through vigorous competition, by improving 
trade. Moreover, vertical restraints may enhance the national economy through providing 
                                                 
144
 Ibid., p. 86. 
145
 John Vickers and Donald Hay, Supra., note 21, p. 47. 
146
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147
 See Ho Yul Chung, ‘Case Review on Restrictive Condition Practice of DPK International Corp.’ in Korea 
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efficient distribution. Therefore, the KFTC should regard the evolution of distribution 
channels in the global market as reasonable practice. 
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6.1. Creation of New Korean Type Vertical Regulation from Comparative Studies 
 
Competition law is subject to development and change, because the world economy is 
dynamic, and economic theories progress and accumulate. In addition, social, political and 
philosophical thoughts about the economy also shift.
1
 Learning from comparative studies will, 
in particular, help the Korean Fair Trade Commission (KFTC) keep up with these dynamic 
developments in globalised competition law and policy. Then, these issues should be 
considered with regard to whether foreign solutions are superior to the Korean system. First, 
it is necessary to acknowledge that existing systems in the foreign competition regimes are 
satisfactory in their origin. Second, it should be asked whether foreign approaches can work 
in the Korean competition regime. The differences in legal procedures, cultures and policies 
in various authorities can require some modifications when adopted in other countries’ 
methods. Therefore, the KFTC should modify resolutions for the Korean system.
2
  
 
Competition law in the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act (MRFTA) on 
vertical restraints (hereafter, vertical regulation) was critically analysed with reference to the 
US, the EC, and Japan in previous chapters. In particular, study of the US and EC provisions 
was necessary to provide the KFTC with a better idea of vertical regulation, in order to solve 
a problem which cannot be sorted out by its own system. As Korean competition law was 
significantly influenced by the Japanese Antimonopoly Law (AML), critical analysis of the 
existing provisions of market dominance and Unfair Business Practice (UBP) in Korea and 
                                                 
1
 See Lawrence Sullivan and Warren Grimes, The Law of Antitrust: An Integrated Handbook, 2nd edn, 
Thomson West, St. Paul MINN, USA, 2006, p. 1. 
2
 See Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kötz, An Introduction to Comparative Law, 3rd edn, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 1998, pp. 15-7.  
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Japan may give an improved design for vertical regulation reform. Some argue that vigorous 
competition has long been missing in Japan. Japanese culture has not traditionally embraced 
the idea of competition.
3
 This situation was very similar to that in Korea at the beginning of 
the MRFTA legislation. However, current vigorous enforcement gives evidence that the 
KFTC is so active as to sometimes misapply the relevant law. This means that the historical 
development of the laws in Korea and Japan is dissimilar, through emphasis on Chaebol 
control. The excessive control on Chaebols by the law gives comparative disadvantages to 
Chaebols in the Korean market. 
 
 Therefore, considering overall problems such as efficiency and trade in the Korean 
market, a clear guidance for application of relevant provisions is essential. Accordingly, the 
KFTC has to amend the current legal provisions of market dominance and UBP, since the 
adopted provisions do not fit the Korean market. This chapter will critically argue that 
provisions influenced by the AML should be amended more closely to the US and the EC in 
vertical cases. Legal prohibitions are appropriate only when vertical restraints have clearly 
anti-competitive consequences, difficult to avoid because of high entry barriers. When entry 
barriers are high, market power can be inferred simply from a large market share with 
evidence that firms are not competing aggressively.
4
 This entry barrier can be easily 
facilitated by market concentration. However, market concentration is one of the common 
features of economic development, and is not unique to Korea. Nevertheless, the treatment of 
Chaebols’ market concentration has been different from other regimes, by dint of historical, 
cultural, and economic differences.
5
  
 
Most areas of competition law are constantly evolving. Competition authorities in 
each country strive to improve legal standards of competition law. For this objective, mutual 
learning from other countries’ practices is very important. The market economy functions in 
                                                 
3
 See Harry First, ‘Antitrust Enforcement in Japan’, Antitrust Law Journal, Vol. 64, 1995, pp. 138-46; Douglas 
Rosenthal and Mitsuo Matsushita, ‘Competition in Japan and the West: Can the Approaches Be Reconciled?’ in 
Edward Graham and David Richardson (eds), Global Competition Policy, Institute for International Economics, 
Washington, D.C., 1997, p. 314.  
4
 See Frederic Scherer, ‘Retail Distribution Channel Barriers to International Trade’, Antitrust Law Journal, Vol. 
67, 1999, p. 111; Herbert Hovenkamp, The Antitrust Enterprise: Principle and Execution, Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge MA, USA and London, 2005, p. 102.  
5
 See Myoungsu Hong, Chaebol-Ui-Kyoung-Jae-Ryuck-Jib-Jung-Kyu-Jae [Regulations on Economic 
Concentrations of Chaebol], Kyoungin Publishing, Seoul, 2006, p. 3. The author explains that the market 
concentration problem in Korea is different from that in other regimes because of its different aspects based on 
historical or economic conditions. 
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the same way worldwide, so that competition law principles, especially of vertical restraints 
in most competition regimes, become increasingly alike.
6
 The questions of reform of this 
aspect will be answered in the subchapters below, through suggestions of amendments to the 
MRFTA, learned from other competition regimes. The first step should be to create clear 
guidance of Article 3-2 MRFTA enforcement. 
 
 
6.2. Amendment to Provisions of Abuse of Market Dominance 
 
6.2.1. Amendment to Article 4 MRFTA and Market Dominance Guidelines 
 
In vertical cases, the absence of market power is often the determining condition by the 
KFTC and other competition authorities.
7
 The MRFTA views enterprises in monopolistic 
positions as market dominant, although in specific cases it is not easy to judge which 
enterprise occupies market power. Accordingly, in order to reduce this problem, the MRFTA 
takes market shares as a criterion, establishing a system deeming certain firms as market 
dominant under Article 4.
8
 This presumption was provided to alleviate KFTC’s burden of 
proof. However, there has been criticism of presumption in the test of market dominance, 
which has contributed to protect inefficient competitors.
9
 The dominant concern is that 
vertical restraints without market power may have flexible application under competition law. 
In contrast, vertical restraint by an enterprise with significant market power will foreclose a 
sufficient share of the up- or downstream market in order to impede competition.
10
  
 
The simplest solution would be to presume the legality of all vertical restraints based 
on market power. Then, the market share threshold test should be the centre of assessing 
                                                 
6
 See Toshiaki Takigawa, ‘Prospect of Antitrust Law and Policy in 21st Century: In Reference to Japanese 
Antimonopoly Law and Fair Trade Commission’ Journal of Korean Competition Law, Vol. 8, 2002, p. 189. 
7
 See Kevin Arquit, ‘Market Power in Vertical Cases’, Antitrust Law Journal, Vol. 60, 1992, p. 921; Massimo 
Motta, Competition Policy: Theory and Practice, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004, p. 343. 
8
 See Ohseung Kwon, ‘Retrospect and Prospect on Korean Antitrust Law’, Journal of Korean Law, Vol. 4, No. 
2, 2005, p. 5. 
9
 See Bong Eui Lee, ‘Prohibition of Abuse of Market-Dominant Undertakings under the Monopoly Regulation 
and Fair Trade Act’, Journal of Korean Law, Vol. 4, No. 2, 2005, pp. 66-70. 
10
 See Einer Elhauge and Damien Geradin, Global Competition Law and Economics, Hart Publishing, Oxford, 
2007, p. 451. 
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market power, although sometimes it does not indicate a firm’s actual market power.
11
 
Market share is used as the leading evidence worldwide for presumption in the test of market 
power, because it is a relatively simple measure.
12
 It contains crucial information on the 
competitive strength of each of the market entities, and also the whole range of market 
structure.
13
 Therefore, the test of dominance based on a certain standard of market share 
would eliminate ambiguity in litigation. The presumption of market dominance is also very 
important to distinguish Articles 3-2 and 23 MRFTA applications. The difference between 
concerted and unilateral action is irrelevant based on the definition of market dominant 
position, because horizontal concerted action is covered only by Article 19. Thus, a 
presumption in the test of market dominance held by a firm whose vertical restraint is not 
anti-competitive, enquires into the real pro-competitive effect on the market where vertical 
restraint is unilateral.  
 
Therefore, market share should be the leading evidence to assess anti-competitive 
effects by vertical restraints, as stated above. Enterprises with less than 50 per cent market 
share should be presumed to have no significant market power.
14
 However, current KFTC 
decisions such as Interpark and Hyundai Motors show that market share of less than 50 or 
even 40 per cent could be presumed market dominant, and could inhibit competition in 
vertical cases.
15
 Most competition regimes usually do not have a statutory provision of 
market dominance presumption, according to a market share threshold test.
16
 However, case 
law in the US and the EC also indicates concerns about assessing market power and 
dominance. The US Supreme Court has stated that market shares above 66 per cent indicate a 
                                                 
11
 See Herbert Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy: The Law of Competition and Its Practice, 3rd edn, 
Thomson West, St. Paul, MINN, USA, 2005, p. 128; Lawrence Sullivan and Warren Grimes, Supra., note 1, p. 
63. 
12
 See George Shepherd, Joanna Shepherd, and William Shepherd, ‘Antitrust and Market Dominance’, The 
Antitrust Bulletin, Vol. 46, No. 4, 2001, p. 841. 
13
 See Luc Peeperkorn and Vincent Verouden, ‘The Economics of Competition’ in Jonathan Faull and Ali 
Nikpay (eds), The EC Law of Competition, 2nd edn, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007, pp. 57-8. 
14
 See Michal Gal, Competition Policy for Small Market Economies, Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA, 
USA and London, 2003, p. 65. The author suggests 50 per cent of market share presumption is adequate for 
small market economies. 
15
 44 per cent in Hyundai Motors, KFTC Decision 2007-281, 2006Dokgam0746, May 18, 2007; 39.5 per cent in 
Interpark G Market Corp., KFTC Decision 2007-555, 2006Sukyoung4846, Dec. 18, 2007.  
16
 The EC and the US competition regimes do not have a particular regulation for this. However, the JFTC 
imposes remedies to under the existence of a monopolistic situation based on Concentration Ratio (CR) test. For 
further details, see Einer Elhauge and Damien Geradin, Supra., note 10, p. 236. 
Chapter 6 
Modernisation of Korean Vertical Regulation: Proposals for New Legislation and Future Implications 
 
 
155 
monopolistic position.
17
 Lower courts also have generally required a market share of at least 
50 per cent to constitute monopoly power.   
 
In the EC, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) held in Hoffman-La Roche
18
 that a 
highly important factor for the presumption of market dominance is the existence of very 
large market shares. In Hoffman-La Roche, the undertaking had approximately 75 per cent to 
87 per cent of market share.
19
 In AKZO,
20
 the ECJ referred to the passage quoted in the 
Hoffman-La Roche case, and indicated that 50 per cent of market share could be considered 
as very large, and thus create a presumption of market dominance. Generally, therefore, 70 
per cent of market share or above will almost certainly constitute a dominant position, and a 
share of 50-70 per cent will raise a presumption of dominance.
21
 Moreover, according to the 
discussion paper, and also guidance on the EC Commission’s enforcement priorities in 
applying Article 82 EC to exclusive abuses, as an example of current EC thought, it is likely 
that very high market shares indicate a dominant position. This would be the case where an 
undertaking holds 50 per cent or more of the market, provided that rivals hold a much smaller 
market share. Furthermore, if the undertaking’s market share is below 40 per cent, its 
dominance is not likely.
22
 
                                                 
17
 United States v. E.I. du Pont de 4emours & Co., 351 US 76 S.Ct., 1264 (1956) at 379, observing that du Pont 
produced 75 per cent of the cellophane sold in the US and that the enterprise may be presumed to have 
monopoly power;  Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., 504 US 451, 112 S.Ct. 2072 (1992), at 
481, holding that a 80-95 per cent market share is enough to survive a summary judgment, and describing a 
prior case as holding that over 2/3 of a market is a monopoly; United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 US 
106, 31 S.Ct. 632 (1911), over 2/3 of the market and over 80 per cent of the field of comparable cigarettes 
constituted a substantial monopoly. See also Einer Elhauge, ‘Defining Better Monopolization Standards’, 
Stanford Law Review, Vol. 56, No. 2, 2003, p. 259; Keith Hylton, Antitrust Law: Economic Theory and 
Common Law Evolution, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003, p. 243; Andrew Gavil, ‘Exclusionary 
Distribution Strategies By Dominant Firms: Striking A Better Balance’, Antitrust Law Journal, Vol. 72, 2004, 
pp. 11-2; Robert O’Donoghue and Jorge Padilla, The Law and Economics of Article 82 EC, Hart Publishing, 
Oxford and Portland Oregon, USA, 2006, pp. 112-5; Einer Elhauge and Damien Geradin, Supra., note 10, p. 
245. 
18
 Case 85/76, Hoffman-La Roche & Co AG v Commission, [1979] ECR 461, [1979] 3 CMLR 211. 
19
 Einer Elhauge and Damien Geradin, Supra., note 10, p. 246.  
20
 Case C-62/86, AKZO Chemie BV v Commission, [1991] ECR I-3359. 
21
 E.g., Case 322/81 4V 4ederlandsche Baden-Industrie Michelin v. Commission [1983] ECR 3461. In this case, 
market shares of 57 and 65 per cent were considered sufficient evidence of dominance. However, in 
Virgin/British OJ [2000] L30/1 [2000] 4 CMLR 999, less than 40 per cent was presumed as dominant. For more 
discussion about market share thresholds in other jurisdictions, see also Michal Gal, Supra. Note 14, p. 66; 
Carles Mosso, Steven Ryan, Svend Albaek, and Maria Centella, ‘Article 82’ in Jonathan Faull and Ali Nikpay 
(eds), The EC Law of Competition, 2nd edn, 2007, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 324-5; Mark Furse, 
Competition Law of the EC and UK, 6th edn, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008, pp. 292-4. 
22
 Para. 31 of the DG Competition discussion paper on the application of Article 82 of the Treaty to 
exclusionary abuses (Dec 2005):  http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/art82/discpaper2005.pdf (accessed 14 
May 2009) and para. 14 of Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the  
Chapter 6 
Modernisation of Korean Vertical Regulation: Proposals for New Legislation and Future Implications 
 
 
156 
 
As seen in both regimes, less than 50 per cent of market share would not indicate 
market dominance, although other factors can be considered for the presumption of market 
dominance. Unlike the KFTC, both regimes do not necessarily show the total market share of 
a certain number of enterprises such as Concentration Ratio (CR) 3 in order to prove market 
dominance.
23
 In particular, the EC guarantees block exemption for vertical agreements where 
a supplier’s market share is less than 30 per cent.
24
 These two regimes’ approaches are 
successful to induce creative and efficient business activities at the vertical level, and also 
may give legal certainty
25
 with the development of case law.
26
 If a firm is unclear about the 
legal status of market dominance and the costs of investigating its market position are high,
27
 
a written provision of market share threshold gives more benefits. This rationale, especially 
in the EC, stems from the proposition that vertical agreements are detrimental to competition 
only where market power exists, and over-application of the law to vertical agreements is 
costly.
28
  
 
The Korean competition system has not borrowed this idea of tolerance in vertical 
cases, and the KFTC condemns the market entities with some degree of market power at a 
vertical level, based on the assumption that they cannot be benign. Although the Korean 
market is a little more concentrated than large economies of developed countries, the KFTC 
can still apply the market dominance presumption in the US and EC as long as the domestic 
market is open to international competition. The existing provision of presumption under 
Article 4 MRFTA is almost equivalent to that in the AML. One of the 1977 amendments to 
the AML included a provision to control monopolistic conditions. This section, Article 2(7) 
AML, provides that in the event of a monopolised sector of the economy in which the market 
                                                                                                                                                        
EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/ 
art82/guidance_en.pdf (accessed 14 May 2009). 
23
 For further comparative study between the US and the EC, see also Giorgio Monti, EC Competition Law, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007, p. 143; Femi Alese, Federal Antitrust and EC Competition Law 
Analysis, Ashgate, Hampshire, UK and Burlington VT, USA, pp. 187-203. 
24
 Art. 3 of EC vertical regulation. 
25
 Some scholars however argue that the EC vertical regulation is not sufficient to give the benefit of legal 
certainty. See Romano Subiotto, ‘The Reform of the European Competition Policy Concerning Vertical 
Restraints’ Antitrust Law Journal, Vol. 69, 2001, p. 193.  
26
 Ohseung Kwon, Supra., note 8, p.12. 
27
 See Michal Gal, ‘Regulation by Declaration: A Novel Regulatory Mechanism to Limit Abuse of Monopoly 
Power’, 4YU Journal of Law & Business, Vol. 2, 2006, p. 422. 
28
 See Richard Whish, ‘Regulation 2790/99: The Commission’s “New Style” Block Exemption for Vertical 
Agreements’ Common Market Law Review, Vol. 37, 2000, p. 907. 
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share of one (CR1) is 50 per cent or that of two enterprises combined (CR2) is 75 per cent or 
more, new entry into the relevant market would be difficult. The economic performance of 
the monopolising enterprises under this market structure is undesirable.
29
 The Japanese 
provision is even more rational than the MRFTA, since the Japan Fair Trade Commission 
(JFTC) shows its concern about duopoly, and its CR2 test can work properly even in vertical 
cases. However, the Korean CR3 test can give an unclear imposition of burden to enterprises, 
which does not give legal certainty, as illustrated in the previous chapter. The KFTC’s 
approach may create a risk of condemning an enterprise whose practices do not harm 
competition, where the enterprise has less than 50 per cent market share. Therefore, the 
KFTC should remove the presumption provision of CR3 method, although it can keep the 
rest of the presumption techniques.
30
 
  
6.2.2. Market Share Threshold and Other Criteria of Presumption Suggested 
 
If vertical restraint and vertical merger had the same effects on the market regarding pro-
competitive and anti-competitive aspects, the KFTC should treat them equally.
31
 Vertical 
mergers that may result in market power have not been treated as objectionable per se in 
Korea, although vertical restraints with some degree of market power can infringe the law. 
Current cases such as Interpark
32
 and eBay/Interpark merger,
33
 evidence that the KFTC has 
not sufficiently established the criteria of market dominance presumption based on market 
share. In the former case, the KFTC held that Interpark’s exclusive dealing was a violation of 
Article 3-2 MRFTA by concluding there was an entry barrier from its high market share. 
However, in the latter, it approved eBay’s merger with Interpark with some remedies, and 
                                                 
29
 See Mitsuo Matsushita, Introduction to Japanese Antimonopoly Law, Yuhikaki Publishing, Tokyo, 1990, p. 5. 
The presumption of market dominance in the MRFTA could be also borrowed from the German GWB Art. 
19(3) rather than the AML. GWB states that if 2 or 3 firms have a market share of 50 per cent or over, or 5 or 
less firms have a combined market share of 2/3 or over, they are assumed to be market dominant. For further 
explanation, see also Sigrid Stroux, US and EC Oligopoly Control, Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 2004, 
p. 19. 
30
 See Ohseung Kwon, Kyoung-Jae-Bub [Economic Law], 5th edn, Bubmunsa, Seoul, 2005, pp. 182-3. The 
author argues that Art. 4 should be amended such as the German GWB, Art. 19(3), CR3: 50 per cent or CR5: 66 
per cent. However, this threshold is very low and may also disregard pro-competitive outcomes by vertical 
restraints. 
31
 See Oliver Williamson, Economic Organization: Firms, Markets, and Policy Control, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 
Hertfordshire, 1986, p. 213. 
32
 Interpark G Market Corp., KFTC Decision 2007-555, 2006Sukyoung4846, Dec. 18, 2007. 
33
 Preliminary merger decision, eBay/Interpark, KFTC Decision 2008Jisik2222, see also KFTC, 4ewsletter, 
Issue 9, Nov. 24, 2008: http://eng.ftc.go.kr/bbs.do?command=getList&type_cd=10 (accessed 11 March 2009). 
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stated that there would be low costs of market entry for its internet-based businesses. These 
two decisions illustrated the KFTC’s different treatment of vertical restraint and merger.  
 
The KFTC allows a vertical merger more easily than vertical restraints. Although the 
vertical restraint and merger have the same effects, the KFTC treats both differently. 
Nonetheless, there is no economic justification for a policy that treats vertical restraint and 
merger in a different way, using a per se rule of prohibition against, for instance, Resale Price 
Maintenance (RPM), whilst allowing all other restraints. In other words, it would be 
inconsistent to have a tough stance against some vertical restraints, whilst being lenient on 
vertical mergers.
34
 Adopting a per se rule for vertical cases may thus result in negative effects, 
and the rule of reason should be applied in analysis of vertical cases.
35
 The KFTC should 
therefore establish clearer guidance about criteria for vertical restraint investigation. It should 
regard the problem of effects in vertical cases when it measures market dominance. It should 
set a plausible presumption to induce a tolerant regulatory measure of vertical restraints, 
equal to vertical mergers. This will also help the rule of reason development in the case law. 
 
When examining abuse of dominance in horizontal cases, the presumption of market 
dominance should be positioned more strictly than vertical cases. It can be reasonable for the 
KFTC to condemn an enterprise’s practice with between 30 and 50 per cent of market share 
in horizontal or unilateral cases, considering other factors of market dominance. The KFTC 
can then prevent horizontal and anti-competitive abusive conducts, and tolerate vertical and 
pro-competitive practices. Thus, the KFTC should design new guidelines for abuse of market 
dominance, stating a special clause of tolerance for vertical cases. It should provide a legal 
measure with an instruction that market share of between 30 and 50 per cent in vertical cases 
may not create a presumption of abuse of market dominance. There would, however, be some 
problems if the KFTC adopted market share analysis as the only indicator to assess market 
power. It should take into account other factors to measure market power, since competitors 
in a market do not give always a sufficient signal of market power. Most of the Chaebol’s 
affiliates are vertically integrated with financial power, and a Chaebol brand with lock-in 
effects may create significant monopoly power. This means merely relying on a market share 
test may fail to assess market power. Therefore, some other factors should be added to a 
                                                 
34
 Massimo Motta, Supra., note 7, p. 377. 
35
 See Andy Chen and Keith Hylton, ‘Procompetitive Theories of Vertical Control’, Hastings Law Journal, Vol. 
50, 1999, p. 621. 
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scrutiny of dominance presumption. Other indicators such as financial strength, number of 
competing suppliers, substitutability of products and entry barriers should be taken into 
account as supplementary tools of indication.
36
  
 
There are, however, several reasons why a market share threshold test should be the 
major application, amongst other factors. First, vertical restraints can be harmful to 
competition, again only where the parties have significant market power. Second, although 
there are problems in assessing market power through a sound market definition, the methods 
of assessment and understanding of market definition have developed drastically. Third, a 
market share threshold provision can eliminate the regulatory burden from enterprises whose 
act would be efficient business conduct where it may be pro-competitive.
37
 Therefore, other 
indicators can only support the market share threshold test, even if these criteria can be added 
to the new guidelines.  
 
In conclusion, in order to establish presumption of market dominance under the 
MRFTA, the KFTC has to include five criteria in the test. First, an enterprise should have 50 
per cent of market share in the relevant market, and second, enterprises with less than 10 per 
cent should get a de minimis exemption under Article 4 MRFTA. In addition, under Market 
Dominance Guidelines, the KFTC should indicate some factors to presume market 
dominance, in order to prevent anti-competitive effects by market power. To achieve this, the 
KFTC should tolerate the vertical restraints of enterprises with some market power in order to 
ensure an exemption for pro-competitive or efficient activities. This allows an enterprise with 
market share of between 30 and 50 per cent to have vertical practices by means of exemption 
from Article 3-2, although it still possibly violates Article 19 or 23. Fourth, the KFTC should 
designate that a supplier with market share of less than 30 per cent may get an automatic 
exemption from both Articles 3-2 and 19, where the practice is vertical. Finally, vertical 
restraint can infringe Article 3-2, where the practice has more than 50 per cent at either the 
horizontal or vertical level because it is likely to harm competition. 
 
                                                 
36
 See Mark Griffiths, ‘A Glorification of De Minimis – The Regulation on Vertical Agreements’, European 
Competition Law Review, 2000, Vol. 21, No. 5, p. 245; Robert O’Donoghue and Jorge Padilla, Supra., note 17, 
pp. 126-7. Financial strength can be seen as an indicator of dominance in the EC regime. 
37
 See Simon Bishop and Derek Ridyard, ‘EC Vertical Restraints Guidelines: Effects Based or Per Se Policy’, 
European Competition Law Review, Vol. 23, No. 1, 2002, p. 35. 
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6.2.3. Presumption of Anti-Competitiveness or Unfairness: Economic Approach 
 
The ultimate objective of Korean competition law seems to maintain a standard of business 
conduct which is considered fair. This goal would concern itself with judgments on how 
market power was used rather than with whether such power existed. However, the content of 
fairness is vague
38
 when its identification with competitive market process is abandoned. In 
general, fairness embraces some concept of equal treatment of those in similar situations. 
Nevertheless, when a competitor becomes very successful or efficient, its rival can be willing 
to sue on the grounds that the competitive market process is unfair. Subsequently, every 
successful and efficient firm may expect a routine incident where it will be the defendant in 
competition law enforcement sooner or later on achieving a certain degree of market power. 
Vigorous competition seems, then, anti-competitive, and fair competition comes to mean no 
competition at all.
39
 The word unfairness, in Article 3-2 and 23, can cover most business 
practices, and therefore catch conduct which is even pro-competitive. Some scholars argue 
that Korea should mainly focus on fairness through distribution or redistribution of wealth,
40
 
by protecting Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SME) rather than freedom of competition. 
However, helping these firms cannot redistribute wealth.
41
  
 
Many commentators assume Korea has a unique form of wealth concentration, due to 
the existence of Chaebols.
42
 The social norms and values, however, always change as the 
national economy changes. In any event, therefore, the wealth redistribution argument for 
competition policy should not have any implications for the content of competition policy.
43
 
Unless there is a fairly general social agreement on the relevant classificatory variables, 
fairness tends to mean equal treatment for everybody. In practice, in the context of a market, 
this may mean equal treatment for firms operating in the market, rather than equal treatment 
                                                 
38
 Einer Elhauge, Supra., note 17, p. 265. This is also problematic in the US monopolisation cases, e.g., 
Spectrum Sports Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 US 445 (1993). 
39
 See William Baumol and Janusz Ordover, ‘Use of Antitrust to Subvert Competition’, Journal of Law and 
Economics, Vol. 28, No. 2, 1985, p. 525. 
40
 For discussion about redistribution of wealth through competition policy, see Richard Whish, Competition 
Law, 6th edn, Oxford University Press, New York, 2009, p. 20. 
41
 Myoungsu Hong, Supra., note 5, pp. 254-7. For criticism against redistribution by competition law 
enforcement, see also Frank Easterbrook, ‘Workable Antitrust Policy’, Michigan Law Review, Vol. 84, No. 8, 
1986, pp. 1703-4. 
42
 See Joung-Woo Lee, ‘Social Impact of the Crisis’ in Duck-Koo Chung and Barry Eichengreen (eds), The 
Korean Economy Beyond the Crisis, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton MA, USA, 2004, p. 148. 
43
 See Richard Posner, Antitrust Law, 2nd edn, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 2001, p. 
24. 
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for potential entrants. Forbidding the use of unfair tactics as a means of maintaining market 
power has been an important element in Korean competition law enforcement. For example, 
if a firm can coerce rivals, suppliers, or consumers, it is often assumed there is some force. 
Accordingly, this implies the acquiescence of the coerced party in a situation that is not the 
result of mutual free bargaining, so is unfair. Then, the meaning of unfairness is viewed as an 
aspect of market power. In many cases, an exercise of market power that distorts competition 
will implicate this fairness value which the Korean authority focuses on.
44
  
 
Article 3-2 MRFTA prohibits unreasonable or unfair practices. However, its 
application is ambiguous, since the wording of unfairness does not necessarily mean anti-
competitiveness, and is also vague as to economic models of voluntary exchange, despite its 
possible definition as unfair bargaining power perspective.
45
 However, the KFTC and the 
courts have not indicated sufficient guidance for presumption in the scrutiny of unfairness. 
The Supreme Court simply stated that scrutiny whether the practice is unfair should be 
decided according to the possibility of impeding fair trade, after the overall review of various 
factors in a given situation, such as intention or objective.
46
 In other words, it should weigh 
overall circumstances in deciding whether a vertical restraint should be prohibited. In refusal 
to deal cases under Article 23 such as Coca-Cola
47
 and SKC Co.,
48
 the Court also articulated 
unfairness as a major criterion of infringement scrutiny. However, the meaning of unfairness 
in Article 23 is different from that in Article 3-2. The concept of fairness under the MRFTA 
therefore has various meanings, which are confusing when applying Articles 3-2 and 23. It 
can signify similar treatment for firms in similar circumstances. The term can likewise be 
                                                 
44
 For further discussion about fairness in market dominance enforcement, see Carl Kaysen and Donald Turner, 
‘Antitrust Policy: An Economic and Legal Analysis’ in Thomas Sullivan (ed), The Political Economy of the 
Sherman Act: The First One Hundred Years, Oxford University Press, New York and Oxford, 1991, pp. 185-7; 
Lawrence Sullivan and Warren Grimes, Supra., note 1, p. 25.  
45
 See Benjamin Klein, ‘Transaction Cost Determinants of “Unfair” Contractual Arrangements’, The American 
Economic Review, Vol. 70, No. 2, 1980, P. 356. 
46
 Hyundai Information Technology Corp. v. KFTC, Supreme Court 99Du4686, June 12, 2001. 
47
 Coca-Cola Co. v. KFTC, Supreme Court 98Du17869, Jan. 5, 2001. This case has some similarity to the EC 
case, Joined Cases, 6/73 and 7/73, Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano SpA and Commercial Solvents Corporation 
v Commission [1974] ECR 223, [1974] 1 CMLR 223, [1974] 1 CMLR 309 ECJ, 223n. However, the Korean 
judgment was very different. The Court did not accept Coca-Cola’s anti-competitive and unfair intents since 
Bumyang continued its business after the refusal to supply. For further discussion about the EC and the US 
approaches, see also Alison Jones, ‘A Dominant Firm’s Duty To Deal: EC and US Antitrust Law Compared’ in 
Philip Marsden (ed), Handbook of Research in Trans-Atlantic Antitrust, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK and 
Northampton MA, USA, 2006, pp. 236-86. 
48
 SKC Co., Ltd v. KFTC, Supreme Court 2001Du1628, June 12, 2001. The Court held that there was no 
violation of Article 23 because the firm could purchase the relevant raw materials from others with a cheaper 
price. 
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considered as synonymous with fair play in the market, which can be interpreted as refraining 
from the use of bargaining position, and thus seeking to achieve reasonable profits rather than 
maximising. According to the views of fairness, it should be permissible to protect SMEs at 
the expense of society as a whole.
49
  
 
This language must be distinguished from anti-competitiveness, and should be 
removed from Article 3-2.
50
 This may furthermore confuse the meaning of fairness from 
Article 23. Article 23 also has this term as its purpose of protection of SMEs and consumers. 
The KFTC should apply Article 23 in a way similar to section 5 of the US Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) Act. The vagueness of the term unfairness in the US act was limited by 
the 1994 amendment, which provides that the US FTC cannot deem conduct unfair unless the 
practice causes substantial injury to consumers. Although the US FTC can have authority to 
adopt substantive rules defining conduct it regards as unfair, it has not exercised this as a 
matter of practice.
51
 However, current enforcement of Article 23 is notable for its over-
application. Fair competition under Article 23 covers broader measures than that under 
Article 3-2, since Article 23 was legislated to protect consumers, competition, and even 
competitors.
52
 Unfairness, itself, in both articles, can confuse the aims of the MRFTA, 
regardless of whether or not they have the same meaning.  
 
 The current controversy surrounding the application of law is not only confined to the 
difficulty of interpreting the meaning of unfair conduct, but also in practice. Along with the 
KFTC’s guidelines, there have been some efforts of case law development regarding the 
subject of presumption of unfairness. All firms are generally free to deal with whom they 
wish, despite the duty to deal in some circumstances. This duty is controversial, because it 
interferes with the freedom of contract and basic property rights,
53
 which are indispensible to 
                                                 
49
 See Roger Van den Bergh and Peter Camesasca, European Competition Law and Economics: A Comparative 
Perspective, Intersentia, Antwerpen, Belgium, 2001, pp. 31-2. 
50
 The wording in Art. 3-2 MRFTA may be the influence from Art. 82 EC. The origins of fairness language in 
Art. 82 EC are not entirely clear, but they most likely reflect the impact of the Ordoliberalism ideal on the initial 
drafting. Likewise, the Korean policy-makers may have added this based on the thoughts of Ordoliberalism. See 
also Robert O’Donoghue and Jorge Padilla, Supra., note 17, p. 7.  
51
 Einer Elhauge and Damien Geradin, Supra., note 10, p. 5.  
52
 Ohseung Kwon, Supra., note 30, p. 326. 
53
 For further discussion by a comparative study of the US approach, see Rudolph Peritz, ‘A Genealogy of 
Vertical Restraints Doctrine’, Hastings Law Journal, Vol. 40, 1989, pp. 537-54. 
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a free market economy. It should therefore only be applied in extraordinary circumstances.
54
 
A current judgment in an Article 3-2 case showed the courts’ development of freedom of 
business principles. The Supreme Court in POSCO reversed the judgment of the Seoul High 
Court, based on the fact that there was no unfairness.
55
 POSCO did its best to cast doubt on 
the evidence accounts. It raised hints about fairness in business practice based on its intention 
test.  
 
To raise this question and generate doubt, POSCO brought its defence based on its 
effects on the market. The POSCO case went further than previously in explaining why, 
under certain circumstances, POSCO’s competitor, Hysco, might get benefits from Article 3-
2. The Court held that its refusal to deal was not unfair, because there was no actual negative 
impact on competition. There was no proof that POSCO intended to cause harmful effects on 
the market. Hysco could obtain the relevant products from other suppliers and get benefits 
from its business activity without POSCO’s supply. In this case, the Court examined whether 
there was an intention of market foreclosure as the means of unfairness, and concluded that a 
mere market share of 80 per cent, was not sufficient to blame for the conduct and therefore, 
the KFTC should not impose a duty to deal, since it could not explain why the practice was 
unfair.
56
 However, it did not clearly consider the issue of objective justification in duty to 
deal, and whether unfairness can be narrowly defined as anti-competitiveness.  
 
The Court merely focused on ex post standards for the challenge of strict legal 
measures against large enterprises. The counter-foreclosure concern against Hysco, which 
refused to supply, was not examined. If the KFTC and the Court had based its rationale on an 
appreciation of POSCO’s motives for implementing a restraint with an ex ante approach, it is 
likely that they would have drawn a better presumption of unfairness. The POSCO judgment 
is, however, still remarkable, since it brought out the real meaning of unfairness, based on 
justification from the lack of anti-competitive intention. Nevertheless, it would have taken a 
closer examination to show whether Hysco could have a market power of foreclosure through 
vertical integration against POSCO, by means of misusing the ex post standard by Article 3-2. 
                                                 
54
 This is not the only problem in Korea but also in the EC. See Robert O’Donoghue and Jorge Padilla, Supra., 
note 17, p. 405.  
55
 POSCO v. KFTC, Supreme Court 2006Da5130, June 29, 2007. 
56
 The Supreme Court of Korea seemed to discuss a limited application of essential facility doctrine concept 
illustrated by the Areeda. See Phillip Areeda, ‘Essential Facilities: An Epithet in need of Limiting Principles’, 
Antitrust Law Journal, Vol. 58, 1989, p. 853.  
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The courts should develop an ex ante yardstick in application of Article 3-2, especially in 
vertical cases. The reason is that the courts can almost never emphasise economic analysis of 
efficiency where they use an ex post measure. Therefore, economic analysis should be 
regarded as an important tool rather than the unfairness ideal, for the ex ante manner of 
Article 3-2 implementation.  
 
There is no reason why the Korean competition regime cannot adopt exemption for 
efficiency improvements under Article 3-2 through more focus on economics, which will be 
different from EC competition law. Article 82 EC does not expressly foresee the possibility 
of exempting abusive behaviour because of efficiencies. However, there are some scholars 
seeking to find a way to include efficiencies in Article 82 EC, such as under Article 81 EC.
57
 
The Korean regime may avoid the problem of inconsistency with economics in Article 3-2 
enforcement by providing clearer presumption of market dominance. Moreover, economic 
theories can be used to help guide the courts, the KFTC, and the policy-makers
58
 to refine the 
concept of fairness in the MRFTA, which will be eventually evaluated as pro-
competitiveness, based on the ex ante approach. 
 
 
6.3. Amendment to Provision of UBP: Article 23 MRFTA and UBP Guidelines 
 
6.3.1. Articles 19 and 23 MRFTA: Single Provision for Agreement Cases 
 
Competition regimes have distinctive legal provisions of (i) preventing an anti-competitive 
concerted act regardless of being a horizontal or vertical agreement; and (ii) preventing 
market dominance or monopolisation.
59
 This measure can give a clear picture to enterprises 
and competition lawyers. Unlike other regimes, the Korean provision Article 19 MRFTA 
                                                 
57
 Robert O’Donoghue and Jorge Padilla, Supra., note 17, p. 18; Neelie Kroes, ‘Tackling Exclusionary Practices 
to Avoid Exploitation of Market Power: Some Preliminary Thoughts on the Policy Review of Article 82’ in 
Barry Hawk (ed), International Antitrust Law and Policy: Fordham Competition Law 2006, Juris Publishing, 
Huntington NY, USA, 2006, p. 390; Trevor Soames, ‘Towards A “Smart” Article 82: Qui Audet Adipiscitur’ in 
Barry Hawk (ed), International Antitrust Law and Policy: Fordham Competition Law 2006, Juris Publishing, 
Huntington NY, USA, 2006, p. 465.  
58
 See Thomas Jorde and David Teece, ‘Innovation, Market Structure and Antitrust: Harmonizing Competition 
Policy in Regimes of Rapid Technological Change’ in Leonard Waverman, William Comanor, and Akira Goto 
(eds), Competition Policy in the Global Economy: Modelities For Competition, Routledge, New York, 1997, p. 
290. 
59
 The US and the Japanese laws prohibit monopolisation but the MRFTA and the EC simply prevent abuse of 
market dominance. 
Chapter 6 
Modernisation of Korean Vertical Regulation: Proposals for New Legislation and Future Implications 
 
 
165 
prohibits only horizontal agreements which are unfair, and Article 23 can be applicable to 
both unilateral and collusive cases. This may confuse enterprises, especially foreign ones. In 
order to create Korean vertical regulation, the KFTC should provide a clear legal measure for 
vertical agreements under Article 19. Article 19, in fact, does not clearly state that it is only 
applied to horizontal agreements. Many Korean scholars have argued that Article 19, like its 
US and EC counterparts, should be applicable to vertical as well as horizontal agreements.
60
 
This Article 19 tradition of application for horizontal cases only was brought in from the 
traditional Japanese approach.  
 
The JFTC prohibits anti-competitive concerted acts under the second half of Article 3 
AML,
61
 and vertical restraints under Article 19 AML. However, the Japanese courts have 
shown efforts to develop interpretations of Article 3 language similar to the US and the EC.
62
 
The Tokyo High Court in the 1953 Asahi 4ewspaper case
63
 construed the term ‘concerted 
acts’ as used in the second half of Article 3 AML to only apply to horizontal agreements.
64
 
The Court denied the JFTC’s decision, based on the grounds that the firm had acted 
unilaterally, and there had been no mutual agreement between firms vertically. It interpreted 
the language in Article 3 AML narrowly, as only applicable to horizontal agreements. In 
Toppan Mua K.K.,
65
 however, the Tokyo High Court constituted a rejection of the rationale 
which was adopted in the Asahi 4ewspaper judgment,
66
 and found that enterprises which 
engaged in restricting the business activities of other firms do not have to be within the same 
level of distribution channel. Following this judgment, many argue that the agreement 
                                                 
60
 See Ho Young Lee, ‘Su-Jik-Jok-Jae-Han-Go-Rae-Ui-Kyu-Jae’ in Ohseung Kwon (ed), Gong-Jung-Go-Rae-
Wa-Bub-Chi [Fair Trade and Regulation], Bubmunsa, Seoul, 2004, pp. 617-8. 
61
 The language of Art. 2(6) AML (the definition of agreements), would not limit the Art. 3 application to 
vertical restraints. See John Haley, Antitrust in Germany and Japan: The First Fifty Years, 1947-1998, 
University of Washington Press, Seattle and London, 2001, p. 77; Akira Inoue, Japanese Antitrust Law Manual: 
Law, Cases, and Interpretatin of Japanese Antimonopoly Law, Kluwer Law International, Alphen aan den Rijn, 
The Netherlands, 2007, pp. 9-12.  
62
 See Mitsuo Matsushita, International Trade and Competition Law in Japan, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
1993, pp. 136-40; Jiro Tamura, ‘Market Access Issues in Japan’s Antimonopoly Law’ in Clifford Jones and 
Mitsuo Matsushita (eds), Competition Policy in the Global Trading System, Kluwer Law International, The 
Hague, 2002, p. 145.  
63
 K.K. Asahi Shinbunsa v. Kōsei Torihiki I’inkai, 4 Shinketsushū 145, Tokyo High Court, March 9, 1953. 
64
 For further discussion about this case, see Masako Wakui, Antimonopoly Law: Competition Law and Policy in 
Japan, Arima Publishing, Suffolk, 2008, pp. 57-8. 
65
 Toppan Mua K.K. v. JFTC, Tokyo High Court, Dec. 14, 1993, 840 Hanreitimes 81. 
66
 Mitsuo Matsushita, Supra., note 29, pp. 38-40. 
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regulation of the AML covers both horizontal and vertical agreements, although this is not 
still completely settled in case law.
67
  
 
This Japanese Court’s interpretation seemed to be influenced by the EC approach 
taken in Consten and Grundig,
68
 which confirmed that Article 81 EC could be applicable to 
vertical agreements. However, the KFTC and the courts have not fully considered this. The 
KFTC has, in practice, dealt with vertical restraints by the UBP provision, which provides a 
list of vertical restraints.
69
 The KFTC should develop its implementation of Article 19 both in 
horizontal and vertical agreements, and should limit its implementation of Article 23 to 
unilateral cases. In order to achieve legal certainty of preventing anti-competitive vertical 
agreements, this amendment is critical. The KFTC can maintain Article 23 as a provision for 
preventing unfair and anti-competitive methods unilaterally, which can be observed in section 
5 of the US FTC Act. The language in Article 23 can be general, but the enforcement should 
be more limited, such as the US FTC Act.
70
 The number of Article 23 cases is overwhelming, 
despite its vague wording. The best way to implement Article 23, therefore, is to narrowly 
interpret its enforcement by limiting its scope to unilateral cases only. 
 
6.3.2. Presumption of Efficiency in Vertical Restraints and Exemption Provisions 
 
The KFTC can uphold Article 19 MRFTA for vertical agreement cases with a slight 
amendment to the exemption clause. If the KFTC implements Article 19 for vertical 
agreements also, the legal provision should ensure the exemption which is indispensible for 
the market. To achieve this aim, the KFTC needs to amend the notification method under 
Article 19(2) to the block exemption system. Article 19(2) provides exemptions where the 
business practices satisfy the criteria of industrial rationales, such as Research and 
Development (R&D), or enhancement of the SMEs’ competitiveness by the authorisation of 
the KFTC in horizontal cases. However, if consumer interests are significantly harmed, this 
                                                 
67
 Some argue that this AML provision still covers only agreements between competitors. See Masako Wakui, 
Supra., note 64, p. 5. 
68
 Joint Cases 56 and 58/64, Establissements Consten SA & Grundig-Verkaufs-GmbH v. Commission [1966] 
ECR 299, 339-40, [1966] CMLR 418. 
69
 See Min Ho Lee, ‘Recent Developments in the Treatment of Collusion by Korean Courts’, Journal of Korean 
Law, Vol. 4, No. 2, 2005, p. 159.  
70
 Einer Elhauge and Damien Geradin, Supra., note 10, p. 228. 
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exemption will not be granted.
71
 Although the KFTC provides exemption by authorisation, 
the number of cases of exemption, especially in horizontal cases, is very small.
72
 The major 
problems are: (i) enterprises do not acknowledge the authorisation system of exemption; (ii) 
they believe it would be difficult to obtain exemption through this system; and (iii) they are 
not willing to expose their anti-competitive schemes.
73
  Since enterprises are not willing to 
take the risk of failure of the exemption grant, this exemption provision does not work 
properly.  
 
Unless the KFTC applies this provision to vertical cases with the block exemption 
method, enterprises will hardly recognise the benefits. The purpose of exemption should be to 
provide a framework for self-regulation which permits economic entities to organise their 
vertical practices, so as to obtain legal protection from the application of law as provided in 
the EC.
74
 The KFTC can adopt the technical methods of Article 81(3) EC. The prohibition of 
agreements contained in Article 81(1) EC is tempered by Article 81(3) EC, which provides 
that an arrangement infringing Article 81(1) EC may still receive benefits from exemption. 
This exemption is granted if the agreement contributes to improving the production or 
distribution of goods, or to promoting technical or economic progress, whilst allowing 
consumers a fair share of the resulting benefits. However, this exemption cannot be allowed 
where (i) the agreement is not indispensible to the attainment of these objectives; or (ii) there 
is a possibility of eliminating competition in respect to a substantial part of the products.
75
  
 
Whilst considering this, the KFTC also needs to focus on de minimis rule. If Article 
19 MRFTA prohibits all possible anti-competitive agreements, irrespective of the size of the 
firms in question, or the impact that the agreement will have, this provision would paralyse 
business activity in the Korean market.
76
 Article 19, along with a de minimis provision of 10 
per cent of market share under Article 4 MRFTA, can give a guarantee of efficient and pro-
competitive results by vertical arrangements. Therefore, vertical agreements under an Article 
                                                 
71
 Art. 29(2) of the Enforcement Decree. 
72
 The number of authorised concerted cases since this legislation is only 8. This indicates that the KFTC applies 
this exemption with a strict limitation. See Jungwon Song, Ca-Ru-Tel-Mit-Bul-Gong-Jung-Go-Rae-Hang-Wi-
Kyu-Jae [Regulations on Cartels and Unfair Business Practices], Pakyoungsa, Seoul, 2005, p. 162. 
73
 See Ohseung Kwon, Kyoung-Jae-Bub [Economic Law], 6th edn, Bubmunsa, Seoul, 2008, p. 270. 
74
 For further details about block exemption in the EC, see Rosa Greaves, EC Block Exemption Regulations, 
Chancery Law Publishing, Chichester and Colorado Springs CO, USA, 1994, p. 3. 
75
 See Joanna Goyder, EU Distribution Law, 4th edn, Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2005, pp. 30-32. 
76
 Compare with the EC de minimis Notice rationale [OJ 2001, C368/13]. See also Mark Furse, Supra. Note 21, 
pp. 215-7.  
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19(2) scrutiny should be considered lawful if the practice satisfies one of the following 
criteria: (i) the enterprise arranging vertical restraints lacks market power; and the agreement 
should (ii) improve production and distribution, (iii), enhance R&D, (iv) promote the state 
economy, (v) improve competitiveness of SMEs, and (vi) should not increase its benefits by 
harming consumers.
77
  
 
Since vertical restraints or mergers without market power can be lawful in many 
regimes, the KFTC and the courts should take the sensible position that a vertical 
arrangement is a method of normal business conduct. Indeed, a vertical merger is still lawful 
even when the post-merger enterprise is monopolist at one level.
78
 However, vertical 
restraints have been treated differently, as quasi-per se unlawful, when the enterprises 
involved possess market power. Often the best the KFTC can do is to offer a guidance of 
possibilities of some pro- and anti-competitive effects by vertical restraints. When the anti-
competitive explanation has been eliminated, the pro-competitive justification will be left.
79
 
This examination should be done mainly under Article 19.  
 
The overall suggestion can give the KFTC full authority to curb anti-competitive 
abusive conduct of dominant enterprises under Article 3-2. Then, Article 23 will be 
considered a provision on unilateral conduct which does not fall within the scope of Article 
3-2. The legislative intent of Article 23 should be its function in a manner supportive of the 
provision of Article 3-2. In other words, its broader purpose of preventing anti-
competitiveness will cover effective implementation of the MRFTA, which could not be 
covered by Article 3-2.
80
 After that, the KFTC, the courts, competition law practitioners, and 
enterprises may get a sufficient degree of guidance, which will result in overall benefits 
fitting the aims of competition law. Moreover, this amendment and implementation of 
Articles 19 and 23 can offer benefits through pro-competitive business practices.  
 
                                                 
77
 See Frank Easterbrook, ‘Vertical Arrangements and the Rule of Reason’, Antitrust Law Journal, Vol. 53, 
1984, p. 159. This idea is mostly from the author’s suggestion.  
78
 Under sec. II.1.(5)(A) of the M&A Review Guidelines [amendment by the KFTC Notification No. 2007-12, 
Dec. 20, 2007], the safe harbour provision for vertical and conglomerate mergers has more tolerant Herfindahl-
Herschman Index (HHI) threshold than horizontal.  
79
 Frank Easterbrook, Supra., note 77, pp. 143-5. 
80
 This intention is originated from the UBP provision in Japan. See Masako Wakui, Supra., note 64, pp. 104-5. 
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Although Article 19 prohibits vertical agreements, Article 23 should remain to control 
various anti-competitive or unfair unilateral offences.  Therefore, this UBP provision of 
Article 23 should also include an exemption clause that ensures efficient and pro-competitive 
vertical restraints. Otherwise, the unilateral or coordinating vertical arrangements that are 
pro-competitive can be prohibited. Therefore, Article 23 should include similar block 
exemption criteria to Article 19. 
 
 
6.4. Amendment to Provision of RPM: Article 29 MRFTA and RPM Guidelines 
 
6.4.1. Withdrawal of Article 29 MRFTA 
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the KFTC needs to consider change of RPM policy. 
Unlike the US, the KFTC still seems to take minimum RPM as a per se violation, and 
imposes significant penalties on those found to have participated in such a practice.
81
 The 
economic consequences of this RPM are not undesirable in most circumstances, because 
most are beneficial to consumers, distributors, and manufacturers alike.
82
 Moreover, the 
ruling to separate vertical price restraints from non-price restraints is unwise. Every vertical 
arrangement is designed to influence price. If, for example, territorial restrictions induce 
dealers to supply additional services and information, they do so only because they can raise 
the price, and thus call forth competition in the service dimension. If a vertical restriction is 
the way of compensating distributors for lending their reputations, they must affect price in 
order to provide that compensation.
83
  
 
Despite this argument, the MRFTA is almost the only statutory provision on RPM 
with an individual exemption by KFTC authorisation. The US Congress once gave the States 
the right to authorise RPM for sales within their borders in 1937,
84
 responding to the US 
                                                 
81
 E.g., Hewlett-Packard Korea, KFTC Decision 2005-160, 2005Jaedo0452, Oct. 25, 2005; Epson Korea Corp., 
KFTC Decision 2005-163, 2005Jaedo0454, Oct. 31, 2005. This hard-core approach is similar to the EC, e.g., 
Yamaha (IP/03/1028), 16 July 2003. The EC Commission imposed fines for practices designed for fixing RPM 
of its products in certain Member States.  
82
 For further discussion, Supra., Chapter 3. See also Walter Adams, ‘Resale Price Maintenance: Fact and 
Fancy’, The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 64, No. 7, 1955, p. 974. 
83
 Frank Easterbrook, Supra., note 77, p. 156. 
84
 The Miller-Tydings Act of 1937, 50 Stat. 693. For further discussion about this Act evaluated as desirable, see 
Walter Adams, Supra., note 82, pp. 972-4.  
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Supreme Court’s per se judgment.
85
 This was understood as putting small manufacturers on 
an equal stance with their large rivals.
86
 However, 40 years later, the regulation for 
authorisation by US enforcement authorities was withdrawn, and the per se rule restored for 
all states by the Consumer Goods Pricing Act.
87
 The US courts, however, recognised RPM as 
one efficiency-enhancing practice like other types of vertical non-price restraints. The US 
Supreme Court has abandoned the per se rule on minimum RPM, and held that the Dr. 
Miles
88
 precedent should be overruled and judged by the rule of reason in Leegin.
89
  
 
Unlike current US antitrust law, Article 29 MRFTA simply gives the KFTC 
exemption power regarding a certain type of vertical price practice, especially in the 
publishing industry.
90
 The Article 29 authorisation method seems a product heated debate on 
vertical restraints during the 1970s in the US, just before the MRFTA legislation in 1980, and 
the ideal of legislation on cartel control in Japan.
91
 However, the Korean RPM provision is 
very distinctive. Other regimes, including Japan, do not have this type of statement in their 
acts.
92
 This regulatory provision does not give efficiency-enhancement and thus, may impede 
pro-competitive practices. As US historical development in RPM legislation and case law 
shows, it is not an easy task for competition authorities to justify minimum RPM, and is 
controversial. There have been arguments by competition economists and lawyers as to 
whether minimum RPM should be treated by the per se rule or rule of reason. Nonetheless, 
reviewing the economic literature on vertical restraints reveals two basic considerations that 
make a rule of reason standard superior to a per se standard in the treatment of minimum 
RPM. First, there is no clear basis in either economic theory or empirical evidence favouring 
                                                 
85
 Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 31 S.Ct. 376 (1911). 
86
 For details of history, see William Baldwin, Market Power, Competition, and Antitrust Policy, Homewood, 
Illinois, USA, 1987, pp. 462-3; Rudolph Peritz, Competition Policy in America: History, Rhetoric, Law, Oxford 
University Press, New York, 1996, pp. 153-6. 
87
 The Consumer Goods Pricing Act of 1975, 89 Stat. 801. See also Herbert Hovenkamp, Supra., note 11, pp. 
55-6. 
88
 Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 31 S.Ct. 376 (1911). For more details of 
historical development of per se and rule of reason in the US courts of RPM, see Ibid., pp. 471-9. 
89
 Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKs, Inc, 551 U.S. (2007). There have been a lot of arguments 
over the per se rule in the US antitrust history before Leegin case. Some argue that there was no obvious per se 
reason for per se rules in the US antitrust. For further discussion, see John McGee, ‘Why Not “Deregulation” for 
Antitrust?’ in Eleanor Fox and James Halverson (eds), Industrial Concentration and the Market System: Legal, 
Economic, Social and Political Perspectives, ABA Publishing, USA, 1979, p. 58. 
90
 The exemption for publication sector under the MRFTA seems the influence of Art. 30 of the GWB. 
91
 Masako Wakui, Supra., note 64, pp. 13-6. The intervention of the Japanese government in the 1940s created 
an authorisation system, even in cartels or international agreements. Moreover, the amendment in 1953 adopted 
an exemption system of cartel and RPM. This was regarded as less stringent and the AML was rarely enforced 
in the 1950s. 
92
 The Japanese UBP provision under Art. 19 AML also covers RPM cases. 
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the per se prohibition of RPM. Second, there is no basis in either logic or public policy 
interests for treating vertical price restraints differently from non-price vertical restraints, 
which can have the same motivation and accomplish the same effects.
93
 Article 29, however, 
curbs the KFTC’s full examination of efficiency in RPM, since it treats minimum RPM as per 
se violation.  
 
Furthermore, Article 29 may overlap the application of Articles 3-2 and 19, since 
these already prohibit price arrangements.
94
 In theory, Article 3-2 can be also applicable to 
unilateral price fixing cases. Moreover, if Article 19 applies to vertical arrangements, Article 
19, as a major provision for RPM, can also cover RPM cases. However, in practice, Article 
29 is applied regardless of market power, or even being concerted or unilateral. This dilemma 
can be seen in the Korea Ginseng Corp. case.
95
 The firm had a 71.3 per cent market share 
that could be presumed as market dominance under Article 4, but the KFTC decided it was  
violation of Article 29, regardless of its market share. Considering all of this, it would be 
desirable to withdraw Article 29. In addition, since RPM practices can be pro-competitive, 
the KFTC should withdraw RPM provision, and apply Article 19 with block exemption.
96
 
Then, the courts can develop a rule of reason approach through case law. The KFTC and the 
courts have failed to provide a coherent rationale for upstream enterprises’ interest in 
enforcing RPM, by their wrongful analogy between vertical and horizontal agreements. 
Although vertical restraints such as RPM do not always have the exact same effect as 
horizontal agreements, the KFTC and the courts have treated RPM as a hard-core restriction. 
However, subsequent economic literature and other competition regimes’ current approach to 
vertical price restraints elaborate upon this distinction.
97
  
 
As discussed in Chapter 5, suppliers of luxury goods such as cosmetics and foreign 
car importers monitored retail prices, and threatened to terminate non-complying retailers. 
Nevertheless, there might have been a rationale of their RPM schemes for supplying products, 
                                                 
93
 See Robert Larner, ‘Vertical Price Restraints: Per se or Rule of Reason?’ in Robert Larner and James Meehan, 
Jr. (eds), Economics and Antitrust Policy, Quorum Books, Westport, Connecticut, USA, 1989, p. 126.  
94
 Some scholars also argue that Article 23 might be applicable to RPM cases. See Ki-Su Lee and Jin-Hee Ryu, 
Kyoung-Jae-Bub [Anti-trust and Consumer Law], 7th edn, Sechang Publishing, Seoul, 2006, p. 312. 
95
 Korea Ginseng Corp., KFTC Decision 2002-041, 2001Jeonsa4681, Jan. 29, 2002. 
96
 See Ju-Sun Lee, ‘Competition Policy on Unfair Business Practices and Resale Price Maintenance’ in Seung-
Hee Jwa, Thoughts of Amendment of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act, Korea Economy Research 
Institute, 2004, pp. 401-2; Ohseung Kwon, Supra., note 8, p. 16.  
97
 See George Hay, ‘Vertical Restraints After Monsanto’, Cornell Law Review, Vol. 70, Mar. 1985. p. 422. 
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by guaranteeing product quality as well as pre-sale services in Cosmetics cases.
98
 The firms 
in these cases had a sufficient reason to have RPM for entering into a new market. 
Furthermore, only if an enterprise does have significant market power should it be regarded 
as quasi-hard-core vertical restraints. However, the KFTC has treated these RPMs as per se 
infringements, despite their small market shares. In conclusion, the KFTC should provide 
flexible guidelines for RPM practices, which allow enterprises to benefit from the rule of 
reason. The current RPM Guidelines do not state clearly which type of RPM can infringe the 
law. This problem has misled the market entities. Different types of vertical restraints can be 
substituted for each other,
99
 so that there is no reason for distinct rules. Therefore, the 
different treatment of price and non-price restraints is not plausible.
100
 If the current Article 
29 is withdrawn, the RPM Guidelines should follow the same step. Instead, the new vertical 
guidelines, which will be discussed below, should provide safe harbour and guarantee the 
efficiency justification for pro-competitive practice, regardless of price or non-price restraints. 
 
 
6.5. Modernisation: Establishment of Korean Vertical Guidelines 
 
6.5.1. Withdrawal of Per Se Provision with Caution
101
 
 
The KFTC currently provides the UBP and the RPM Guidelines as guidance for vertical 
restraints. However, these guidelines do not have an adequate level of balancing pro- and 
anti-competitiveness by vertical restraints. Furthermore, these are unnecessary where the new 
guidelines cover both vertical price and non-price restraints. The KFTC guidelines are 
important for guidance in vertical cases where the courts do not have sufficient understanding 
of vertical restraints, which can improve the rule of reason development. Examining 
historical developments through landmark cases in the US, the US Supreme Court began, in 
                                                 
98
 E.g., LG Health Corp., KFTC Decision 2002-367, 2002Danchae1696, Dec. 24, 2002; L’Oreal Korea, KFTC 
Decision 2002-368, 2002Danchae1700, Dec. 24, 2002. See also Howard Marvel and Stephen McCafferty, 
‘Resale Price Maintenance and Quality Certification’, The RA4D Journal of Economics, Vol. 15, No. 3, 1984, 
pp. 358-9. 
99
 See Frederic Mathewson and Ralph Winter, ‘An Economic Theory of Vertical Restraints’, The RA4D Journal 
of Economics, Vol. 15, No. 1, 1984, pp. 27-38. 
100
 Roger Van den Bergh and Peter Camesasca, Supra., note 49, p. 242. 
101
 See Ohseung Kwon, ‘Gong-Jung-Go-Rae-Bub-Ui-Kae-Yo-Wa-Jaeng-Jom (Introduction to Fair Trade Law 
and Issues) in Ohseung Kwon (ed), Ja-Yoo-Kyoung-Jaeng-Kwa-Gong-Jung-Go-Rae [Free Competition and 
Fair Trade], Bubmunsa, Seoul, 2002, p. 17. The author argues that RPM provision is unnecessary because Art. 
23 may cover RPM as a type of UBP. However, Art. 19 should be more appropriate as discussed above. 
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the Sylvania case, to recognise the rule of reason as a primary standard of antitrust analysis, 
inspired by economic theories. This gave new prominence to the economic approach to US 
antitrust law.
102
 It holds that the market impact of vertical restraints is complex, because of 
their potential for restriction on intra-brand competition, and also stimulation of inter-brand 
competition. However, inter-brand competition became the primary concern of US antitrust 
law.
103
  
 
Korean vertical guidelines should take this into account. They should guarantee 
efficiency justification based on an inter-brand competition analysis for vertical restraint, 
without market power. For the progressive development of new vertical guidelines, the KFTC 
must distinguish between price and non-price restraints. Regarding non-price restraints, first, 
the KFTC needs to illustrate how these can encourage dealer investments on pre-sale services, 
in order to develop consumer demand for goods. Second, it should scrutinise whether vertical 
non-price restraints may be designed to promote inter-brand competition. Third, it should 
examine whether vertical non-price restraints can usefully encourage specialisation in 
distribution. These pro-competitive justifications are persuasive, because the ensured return, 
such as recoupment of investment by suppliers, gives more confidence in their business 
profits.
104
  
 
With regards to price restraints, the guidelines should also articulate that some 
restraints, such as minimum RPM, can still be regarded as quasi-per se illegal, although all 
other vertical restraints, including maximum and recommended RPM, should be examined 
under the full rule of reason. The KFTC can consider minimum RPM as pro-competitive, 
with, of course, caution. This standard of the quasi-per se approach for minimum RPM 
requires pre-existing market power. It does, however, allow for the possibility that a party 
that does not possess market power will acquire it through minimum RPM, with other 
methods of non-price restraints, by increasing competitors’ distribution costs. This may 
impede competition.
105
 Furthermore, there is a major reason why the KFTC needs to treat 
                                                 
102
 Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977) at 49-52. See also Richard Posner, ‘The Rule 
of Reason and the Economic Approach: Reflections on the Sylvania Decision’, The University of Chicago Law 
Review, Vol. 45, No. 1, 1977, p. 20. 
103
Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKs, Inc, 551 U.S. (2007). See also ABA, Antitrust Law 
Developments, Vol. I, 6th edn, ABA Publishing, Chicago, 2007, pp. 148-9. 
104
 Einer Elhauge and Damien Geradin, Supra., note 10, p. 651. 
105
 Kevin Arquit, Supra., note 7, p. 930. 
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minimum RPM with special caution. Minimum RPM can make it easier for suppliers to 
maintain cartel prices than maximum or recommended RPM. If retail prices are fixed, a 
manufacturer will have little incentive to reduce prices.
106
 Therefore, the KFTC should give 
attention to minimum RPM, despite withdrawal of its per se illegal approach. Through the 
provisions of block exemption, based on revised Articles 19 and 23 MRFTA, the suggested 
vertical guidelines should allow exemptions to pro-competitive and efficient vertical 
restraints, where there is no threat from market power. However, the guidelines should 
provide a quasi-hard-core restriction on practices of minimum RPM, combined with other 
vertical non-price restraints, as shown in the KFTC’s enforcement.
107
  
 
6.5.2. One-Fits-All Approach: New Safe Harbour and Pursuit of Legal Certainty  
 
The way to solve problems of trade-off between pro- and anti-competitive effects by vertical 
restraints will be the central issue in the new vertical guidelines. To allow a positive impact 
on the competition by vertical restraints, competition authorities should practise (i) market 
power examination; and (ii) an anti-competitiveness test. To establish legal certainty in 
efficient vertical practices, the KFTC should examine the first criterion of the market share 
threshold test. The current exemption clause of 10 per cent market share under the UBP 
Guidelines does not guarantee the efficiency justification. Therefore, the KFTC needs to 
establish the most effective market share threshold test, based on sufficient degree of 
tolerance. Therefore, the KFTC should create a new safe harbour to fit the efficiency- 
justified policy, for ensuring legal certainty. This safe harbour provision is held in the EC as 
an important step towards a more economics-based approach.
108
  
 
The EC competition authority has a good example of competition policy on vertical 
restraints with a statutory provision. Article 81(1) EC prohibits vertical agreements which 
                                                 
106
 See Don Waldman and Elizabeth Jensen, Industrial Organization, 3rd edn, Addison Wesley, USA, 2007, p. 
577. 
107
 The following cases showed that RPM together with other vertical restraints can increase the possibility of 
violation, e.g., Taepyoungyang Cosmetics, KFTC Decision 2002-366, 2002Danchae1702, Dec. 24, 2002; 
4omshim Corp., KFTC Decision 2004-036, 2003Danchae2188, Feb. 11, 2004; Haitai Corp., KFTC Decision 
2004-041, 2003Danchae2189, Feb. 11, 2004; Lotte Chilsung Corp., KFTC Decision 2004-039, 
2003Danchae2190, Feb. 11, 2004; Woongjin Food Corp., KFTC Decision 2004-185, 2003Kyoungchok0423, 
0424, 0550, June 7, 2004; Daeho Corp., KFTC Decision 2005-168, 2005Jonsa0500, Sept. 6, 2005; Decori 
Corp., KFTC Decision 2006-436, 2006Sokyoung0733, Dec. 18, 2006; Biontech Corp., KFTC Decision 2007-
127, 2006Sokyoung2748, May 17, 2007; Woongjin Kutchen Corp., KFTC Decision 2008-216, 
2007Sokyoung2398, May 20, 2008.  
108
 Romano Subiotto, Supra., note 25, pp. 192-3. 
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distort competition within the common market. However, Article 81(3) EC, EC vertical 
regulation,
109
 and vertical guidelines
110
 provide exemptions from specific categories of 
vertical restraints and concerted practices.
111
 The EC Commission is well aware that vertical 
restraints can have negative effects on competition only where significant market power 
exists.
112
 Thus, the EC Commission works within two parameters: (i) the nature of the 
vertical restraint; and (ii) the level of market power involved.
113
 Where a supplier’s market 
share does not exceed 30 per cent, it will get block exemption benefits, unless the agreement 
contains hard-core restrictions, such as minimum RPM or absolute territorial restriction.
114 
For the modernisation of vertical guidelines in Korea, the KFTC should undertake similar 
parameters, of understanding the nature of vertical restraints and market power since the 
current UBP and RPM guidelines produce only ‘strait-jacket effects’ from the white and 
black lists, which were observed in the old EC approaches.
115
 These guidelines, providing 
complicated lists of violations, may even confuse economic entities and lawyers, because 
each section of the list may overlap Article 3-2 provision. 
 
A market share threshold test is important to prevent possible abuse, since it is more 
likely for enterprises to get exemptions through tolerant policy on vertical restraints when 
they do not have some degree of market power.
116
 The EC vertical regulation and guidelines 
provide market share threshold guidance for benefits such as legal certainty. These not only 
prevent possible abuse from an undertaking’s market power, but also allow economic 
justifications for pro-competitive vertical agreements. The US Department of Justice (DOJ) 
                                                 
109
 Regulation 2790/99 OJ L336/21.  
110
 Commission Notice, Guidelines on Vertical Restraints [2000] OJ C 291/01, [2000] 5 CMLR 1074. 
111
 De minimis Notice [OJ 2001, C368/13] also gives guidance of the safe harbour rule for exemptions.  
112
 See Vicent Verouden, ‘Vertical Agreements and Article 81(1) EC: The Evolving Role of Economic 
Analysis’, Antitrust Law Journal, Vol. 71, 2003, pp. 526-7. 
113
 Roger Van den Bergh and Peter Camesasca, Supra., note 49, p. 236. 
114
 See para. 116(2) of EC vertical guidelines. It states that territorial restriction may be necessary to recoup the 
investment to open up or enter new markets. Therefore, only absolute territorial protection may be regarded as a 
hard-core restriction. For further explanation about hard-core restrictions, see also Roger Van den Bergh, ‘The 
Difficult Reception of Economic Analysis in European Competition Law’ in Antonio Cucinotta, Roberto 
Pardolesi and Roger Van den Bergh (eds), Post-Chicago Developments in Antitrust Law, Edward Elgar, 
Cheltenham, UK and Northampton MA, USA, 2002,  pp. 40-42. 
115
 See Richard Whish, ‘Recent Developments in Community Competition Law 1998/99’, European Law 
Review, Vol. 25, No. 3, 2000, pp. 228-9; Joanna Goyder, Supra., note 75, p. 65. The old approach in the EC was 
widely criticised as too rigid and formalistic. See also Ohseung Kwon, Supra., note 30, pp. 330-31; Ki-Su Lee 
and Jin-Hee Ryu, Supra., note 94, pp. 204-5. Lee and Ryu argue the current provision in the guidelines of 
exemplified black list gives its flexibility of implementation with somewhat legal certainty. However, Kwon 
criticised the guidelines for the ‘strait-jacket’ reason. 
116
 E.g., para. 116 of the EC vertical guidelines. The EC Commission recognises the free-riding problem enough 
to justify vertical restraints that do not harm competition in the market. Nevertheless, the EC Commission is 
concerned more about pre-sale services. Therefore, free-riding justification might not apply to after-sale services. 
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used to have guidelines for vertical restraints, providing market share threshold test, which is 
now withdrawn.
117
 The US guidelines utilised a screen of 10-20 per cent for territorial, 
customer restraints, and exclusive dealing, and 30 per cent for tying. Some US courts have 
also applied the market power screen. These courts examine whether the supplier had enough 
market power to increase and sustain its dominant position through vertical restraints.
118
 
However, not all courts apply this test, and only few legal commentators agree with this. 
Some US commentators still criticise rulings in tying cases such as Kodak,
119
 in which the 
court emphasised unnecessarily the possibility of gaining market power by lock-in effects.
120
 
They argue that Kodak had a small market share of the overall inter-brand market.
121
 The US 
antitrust regime is, therefore, sometimes reluctant to strictly apply a market share threshold 
test.  
 
Comparing the two regimes’ approaches regarding the market share threshold test, the 
EC provision is more suitable for the Korean regime, since it gives more legal certainty, 
appropriate to the civil law system. Along with this market share threshold, the KFTC can 
also adopt flexibility in application of the law by the rule of reason development, originated 
in the US. To summarise, an appropriate degree of market share threshold test should be 
included in core Korean vertical guidelines to give the benefit of legal certainty. However, 
even if the KFTC can reduce administrative costs from block exemption in vertical cases, it is 
also possible that the costs from market definition in each case may outweigh the benefits 
from investigation of vertical arrangements. Nevertheless, Articles 3-2 and 23 enforcements 
have already required improvement on better techniques for assessing market power and 
                                                 
117
 The now-withdrawn 1985 Vertical Restraints Guidelines of the Department of Justice. For further discussion, 
see also Charles Rule, ‘Statement of Charles F. Rule Acting Assistant Attorney General Antitrust Division 
before the Committee on the Judiciary United States Senate Concerning the Justice Department’s Vertical 
Restraints Guidelines on July 16, 1985’, Antitrust Law Journal, Vol. 54, 1985, p. 381. 
118
 In the US, 70 per cent of market share can be evidence of monopolisation, whilst 30 to 35 per cent may be an 
infer a possible monopolisation attempt. However, the US antitrust authorities do not provide clear guidelines 
for this, e.g., Zschaler v. Claneil Enters. Inc., 958 F. Supp. 929 (D. Vt. 1997). See also Janet McDavid and 
Richard Steuer , ‘The Revival of Franchise Antitrust Claims’, Antitrust Law Journal, Vol. 67, 1999, p. 239.  
119
 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 112 S. Ct. 2072 (1992). 
120
 See Benjamin Klein, ‘Market Power in Antitrust: Economic Analysis after Kodak’, Supreme Court 
Economic Review, Vol. 3, 1993, pp. 47-63. For further theoretical discussion in Kodak, see also Carl Shapiro, 
‘Aftermarket and Consumer Welfare: Making Sense of Kodak’, Antitrust Law Journal, Vol. 63, 1995, pp. 483-
511. 
121
 See Frank Taney, ‘Rewriting the Law of Resale Price Maintenance: The Kodak Decision and Transaction 
Cost Economics’, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 143, No. 1, 1994, pp. 361-2; Richard Steuer, 
‘Vertical Restraints in the Nineties’, Antitrust Law Journal, Vol, 62, 1994, pp. 721-2. 
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defining markets.
122
 Korean policy-makers should, therefore, make details of criteria of the 
market share threshold test. Then, the new vertical guidelines will clarify the application of 
provisions Articles 3-2, 19, and 23 MRFTA to offer legal certainty, as shown in the table 
below.  
 
 Above 50% 30-50 % 10-30% Below 10% 
Article 3-2 MRFTA 
Abuse of 
Market Dominance 
Horizontal Applicable Applicable 
Not 
applicable 
De minimis 
Exemption 
Vertical Applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
De minimis 
Exemption 
Article 19 MRFTA 
Unfair Concerted 
Practices 
Horizontal Applicable Applicable Applicable 
Exemption 
except 
hard-core 
Vertical Applicable Applicable 
Block 
exemption 
Exemption 
except 
quasi-hard 
core 
Article 23 MRFTA 
Unfair Business 
Practices 
Horizontal 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Applicable 
De minimis 
Exemption 
Vertical 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Applicable 
De minimis 
Exemption 
 
Table 6.1. Application of law based on market share threshold and types of violations according to the 
suggested amendments 
 
Some Korean scholars argue that the rule of reason approach should not be 
implemented in certain provisions in the MRFTA. According to them, Article 3-2 cannot be 
interpreted under the rule of reason, because it cannot be evaluated persuasively based on 
purely economic analysis. It can be inferred that illegality of conduct by market dominant 
enterprises is likely to be more widely accepted than in a monopolisation approach in the US, 
where the rule of reason may work. This concept takes a stricter view on unilateral unfair 
practices of market dominance. However, as marked before, because the criteria are not 
exclusively based on economic principles, firms would have difficulty predicting when and 
                                                 
122
 This assessment technique is the common phenomenon and also requirement worldwide. Therefore, this has 
been more developed around the world than before. See Philip Areeda, ‘Monopolization, Mergers, and Markets: 
A Century Past and the Future’ California Law Review, Vol. 75, No. 3, 1987, p. 960. 
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under what circumstances their conduct could be challenged or not.
123
 Therefore, the 
development of the rule of reason should be made by the courts, along with the new vertical 
guidelines. Addition to this, the new guidelines should also articulate the standards for 
finding evidence of a vertical agreement, which has been discussed by means of the US 
‘Colgate doctrine’,
124
 or the standard of proof of an agreement in the EC,
125
 in order to 
support the market share threshold test.  
 
If the KFTC maintained the current provisions, which do not distinguish between 
agreements and unilateral policy, but focus on practices, it would continue confusing 
applications of Articles 3-2 and 23 with Article 19. The Korean standards from the Maeil and 
4amyang cases
126
 do not give a sufficient degree of standard of evidence.
127
 A further 
development in vertical guidelines by details of criteria is necessary for clear evidence to 
establish that downstream firms have agreed or acquiesced, explicitly or tacitly, in any 
unilateral policy declared by upstream firms. The scrutiny for existence of agreements is not 
an easy task, and this is not a problem unique to Korea. In the Japanese Shiseido case,
128
 the 
JFTC’s decision also did not give clear guidance for this distinction. This case was merely 
                                                 
123
 Bong Eui Lee, Supra., note 9, pp. 71-2. 
124
 United States v. Colgate & Co, 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919) and Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 
U.S. 752 (1984). Unilateral suggestion of RPM followed by refusal to deal does not constitute agreement. See 
also ABA, Antitrust Law and Economics of Product Distribution, ABA Publishing, Chicago, 2006, p. 87. 
125
 The EC case law has developed the distinction between vertical agreements and unilateral practice. In the 
Case 107/82, AEG-Telefunken v. Commission [1983] ECR 3151, [1984] 3 CMLR 325, the ECJ found that the 
systemic refusal to supply, which did not adhere to the pricing policy, arose out of the agreement between AEG 
and its resellers. In Case 277/87, Sandoz Prodotti Farmaceutici SpA v. Commission [1990] ECR I-45, [1990] 4 
CMLR 242, the ECJ also affirmed the EC Commission’s decision. Sandoz’s policy did not constitute conduct 
but formed part of the general framework of commercial relations for its constituting a tacit agreement. 
However, in Case T-41/96, Bayer AG v. Commission [2000] ECR II-3383, [2001] 4 CMLR 126, aff’d on appeal 
Cases C-2&3/01 P, [2004] ECR I-23, [2004] 4 CMLR 653, the Court of First Instance (CFI) and the ECJ 
stressed that it was not open for the EC Commission automatically to assume that the expression of a unilateral 
practice by one party established an agreement. Such a broad approach would confuse Art. 81 with 82 EC. Proof 
of an agreement under Art. 81 should be found upon the direct or indirect findings of a concurrence of wills 
between economic entities. For further discussion, see also Alison Jones and Brenda Sufrin, EC Competition 
Law: Text, Cases, and Materials, 3rd edn, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008, pp. 148-68; Barbora 
Jedlickova, ‘Boundaries between Unilateral and Multilateral Conducts in Vertical Restraints’, European 
Competition Law Review, Vol. 29, No. 10, 2008, pp. 602-6. 
126
 4amyang Dairy Products Co. v. KFTC, Supreme Court 99Du11141, Dec. 24, 2001; Maeil Dairy Industry 
Ltd v. KFTC, Supreme Court 2000Du1829, May 31, 2002.  
127
 Under the Art. 19(5) MRFTA, however, the existence of an agreement is presumed despite the absence of an 
explicit agreement to engage in anti-competitive practices. The burden of proof whether or not an agreement 
existed is on the parties, e.g. Dong-Suh Food, Inc. and 4estlé Korea Inc. v. KFTC, Supreme Court 2000Du3184, 
May 2, 2002; Four Toilet Companies v. KFTC, Supreme Court 2000Du1386, May 28, 2002. This was 
introduced to lessen the difficulties of proof of collaboration, but many criticise this presumption. This is very 
different from other regimes’ presumption criteria, and shall not be applicable to vertical cases. For further 
discussion, see Ohseung Kwon, Supra., note 8, p. 15; Min Ho Lee, Supra., note 69, pp. 162-7. 
128
 Shiseido Co., Ltd., JFTC consent Decision, Nov. 30, 1995, Shinketushu 42-97. 
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understood to be an example of a tacit agreement forming an RPM through its instruction of 
price.
129
 Without clear guidance, the courts in Korea and Japan may have difficulties solving 
categorisation of the concerted and unilateral.  
 
Considering all of the references from the comparative study, the KFTC and the 
Korean courts need to develop the meaning of standards of proof in vertical agreements, such 
as developed in the US Colgate case,
130
 and also the EC cases,
131
 Bayer AG
132
 and 
Volkswagen.
133
 In Maeil and 4amyang, the Supreme Court should have articulated the 
conditions for presumption in the test of agreement. A manufacturer can unilaterally 
announce its pricing policy, and that it would not deal with distributors who refused to adhere 
to the RPM. Then, the practice of coercing a dealer to adhere to its retail pricing policy as a 
condition of supplying goods can be found liable for vertical price-fixing.
134
 The KFTC and 
the courts should accept the establishment of this standard of vertical agreement proof. The 
new vertical guidelines will help the KFTC and the courts have a better objective justification 
in vertical cases, through giving guidance regarding these issues. 
 
6.5.3. Supplementary Factors Considered for New Guidelines: Inter-brand Competition 
 
To examine the anti-competitiveness test after the safe harbour scrutiny is not an easy task, 
because it is difficult to weigh inter- and intra-brand competition against each other. However, 
there are several reasons why the KFTC should outweigh inter-brand competition. The 
reduction in intra-brand restraint for improving inter-brand competition is the source of the 
                                                 
129
 This was the influence of the Supreme Court of Japan judgment in Wakodo, July 10, 1975, Saiko Saibansho 
Minji Hanreishu (Minshu) 29-6-888. The Court held that the economic disadvantage from the restrictive term 
which could be observed effectively is sufficient to find a violation. See also Masako Wakui, Supra., note 64, pp. 
154-5. 
130
 United States v. Colgate & Co, 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919); Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics 
Corp., 485 US 717 (1988) at 735-736. In Sharp, the Court established that a vertical restraint is not per se illegal 
unless it contains some agreement on price or price level. 
131
 For further discussion about the EC’s approach to unilateral conduct and Article 81 EC in vertical cases, 
Richard Whish, Supra., note 40, pp. 107-13. 
132
 Case T-41/96, Bayer AG v. Commission [2000] ECR II-3383, [2001] 4 CMLR 126, aff’d on appeal Cases C-
2&3/01 P, [2004] ECR I-23, [2004] 4 CMLR 653. 
133
 Case T-208/01, Volkswagen v. Commission [2003] ECR II-5141, [2004] 4 CMLR 14, aff’d Case C-74/04 P, 
[2006] ECR I-6585. For further discussion regarding unilateral conduct and agreements, see also Mario 
Filipponi, Luc Peeperkorn and Donncadh Woods, ‘Vertical Agreements’ in Jonathan Faull and Ali Nikpay (eds), 
The EC Law of Competition, 2nd edn, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007, pp. 1138-41; Alison Jones and 
Brenda Sufrin, Supra., note 125, p. 168; Mark Furse, Supra., note 21, pp. 179-80. 
134
 This may be clear as seen in the US approach in Colgate. For further discussion, see Douglas Broder, A 
Guide to US Antitrust Law, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2005, p. 59. 
Chapter 6 
Modernisation of Korean Vertical Regulation: Proposals for New Legislation and Future Implications 
 
 
180 
competitive benefit that helps one product compete against another.
135
 Vertical restraints 
which affect intra-brand competition, therefore, do not raise many welfare problems. 
Accordingly, most economists argue that intra-brand restraints are not worth investigating 
when no market power exists.
136
 To achieve the best test of balance, seeking alternative 
means is crucial. If there is no alternative, the probability of efficiency from the practices will 
increase. The new vertical guidelines should, hence, include criteria for analysing whether 
there are less restrictive means as an alternative to the vertical restraints in question. 
Recognising the value of pre-sale services, the KFTC may be reluctant to prevent them, 
unless less drastic means for generating the same benefits are available.
137
 If there is an 
alternative means of providing the same pro-competitive effect or efficiency, the KFTC 
should prohibit the vertical restraints. The new vertical guidelines should not then list mere 
details but give examples. However, the exemplified details should not be binding, but give 
guidance to competition law practitioners and enterprises not to infringe the law. 
 
Along with these criteria, the new guidelines need to include other factors that may 
significantly impede competition by vertical restraints. Some vertical restraints with market 
power can improve inter-brand competition. However, there is still a risk of excessive anti-
competitive effects, where the enterprise leverages horizontal or vertical market power 
through vertical foreclosure, entry barrier, and collusion. These are certainly negative impacts 
on competition, which the KFTC should be concerned about. Therefore, it is essential for the 
KFTC to find a marginal scrutiny to create the best policy of competition law. As a practical 
matter, the KFTC’s analysis may often reach the same results as a market power screen, but it 
should require more sophisticated economic analysis, measuring each restraint’s economic 
effect on competition. Its analysis should focus on inter-brand effects and, specifically, on 
horizontal effects at either the manufacturer’s or the dealer’s level. It should not ignore the 
fact that vertical restraints may also facilitate collusion.
138
  
 
                                                 
135
 Frank Easterbrook, Supra., note 77, p. 156; Alan Meese, ‘Property Rights and Intrabrand Restraints’, Cornell 
Law Review, Vol. 89, 2004, pp. 586-620.  
136
 Massimo Motta, Supra., note 7, p. 347. 
137
 See Alden Abbott, ‘Paradox Regained: Towards a ‘New Economic Approach” to Vertical Restraints Policy’, 
George Washington Law Review, Vol. 48, 1980, p. 579. 
138
 For further discussion about facilitating collusions in both upstream and downstream levels, see Peter 
Carstenesen, ‘The Competitive Dynamics of Distribution Restraints: Efficiency versus Rent Seeking’ in Antonio 
Cucinotta, Roberto Pardolesi, and Roger Van den Bergh (eds), Post-Chicago Developments in Antitrust Law, 
Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton MA, USA, 2002, pp. 284-6. 
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Therefore, the standard in the new guidelines should include all potential anti-
competitive aspects of vertical restraints.
139
 The KFTC has to be hostile to these practices. 
The economic justifications for the imposition and maintenance of vertical restraints remain 
somewhat doubtful. Even if vertical restraints increase additional information and services at 
the distribution level, the welfare effects of increased services and information are ambiguous, 
since consumer welfare may rise or fall. These uncertainties, and the possible harmful effects 
on consumer welfare, raise judicial doubts on vertical restraints, especially in light of the 
argument of competition scholars that consumer welfare rather than efficiency concerns 
should guide competition law analysis.
140
 In addition, the uncertainty of the national economy 
raises the same consideration. The new vertical guidelines should include all of these 
considerations for ensuring the achievement of competition law objectives, and provide 
criteria for the harmful factors of vertical restraints. 
 
 
6.6. Concluding Remarks 
 
Excessive concerns about economic power have made the KFTC fearful to develop vertical 
regulation for efficiency and pro-competitiveness improvements. The current provisions from 
these concerns do not satisfy the objectives of Korean competition law. The overall 
objectives of competition policy vary from country to country. In particular, objectives other 
than efficiency are included in many countries. However, these social, economic, and 
political objectives also vary across countries, and may often conflict with the aim of 
promoting efficiency.
141
 For that reason, it has not been easy for Korean competition policy-
makers to establish more efficiency-focussed legislation. The KFTC has not, thus, fully 
established satisfactory theories of vertical restraints, and demonstrated its unfledged 
implementation of the law. Furthermore, cases in Korea illustrate that the KFTC and the 
courts need to develop their rationale to reach the evidentiary argument for vertical restraints. 
Although the KFTC’s decision in some cases was founded on economic theory, it has a long 
way to go to reach a sufficient level of efficiency-enhancement. The KFTC should bear this 
                                                 
139
 Kevin Arquit, Supra., note 7, p. 926. 
140
 Alden Abbott, Supra., note 137, pp. 582-3. 
141
 See Sylvia Ostry, ‘Globalization, Domestic Policies and The Need For Harmonization’ in Leonard 
Waverman, William Comanor, and Akira Goto (eds), Competition Policy in the Global Economy: Modelities 
For Competition, Routledge, New York, 1997, p. 34. 
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burden, since its wrongful decisions may create a significant amount of costs to enterprises. 
This eventually distorts competition, which leads to a competitor-protection policy.  
 
This chapter has considered a further development of vertical regulation in Korea by 
the regulatory reform of Articles 3-2, 4, 19, 23, and 29 MRFTA, along with the establishment 
of new vertical guidelines, which can fit the aims of Korean competition law. Then, the 
courts need to take a full analysis of vertical restraints. Otherwise, satisfactory outcomes from 
reform will not be appreciated. The case law development will ensure appropriate 
competition policy and implementation of the Korean competition law. A sufficient level of 
economic enquiry into the actual effect of every vertical restraint will overwhelm the 
judges.
142
 However, the suggested reform will subsequently help the courts better understand 
the effects of vertical restraints, with reference to economic principles. The apparent retreat 
from strict enforcement by regulatory reform will offer a potential change in examining 
vertical restraints at the micro and macro level. The next chapter will critically assess new 
approaches to vertical restraints from the amendments discussed in this chapter, based on the 
micro and macro analyses. 
 
                                                 
142
 George Hay, Supra., note 97, p.  422. 
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Chapter 7 
 
Critical Assessment of Regulatory Reform: 
Model for Globalisation 
 
 
 
7.1. New Vertical Regulation Approach Scrutinised for Small Market 
 
The number of countries adopting competition policy is increasing worldwide,
1
 most 
competition policy in these countries correlating with their trade policy. In particular, the 
rapid and increasing global market integration through free trade has heightened political 
tensions between major trading countries, where there are domestic industrial problems as 
impediments to adjustment of trade.
2
 This impacts on national competition policy.
3
 
                                                 
1
 See Paul Cook, Colin Kirkpatrick, Martin Minogue, and David Parker, ‘Competition, Regulation and 
Regulatory Governance: An Overview’ in Paul Cook, Colin Kirkpatrick, Martin Minogue, and David Parker 
(eds), Leading Issues in Competition, Regulation, and Development, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK and 
Northampton MA, USA, 2004, pp. 4-5. 
2
 For example, international competition has brought fundamental changes in the US industries. See Robert 
Pitofsky, ‘Antitrust at the Turn of the Twenty-First Century: A View from the Middle’, Saint John’s Law 
Review, Vol. 76, 2002, p. 586. 
3
 E.g. the US-Japan Structural Impediments Initiative (SII) talks. A large volume of academic literature 
regarding this has been published. See Hiroyuki Odagiri, Growth Through Competition, Competition Through 
Growth: Strategic Management and the Economy in Japan, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1992, pp. 322-4; Frederic 
Scherer, Competition Policies for an Integrated World Economy, The Brookings Institute, Washington D.C., 
1994, p. 13; Mitsuo Matsushita, ‘The Antimonopoly Law in Japan’ in Edward Graham and David Richardson 
(eds), Global Competition Policy, Institute for International Economics, Washington D.C., 1997, pp. 155-6; 
Mark Furse, ‘Competition Law and the WTO Report: “Japan – Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic 
Film and Paper”’, European Competition Law Review, Vol. 20, No. 1, 1999, pp. 9-13; Russell Weintraub, 
‘Globalization’s Effect on Antitrust Law’, 'ew England Law Review, Vol. 34, 1999, pp. 32-3; Ulrike Schaede, 
Cooperative Capitalism: Self-Regulation, Trade Associations, and the Antimonopoly Law in Japan, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2000, pp. 273-5; Kevin Kennedy, Competition Law and The World Trade 
Organisation: The Limits of Multilateralism, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2001, pp. 52-5; Toshiaki Takigawa, 
‘Prospect of Antitrust Law and Policy in 21st Century: In Reference to Japanese Antimonopoly Law and Fair 
Trade Commission’ Journal of Korean Competition Law, Vol. 8, 2002, p. 163; Michael Utton, International 
Competition Policy: Maintaining Open Markets in the Global Economy, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK and 
Northampton MA, USA, 2006, p. 3; Chris Noonan, The Emerging Principles of International Competition Law, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008, pp. 22-5; Masako Wakui, Antimonopoly Law: Competition Law and 
Policy in Japan, Arima Publishing, Suffolk, 2008, pp. 30-31. 
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Competition policies in large economies, in particular, have been a major tool for achieving 
economic and other social goals, including trade and state economy, for several decades.
4
  
 
In addition, competition policies around the world differ according to the needs and 
levels of economic development.
5
 Korean competition policy differs from large economies in 
its unique economic development, background, culture, and, especially, market size. Small 
markets are normally assumed to be characterised by monopolies,
6
 and some may argue the 
Korean market is one of the best examples. Therefore, in Korea, less rigid competition policy 
for efficiency reasons may not easily take root, for the fear that it may harm competition and 
international trade.
7
 Unlike Korea, competition policies in most small market economy 
countries have obtained the name of protection of market
8
 or domestic firms,
9
 which may 
result in two kinds of costs: (i) monopolistic misallocation of resource, i.e., failure of 
allocative efficiency; and (ii) disincentives for efficiency from vigorous competition, in other 
words, failure of productive and dynamic efficiency.
10
 These small economies have 
competition laws for protecting successful firms, especially since the idea of competition has 
adapted to evolving economics-influences as well as legal and political changes.
11
 Their 
competition law goal seems to appear as a macroeconomic goal, rather than non-economic or 
social goal. However, the approach of Korean competition enforcement is very different from 
                                                 
4
 Some may argue that competition policies in large economies do not necessarily apply to small market 
economies of developing countries such as Korea. For further discussion, see Michal Gal, Competition Policy 
for Small Market Economies, Harvard University Press, MA, USA, 2003, p. 1. 
5
 See Mark Furse, ‘Competition Law Choice in China’, World Competition, Vol. 30, No. 2, 2007, p. 326; Dina 
Waked, ‘Competition Law in the Developing World: The Why and How of Adoption and Its Implications for 
International Competition Law’, Global Antitrust Review, Issue 1, 2008, p. 69. 
6
 Paul Cook et al., Supra., note 1, p. 39.  
7
 However, most developing countries seem to take the advantages of national large firms and to easily justify 
monopolistic or oligopolistic structures. See Pradeep Mehta, Manish Agarwal, and V.V. Singh, Politics Trumps 
Economics: Lessons and Experiences on Competition and Regulatory Regimes from Developing Countries, 
UNCTD, May, 2007, p. 15: http://www.unctad.org/sections/wcmu/docs/c2clp_ige8p11Cuts_en.pdf (accessed 23 
August 2008). 
8
 E.g., Keiretsu has been considered as one of mechanisms of trade protection. See Gary Saxonhouse, ‘What 
Does Japanese Trade Structure Tell Us About Japanese Trade Policy?’, The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 
Vol. 7, No. 3, 1993, pp. 35-9; Frederic Scherer, ‘Retail Distribution Channel Barriers to International Trade’, 
Antitrust Law Journal, Vol. 67, 1999, p. 77. 
9
 Even some argue that the goals of the US antitrust enforcement sometimes demand protection of competitors. 
See Louis Schwartz, ‘“Justice” and Other Non-Economic Goals of Antitrust’, University of Pennsylvania Law 
Review, Vol. 127, 1979, p. 1076. 
10
 Some firms are also likely to seek governmental protection from effective competition, which results in 
protectionism as rent seeking. See William Baumol and Janusz Ordover, ‘Use of Antitrust to Subvert 
Competition’, Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 28, No. 2, 1985, pp. 248-50. 
11
 A good example of political influence can be seen in the US politics and Chicago School, see Lawrence 
Sullivan and Warren Grimes, The Law of Antitrust: An Integrated Handbook, 2nd edn, Thomson West, St. Paul 
MINN, USA, 2006, p. 7; Steven Teles, The Rise of the Conservative Legal Movements: The Battle for Control 
of the Law, Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ and Oxford, 2008, Chapters 4 and 6. 
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this protection strategy. The Korea Fair Trade Commission (KFTC) rather, applies a strict 
rule, as discussed in previous chapters, focusing on non-economic goals, such as 
redistribution of wealth or consumer welfare improvement.  
 
Competition policy is essential when countries with economies in transition 
restructure their domestic economies, and integrate them into the global economy. Therefore, 
countries such as Korea should develop competition law to become competitive in a 
globalised economy,
12
 through eliminating public and private restraints to trade.
13
 Korea is a 
good example of using economic growth and competition policy to vigorously join the 
international market. Under these circumstances, efficiency outcomes from vertical restraints 
should be regarded as practical. Firms make vertical arrangements of various types in order to 
reduce transaction costs, guarantee stability of supplies, and have better contracts.
14
 These 
practices cannot harm free trade if the domestic market is open to foreign firms without 
discriminatory competition law provisions. Nevertheless, the KFTC has not fully considered 
the effects from open market economies.  
 
It is proper that when a small economy opens to the global economy, its competition 
authority needs to consider hindrances caused by the anti-competitive behaviour of private 
enterprises to market access,
15
 especially vertical restraints. Competition law should, then, 
generally guarantee that domestic large firms would be unable to restrict market access.
16
 
This concern can rise in an increasingly integrated and liberalised global economy.
17
 Some 
may argue that vertical restraints can have the effect of preventing foreign enterprises from 
developing a distribution network. Moreover, entry barriers may occur in the case of 
domestic dominant enterprises that engage in abusive practices. This is designed with the aim 
                                                 
12
 See Maher Debbah, The Internationalisation of Antitrust Policy, Cambridge University Press, New York, 
2003, pp. 47-8. Traditionally, trade law has involved public restraints of trade, and competition law has concerns 
about private restraints. Trade law is internationally oriented whereas competition law has national grounds. 
13
 See Eleanor Fox, ‘Toward World Antitrust and Market Access’, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 
91, 1997, p. 3. 
14
 See Massimo Motta, Competition Policy: Theory and Practice, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
2004, p. 302. 
15
 See Avinash Dixit, ‘Issues of Strategic Trade Policy for Small Countries’, The Scandinavian Journal of 
Economics, Vol. 89, No. 3, 1987, pp. 350-57; Eleanor Fox, Supra., note 13, p. 1; Frederic Scherer, Supra., note 
8, p. 77. 
16
 See Christian Conrad, ‘Strategies to Reform the Regulations on International Competition’, World 
Competition, Vol. 26, No. 1, 2003, p. 111. 
17
 Maher Debbah, Supra., note 12, Chapter 8.  
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of excluding foreign enterprises from domestic markets.
18
 Sometimes, although foreign rivals 
can have more difficulty penetrating a new market than domestic firms,
19
 domestic 
competition authorities give excessive exemptions to domestic dominant firms. In that case, 
countries with competition law may exempt the anti-competitive behaviour of domestic 
enterprises, and this can be problematic when it impedes international trade.
20
 Furthermore, 
domestic firms may have a stronger incentive to re-erect barriers and keep their advantages in 
the domestic market. In particular, when a distribution channel is limited, competition policy 
has an important role in ensuring that foreign firms have the same access to domestic 
channels as do domestic firms. Thus, Korean competition policy cannot entirely be separated 
and distinguished from trade policy.
21
 
 
According to this argument, the best method for removing private barriers to market 
access is through vigorous application of national competition laws.
22
 Since free international 
trade of small economies is very important for economic growth, the concern about 
exemption may increase.
23
 However, if the exemption on vertical restraints is not 
discriminatory against foreign enterprises, and the domestic market is open without any 
public restraints such as high tariffs, it should be considered a vital means of improving 
competition and efficiency. The amendments to vertical regulation stated in the previous 
chapter are not discriminatory against foreign firms, and will thus eventually improve 
competition in the long run. In this chapter, the primary question will be whether the 
suggested amendments in Chapter 6 will cause further vertical foreclosure, as a method of 
fostering private restraints, which will impede international trade and competition. For 
instance, some may question that if there is a significant uncertainty of supply in international 
transactions, the demands of vertical restraints, such as exclusive dealing, may increase.
24
 
                                                 
18
 Ibid., pp. 209-10. 
19
 Chris Noonan, Supra., note 3, p. 112. 
20
 See Sylvia Ostry, ‘Globalization, Domestic Policies and The Need For Harmonization’ in Leonard Waverman, 
William Comanor, and Akira Goto (eds), Competition Policy in the Global Economy: Modelities For 
Competition, Routledge, New York, 1997, p. 29. 
21
 See William Comanor and Patrick Rey, ‘Competition Policy Towards Vertical Foreclosure in A Global 
Economy’ in Leonard Waverman, William Comanor and Akira Goto (eds), Competition Policy in The Global 
Economy: Modalities for Cooperation, Routledge, London and New York, 1997, p. 356; Michal Gal, Supra., 
note 4, p. 41. 
22
 Kevin Kennedy, Supra., note 3, p. 1. 
23
 See Eleanor Fox, ‘Economic Development, Poverty and Antitrust: The Other Path’, Southwestern Journal of 
Law and Trade in the Americas, Vol. 13, 2007, pp. 212-4. 
24
 See Kenneth Arrow, ‘Vertical Integration and Communication’, The Bell Journal of Economics, Vol. 6, No. 1, 
1975, p. 173. 
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This practice may ultimately result in anti-competitive outcomes in the Korean market. As 
argued above, this problem cannot emerge unless competition law is discriminatory against 
foreign firms. 
 
The KFTC sometimes seems to believe that aggressive competitors can impede 
competition by injuring their rivals. It underlies a range of competition law controlling 
vertical restraints, although most vertical restraints may be means of pro-competition, 
operating more efficiently.
25
 The incumbent Chaebol may be able to impede market entry,
26
 
but its complete control in the market may become increasingly difficult, through the erosion 
of entry barriers. Unless entry is completely blocked, market shares will be gradually eroded. 
In other words, it is possible that the market structure may change, as a result of the growth of 
imports.
27
 In addition, current competition law established discriminatory measures against 
domestic large firms through controlling domestic holding companies’ internal transactions, 
which is sufficient to curb their market power. If the law discriminates against domestic 
enterprises to prevent market concentration, the domestic market will be harmed by foreign 
monopolists in the long run. Besides, in strategic trade environments, many suggest that  
proper design of competition policy must reflect not only the consequences of the policy on 
domestic consumers, but also on the relative competitiveness of domestic firms in a global 
struggle for market leadership and profits.
28
 In short, the Korean competition law should 
maximise efficiencies rather than focusing on consumer welfare, because this is myopic. 
 
The regulatory reform in the previous chapter will prevent anti-competitive vertical 
arrangements, which may inhibit competition, by examining the degree of market power held 
by a firm. It will also trigger vigorous competition in the domestic market. This will balance 
anti-competitive effects and efficiency outcomes, which will not harm macroeconomic policy, 
i.e., international trade. Some argue that vertical restraints create more significant harm to 
                                                 
25
 See Robert Bork, ‘Contrasts in Antitrust Theory: I’, Columbia Law Review, Vol. 65, No. 3, 1965, p. 402. 
26
 See Ho Young Lee, Dok-Jum-Kyu-Jae-Bub-Ui-Ie-Ron-Kwa-Sil-Mu [Theories and Practices in Monopoly 
Regulation and Fair Trade Act], Hongmunsa, Seoul, 2006, pp. 114-5. The author argues that the monopolised 
market structure by Chaebols’ affiliates creates a blockage against potential entrants. 
27
 See Michael Utton and A.D. Morgan, Concentration and Foreign Trade, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1983, p. 51; Michael Utton, Profits and Stability of Monopoly, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1986, p. 3. The KFTC provides guidelines to improve imports and also prevents anti-competitive 
practices which inhibit trade flows, e.g., Notification on the Types of and Criteria for Determining Unfair 
Business Practices in International Contracts, KFTC Notification No. 1997-23, Apr. 21, 1997; The Types of 
Unfair Trade Conducts Regarding Parallel Import, KFTC Notification No. 1998-18 amended on Dec. 31, 1998. 
28
 See Janusz Ordover, ‘Transnational Antitrust and Economics’ in Barry Hawk (ed), Antitrust and Trade Policy 
in International Trade, Matthew Bender, New York, 1985, pp. 234-5. 
Chapter 7 
Critical Assessment of Regulatory Reform: Model for Globalisation 
 
 
188 
competition in smaller markets than in large ones. It is therefore often discussed that the US 
rule of reason in vertical cases makes sense only in the context of such a large market.
29
 
However, this is wrong. Each competition regime develops rule of reason or objective 
justification
30
 regardless of whether its market size, where it finds benefits from balance tests. 
Sometimes the KFTC seems reluctant to adopt the full rule of reason, on the grounds that the 
US rule of reason may work only in the common law system.
31
 This approach brings 
concerns not only to large domestic firms, but also foreign firms who have or will have 
businesses in the Korean market. Recent cases such as Microsoft
32
 and Intel
33
 demonstrate 
this. As cases of foreign firms increase in Korean jurisdiction, the demands for establishment 
of more globalised vertical regulation increases.
34
 This is crucial to establish a globalised 
standard in Korean competition law.
35
 This chapter, thus, intends to assess the suggested 
amendments regarding domestic competition, and then discuss those regarding global 
perspectives.  
 
 
7.2. Micro-Assessments on the New Vertical Regulation 
 
7.2.1. Provisions on Abuse of Market Dominant Position 
 
The market power proof requirement in vertical cases generally requires the application of an 
economic approach, because economic analysis indicates that, if there is no significant 
                                                 
29
 See David Gerber, ‘Competition Law’, The American Journal of Comparative Law, Vol. 50, 2002, pp. 284-5. 
30
 For further discussion about objective justification in the EC regime, see Paul-John Loewenthal, ‘The Defence 
of “Objective Justification” in the Application of Article 82 EC’, World Competition, Vol. 28, No. 4, 2005, pp. 
455-77. The EC objective justification cannot be seen as ‘an exemption’ to abusive practices, e.g., Case 62/86, 
Ahmed Saeed Flugreisen and Silver Line Reisebüro GmbH v Zentrale zur Bekämpfung Unlauteren Wettbewerbs 
eV [1989] ECR 803, [1990] 4 CMLR 102. 
31
 See Bong Eui Lee, ‘Bul-Gong-Jung-Go-Rae-Haeng-Wi-Ui-Wi-Bub-Sung (Illegality in Unfair Business 
Practices)’ in Ohseung Kwon (ed), Gong-Jung-Go-Rae-Wa-Bub-Chi [Fair Trade and Regulation], Bubmunsa, 
Seoul, 2004, p. 682. 
32
 Microsoft Co., KFTC Decision 2006-042, 2002Kyoungchok0452 and 2005Kyoungchok0375, Feb. 24, 2006. 
33
 Intel Corp., Intel Semiconductor Ltd, and Intel Korea, KFTC Decision 2008-295, 2007Dokgam1790 and 
2008Sijang1126, Nov. 5, 2008. 
34
 See Seung-Wha Chang, ‘Violation Criteria of Tying under the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act’, 
Seoul University Law Journal, Vol. 45, No. 4, 2004, p. 517. The author argues that the simplified decision 
without theoretical background in such tie-ins in new economy should not be made because of the impact of 
global aspect.  
35
 See Hun-Jae Suh, ‘Globalisation of the Korean Competition Law’ The Justice, Vol. 92, 2006, p. 259. 
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market power, anti-competitive effects from vertical practices do not exist.
36
 In particular, 
Article 3-2 MRFTA has been regarded as one of the core engines bringing sound market 
order in the Korean market. Although this statutory provision is added to prevent further 
market dominance, the KFTC has applied this measure less often than Article 23. This 
indicates that the KFTC has the burden of proof of abusive conduct based on its vague 
definition of unfairness. However, the suggested reform of dominance presumption under 
Article 4 will lessen administrative costs of investigation. In other words, the reform adopts 
quasi-per se illegality for anti-competitive unilateral acts at the horizontal level based on 
market power, but also accepts the rule of reason for vertical restraints. Then, the proposed 
market share threshold test can be appropriate, since it can also offer enterprises benefits of 
block exemption, where they do not exercise real market power at the vertical level.
37
  
 
The only technical difficulty in the presumption of market dominance is to define the 
relevant market.
38
 Defining the market is very important, because the burden of proof in 
defining the market can influence a successful analysis of an application of the market share 
test. Although this problem still remains, the provision of market share threshold gives legal 
certainty to enterprises practising restraints in the market, which will improve consistency in 
the KFTC’s enforcement. Furthermore, the KFTC and lawyers have developed their 
techniques of market definition in merger cases. Therefore, the administrative burden of the 
market share test will be gradually reduced. The existing problem is whether the present 
presumption in the test of market dominance is appropriate. The current KFTC 
implementation shows that it does not apply appropriate rules, because of the wrongful 
standard of Concentration Ratio (CR) 3 under Article 4. For example, in the Interpark case,
39
 
the KFTC applied Article 3-2 based on CR3 test, although the firm’s market share, 40 per 
cent, could not have been presumed market dominance. On the contrary, the KFTC applied 
Article 23 in 'amyang and Maeil
40
 although their market shares satisfied the dominance 
                                                 
36
 See Louis Kaplow, ‘Antitrust, Law and Economics, and the Courts’, Law and Contemporary Problems, Vol. 
50, No. 4, 1987, p. 196. 
37
 For further discussion, see Einer Elhauge, ‘Defining Better Monopolization Standards’, Stanford Law Review, 
Vol. 56, No. 2, 2003, pp. 334-7. 
38
 See Philip Areeda, ‘Monopolization, Mergers, and Markets: A Century Past and the Future’ California Law 
Review, Vol. 75, No. 3, 1987, p. 979. The author states that there are some difficulties in market power 
assessments: (i) the data on market definition is often incomplete; and (ii) market share is an imperfect for 
measuring market power. 
39
 Interpark G Market Corp., KFTC Decision 2007-555, 2006Sukyoung4846, Dec. 18, 2007.  
40
 'amyang Diary and Maeil Diary, KFTC Decision 2007-345, 2006Dokgam4792 and 4818, July 3, 2007. This 
was a joint decision of the KFTC. 
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presumption of CR3 (78 per cent). The suggested presumption in the test of market 
dominance will solve this unclear border between applications of Articles 3-2 and 23. This 
guidance gives sufficient notice for enterprises to prevent abusing their market power.  
 
Article 19 MRFTA will then remain as a major device forming a framework for the 
trade-off between anti- and pro-competitive effects in vertical agreements, and Articles 3-2 
and 23 will be the measures to prevent unilateral restraints. Along with Article 19, Articles 3-
2 and 23 will prevent abusive practices, and at the same time allow economic efficiency in 
vertical arrangements. In other words, efficiency consideration cannot be excluded from the 
analysis carried out under Articles 3-2 and 23, as well as Article 19,
41
 since the unilateral case 
will be scrutinised under the rule of reason. In reality, the distinction between Articles 3-2 
and 19 is not easy in vertical cases. However, the suggested reform of presumption of market 
dominance under Article 4, and safe harbour in the vertical guidelines, will subsequently 
reduce administrative burdens, and increase gains from the efficiency justification, as well as 
legal certainty.
42
 This will guide the courts to further develop details of criteria to offer 
distinctions between unilateral and concerted practices.  
 
The existing Article 3-2 analysis is the provision by which the KFTC and the courts 
barely implement an economic theory of efficiency, because of the MRFTA’s unique 
development, by curbing Chaebols. Although case law in Korea is a very important source of 
application of the law, and also has the same important value for judicial development as the 
US and the EC,
43
 it has not been developed as much as other competition regimes. The major 
problem comes from the fact that the KFTC and the courts tend to apply the per se rule to 
various forms of vertical practices, such as Resale Price Maintenance (RPM), or practices by 
                                                 
41
 Some scholars argue Art. 82 EC enforcement should also consider efficiency. See Damien Geradin, 
‘Efficiency Claims in EC Competition Law and Sector-Specific Regulation’ in Hanns Ullrich (ed), The 
Evolution of European Competition Law: Whose Regulation, Which Competition?, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 
UK and Northampton MA, USA, 2006, p.346.  
42
 However, some argue that market share alone can mislead the test. See William Landes and Richard Posner, 
‘Market Power in Antitrust Cases’, Harvard Law Review, Vol. 94, No. 5, 1981, pp. 947-51. Furthermore, there 
are some commentators arguing that the EC vertical regulation does not give legal certainty and notification 
method is more plausible. However, There is no concrete outcome which is supportive to this argument and 
moreover, this problem is probably caused from decentralisation which the Korean regime is not concerned 
about. For further discussion, see David Roitman, ‘Legal Uncertainty for Vertical Distribution Agreements: the 
Block Exemption Regulation 2790/1999 (BER) and Related Aspects of the New Regulation 1/2003’, European 
Competition Law Review, Vol. 27, No. 5, 2006, pp. 261-8. 
43
 See Einer Elhauge and Damien Geradin, Global Competition Law and Economics, Hart Publishing, Oxford 
and Portland Oregon, USA, 2007, p. 38. 
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large firms, although the current POSCO judgment
44
 changed this. However, the per se 
prohibition of certain types of vertical conduct should be justified, because such conduct may 
have welfare-enhancing effects.
45
 Therefore, it is for the KFTC to examine vertical restraints 
by a more tolerant competition policy. This is because loss of market dominance by domestic 
firms can be ignored where the market is open to foreign companies. Furthermore, domestic 
monopolists may be more ‘self-destructive’
46
 under free international trade, because 
monopoly prices in a single domestic market eventually attract foreign firms which are larger 
than domestic ones. Accordingly, an important source of the decline in domestic market 
concentration is the increase of imports.
47
 Therefore, the amendment to Article 4 MRFTA 
regarding presumption of market dominance and the application of Article 3-2 will produce 
beneficial outcomes of concrete measures for preventing abuse of market dominance, whilst 
allowing efficiency results. This system will give clearer guidance for the application of 
abuse of market dominance rule.  
 
Some may further question the 30 per cent market share threshold test, the idea 
borrowed from EC vertical regulation, and whether this should be implemented in Article 3-2 
or 23 cases. In the EC, 30 per cent block exemption is applicable only to the agreements. 
Accordingly, the application of block exemption only in Article 81 EC cases has brought 
some questions whether this exemption can be also applicable in Article 82 cases. In Tetra 
Pak,
48
 nevertheless, the Court of First Instance (CFI) confirmed that Article 82 EC does not 
allow for any Article 81(3) type exemption. Some argue that, however, even when the EC 
Commission applies Article 81 EC, it relies on a substantive analysis of market power in its 
market share threshold test, although certain agreements, such as minimum RPM and 
absolute territorial restrictions, are unlawful without further market power tests.
49
 This may 
confuse application of the law, since the EC applies a market share test for block exemption 
only in Article 81 EC cases, although the EC competition authorities examine market power 
in both Articles 81 and 82 cases. 
                                                 
44
 POSCO v. KFTC, Supreme Court, 2002Du8626, Nov. 22, 2007. 
45
 For instance, the KFTC has not fully considered theoretical arguments of welfare effects by the Chicago or 
Post-Chicago Schools in the current tying cases. For further comparison with the US, see ABA, Antitrust Law 
and Economics of Product Distribution, ABA Publishing, Chicago, 2006, pp. 190-91. 
46
 For discussion about self-destruction of large firms, see Frank Easterbrook, ‘The Limit of Antitrust’, Texas 
Law Review, Vol. 63, 1984, p. 2. 
47
 Michael Utton, Supra., note 27, p. 58. 
48
 Case T-51/89, Tetra Pak Rausing SA v Commission, [1990] ECR-II 309, [1991] 4 CMLR 334. 
49
 See Giorgio Monti, EC Competition Law, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007, pp. 153-7. 
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One may argue that this will trigger the same argument in the new Korean vertical 
regulation, where the KFTC adopts a block exemption technique from the EC regime. 
However, the MRFTA’s implementation system is very different from that of the EC. Article 
4, which the EC does not have, already provides market share presumption for the test in 
Article 3-2 cases. In addition, Article 23, as a supplementary provision, is applied to overall 
anti-competitive or unfair practices, without Article 4 guidance. Therefore, the amendment to 
Article 4 will ensure application of Article 3-2, and the vertical guidelines of 30 per cent 
market share threshold will help the KFTC apply a proper provision, whether Article 3-2 or 
23. Furthermore, there is no market integration concern in Korea, unlike the EC. Therefore, 
there will be fewer problems in the balance test based on market share provision in Article 3-
2 cases than Article 82 EC. Moreover, Articles 19 and 23’s application based on the designed 
block exemption provision improves legal certainty. In conclusion, the 30 per cent market 
share threshold, along with the suggested Article 4 MRFTA, can be effectively applicable to 
abuse of dominance cases under Article 3-2, and also concerted cases under Article 19. 
 
7.2.2. Provisions on Unfair Concerted Agreements: Market Share Threshold 
 
To examine the amendment to Article 19 MRFTA, it is necessary to scrutinise the existing 
rules in the EC, and whether they may work in Korea, because the market share threshold test 
is the core of change. Some commentators maintain that the threshold test of 30 per cent 
market share in the EC was the expected outcome.
50
 It might, however, be an open question 
whether this system introduced by the EC Commission is likely to be considered excessively 
generous,
51
 according to the economics-based approach.
52
 Therefore, the KFTC has to 
consider the following problem; whether the market share criterion in new vertical guidelines 
is necessarily arbitrary to a certain extent, because of its random choice of 30 per cent market 
share, simply based on administrative convenience, and also if it is unnecessarily generous.  
                                                 
50
 See Richard Whish, ‘Regulation 2790/99: The Commission’s “New Style” Block Exemption for Vertical 
Agreements’ Common Market Law Review, Vol. 37, 2000, p. 888. 
51
 See Wulf-Henning Roth, ‘Strategic Competition Policy: A Comment on EU Competition Policy’ in Hanns 
Ullrich (ed), The Evolution of European Competition Law: Whose Regulation, Which Competition?, Edward 
Elgar, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton MA, USA, 2006, p. 46. 
52
 See Maurizio Gambardella and Francesco Maria Salerno, ‘Vertical Agreements: Was the Commission’s 
Response Adequate? On the Commission’s Ability to Reform Long-standing Policies’ in Giuliano Amato and 
Claus-Dieter Ehlermann (eds), EC Competition Law: A Critical Assessment, Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2007, p. 
176. 
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Some commentators propose withdrawal of 30 per cent market share threshold in the 
EC, because sometimes vertical agreements can appear to deserve investigation even below 
the 30 per cent threshold.
53
 Furthermore, policy-makers often attempt to simplify legal 
provisions, in order to mitigate competition lawyers’ concerns for legal certainty. These rules 
may not work in reality. However, the benefits from safe harbour are more appreciated than 
incurred costs. Under the EC vertical regulation, growing use of market shares creates this 
benefit, hence providing presumptions of legality to certain vertical restraints. It is still 
remarkable that this expansion of the market share approach is accompanied by other 
indicators for determining market power such as entry barriers and financial strength in 
favour of a more economics-based approach.
54
  
 
Economic analysis based on market share threshold provides more objective standards 
for the KFTC and the courts, and also larger predictability for domestic and foreign 
enterprises in the Korean market.
55
 This outcome becomes imperative, since simple per se 
rules on such as minimum RPM may inhibit competition in the market.
56
 Therefore, as 
analysed by the studies on EC vertical regulation, the major advantage from the market share 
test in examining vertical agreements is to remove the burden for enterprises above the 
threshold to carry out a complex assessment of their vertical agreements. It is, then, more 
likely that competition lawyers will have the means or legal techniques to undertake the case 
adequately, thereby reducing the risk of extended, costly and uncertain litigation.
57
 Although 
the adoption of the 30 per cent market share threshold test cannot escape charges of having 
set an arbitrary threshold, it still gives the benefit of legal certainty. In addition, if a vertical 
                                                 
53
 See Denis Waelbroeck, ‘Vertical Agreements: 4 Years of Liberalisation by Regulation N. 2790/99 After 40 
Years of Legal (Block) Regulation’ in Hanns Ullrich (ed), The Evolution of European Competition Law: Whose 
Regulation, Which Competition?, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton MA, USA, 2006, pp. 87-90. 
54
 See Barry Hawk and Nathalie Denaeijer, ‘The Development of Article 81 and 82 EC Treaty: Legal Certainty’ 
Working Paper in Claus-Dieter Ehlermann and Isabela Atanasiu (eds), European Competition Law Annual 
2000: The Modernisation of EC Antitrust Policy, Hart Publishing, Oxford and Portland Oregon, USA, 2001, p. 
129; Roger Van den Bergh, ‘The Difficult Reception of Economic Analysis in European Competition Law’ in 
Antonio Cucinotta, Roberto Pardolesi, and Roger Van den Bergh (eds), Post-Chicago Developments in Antitrust 
Law, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton MA, USA, 2002, pp. 46-7. 
55
 Hun-Jae Suh, Supra., note 35, p. 273. The author argues that economic analysis is very crucial to improve the 
MRFTA for a global standard. 
56
 Per se rule can be considered as simple because of its reduction of litigation costs. See William Bohling, ‘A 
Simplified Rule of Reason for Vertical Restraints: Integrating Social Goals, Economic Analysis, and Sylvania’, 
Iowa Law Review, Vol. 64, 1979, p. 490; Andrew Gavil, ‘Competition Policy, Economics, and Economists: Are 
We Expecting Too Much?’ in Barry Hawk (ed), International Antitrust Law and Policy: Fordham Competition 
Law 2006, Juris Publishing, Huntington NY, USA, 2006, p. 589. 
57
 Denis Waelbroeck, Supra., note 53, 2006, p. 88-91. 
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agreement is deemed to deserve investigation even below the 30 per cent threshold, the 
KFTC can still catch the anti-competitive practice by applying Article 23. 
 
In addition, the Guidelines for the review cartel (Cartel Guidelines)
58
 provide an 
exemption condition of 20 per cent market share threshold, except for hard-core restrictions 
such as price fixing, or output restriction in horizontal concerted practices. Accordingly, the 
KFTC can have a more relaxed block exemption provision for vertical agreements than 
horizontal agreements, and thus, 30 per cent market share threshold is not exceptionally 
lenient. Furthermore, as held in the EC, this block exemption will reduce the administrative 
burden of competition authority,
59
 and overwhelming burdens on judges. In fact, the per se 
rule is a generalisation, but the rule of reason, which the KFTC and the courts have been 
developing, is rather a case-by-case approach.
60
 Since a case-by-case investigation is not 
always practicable in the civil law system, for the litigation and administrative costs, the 
KFTC should seek to make better generalisations for certain types of vertical practices, by 
providing rules both to give legal certainty to firms, and to relieve the courts of the burden of 
analysing every individual vertical agreement.
61
 Therefore, the market share threshold for 
Article 19 enforcement will support the rule of reason practice of the courts.
62
 
 
Furthermore, the RPM policy change under the amendment will be one of the major 
improvements. A policy towards RPM is currently somewhat inconsistent worldwide. For 
example, minimum RPM is treated as per se illegal in the EC, but is tolerated under the rule 
of reason in the US. The arguments for permitting RPM should be economic, but the KFTC’s 
current legal test for RPM was not based on any economic analysis. Moreover, the tolerance 
                                                 
58
 Sec. III.2. of the KFTC Guidelines for review cartel, amended on Dec. 21, 2007. The KFTC also tests a 
balance of outcomes between efficiency and anti-competitiveness, according to sec. III.4. This provision gives a 
rationale of choice of 30 per cent market share threshold for vertical cases. Furthermore, there will be no such 
complicated problem of choice of number in market share threshold from the tension between Member States in 
the EC. See David Cowan and Julie Nazerali, ‘Reforming E.U. Distribution Rules – Has the Commission Found 
Vertical Reality?’, European Competition Law Review, Vol. 20, No. 3, 1999, pp. 161-3. 
59
 See Rosa Greaves, EC Block Exemption Regulations, Chancery Law Publishing, Chichester and Springs CO, 
USA, 1994, p. 4. 
60
 See Malcolm Coate and Andrew Kleit, ‘Introduction: The Economics of the Antitrust Process’ in Malcolm 
Coate and Andrew Kleit (eds), The Economics of the Antitrust Process, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Norwell 
MA, USA, 1996, p. 2. 
61
 This is the same benefit expected as discussed in the EC. See also Joanna Goyder, EU Distribution Law, 4th 
edn, Hart Publishing, Oxford and Portland Oregon, USA, 2005, p. 67. 
62
 For further discussion about per se and rule of reason concerning administrative costs and also legal certainty, 
see Richard Posner, ‘The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of Restrictive Distribution: Per Se Legality’ The 
University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 48, No. 1, 1981, pp. 7-8. 
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towards RPM is based on a notion of agreement, which should be covered by Article 19. In 
light of these contradictions, RPM policy change in MRFTA enforcement is inevitable. 
However, this change requires a clear understanding and analysis of balance. The balance test 
should be attached to the anti-competitive and efficiency explanations, since this can be used 
by enterprises seeking to inhibit competition in order to obtain or to retain monopoly power. 
This results in harming consumer.
63
 The most important factor to decide whether RPM is 
lawful should be judged by economic theories of balance and trade-off tests, and under 
Article 19 rather than Article 29. 
 
The KFTC and the courts need to give up their rigid approach to RPM without an 
economics principle. In Seragem Medical Device Corp.,
64
 the Seoul High Court upheld the 
KFTC’s decision on the firm’s infringement of Article 29 MRFTA. The Court considered the 
benefits of pro-competitive effects, including pre-sale services by the RPM. However, it 
concluded that its practice would prevent competition, based on the argument of anti-
competitive outcomes and consumer harm. This judgment was wrong, since the relevant 
product, a personal heating device, generally required pre-sale service, and this would help 
consumers’ choice, thereby improving consumer welfare as well as inter-brand competition. 
The KFTC and the courts should consider that RPM can benefit not only manufacturers but 
the efficient functioning of the distribution system generally, including consumer benefits,
65
 
whilst retaining caution about minimum RPM with market power held by large firms. 
 
Moreover, the persistence of the per se rule forbidding minimum RPM is inconsistent 
with the judicial approach to vertical non-price restraints.
66
 Vertical non-price restraints in 
Korea are normally subject to a rule of reason. There is no reason why the KFTC and the 
courts should not take the further step of rule of reason on minimum RPM cases, especially 
where the trading country has relaxed rules on this.
67
 Although the effects of vertical price 
                                                 
63
 See Howard Marvel, ‘The Resale Price Maintenance Controversy: Beyond the Conventional Wisdom’, 
Antitrust Law Journal, Vol. 63, 1994, pp.  81-2. 
64
 Seragem Medical Device Corp. v. KFTC, Seoul High Court 2003'u7455, Mar. 31, 2004. 
65
 See Mark Anderson, ‘Vertical Agreements under Section 1 of the Sherman Act: Results in Search of Reason’, 
University of Florida Law Review, Vol. 37, No. 5, 1985, p. 913; Howard Marvel, Supra., note 63, p.92. 
66
 Richard Posner, Supra., note 62, p. 8. 
67
 See Frank Mathewson and Ralph Winter, ‘The Economics of Vertical Restraints in Distribution’ in Joseph 
Stiglitz and Frank Mathewson (eds), 'ew Developments in the Analysis of Market Structure, MacMillan Press, 
Hampshire and London, 1986, p. 219. Where the relaxed policy is encouraged in one country such as the US, a 
trading partner’s stricter rules can create disadvantage to the domestic enterprise. Some scholars argue that the 
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and non-price restraints are not absolutely identical, there is a common issue of concern and 
efficiency argument in effects. Therefore, all vertical restraints are presumptively pro-
competitive. Applying the rule of reason under Article 19 to both vertical non-price and price 
agreements will largely eliminate excessive concerns about whether the vertical restraint is 
about price or not.
68
 In conclusion, as the volume of international transaction increases, the 
KFTC should consider a safe harbour method in the new vertical guidelines, for better 
scrutiny of vertical agreements, including RPM. The safe harbour technique will eventually 
ensure pro-competitive gains. This will remove the burden of administrative costs, and 
improve legal certainty, with the rule of reason development.  
 
 
7.3. Macro-Assessments: International Trade, Market Access, and New Regulation 
 
7.3.1. Mutual Interaction and Problems in Strategic Competition Law Legislation 
 
Competition policy can cover wide social and economic issues. This makes the 
implementation of competition law and policy a more complicated balancing measure in 
developing countries. To be effective, competition law in developing countries, including 
Korea, will require amendments and improvements in light of market development and 
evolution, as is the case in developed countries.
69
 Accordingly, the KFTC should be 
concerned about the importance of vertical regulation in the perspective of a global level, in 
order to achieve the goals of efficiency gains and free competition from international trade.
70
 
The modernisation of Korean vertical regulation for a globalised market may eventually lead 
the KFTC and the courts close to current US and EC concepts of competition and economics, 
by learning from their legal techniques.
71
  
                                                                                                                                                        
EC regime should also give up per se ban on RPM. See Femi Alese, ‘Unmasking the Masquerade of Vertical 
Price Fixing’, European Competition Law Review, 2007, Vol. 28, No. 9, pp. 525-6. 
68
 This will be achieved such as in the US regime. See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Antitrust Enterprise: Principle 
and Execution, Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA, USA and London, 2005, pp. 190-91.  
69
 See UNCTD, The Relationship Between Competition, Competitiveness, and Development,TD/B/COM.2/CLP/ 
30, 23 May 2002, pp. 11-2: http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/c2clp30.en.pdf (accessed 23 August 2008). 
70
 See Jungwon Song, Ca-Ru-Tel-Mit-Bul-Gong-Jung-Go-Rae-Hang-Wi-Kyu-Jae [Regulations on Cartels and 
Unfair Business Practices], Pakyoungsa, Seoul, 2005, pp. 216-7. The author argues the current UBP Guidelines 
were made by considering for the global standard which can give more pro-competitive intense. However, this 
can be further developed by the new vertical guidelines. 
71
 See Clifford Jones, ‘Foundations of Competition Policy in the EU and USA: Conflict, Convergence and 
Beyond’ in Hanns Ullrich (ed), The Evolution of European Competition Law: Whose Regulation, Which 
Competition?, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton MA, USA, 2006, p. 37. The author argues that 
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In particular, adoption of competition laws and policies of US and EC on vertical 
restraints gives benefits to Korea, such as the following: (i) easy adoption of tried and tested 
law that is frequently updated; (ii) reduction of trade obstacles; and (iii) reduction of 
experimental or adaptation costs.
72
 The significant contribution of a comparative study based 
on economics will guide the formation of Korean competition policy.
73
 This will lead Korean 
competition policy closer to globalised competition law, with similar aims of being market-
friendly, with less entry barriers. Therefore, the new Korean vertical regulation, which is the 
outcome of mutual learning from experimental development in the US and the EC, will be 
more pro-competitive and efficiency-improving, rather than a means for vertical foreclosure 
or entry barriers, since it is not discriminatory against foreign firms. Some commentators 
argue that countries may indirectly and strategically apply their vertical regulations in order 
to promote national businesses at the expense of foreign enterprises. In particular, national 
and international developments have made aggressive degrees of competition enforcement 
politically impracticable.
74
  
 
When major domestic industries lose ground in competition with foreign rivals, 
competition enforcement easily focuses on the efficiency of domestic firms, and treats it as a 
priority in crafting competition policy.
75
 If this happens, a leading national company 
sometimes may not have much incentive to operate efficiently, or to act in the interests of 
consumers, unless it is exposed to vigorous competition, either from local or foreign rivals.
76
 
Although there are no comprehensive empirical data which can clarify this concern, 
recognition is increasing that the effect of private anti-competitive practices on trade between 
                                                                                                                                                        
the EC regime will modernise its competition law close to the US although this has yet to be confirmed. 
Likewise, Korea will take the similar step close to the US and the EC. 
72
 See Michal Gal, ‘Size Does Matter: The Effects of Market Size on Optimal Competition Policy’, Southern 
California Law Review, Vol. 74, 2001, pp. 1438-9; Michal Gal, ‘Market Conditions under the Magnifying 
Glass: The Effects of Market Size on Optimal Competition Policy’, The American Journal of Comparative Law, 
Vol. 50, No. 2, 2002, p. 303.  
73
 See William Kovacic and Carl Shapiro, ‘Antitrust Policy: A Century of Economic and Legal Thinking’, The 
Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 14, No. 1, 2000, pp. 58-9. The authors argue that economists have 
contributed to formulate the US antitrust policy. 
74
 See Robert Pitofsky, ‘Antitrust in the Next 100 Years’, California Law Review, Vol. 75, No. 3, 1987, p. 821. 
75
 See Joel Davidow, ‘Antitrust, Foreign Policy, and International Buying Cooperation’, The Yale Law Journal, 
Vol. 84, No. 2, 1974, p. 269; Maher Debbah, Supra., note 12, p. 211; Lawrence Sullivan and Warren Grimes, 
Supra., note 11, p. 18.  
76
 See David Round, ‘Regional Cooperation in Competition Policy’ in Erlinda Medalla (ed), Competition Policy 
in East Asia, Routledge, London and New York, 2005, p. 242. 
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trading countries can seriously impede competition, and also trade.
77
 In fact, foreign suppliers 
can affect the market power of domestic firms. This is true if the foreign firms are large and 
can quickly and easily produce goods for penetrating markets across borders. The most 
obvious way foreign firms can limit the market power of domestic firms is when foreign 
competitors distribute their goods in the domestic market in direct competition with domestic 
firms.
78
  
 
Competition law on vertical restraints, then, appears central to issues of market access, 
which are important to competition and trade. Vertical restraints imply geographic 
restrictions, and a competition authority’s attacks on them would seem to encourage free-
flowing international transaction.
79
 On the contrary, a great emphasis in vertical restraint 
economics theory has been placed on efficiency-improvement. Vertical restraints may 
enhance efficiency. At the international level, nevertheless, these restraints may impede the 
entry of foreign products, which can be foreclosed from the market by lack of access of 
distribution channels. The main problem of conflict between trading countries will be then 
the different traditions of competition law. Therefore, the disparity in competition law 
enforcement places foreign enterprises in some markets at a competitive disadvantage,
80
 
although the interaction between foreign enterprises and national competition enforcement 
reduces divergence between the competition rules.
81
  
 
Although the foreign entrant can expect equal treatment, there is still an issue of how 
effective domestic competition policy is. A weak competition policy may be a substitute for 
market protection, enabling domestic enterprises to block market entry of more efficient 
foreign suppliers. There will be, of course, distortion of competition incurred by a weak 
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78
 See Richard Caves, ‘International Trade and Industrial Organization: Introduction’, The Journal of Industrial 
Economics, Vol. 29, No. 2, 1980, pp. 113-7; William Shepherd, ‘Theories of Industrial Organization’ in Harry 
First, Eleanor Fox, and Robert Pitofsky (eds), Revitalizing Antitrust in Its Second Century: Essays on Legal, 
Economic, and Political Policy, Quorum Books, New York, 1991, pp. 56-7; George Hay, John Hilke, and Philip 
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 See Stephen Calkins, ‘Reflections on Vertical Restraints of Trade and National Competition Laws in an 
Integrated World Economy’ in Einar Hope and Per Maeleng (eds), Competition and Trade Policy, Routledge, 
London and New York, 1998, p. 211. 
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 Michael Utton, Supra., note 3, pp. 46-7. 
81
 See Kyu Uck Lee, Competition and Trade in the Post-Uruguay Round Period: The Case of the Republic of 
Korea, UNCTD, UNCTAD/ITD/11, 10 February 1995, p. 13: http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/poitd_11.en.pdf 
(accessed 23 August 2008).  
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competition policy.
82
 Korea used to have the barrier scheme of hybrid restraints of trade from 
coordination between the government and Chaebols. However, since the MRFTA legislation, 
the KFTC and the courts have tried to create a hard line of prohibition of market 
concentration. This strict measure has created a discriminatory system against Chaebols. 
Korean competition policy seeks to minimise the social cost of Chaebols, although measuring 
social cost has proved to be an elusive task, and difficult to minimise.
83
 Therefore, the 
existing legal provision on vertical restraints does not incur the problem of entry barriers. 
Furthermore, the suggested reform also does not block market access of foreign firms, 
because it is not discriminatory. The KFTC should be aware that although Korean 
competition law is national, its market is already global.
84
 As long as the Korean market is 
open to foreign enterprises, this will be more common.  
 
7.3.2. Choice of Vertical Regulation Enforcement: Case of Japan 
 
This section will discuss why the new vertical regulation may be effective in the Korean 
market by comparison with the Japanese case. Japanese experience is particularly relevant to 
Korea that has recently emerged from a developmental stage, and is in the process of 
developing competition-oriented economies.
85
 In particular, it would be beneficial to discuss 
competition law on anti-competitive conduct by Keiretsu in Japan, to compare with the 
Korean policy on Chaebols.
86
 The Japanese Antimonopoly Law (AML) underwent a number 
of reforms in the 1990s. These changes were conceived under the influence of the US model, 
making Japanese competition law appear similar.
87
 Traditionally, however, the concept of fair 
and free competition was not the norm in the Japanese market, and unfamiliar to the public in 
general. Accordingly, Japanese firms were willing to cooperate with each other to compete 
                                                 
82
 See Donald Hay, ‘United Kingdom’ in Edward Graham and David Richardson (eds), Global Competition 
Policy, Institute for International Economics, Washington, D.C., 1997, pp. 199-200; Eleanor Fox and Robert 
Pitofsky, ‘United States’ in Edward Graham and David Richardson (eds), Global Competition Policy, Institute 
for International Economics, Washington, D.C., 1997, p. 239. This problem of private blockage of market 
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 See Herbert Hovenkamp, ‘Chicago and Its Alternatives’, Duke Law Journal, Vol. 1986, 1986, p. 1026.  
84
 See Eleanor Fox, ‘Antitrust and Regulatory Federalism: Races Up, Down, and Sideways’, 'ew York 
University Law Review, Vol. 75, 2000, p. 1781. 
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 Toshiaki Takigawa, Supra., note 3, p. 162. 
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 For discussion about the types of anti-competitive conduct by Keiretsu, see Frederic Scherer, Supra., note 8, p. 
77; Chris Noonan, Supra., note 3, pp. 185-6.  
87
 Russell Weintraub, Supra., note 3, p. 33; Kevin Kennedy, Supra., note 3, p. 1; Kenji Suzuki, Competition Law 
Reform in Britain and Japan: Comparative Analysis of Policy 'etworks, Routledge, London and New York, 
2002, p. 1.  
Chapter 7 
Critical Assessment of Regulatory Reform: Model for Globalisation 
 
 
200 
with foreign firms. This was recognised as a national priority. After the US occupation ended 
in the 1940s, demands for wider relaxation in competition enforcement increased rapidly in 
Japan. Japanese competition policy was primarily discussed amongst businessmen, 
politicians, and public agencies in charge of industrial and competition policy.
88
 Nonetheless, 
weak enforcement of competition law on vertical restraints in Japan has been criticised as a 
practice that results in an unfair advantage for Japanese firms in the domestic market.
89
  
 
Under relaxed competition law enforcement, Japanese firms were also blamed for 
gaining profits from anti-competitive practices, such as cartels and restrictive distribution 
practices. As a result, restrictions on entry to the Japanese market imposed by government 
regulations or resulting from anti-competitive practices by private firms, have protected the 
market from the competition of foreign entrants.
90
 Much controversy over vertical restraints 
as impediments to international trade has centred on claims that Japanese distribution 
channels are limited to foreign suppliers.
91
 It seemed to appear that less rigid enforcement on 
vertical restraints could cause the problem discussed in the Japanese case. However, the main 
problem in law on vertical restraints involves potential trade-offs between market power 
which may inhibit international trade, and efficiency gains, such as reduction of transaction 
costs.
92
 Understanding of this may, then, help Korean policy-makers have a better trade-off 
policy to solve this dilemma.  
 
Similar to Chaebols, the vertical relationship by Keiretsu has had major consequences 
for competition in the industry. Keiretsu’s control over a vast network of distribution led to 
tight vertical restrictions that directly facilitated horizontal and anti-competitive practices.
93
 
Keiretsu was, thus, represented as a near impenetrable barrier to the Japanese market.
94
 
                                                 
88
 Ibid., Kenji Suzuki, pp. 7-39. 
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 See Stephen Hamilton and Kyle Stiegert, ‘Vertical Coordination, Antitrust Law, and International Trade’, 
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Bulletin, Vol. 40, Issue 4, 1995, pp. 828-9. 
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Japan’s distinctive forms of Keiretsu have become a contentious issue in policy and academic 
debates concerning market competition in Japan and the openness of the Japanese market.
95
 
These issues raised by Keiretsu were underrated in the light of Japanese industrial 
organisation aims to facilitate productive efficiency.
96
 However, there is a major difference 
between Korea and Japan in competition policy on large firms.  
 
Korean competition policy has adopted the idea of a market economy, which 
facilitates stringent provision against large firms. It is true that Japanese competition policy 
focused on private monopolies, Keiretsu, from the beginning of legislation. However, its 
coalition with macroeconomic policy for economic development created relaxation of 
implementation. On the contrary, Korean competition law has been amended in order to 
prevent market dominance of Chaebols, and rigid enforcement has not been eroded. 
Furthermore, Chaebols have less tight and concentrated membership than Japanese Keiretsu, 
although some Chaebols are vertically integrated into ‘one-set-production’ systems.
97
 The 
mere name Chaebol, the market concentration trend, has attracted the KFTC’s attention, 
through terminology in Articles 3-2 and 23 MRFTA. However, again this seems 
unreasonable, and theoretically controversial in vertical cases. This should raise criticism to 
the rationale of having such stringent implementation on vertical restraints. The Korean 
competition authority preserves vigorous enforcement, especially in vertical cases, and has a 
history of a larger number of decisions than other regimes.
98
 Sometimes this policy looks like 
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 There was a trade imbalance issue between the US and Japan in the late 1980s, and this became so remarkable 
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argue that a hybrid of vertical integration and contracting of Keiretsu improves productive efficiency. 
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Japan: The Problem of Distribution Keiretsu’, Journal of Japanese Studies, Vol. 9, No. 2, 1983, pp. 319-34; 
Robert Feenstra and Gary Hamilton, Emergent Economies, Divergent Paths: Economic Organization and 
International Trade in South Korea and Taiwan, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006, p. 41. 
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 See Keith Hylton and Fei Deng, ‘Antitrust Around the World: An Empirical Analysis of the Scope of 
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an attempt to eliminate large firms, which would create disruption of the market economy 
whilst disregarding its outcomes.
99
  
 
To summarise, where imports are brought for distribution to the domestic market by 
large foreign firms directly engaged in foreign trade, the foreclosure against import 
competition is undermined. Market penetration could grow even in a concentrated 
industry.
100
 Furthermore, vertical foreclosure by Chaebols does not appear to be a serious 
concern, even in distribution, when the KFTC implements unbiased law. Along with the 
competitiveness of the Korean manufacturing industry, a remarkable change has taken place 
in Korean distribution, since the government removed restrictions that effectively had 
prevented foreign suppliers from competing in the domestic market. Large retailers such as 
Samsung-Tesco and Costco have contributed to price competition that has benefited 
consumers. They have had a direct or indirect influence on modernisation and 
competitiveness of domestic firms by attracting consumers.
101
  
 
Therefore, the adoption of the new vertical regulation does not necessarily mean weak 
enforcement of market foreclosure. The Japanese competition authority failed once in 
harmonising the aims of competition law and international trade by its weak enforcement. 
Some scholars criticise the AML for protecting the Japanese market.
102
 However, the 
traditional enforcement of the KFTC has been strong. Furthermore, competition law 
legislation itself cannot be discriminatory against foreign rivals by means of protecting 
domestic firms, because of its intrinsic measures for pro-competitive achievement. Of course, 
market entry of foreign firms can be restrained by the presence of strong vertical integration 
by Chaebols. However, foreign firms will find alternative way of penetration. Moreover, high 
domestic concentration can tend to encourage aggressive penetration by foreign firms, unless 
imports are hampered by the public restraints.
103
 These practices by large firms are common 
                                                                                                                                                        
in 2004 shows that the Korean competition enforcement of total index score (effective competition law) is much 
higher than the Japanese.   
99
 See Ohseung Kwon, Kyoung-Jae-Bub [Economic Law], 5th edn, Bubmunsa, Seoul, 2005, p. 163. The author 
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externalities on the Korean economy. 
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worldwide, and vertical arrangements by Chaebols should be generalised.
104
 The new vertical 
regulation will control any anti-competitive abusive conduct of market dominant firms, and 
improve efficiency and inter-brand competition through the block exemption provision. This 
principle will be applied to any enterprises in the Korean market. 
 
 
7.4. Final Thought from Modernisation 
 
7.4.1. Competition Policy Design from Economics: the Age of Efficiency 
 
Economics can be employed in relation to Korean competition law. It should be applicable to 
each individual case to justify an enterprise’s position. Therefore, attempts to avoid the 
problems of economics may result in an unsound competition policy.
105
 Competition law, 
especially on vertical restraints, should be an interdisciplinary combination of law, economics, 
and interaction between competition regimes.
106
 Korean competition law and policy have 
been influenced by other competition regimes, the US,
107
 the EC, and, largely, Japan, but not 
entirely. For instance, although US law developed its antitrust policy as economics evolved, 
the Korean authority has not fully developed its economic rationale in vertical cases, because 
of its different historical and cultural background, mainly from Anti-Chaebol policy. This 
less-economics focused approach is, as argued in this thesis, very wrong. The present law is 
not a sufficient tool for efficiency enhancement. In short, too much tolerance of the vertical 
restraints or excessive prohibition on them should not be allowed. Accordingly, the KFTC 
must design newly structured legal provisions on vertical restraints, through an attempt to 
value the nature of vertical restraints.  
 
To eliminate the problem of ambiguity in vertical arrangements, the KFTC should 
adopt the approach of a certain market share threshold test. Vertical foreclosure in the 
domestic market can be harmless, where the market share foreclosed is trivial. Therefore, the 
KFTC should consider that efficiency could be improved by increased foreign competition. 
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Accordingly, the KFTC has to make its competition policy work directly to keep the market 
open and maintain vigorous competition.
108
 An efficiency-promotion approach in 
modernisation will not erect trade barriers and enhance monopoly power. The Korean market 
can be more competitive under the influence of imports, which force domestic enterprises to 
improve the quality of their products or services and reduce prices. Through this process, 
competition can be improved. As a consequence of globalisation, the market is more likely to 
be competitive.  
 
Vertical restraints have complex potential pro- and anti-competitive effects. Since 
they can enhance or reduce market access by foreign-based competitors, vertical restraints 
need to be examined carefully upon a case-by-case basis. Therefore, if the anti-competitive 
impact of a restraint is clear, but pro-competitive justifications exist, abbreviated market 
analysis under the rule of reason and market share threshold test will be useful to reach the 
judgment of trade-off.
109
 In the Korean market, where a number of competing enterprises are 
sufficient to maintain market competitiveness, vertical restraints cannot be presumed to be 
anti-competitive, although they should be subject to increased scrutiny if they potentially 
exclude foreign and domestic entrants.
110
 In conclusion, the amendment to Articles 3-2, 19, 
23, and 29 MRFTA will not hamper international trade, and the new vertical guidelines will 
give legal certainty not only to domestic but also foreign firms in the Korean market. This 
benefit, based on economic efficiency rationale, will increase overall business transactions of 
international trade flow.
111
  
 
7.4.2. Vertical Regulation Reform for Clarifying Objectives of Competition Policy  
 
It is not easy to achieve a consistent goal of competition policy, because macro- and 
microeconomic policies change. In particular, developing countries of small markets are 
likely to have a wide range of goals for competition policy, responding to changing economic 
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policies. This is because the economic situations of many developing countries may require 
broad social objectives to be built into the goals of competition policy. However, the Korean 
competition authority has to dictate a consistent economics-focusing competition policy when 
the market is open to global competition.
112
 It is important for policy-makers to consider non-
economic goals, such as consumer welfare.
113
 However, a general prescription that 
competition law should maximise consumer welfare gives very vague guidance for 
developing specific competition rules that will facilitate a proper balance between 
competitiveness and economic progress.
114
 Furthermore, non-economic goals in competition 
policy do not help courts or competition authorities draw distinctions between harm and 
benefit by vertical restraints. They must be able to articulate standards that do so at a 
reasonable cost, and without deterring beneficial conduct.
115
 However, efficiency goals can 
give clearer guidance to courts and competition authorities.  
 
In Korea and Japan the consumer welfare objective seems over-emphasised, for 
instance, in the cases, Intel
116
 and Microsoft.
117
 In these cases, the competition regimes 
protected consumers and imposed remedies, which went beyond what was necessary, as 
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discussed in Chapter 4. In fact, where non-economic goals conflict with the goal of economic 
efficiency, the KFTC may not promote both goals.
118
 Where the cases involve situations in 
which a business practice such as vertical restraints has both anti-competitive and efficient 
effects, a balancing technique must be utilised to draw appropriate decisions.
119
 It should 
strive to achieve economic efficiency as a priority, since efficiency will improve the economy 
and consumer welfare in the long run. Currently, Korean scholars started considering 
efficiency as a major purpose of the MRFTA, which should not be undermined by other 
social objectives.
120
  
 
Pursuit of redistribution of wealth through protection of consumers and SMEs at the 
expense of efficiency will be costly for the Korean economy, because inefficient enterprises 
will be preserved in the market. Such protection of SMEs may even harm consumers, by 
preventing inefficient producers from realising cost savings or product innovation. This cost 
of SME protection will be wholly or partially transferred to consumers. If such protection 
were consistently pursued, it would influence the whole scope of the market and state 
economy, since protection of SMEs would make little contribution to social goals. Therefore, 
the KFTC should protect competition rather than competitors, through more efficiency-
enhancing and inter-brand competition pursuit. The harm to competitors does not necessarily 
mean harms to competition. In POSCO,
121
 the Supreme Court has articulated that the 
protection of competitors rather than competition will increase the risk of hampering business 
activities and efficiency in the market economy system.  
 
Economic and non-economic objectives of competition law may substantially diverge, 
when this protection of competition rather than competitors or inter-brand competition by the 
sacrifice of intra-brand dictates displacement of SMEs by larger firms. However, this is not 
easily implemented, because of the complicated priorities in Korea.
122
 Moreover, some 
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commentators argue that the distribution channel in Korea is sometimes very complicated and 
dominated by affiliates of Chaebols, which improves inter-brand competition but impedes 
intra-brand.
123
 However, this argument may not be plausible, because inter-brand competition 
will produce better outcomes. If the market has a significant level of inter-brand competition, 
the KFTC should not be concerned excessively about restraints on intra-brand, although this 
may harm consumer welfare in the short run. Therefore, the easier way of facilitating 
economics-focused implementation of competition law will be to adopt the new vertical 
regulation. 
  
Korean competition policy-makers seem to believe that the process of competition 
itself must not be only free, but also by understood a social norm, such as fair. They often 
assume that if the competition process is unfair, the freedom to compete loses its intrinsic 
value, since fair competition must go along with free competition. These two concepts 
embody one and the same value in Korea, as explicitly stated in Article 1 MRFTA. This may 
be the reason why MRFTA clearly specifies ‘fair and free competition’ as its major objective. 
The KFTC’s policy focuses on the issue of Chaebols, implying that market power was not 
fairly distributed and, therefore, competition policy had to play an important role in helping 
SMEs become strong in the process of competition, and of establishing the legal techniques 
of fair and free competition.
124
 Some believe that the definition of competition has cultural 
and normative content,
125
 and that Korea should accept this rather than economic principles. 
Accordingly, the MRFTA defines unfairness more broadly than other regimes. This term 
embraces methods of competition that it perceives to be fair, as shown in the Articles 3-2 and 
23 cases.
126
 In particular, the over-emphasis of the term unfairness in vertical restraints has 
curbed application of the rule of reason. Competition policies around the world, however, 
                                                                                                                                                        
In small economies of developing countries, social goals should be given little or no independent weight in 
formulating competition policy.  
123
 Ohseung Kwon, Supra., note 99, p 327. 
124
 This is the same rhetoric shown in the US antitrust history discussed by Peritz. See Rudolph Peritz, ‘A 
Counter-History of Antitrust Laws’, Duke Law Journal, Vol. 1990, No. 2, 1990, p. 264. 
125
 See Eleanor Fox, ‘What is Harm to Competition? Exclusionary Practices and Anticompetitive Effect’, 
Antitrust Law Journal, Vol. 70, 2002, pp. 407-8; Eleanor Fox, ‘We Protect Competition, You Protect 
Competitors’, World Competition, Vol. 26, No. 2, 2003, pp. 163-4. The author referenced the speech of Kyu 
Uck Lee. 
126
 Ibid., Eleanor Fox, (We Protect Competition), p. 163. An unfair competition component of competition 
policy may be anathema to policy-makers in mature market jurisdictions because this can protect competitors 
from competition itself. From the point of view of the developed competition regimes, application of this has no 
benefits except to the protected competitors. 
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seek a mixture of efficiency and fairness in their markets,
127
 and it seems difficult to 
eliminate this language in the MRFTA.    
 
Competition laws are, nevertheless, designed to protect the process of competition. 
For most of the history of competition regimes around the world, the objectives of 
competition laws were stated primarily in terms of notions which the society desired. In 
particular, factors of macroeconomic policy can influence competition law.
128
 At various 
times, diverse concerns about fairness, such as for SMEs, stability of market economy, 
equality of business opportunity, and economic liberty have been included in the MRFTA.
129
 
If Korean competition law demonstrates the costs of moving towards fairness for equality in 
exchange for efficiency, it will eventually create the destruction of the state economy.
130
 This 
problem seems to have appeared particularly in the KFTC’s enforcement of Unfair Business 
Practice (UBP) provision under Article 23 MRFTA, which was originated from the adoption 
of the Japanese UBP provision.  
 
As a result of UBP’s vague definition of unfairness, the JFTC finds illegality in vast 
areas of business conduct. Excessively broad illegality standards of the UBP provision has 
hindered rather than helped the JFTC to actively enforce the AML against vertical 
restraints.
131
 The KFTC has the same burden on its UBP enforcement, which was initially 
brought in from the language of unfairness. Competition authorities should endeavour to 
establish as clear and economically meaningful standards as possible. For this objective, 
ambiguous phrases such as unfairness or unreasonableness should be avoided in the vertical 
regulation.
132
 This language needs to be replaced by anti-competitiveness. A regulatory 
reform of vertical regulation will be the most important step for clarifying from the linguistic 
to practical implementation in order to achieve the objectives of Korean competition law. 
                                                 
127
 This is because efficiency may not always maximise wealth. For further discussion see Robin Malloy, Law 
and Market Economy: Reinterpreting the Values of Law and Economics, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2000, pp. 137-48. 
128
 For example, the political and diplomatic changes impacted on the AML. These facilitated the relaxation of 
economic reform. See Masako Wakui, Supra., note 3, p. 11. 
129
 See Hwang Lee, ‘Tying Arrangement As A Kind of Unfair Trade Practices: Discussions About A Recent 
Case’, Journal of Korean Competition Law, Vol. 14, 2006, p. 258. 
130
 See Robert Bork, The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself, The Free Press, New York, 1993, p. 
423; David Gerber, Supra., note 29, pp. 272-3. Bork argues that egalitarianism in the sense of a desire for 
outcome of equality rather than of opportunity is a prominent feature in many fields of law in the society. This is 
often emphasised in Korea. 
131
 Toshiaki Takigawa, Supra., note 3, pp. 172-3. 
132
 Ibid., p. 174. 
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7.5. Concluding Remarks 
 
A large number of changes in Korean competition policy should be created for a more 
efficient and market-friendly environment. Along with improvement of product market 
structures and competition, Korean competition law and policy on vertical restraints should 
be developed by adopting economic theories. This includes reforms associated with the 
macroeconomic policy of the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with other regimes for opening 
up the domestic market in numerous ways. Furthermore, it is possible to harmonise between 
competition and economic growth in vertical issues. To achieve this aim, it is the one of the 
most important tasks for the KFTC to assess and examine how great the social cost of vertical 
restraints is. If vertical restraints by large enterprises are very harmful to the market, the 
KFTC should not allow the positive impact from the practices. The new vertical regulation is 
designed to enhance economic welfare by preventing creation and misuse of market power of 
large firms whilst ensuring efficiency improvement. The new vertical guidelines and 
amendments to Articles 3-2, 4, 19, 23, and 29 MRFTA will improve overall vertical structure 
in the Korean market.  
 
The primary objectives of this amendment are, first, to ensure a pro-competitive 
outcome by the vertical restraints in the domestic market and, second, to improve 
international trade. On the first objective, there is no common ground of understanding of 
vertical restraints between different competition regimes around the world, including abuse of 
dominant position. Substantial differences between their competition policies on vertical 
restraints will possibly remain.
133
 However, there is an increasing opinion that vertical 
restraints are unlikely to violate competition laws. Basic assumptions about the causation of 
competitive harm have been fundamentally revised in the light of economic theories. In 
vertical cases, only where an enterprise with significant market power restricts the 
competitive freedom of others without pro-competitive justification, is it likely to be 
considered violation of competition law.
134
 On the second objective, competition enforcement 
of strict prohibitions on vertical restraints in order to address market access problems can 
increase the particular problems of counter-attack on domestic firms, especially when facing 
                                                 
133
 See Warren Grimes, ‘Spiff, Polish, and Consumer Demand Quality: Vertical Price Restraints Revisited’, 
California Law Review, Vol. 80, 1992, p. 853. 
134
 David Gerber, Supra., note 29, p. 283. 
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efficient modes of distribution. The important question is whether vigorous competition 
brought from foreign rivals will be increased, even though domestic concentration is high. If 
there is no public restraint against foreign firms, however, more penetration by foreign firms 
is predicted, because they are more competitive than domestic firms in the global market. 
Then, entry barriers will be gradually eroded in the long run. Therefore, if domestic 
competition is becoming vigorous, the KFTC and the courts need to allow a more economic-
efficiency approach in vertical restraint cases. The new vertical restraints will be the first 
move towards this achievement. 
Chapter 8 
Conclusion 
211 
 
Chapter 8 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
 
 
This thesis has attempted to identify what the main problems are in Korean competition law 
and policy on vertical restraints, when facing the open market. It has focused on vertical 
restraint as one of the controversial areas of competition law, and examined it in the context 
of Korea. To this end, the thesis adopts an economics and comparative approach by looking 
at the US, the EC and Japanese competition regimes through analysis of Korean competition 
law on vertical restraints. This has brought discussion of crucial problems in the Monopoly 
Regulation and Fair Trade Act (MRFTA) on vertical restraints (vertical regulation) and, thus, 
critically analysed the current implementation and case law. It then suggested amendments to 
provisions on abuse of market dominance, unfair concerted practice, Unfair Business Practice 
(UBP), and Resale Price Maintenance (RPM). The major question in this thesis was whether 
the Korea Fair Trade Commission (KFTC) and the courts need to consider a better 
competition law standard, based on micro- and macroeconomic levels. Regarding this, the 
thesis further discussed globalised vertical regulation through economic principles and 
comparative studies, which would improve domestic competition, and international trade also. 
Since Korean society is very aware of the influence of global economic changes, Korean 
competition law and policy on vertical restraints requires to be amended and developed, so 
that globalisation does not impede trade. It should be, moreover, responsive to changes in the 
global environment. Therefore, it is important to find how the KFTC and the courts examine 
the domestic market, and the influence from international rivals on Korean market 
competition.  
 
In order to solve the problem, we first looked at the historical development of the 
Korean economy and competition policy, and how this influenced the market competition in 
Korea. In effect, the extreme fear from market concentration by Chaebols created a rigid rule 
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on vertical restraints, and resulted in inefficiency outcomes. This myopic concern of the 
competition authority created significant side effects. The role and behaviour of Chaebols 
dictated the way in which the KFTC could apply relevant competition law. However, the 
globalisation of economic activity, rapid technological developments, and the progressive 
elimination of trade restraints, are vitally important factors which the KFTC pays little 
attention to. The KFTC keeps strict measures on vertical restraints, although it appears that 
the race of efficiency-priority legislation by competition regimes around the world is 
increasingly popular. Furthermore, the Korean market has become more open and 
interconnected with the global market, as competition is increasingly transcending national 
boundaries and penetrating deeply into markets. Some scholars are concerned that the process 
of free trade has shifted the emphasis from public restraints to private restraints as obstacles 
to international trade flow. This often leads to increased concern over the relation between 
trade and competition policies, and their consequences for international trade, especially in 
vertical restraints. For example, anti-competitive effects of vertical restraints appear to the 
extent that domestic enterprises act successfully in preventing foreign competitors from 
entering the domestic market, by foreclosing access to distribution channels locally.
1
 It is, 
therefore, obvious that freer trade means increased market competition from penetration by 
foreign firms, and more competition in the domestic market. Thus, policies that ensure free 
international trade, as far as possible, are an important element in a foundation of pro-
competitive policies.
2
  
 
Domestic market competition from foreign firms can prevent the exercise of market 
power by large domestic firms. As long as the Korean market remains reasonably open to 
global competition, the large domestic firms cannot generate distortion of domestic market 
competition. However, the KFTC mistakenly underestimates the significance of foreign 
competition, and focused on the problem of market access, disregarding efficiency and pro-
competitive effects of vertical restraints. The KFTC needs to develop the current provisions 
more clearly for domestic and foreign economic entities to create positive outcomes. Some 
may argue that the new vertical regulation suggested in this thesis can give incentives to 
pursue strategies that protect and nourish large national companies, since it may look more 
                                                 
1
 See Einer Hope and Per Maeleng, Competition and Trade Policy, Routledge, London and New York, 1998, pp. 
1-5. 
2
 See Victor Norman, ‘A Small Open Economy Perspective on International Competition Policy’ in Einer Hope 
and Per Maeleng (eds), Competition and Trade Policy, Routledge, London and New York, 1998, p. 61. 
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relaxed than the current policy for domestic firms. However, the reform is not discriminatory, 
which means the suggested amendments cannot be a means of trade protection. Accordingly, 
the view on economic efficiency by vertical restraints is more obvious than may appear, and 
what the KFTC should pay attention to. If there is no harm expected from vertical restraints, 
the next task of the KFTC is to provide more a market-friendly policy based on efficiency-
economics. Economic efficiency by vertical restraints should not be jeopardised, although the 
intent and consequences of vertical restraints are sometimes complex. Even competition 
lawyers and economists’ evaluations of them diverge, and do not produce unanimous opinion. 
It is, therefore, unsurprising that national competition laws on vertical restraints differ widely, 
both internally and across borders.
3
 In addition, legal and economic analysis of vertical 
restraints sometimes faces a problem from a systematic description of guidance that 
competition law should focus on non-economic goals;
4
 this is the current problem in the 
MRFTA. Furthermore, Korean competition law has not received sufficient benefits from 
economic theories, especially in its vertical regulation. On the contrary, competition 
authorities and courts in the US and the EC have rarely suffered from a lack of economic 
theories on vertical restraints. Hence, the KFTC should develop its competition law through 
more sound economic theories, and applying legal techniques from other regimes which have 
exercised legal provisions on vertical restraints based on economic principle.  
 
Firms whose goods are traded in competitive markets generally have no market power, 
and cannot raise competition policy concerns. If their practice engages in imperfectly 
competitive markets, on the other hand, they may enjoy market power. In this case, 
competition authorities attempt to regulate these firms through the use of competition law.
5
 In 
fact, the size of a firm determines violation of competition law, disregarding its business 
activity in the Korean competition regime, and efficiency-economics has been disregarded 
from the fear of largeness of Chaebols. Under the MRFTA, the KFTC prevents a number of 
internal trading activities of Korean holding companies, such as cross-shareholdings and 
cross-debt guarantees, disregarding the positive effects of reduction of transaction costs. This 
                                                 
3
 See Frederic Scherer, Competition Policies for and Integrated World Economy, The Brookings Institute, 
Washington D.C., 1994, p. 70. 
4
 See Peter Carstenesen, ‘The Competitive Dynamics of Distribution Restraints: Efficiency versus Rent 
Seeking’ in Antonio Cucinotta et al (eds), Post-Chicago Developments in Antitrust Law, Edward Elgar, 
Cheltenham, UK and Northampton MA, USA, 2002, p. 281. 
5
 See Andrew Guzman, ‘International Competition Law’ in Andrew Guzman and Alan Sykes (eds), Research 
Handbook in International Economic Law, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton MA, USA, 2007, 
p. 432. 
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is already discriminatory against domestic large firms. It is clear that the MRFTA was 
established on the aim of restrictions on large business groups, regardless of their efficiency. 
The choice in Korean jurisdiction has been made to obtain the goal of protecting consumer 
and Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SME) at the expense of efficiency and economic 
growth. This Anti-Chaebol competition policy has been accepted, since the Korean market 
was believed to be and evaluated as imperfectly competitive. Furthermore, social problems, 
such as concentration of wealth by Chaebols, have created this stringent policy. Korean 
competition law was adopted in an environment where economic activity is already highly 
concentrated, mainly due to past government policies and interventions. It has evolved as not 
only a means to prevent anti-competitive practices, but also to pro-actively strengthen small 
economic entities in the market. Therefore, the MRFTA is explicitly concerned about 
competition being impeded by the market dominance of large enterprises, but does not 
mention economic efficiency.
6
 The KFTC often seems to believe that competition and 
efficiency diverge. Nonetheless, competition itself fosters efficiency.  
 
In particular, the position of productive and dynamic efficiency, of taking new 
methods to distribution, e.g., e-commerce,
7
 in achieving continuous economic growth and 
welfare in society has been acknowledged by economists, lawyers, and policy-makers around 
the world. A desire to foster competition encourages productive and innovative activities, and 
this should be acknowledged in competition law enforcement, especially on vertical 
arrangements in the new economy.
8
 Furthermore, many jurisdictions that have adopted a 
competition law find efficiency desirable.
9
 It is certainly true that in the absence of market 
power, which implies the absence of entry barriers, vertical restraints may have positive 
effects. In practice, many markets are likely to exhibit varying degrees of market power 
                                                 
6
 However, a language of efficiency is also hardly observed in statutes in other competition regimes, e.g., the US 
antitrust acts. See Keith Leffler, ‘Toward a Reasonable Rule of Reason: Comments’, Journal of Law and 
Economics, Vol. 28, No. 2, 1985, p. 383. 
7
 See Warren Grimes, ‘Spiff, Polish, and Consumer Demand Quality: Vertical Price Restraints Revisited’, 
California Law Review, Vol. 80, No. 4, 1992, pp. 848-50; Wolfgang Kerber and Simonetta Vezzoso, ‘EC 
Competition Policy, Vertical Restraints, and Innovation: An Analysis from an Evolutionary Perspective’, World 
Competition, Vol. 28, No. 4, p. 515. 
8
 See Richard Nelson and Sidney Winter, ‘Simulation of Schumpeterian Competition’, The American Economic 
Review, Vol. 67, No. 1, 1977, pp. 273-4; Marcus Glader, Innovation Markets and Competition Analysis: EU 
Competition Law and US Antitrust Law, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK, 2006, pp. 4-5. 
9
 See Daniel Gifford and Thomas Sullivan, ‘Can International Antitrust Be Saved for the Post-Boeing Merger 
World? A Proposal to Minimize International Conflict and to Rescue Antitrust From Misuse’, The Antitrust 
Bulletin, Vol. 45, Issue 1, 2000, pp. 88-9. 
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maintained by barriers to entry,
10
 as in Korea. Therefore, the KFTC should balance the 
positive and negative effects from vertical restraints. Competition law and policy on vertical 
restraints cannot be used for protecting SMEs or large competitors, but protecting 
competition, thereby enhancing efficiency and innovation in distribution that may result in 
economic growth. Protecting SMEs only or even excessively can cause harm to competition. 
It may be difficult for the KFTC to find a fully-fledged theory regarding vertical restraints. 
This may happen where the incumbent large enterprise engages in vertical arrangements. 
Therefore, some questions of regulatory reform should be addressed. First, should 
competition law enforcement pursue violations without market power? Second, how can the 
KFTC assess the problem of the efficiency of vertical restraints? Third, are there conditions 
under which the KFTC should allow market power to stimulate efficiency?
11
 These questions 
may still remain after the amendments. However, the suggested amendments to the MRFTA 
will give guidance to solve these problems, although they may not be perfect in some 
circumstances. Articles 19 and 23 MRFTA will prevent anti-competitive practices without 
market power held by a firm, which Article 3-2 does not cover. Market share threshold 
guidance will also offer better assessment techniques of efficiency. Finally, the balance test 
of efficiency, and pro-competitive effects under the new vertical guidelines and the rule of 
reason, will provide criteria of requirements for efficiency justification for large firms.  
 
Based on the 30 per cent market share threshold test, the KFTC can clarify the 
application of law. The Korean market is confident that this new method will give some 
benefits, which have been recognised in the EC. First, more categories of agreements are 
automatically exempted. Although there may be some externalities from the categorisation 
process of the courts,
12
 this categorisation will give more, of reducing litigation costs, than 
losses. Second, firms become freer to make vertical agreements according to their needs, 
although the agreements concluded by firms with significant market power cannot receive 
benefits from block exemption.
13
 If the market share thresholds are met under the new 
vertical guidelines, the burden should shift to the firm to prove two things: (i) clear purposes 
                                                 
10
 See Michael Utton, International Competition Policy: Maintaining Open Markets in the Global Economy, 
Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton MA, USA, 2006, p. 48. 
11
 See Joseph Brodley, ‘Post-Chicago Economics and Workable Legal Policy’, Antitrust Law Journal, Vol. 63, 
1995, pp. 683-4. 
12
 For further discussion about the US categorisation issue and its problems, see Mark Lemley and Christopher 
Leslie, ‘Categorical Analysis in Antitrust Jurisdiction’, Iowa Law Review, Vol. 93, 2008, pp. 1260-63. 
13
 These benefits are observed in the EC. See Romano Subiotto, ‘The Reform of the European Competition 
Policy Concerning Vertical Restraints’ Antitrust Law Journal, Vol. 69, 2001, p. 193. 
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of business that can be justified; and (ii) no less restrictive alternatives to the vertical restraint. 
If the firm’s practice meets the criteria, it should normally be approved.
14
  
 
According to the Guidelines for the review cartel (Cartel Guidelines),
15
 the KFTC can 
trade-off between efficiency and anti-competitiveness in soft cartel cases. However, it is 
difficult to observe an actual case based on the Cartel Guidelines.
16
 This is because the KFTC 
and the courts have not established a clear trade-off test yet. It is important to trade-off 
between negatives and positives by vertical restraints. The process of weighing competitive 
benefits against harm to competition is the essence of the rule of reason development. Article 
3-2 MRFTA cases should be also evaluated under this standard.
17
 A current outstanding 
judgment of the Supreme Court has illustrated the Court’s attempts to refine competition law 
to fit the aims of the law, which are especially designed for the Korean market. The Court in 
POSCO
18
 signalled its endeavours to eliminate obscure implementation of law by articulating 
the definition of Article 3-2 violation in refusal to deal where (i) Article 3-2 infringement can 
be deemed as perpetrated with intent or the objective of maintaining or reinforcing 
monopolistic status; and (ii) it is likely to have anti-competitive effects from the objective 
point of view. Despite this effort, some issues still remain unexplained. The POSCO case 
could have given better solutions for the problem in vertical restraints under the full rule of 
reason. The Court, however, failed to examine the compatibility of the various economic 
principles.  
 
It is somewhat difficult to measure the impacts of vertical restraints through economic 
principles for establishing a legal standard. However, the courts can still measure the impacts 
on the market based on the degree of market power. In particular, the current development in 
the KFTC’s decision shows its increasing use of economics. The courts and the competition 
authority in Korea have become more comfortable with evidence from economic analysis, as 
                                                 
14
 Even some of the US approaches are useful for the KFTC to examine the balance test. See Herbert 
Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy: The Law of Competition and Its Practice, 3rd edn, Thomson West, St. 
Paul, MINN, USA, 2005, pp. 493-59.  
15
 Sec. III.2. of the KFTC Guidelines for review cartel, amended on Dec. 21, 2007. See Supra., Chapter 7. 
16
 See Meong Cho Yang, ‘Comments on 2005 Korean Supreme Court Cartel Decisions’, Journal of Korean 
Competition Law, Vol. 14, 2006, p. 162. 
17
 This approach can be observed in the US. Although the rule of reason evolved out of the case law under sec. 1 
of the Sherman Act, monopolisation claim under sec. 2 has been evaluated under this rule as well. See ABA, 
Antitrust Law and Economics of Product Distribution, ABA Publishing, Chicago, 2006 p. 28.  
18
 POSCO v. KFTC, Supreme Court 2002Du8626, Nov. 22, 2007. 
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the volume of studies in economics of vertical restraints have increased.
19
  This development 
will influence development of the rule of reason in the courts, as observed in the US. Some 
commentators are sceptical about the rule of reason development through efficiency-
economics.
20
 However, the rule of reason is an important judicial means that is relevant to 
many cases, including vertical restraints, where considerations of efficiency require subtle 
judgments and balancing of arguments. This inevitably leads to the trade-off principle, 
balancing the efficiency gains against the anti-competitive effects.
21
 For completion of this 
balance test, the US approach of rule of reason enquiry is an attractive experiment for the 
Korean competition regime. However, a single specific theory cannot explain all cases of 
vertical practices,
22
 and a case-by-case approach may not bring legal certainty.
23
 Therefore, 
the rule of reason development, along with market share threshold guidance, will adjust this 
problem, and lead to more certainty through economic theories. The best method to achieve 
this is to implement a proper economic rationale of rule of reason from clearer criteria, along 
with the new vertical regulation. This will help the KFTC establish a better structure of 
vertical regulation, in order to satisfy the objectives of Korean competition law. 
 
In modern society, the economic life of citizens is inspired by the liberal ideal. Here, 
the absence of government intervention of competition law enforcement in market activities 
is seen as a necessary condition for wealth. However, the inherent tendency of large 
enterprises to restrict competition to increase profits from their market dominant position 
induces anti-competitive practices. They may make use of the idea of business freedom in 
order to restrain their competitors’ freedom to contract. Therefore, competition policy 
inevitably establishes a set of restrictions on the freedom of business activities.
24
 This theory 
has dominated Korean competition jurisdiction, as observed in the current vertical cases. This 
                                                 
19
 The development of economics in the competition litigation has also affected the development of the rule of 
reason in the US. See Phillip Areeda, ‘A Second Century of the Rule of Reason’, Antitrust Law Journal, Vol. 59, 
1990, pp. 145-6.  
20
 See Eleanor Fox and Lawrence Sullivan, ‘Antitrust-Retrospective and Prospective: Where Are We Coming 
From? Where Are We Going?’ 0ew York University Law Review, Vol. 62, 1987, p. 968. The authors argue that 
the courts will eliminate a bundle of theoretic literature from the Chicago School. 
21
 See Roger Van den Bergh and Peter Camesasca, European Competition Law and Economics: A Comparative 
Perspective, Intersentia, Antwerpen, Belgium, 2001, p. 252. 
22
 See Ralph Winter, ‘Vertical Control and Price versus Nonprice Competition’, The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, Vol. 108, No. 1, 1993, p. 70. 
23
 See Richard Posner, ‘The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of Restrictive Distribution: Per Se Legality’ 
The University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 48, No. 1, 1981, p. 22. 
24
 See Donald Dewey, The Antitrust Experiment in America, Columbia University Press, New York, 1990, p. 
18; Doris Hildebrand, The Role of Economic Analysis in the EC Competition Rules, 2nd edn, Kluwer Law 
International, The Hague, 2002, p. 9. 
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is the outcome of orthodox thought of fairness in competition. However, unfair and rigid 
enforcement without an economics principle created anti-competitive outcomes. Korean 
competition policy on vertical restraints must adapt to the rapid evolution of economics, as 
well as globalisation. This change will make the KFTC revise the MRFTA on vertical 
restraints, to a less strict level than in the first legislation. Some may argue that the current 
stringent rule on vertical restraints is necessary to make a better market structure, which has 
been influenced by Chaebols. Nevertheless, maintaining the current provision, especially in 
order to change the market structure, is a risky proposition. The only way of creating 
competitive market structure is free competition through the open market. Korean 
competition policy will be developed by economics debates and analysis of the statutes, with 
reference to other competition regimes, as it should be. Korean Competition law has travelled 
a rough road since the first legislation, and its development will continue perpetually. Korean 
competition law evolves through reforms, as the market economy and business practices 
change. The following step from this should be the adoption of the principles of the 
competition law of efficiency. This will improve the pro-competitive environment in the 
domestic market without impeding trade. 
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APPEDIX. SUBSTATIVE LEGISLATIOS (EXCERPTS) 
 
THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA  
 
Constitution of the Republic of Korea, amended Oct. 29, 1987 
 
Article 23 
(1) The right to property of all citizens is guaranteed. Its contents and limitations are determined by law.  
(2) The exercise of property rights shall conform to the public welfare. (3) Expropriation, use, or restriction of 
private property from public necessity and compensation therefore are governed by law. However, in such a 
case, just compensation must be paid. 
 
Article 119 
(1) The economic order of the Republic of Korea is based on a respect for the freedom and creative initiative of 
enterprises and individuals in economic affairs.  
 
Article 127 
(1) The State strives to improve the national economy by developing science and technology, information and 
human resources, and encouraging innovation.  
(2) The State establishes a system of national standards.  
(3) The President may establish advisory organisations necessary to achieve the purpose referred to in Paragraph 
(1). 
 
 
Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act, amended by the law no. 9554, Mar. 25, 2009 
 
Article 1 (Purpose) 
This Act seeks to promote fair and free competition such that creative enterprising activities are fostered, to 
protect consumers, and to strive for the balanced development of the national economy by preventing the abuse 
of market dominance by enterprisers and excessive concentration of economic power and by regulating 
improper cartels and unfair business practices. 
 
Article 2 (Definitions) 
For the purpose of this Act, the terms used herein shall have the following definitions: <Amended on December 
8, 1992, December 30, 1996, February 5, 1999, January 16, 2001, December 31, 2004, April 27, 2007, August 3, 
2007> 
1. The term “enterpriser” refers to a person who operates a manufacturing business, a service business, or any 
other business. Any officer, employee, agent, or other person acting in the interest of the enterpriser shall be 
considered an enterpriser in relation to the application of provisions pertaining to the enterprisers‘ organization.  
1-2. The term “holding company” pertains to a company that makes its primary business the control of any 
domestic company's business through the ownership of stocks (including equities; the same shall apply 
hereinafter) and whose total assets are above the amount set by the Presidential Decree. In this case, the 
standards for primary business shall be prescribed by the Presidential Decree. 
1-3. The term “subsidiary” refers to a domestic company whose business is controlled by the holding company 
under the criteria prescribed by the Presidential Decree. 
1-4. The term “business-related sub-subsidiary” pertains to a domestic company whose business is controlled by 
subsidiaries. A business-related sub-subsidiary is closely related to the subsidiaries concerned as per the 
Presidential Decree. 
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2. The term “Business Group” pertains to a group of companies whose businesses are substantially controlled by 
the same person according to the following pursuant to the standards prescribed by the Presidential Decree: 
A. The “same person” is a company or a group composed of such person and one or more companies he/she 
controls. 
B. The “same person” is not a company or a group composed of two or more companies he/she controls.  
3. The term “affiliated company” refers to the case wherein two or more companies belong to the same Business 
Group; each company is an “affiliated company” of the others.  
4. The term “enterprisers’ organization” pertains to a juristic person or federation organized by two or more 
enterprisers for the purpose of promoting their common interests regardless of the organization's form. 
5. The term “officer” refers to a director, a representative director, a managing partner with unlimited liability, 
an auditor, or a person in a similar position or a commercial employer who is capable of carrying out general 
business for the main office or a branch office, e.g., manager, etc. 
6. The term “resale price maintenance” pertains to an act of trading goods or services wherein an enterpriser 
compels a counterpart enterpriser or another enterpriser by the next stage of transaction to sell or provide them 
only at a price fixed in advance at each stage of distribution or executes transactions under any agreement or 
binding condition for such purpose. 
7. The term “market-dominating enterpriser” refers to any enterpriser enjoying Market Dominance and possibly 
determining, maintaining, or changing the prices, quantity, or quality of commodities or services or other terms 
and conditions of business as a supplier or a customer in a particular business area individually or jointly with 
other enterprisers.  
8. The term “particular business area” pertains to an area wherein any competitive relation exists by subject, 
stage, or geographical area of such trade, or there is a possibility of such. 
8-2. The term “practices practically suppressing competition” refers to any of the practices that affect or threaten 
to affect the setting of price, quantity, quality, or other terms or conditions of trading in accordance with the 
intent of a certain enterpriser or an enterprisers’ organization owing to reduced competition in a particular 
business area.   
9. The term “credit” pertains to any loan and guarantee or acceptance of company obligations by domestic 
financial institutions.  
10. The term “financial industry or insurance industry” refers to any of the financial and insurance businesses 
under the Korea Standard Industrial Classification as notified by the Commissioner of the Korea National 
Statistical Office pursuant to the provision of Clause 1, Article 22 (Standard Classification) of the Statistical Act. 
 
Article 2-2 (Application to Extra-Territorial Activities) 
The Act shall apply even to activities carried out overseas when they are deemed to have influence on the 
domestic market. 
[Newly established on December 31, 2004]  
 
Article 3-2 (Prohibition on the Abuse of Market Dominance)  
(1) No market-dominating enterpriser shall commit any of the following acts (hereinafter referred to as “abusive 
acts”): <Amended on February 5, 1999>  
1. Act of determining, maintaining, or changing the price of commodities or services unreasonably (hereinafter 
referred to as “price”) 
2. Act of unreasonably controlling the sale of commodities or provision of services 
3. Act of unreasonably interfering with the business activities of other enterprisers  
4. Act of unreasonably impeding the participation of new competitors  
5. Act of unfairly excluding competitive enterprisers or act that may considerably harm the interest of 
consumers 
(2) The categories or standards for abusive acts shall be specified by the Presidential Decree. <Newly 
established on December 30, 1996, February 5, 1999> 
[Moved from Article 3 <December 30, 1996>]  
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Article 4 (Presumption of Market-Dominating Enterpriser)  
An enterpriser with any of the following market shares in a particular business area (excluding an enterpriser 
whose annual sales and/or purchases in a regular field of trade amount to less than KRW4 billion) shall be 
presumed to be a market-dominating enterpriser as referred to in Clause 7, Article 2 (Definitions): <Amended 
on August 3, 2007>  
1. The market share of one enterpriser is 50/100 or more.  
2. The total market share of at least three enterprisers is 75/100 or more, excluding those whose market share is 
less than 10/100 [Amended on February 5, 1999]  
 
Article 5 (Corrective Measures)  
In case of any act violating the provisions of Article 3-2 (Prohibition on the Abuse of Market Dominance), the 
Fair Trade Commission may order the market-dominating enterpriser involved to reduce prices, discontinue the 
violation, announce its receipt of a corrective order to the public, and take other measures required for correction. 
<Amended on December 30, 1996, December 31, 2004>  
 
Article 6 (Surcharge)  
In case of abusive acts by a market-dominating enterpriser, the Fair Trade Commission may slap such 
enterpriser with surcharges equal to not more than 3 percent of the turnover specified by the Presidential Decree 
(referring to the profits of the business particularly for the person designated by the Presidential Decree; the 
same shall apply hereinafter). In the absence of a turnover, or in case of difficulty in computing the turnover 
under the Presidential Decree (hereinafter referred to as “in the absence of turnover, etc.”), however, surcharges 
of not more than KRW1 billion may be imposed.  
[Amended on December 30, 1996]  
 
Article 19 (Prohibition on Improper Cartels)  
(1) No enterpriser shall agree with other enterprisers by contract, agreement, resolution, or any other means to 
engage jointly in any of the following acts or let others engage in such kinds of activities that unfairly restrict 
competition (hereinafter referred to as “improper cartels”): <Amended on December 8, 1992, December 22, 
1994, December 30, 1996, February 5, 1999, December 31, 2004, August 3, 2007>  
1. Act of fixing, maintaining, or changing prices  
2. Act of determining the terms and conditions for the transactions of goods or services or payment of prices 
thereof  
3. Act of restricting production, delivery, transportation, or transaction of goods or services  
4. Act of limiting the territory of trade or customers 
5. Act of preventing or restricting the establishment or extension of facilities or installation of equipment 
required for the production of goods or rendering of services  
6. Act of restricting the types or specifications of goods or services in producing or transacting goods or services  
7. Act of jointly carrying out and managing the main parts of a business or establishing a company, etc., to carry 
out and manage the main parts of a business jointly 
8. Act of deciding matters prescribed by the Presidential Decree, e.g., bidding price, auctioning price, auctioneer, 
or bidder in bids or auctions 
9. Any practice that substantially minimizes competition in a particular business area by means other than those 
under Items 1~8 or interferes with or restricts the activities or contents of the business 
(2) The provision of Clause (1) shall not apply if unfair collaborative acts are deemed by the Fair Trade 
Commission to meet the requirements specified in the Presidential Decree in case they are committed for any of 
the following purposes: <Newly established on December 30, 1996>  
1. Industry rationalization  
2. Research and technology development  
3. Overcoming economic depression 
4. Industrial restructuring 
5. Rationalization of trade terms and conditions  
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6. Enhancement of competitiveness of small and medium enterprises  
(3) Any and all relevant policies with respect to the standards, methods, and procedures for authorization under 
Clause (2) and modification of authorized matters shall be specified by the Presidential Decree. <Newly 
established on December 30, 1996, February 5, 1999>  
(4) Any contract, etc., stipulating the improper cartels listed in Clause (1) between enterprisers shall be null and 
void.  
(5) If two or more enterprisers commit any of the acts listed in Clause (1) and practically restrict competition in 
a particular business area, they shall be presumed to have committed an unfair collaborative act despite the 
absence of an explicit agreement to engage in such act. <Amended on August 3, 2007>  
(6) The Fair Trade Commission may establish and announce the criteria for examining improper cartels. 
<Newly established on August 3, 2007>  
 
Article 21 (Corrective Measures)  
Where an enterpriser commits any act in violation of the provisions of Clause 1, Article 19, the Fair Trade 
Commission may order the enterpriser to discontinue the act, announce the receipt of corrective order, or take 
other corrective measures. <Amended on December 30, 1996, December 31, 2004>  
 
Article 22 (Surcharge)  
The Fair Trade Commission may impose on those demonstrating any behavior violating the provision of Clause 
1, Article 19 a surcharge of not more than 10 percent of the turnover as prescribed by the Presidential Decree. In 
the absence of turnover, etc., however, a surcharge of not more than KRW2 billion may be imposed. <Amended 
on December 31, 2004>  
[Amended on December 30, 1996]  
 
Article 23 (Prohibition on Unfair Business Practices)  
(1) No enterpriser shall commit any of the following acts that are likely to impede fair trade (hereinafter referred 
to as “unfair business practices”) or make an affiliated company or other enterprisers perform such acts: 
<Amended on December 30, 1996, February 5, 1999, April 13, 2007>  
1. Act that unfairly rejects any transaction or discriminates against a certain transacting partner  
2. Act designed to exclude competitors unfairly 
3. Act of unfairly coercing or inducing customers of competitors to deal with the enterpriser in question 
4. Act of engaging in a trade with a transacting partner by unfairly taking advantage of its position in the 
business area  
5. Act of trading under terms and conditions that unfairly restrict or disrupt business activities  
6. Deleted <February 5, 1999>  
7. Act of assisting a person with special interest or other companies by providing advanced payment, loans, 
manpower, immovable assets, stocks and bonds, or intellectual properties or by transacting under substantially 
favorable terms  
8. Any act that threatens to impair fair trade other than those listed in Items 1~7 
(2) The categories or standards for unfair business practices shall be prescribed by the Presidential 
Decree.<Amended on December 30, 1996>  
(3) If necessary for the prevention of acts violating the provisions of Clause (1), the Fair Trade Commission may 
establish and announce the guidelines to be observed by enterprisers.  
(4) To prevent the unreasonable inducement of customers, enterprisers or enterprisers’ organization may 
voluntarily write a code (hereinafter referred to as “fair competition code”).<Amended on February 5, 1999>  
(5) The enterprisers or an enterprisers’ organization may request that the Fair Trade Commission examine 
whether or not the fair competition code as referred to in Clause (4) violates the provisions of Clause (1) 3 or 6.  
 
Article 24 (Corrective Measures)  
When an act in violation of the provisions of Article 23 (1) is committed, the Fair Trade Commission may order 
the enterpriser concerned to discontinue such unfair business practices, to delete any pertinent provision from a 
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contract, to announce the receipt of corrective order to the public, or to take other necessary corrective measures 
against such act. <Amended on December 30, 1996, February 5, 1999, December 31, 2004>  
 
Article 24-2 (Surcharge)  
In case of practices in violation of the provisions of Clause 1, Article 23, the Fair Trade Commission may 
impose on the person concerned a surcharge of not more than two percent (five percent in case the provisions of 
Item 7 are violated) of the turnover prescribed by the Presidential Decree. In the absence of turnover, however, a 
surcharge of not more than KRW500 million may be imposed. <Amended on December 28, 1999, December 31, 
2004>  
[Amended on December 30, 1996]  
 
Article 29 (Restrictions on Resale Price Maintenance)  
(1) No enterpriser shall engage in resale price maintenance. Note, however, that this provision shall not apply to 
cases wherein there are justifiable reasons in terms of the maximum price maintenance preventing the transactions 
of commodities or services in excess of the specified prices. <Amended on January 16, 2001>  
(2) The provisions of Clause (1) shall not apply to literary works prescribed by the Presidential Decree or to 
those commodities meeting the following conditions and receiving designation in advance from the Fair Trade 
Commission as being eligible for resale price maintenance:  
1. The uniformity in quality of the commodity concerned is easily identifiable. 
2. The commodity concerned is used daily by ordinary customers.  
3. Free competition exists with respect to the commodity concerned.  
(3) Any enterpriser wishing to be designated as per Clause (2) shall apply with the Fair Trade Commission 
under the conditions prescribed by the Presidential Decree. 
(4) Whenever it designates a commodity as eligible for resale price maintenance under Clause (2), the Fair 
Trade Commission shall make such fact public.  
 
Article 30 (Modification of Resale Price Maintenance)  
If an enterpriser producing or selling a commodity designated and made public by the Fair Trade Commission 
under Article 29 (4) concludes a contract to determine and maintain the resale price of such commodity, but the 
contract threatens to cause serious harm to the interest of consumers or contradicts public interest, the Fair Trade 
Commission may order the modification of such contract. <Amended on August 3, 2007>  
[Amended on February 5, 1999]  
 
Article 31 (Corrective Measures)  
When an act violates the provisions of Article 29 (1), the Fair Trade Commission may order the enterpriser 
concerned to discontinue such act, announce the receipt of corrective order to the public, or take other necessary 
corrective measures against such act. <Amended on December 30, 1996, December 31, 2004>  
 
Article 31-2 (Surcharge)  
For resale price maintenance in violation of Article 29, the Fair Trade Commission may impose on the 
enterpriser concerned a surcharge of not more than two percent of the turnover as prescribed by the Presidential 
Decree. In the absence of turnover, however, a surcharge of not more than KRW500 million may be imposed.  
[Amended on December 30, 1996]  
Article 66 (Penal Provisions)  
(1) The following persons shall be slapped with a jail term of not more than three years or a fine of not more 
than KRW200 million: <Amended on December 8, 1992, December 30, 1996, February 24, 1998, February 5, 
1999, December 28, 1999, January 16, 2001, January 26, 2002, December 31, 2004, April 13, 2007, August 3, 
2007>  
1. Person who has committed an abusive act in violation of the provisions of Article 3-2  
2. Person who has combined enterprises in violation of Article 7 (1)  
3. Person who has violated the provisions of Article 8-2 (2) or (5)  
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4. Person who has established a holding company or converted a company into a holding company in violation 
of Article 8-3  
5. Person who has acquired or owned stocks in violation of the provisions of Article 9 or 10 (1), excluding the 
person subject to an order of prohibition as per Article 17-2 (1) (including the applicable case as per Article 4 of 
the Addenda) from among those violating Article 10 (1)  
6. Person who has guaranteed a debt in violation of the provisions of Article 10-2 (1) 
7. Person who has exercised his/her voting rights in violation of the provisions of Article 11 or 18  
8. Person who has evaded the law in violation of the provisions of Article 15  
9. Person who has engaged in unfair collaborative practices or encouraged others to participate in such in 
violation of the provision of Article 19 (1) 
10. Person who has engaged in prohibited practices involving an enterprisers’ organization in violation of 
Article 26 (1) 1 
(2) Both a jail term and a fine as referred to in Clause (1) may be imposed concurrently.  
 
Article 67 (Penal Provisions)  
The following persons shall be slapped with a jail term of not more than two years or a fine of not more than 
KRW150 million:<Amended on December 8, 1992, December 22, 1994, December 30, 1996, February 24, 
1998, February 5, 1999, January 26, 2002, August 3, 2007>  
1. Deleted <December 30, 1996>  
2. Person who has engaged in unfair trade practice in violation of Article 23 (1) 
3. Person who has violated the provisions of Article 26 (1) 2~5 
4. Person who has engaged in resale price maintenance in violation of Article 29 (1) 
5. Person who has concluded an international contract in violation of Article 32 (1) 
6. Person who has failed to comply with the corrective measures or order of prohibition, etc., as per Articles 5, 
16 (1), 17-2 (1), 21, 24, 27, 30, 31, or 34 
7. Person who has failed to undergo audit by a certified public accountant in violation of the provisions of 
Article 14 (5)  
 
 
Enforcement Decree of Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act, amended by 
presidential decree no. 21148, Dec. 3, 2008 
 
Article 5 (Types of and Criteria for Abusive Acts)  
①“Unreasonable fixing, maintenance, or alteration of price” as per Item 1, Clause (1), Article 3-2 (Prohibition 
on the Abuse of Market Dominance) of the Act pertains to a sharp increase or insignificant decrease in the 
price/cost of goods or services relative to the changes in the supply and demand or in the supply cost without 
justifiable reason (limited to general or similar businesses). 
②“Unreasonable control of the sale of goods or provision of services” as per Item 2, Clause (1), Article 3-2 
(Prohibition on the Abuse of Market Dominance) of the Act refers to the following: 
1. Significantly decreasing the supply of goods or services without justifiable reason and considering the recent 
trends 
2. Decreasing the supply of goods or services despite a supply shortage in distribution without justifiable reason 
③ “Unreasonably hampering another enterpriser's business activities” as per Item 3, Clause 1, Article 3-2 
(Prohibition on the Abuse of Market Dominance) of the Act involves hindering another enterpriser's business 
activities by directly or indirectly engaging in any of the following acts: <Amended on March 27, 2001> 
1. Hindering the purchase of raw materials required for the production of the other enterpriser without justifiable 
reason 
2. Employing human capital indispensable to the business activities of another firm by granting or promising 
excessive economic compensation compared to normal practices 
3. Refusing, discontinuing, or limiting the use of or access to essential facilities for the manufacture, provision, 
or sale of products or services of other enterprisers without justifiable reason 
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4. Engaging in unreasonable acts other than those in Items 1, 2, and 3 and deemed by the Fair Trade 
Commission to hinder the business activities of other enterprisers 
④“Unreasonably hindering the entry of a new competitor” as per Item 4, Clause (1), Article 3-2 (Prohibition on 
the Abuse of Market Dominance) of the Act involves obstructing the entry of new competitors by directly or 
indirectly engaging in any of the following acts: <Amended on March 27, 2001> 
1. Entering into an exclusive contract with a transaction partner without justifiable reason 
2. Purchasing the rights, etc., required for the continued business activities of an established enterpriser without 
justifiable reason 
3. Refusing or limiting the use of or access to essential facilities for the manufacture, provision, or sale of 
products or services of new competitors without justifiable reason 
4. Engaging in unreasonable acts other than those in Items 1, 2, and 3 and deemed by the Fair Trade 
Commission to hinder the entry of new competitors 
⑤“Unreasonable transaction to exclude competitors” as per Item 5, Clause (1), Article 3-2 (Prohibition on the 
Abuse of Market Dominance) of the Act pertains to any of the following: 
1. Where there is a possibility of excluding a competitor by supplying goods or services at unreasonably low 
prices or purchasing goods or services at unreasonably high prices compared to the normal transaction price 
2. Unreasonably transacting with a partner under the condition that the partner does not transact with a 
competing enterpriser 
⑥The Fair Trade Commission may determine and announce the specific types of and criteria for Abusive Acts 
as referred to in Clauses (1)~(5). 
[Amended on March 31, 1999] 
 
Article 6 (Request for Price Investigation)  
When there is substantial ground to suspect that a market-dominant enterpriser has unreasonably fixed, 
maintained, or altered the price of goods or services, the Fair Trade Commission may request for an 
investigation of the price of goods or services from the head of the relevant administrative agencies or from 
public institutions responsible for investigating consumer prices. 
 
 
Article 8 (Method for the Public Announcement of Receipt of Corrective Order <Amended on March 27, 2001, 
March 30, 2002>)  
The Fair Trade Commission may order the enterpriser concerned pursuant to Article 5 (Corrective Measures), 
Article 16 (Corrective Measures), Clause 1, Article 21 (Corrective Measures), Article 24 (Corrective Measures), 
Article 27 (Corrective Measures), or Article 31 (Corrective Measures) of the Act [in the case of Article 27 
(Corrective Measures) of the Act, a business group (including member enterprisers when necessary)] to 
publicize its receipt of corrective order by setting the standards for the content, type and number of media, 
and size of space for such publication considering the following: 
  1. Content and degree of violations 
  2. Duration and frequency of violations <Amended on March 31, 1997, March 31, 1999, June 30, 1999, March 
27, 2001, March 30, 2002> 
 
Article 9 (Computation of Surcharges)  
①“Turnover set forth in the Presidential Decree” as per Article 6 (Surcharges), Article 22 (Surcharges), Article 
24-2 (Surcharges), Article 28 (Surcharges), Clause (2), Article 31-2 (Surcharges), and Article 34-2 (Surcharges) 
of the Act refers to an enterpriser's average turnover for the past three years (hereinafter referred to as “average 
turnover”). If the firm is less than three years old at the start of the relevant business year, however, the turnover 
shall be the annual average turnover adjusted from the total amount of turnover from the first day until the last 
day of business for the year immediately prior to the relevant business year; in case the firm commenced 
business during the relevant business year, the turnover shall be the annual average turnover calculated from the 
total turnover from the first day of operation until the date of violation. <Amended on April 1, 2004> 
②Other details required for the computation of the average turnover shall be determined by the Fair Trade 
226 
 
Commission. <Amended on April 1, 2004> 
[Amended on March 31, 1997] 
 
Article 9-2 (Scope of Enterprisers Using Operating Revenue)  
“An enterpriser as provided for by the Presidential Decree” as per Article 6 (Surcharges) of the Act pertains to 
an enterpriser entering in its financial statements the total price of goods or services as operating revenue. 
[Amended on March 31, 1997] 
 
Article 10 (Absence of Turnover, etc.)  
“In the absence of turnover, or in case of difficulty in calculating the turnover as provided for by the Presidential 
Decree” as per Article 6 (Surcharges) of the Act refers to any of the following cases: <Amended on April 1, 
2004> 
  1. There is no operating result because either business was not commenced or was suspended. 
  2. Deleted <April 1, 2004> 
  3. The computation of an objective turnover is difficult due to a disaster, etc., thereby causing data damage or 
loss in the course of calculating the turnover. 
[Amended on March 31, 1997] 
 
Article 24 (Criteria for the Authorization of Cartels)  
“Criteria set forth in the Presidential Decree” in Clause (2), Article 19 (Restrictions on Improper Cartels) of the 
Act refer to the conditions stipulated in Article 24-2 (Criteria for Cartels for Purposes of Industry 
Rationalization) to Article 28 (Criteria for Cartels for Purposes of Enhancing the Competitiveness of Small and 
Medium Enterprises) of the Decree.  
[Newly established on March 31, 1997] 
 
Article 24-2 (Criteria for Cartels for Purposes of Industry Rationalization)  
Authorization for cartels for the purpose of industrial rationalization as per Item 1, Clause (2), Article 19 
(Prohibition on Improper Cartels) of the Act shall be limited to cartels meeting the following conditions: 
<Amended on March 31, 1997, March 30, 2002> 
  1. Effects arising from the cartel such as technological enhancement, quality improvement, cost reduction, and 
efficiency increases are clearly manifested. 
  2. The rationalization of the industry using means other than the cartel is difficult. 
  3. The beneficial effects of industrial rationalization outweigh the effects of prohibiting the restriction of 
competition. 
 
Article 24-3 (Criteria for Cartels for Purposes of Research and Technological Development) 
Authorization for cartels for the purpose of research and technological development as per Item 2, Clause (2), 
Article 19 (Prohibition on Improper Cartels) of the Act is limited to cartels meeting the following conditions:  
<Amended on March 31, 1997, March 30, 2002> 
  1. The research and technological development are indispensable to the reinforcement of industrial 
competitiveness, and their economic impact is substantial. 
  2. The scale of investment required for research and technological development is too large for a single 
enterpriser. 
  3. Collaboration is necessary for the distribution of risks associated with the uncertainties of research and 
technological development results. 
  4. The beneficial effects of research and technological development outweigh the effects of prohibiting the 
restriction of competition. 
[Newly established on February 20, 1993] 
 
Article 25 (Criteria for Cartels for Purposes of Overcoming Economic Depression)  
Authorization for cartels for the purpose of overcoming economic depression as per Item 3, Clause (2), Article 
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19 (Prohibition on Improper Cartels) of the Act is limited to cartels meeting the following conditions: 
<Amended on March 31, 1997> 
  1. There has been a continued decline in the demand for a particular product or service for a substantial period 
of time due to a continued large oversupply, and the situation will most likely persist in the future. 
  2. The transaction price of a particular product or service has persistently fallen short of the average production 
cost. 
  3. A considerable number of companies in a given area of trade will likely be unable to continue their business. 
  4. The circumstances in Items 1~3 cannot be overcome through the rationalization of enterprisers. 
 
Article 26 (Criteria for Cartels for Purposes of Industrial Restructuring)  
Authorization for cartels for the purpose of industrial restructuring as per Item 4, Clause (2), Article 19 
(Prohibition on Improper Cartels) of the Act is limited to cartels meeting the following conditions: <Amended 
on March 31, 1997, March 30, 2002> 
  1. There is a marked excess in capacity on the supply side in a particular industry due to a change in the 
economic environment at home or abroad, or production efficiency or international competitiveness has 
substantially decreased due to the deterioration of production facilities and methods. 
  2. The situation described in Clause (1) cannot be overcome through the rationalization of enterprisers. 
  3. The benefits of industrial restructuring outweigh the effects of restriction on competition. 
 
Article 27 (Criteria for Cartels for Purposes of Rationalizing the Terms of Trade)  
Authorization for cartels for the purpose of rationalizing the terms of trade as per Item 5, Clause (2), Article 19 
(Prohibition on Improper Cartels) of the Act is limited to cartels meeting the following conditions: <Amended 
on March 30, 2002> 
  1. The cartel significantly contributes to an increase in production efficiency, facilitation of transaction, and 
enhancement of convenience of consumers by rationalizing the terms of trade. 
  2. The nature of rationalization of the terms of trade is technologically and economically viable for most 
enterprisers in the given area of trade. 
  3. The benefits of rationalization of the terms of trade outweigh the effects of restriction on competition. 
[Newly established on March 31, 1997] 
 
Article 28 (Criteria for Cartels for Purposes of Enhancing the Competitiveness of Small and Medium 
Enterprises)  
Authorization for cartels for the purpose of enhancing the competitiveness of small and medium enterprises as 
per Item 6, Clause (2), Article 19 (Prohibition on Improper Cartels) of the Act is limited to cartels meeting the 
following conditions:  
<Amended on March 31, 1997> 
  1. The cartel has a significantly positive effect on the productivity of small and medium enterprises, e.g., 
quality and technological improvement, or on the reinforcement of their bargaining power with respect to the 
terms of trade. 
  2. All participating enterprisers are small and medium enterprises. 
  3. There is no means of competing effectively with or countering large-scale companies other than the cartel. 
 
Article 29 (Limitations on the Authorization of Cartels)  
Notwithstanding Article 24-2 (Criteria for Cartels for Purposes of Industry Rationalization) up to Article 28 
(Criteria for Cartels for Purposes of Enhancing the Competitiveness of Small and Medium Enterprises) of the 
Decree, the Fair Trade Commission shall not grant authorization for the following cartels: <Amended on March 
31, 1997> 
  1. The cartel exceeds the necessary extent for the achievement of its purpose. 
  2. The interests of consumers and other related enterprisers will likely be compromised unreasonably. 
  3. The nature of the cartel unreasonably discriminates against participating enterprisers. 
  4. The participation in or withdrawal from the Cartel is unreasonably restricted. 
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Article 30 (Procedures for the Authorization of Cartels)  
①Any person wishing to obtain authorization from the Fair Trade Commission as per Clause (2), Article 19 
(Prohibition on Improper Cartels) of the Act shall submit to the Fair Trade Commission an application 
specifying the following:<Amended on March 31, 1997> 
  1. Number of participating enterprisers 
  2. Names of the participating enterprisers and their office locations 
  3. Addresses and names of representative directors and officers 
  4. Reasons for and nature of the cartel 
  5. Proposed duration of the cartel 
  6. Business content of the participating enterprisers 
②The following documents shall be attached to the application described in Clause (1): <Amended on March 
31, 1997> 
  1. Business reports, balance sheets, and statements of income of the participating enterprisers for the past two 
years 
  2. Copy of the agreement or statement of resolution of the cartel 
  3. Documents verifying the satisfaction of criteria for authorization 
  4. Documents verifying the satisfaction of provisions of Article 29 (Limitations on the Authorization of 
Cartels) of the Decree 
③When granting authorization upon receiving an application for such as per Clause (1), the Fair Trade 
Commission shall deliver a certificate of authorization to the applicant. 
④A person who has been granted authorization but wishes to modify the details he/she submitted shall submit 
to the Fair Trade Commission an application for change containing the documents specified in Clauses (1) and 
(2) as necessary for the modified particulars together with a certification of authorization.  
⑤Upon receiving an authorization application as per Clause (2), Article 19 (Prohibition on Improper Cartels) of 
the Act, the Fair Trade Commission shall reach a decision within thirty days of receipt of such application 
[when making a public notification as outlined in Clause (3), Article 31 (Public Notification on the Contents of Application 
for the Authorization of Cartels) of the Decree, thirty days in addition to the public notification period]; when deemed 
necessary, however, the Fair Trade Commission may extend the period for up to thirty days. <Newly established 
on March 31, 1997> 
 
Article 31 (Public Notification on the Contents of Application for the Authorization of Cartels)  
①When deemed necessary, the Fair Trade Commission may announce the contents of an application for the 
authorization of cartels as submitted in accordance with Clause (2), Article 19 (Prohibition on Improper Cartels) 
of the Act and hear the opinions of the interested parties. The same shall apply to cases of authorization 
modification. <Newly established on March 31, 1997> 
②In announcing the contents of applications for the authorization of cartels or applications for the modification of 
some details, the following information shall be included in the announcement:<Amended on March 31, 1997> 
1. Name and address of the applicant enterpriser  
2. Nature of the cartel  
3. Reasons for the cartel  
4, Proposed period of the cartel  
5, In the case of application for modification, the reason and nature of change  
③The duration of announcement as per Clause (1) shall not exceed thirty days. <Newly established on March 
31, 1997> 
④An interested party with an opinion regarding the contents of the announcement described in Clause (2) may 
submit to the Fair Trade Commission a statement of opinion containing the following information within the 
period of announcement: 
1. Name and address of the person stating an opinion  
2. Opinion and reasons for its submission  
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3. Other materials required for stating an opinion  
 
Article 32 (Discontinuance of Authorized Cartels)  
Any person who has received authorization for a cartel as per Clause (2), Article 19 (Prohibition on Improper 
Cartels) of the Act but discontinues the authorized cartel shall immediately notify the Fair Trade Commission 
accordingly. 
[Amended on March 31, 1999] 
Article 36 (Designation of Unfair Business Practices)  
①The types of and criteria for Unfair Business Practices as per Clause (2), Article 23 (Prohibition on Unfair 
Business Practices) of the Act are listed in Appendix 1. 
②When deemed necessary, the Fair Trade Commission may establish and announce the detailed standards for 
the types of and criteria for Unfair Business Practices as per Clause (1) for purposes of applying them to a 
particular area or act. In this case, the Fair Trade Commission shall hear the opinions of the heads of the relevant 
administrative agencies in advance. 
[Amended on March 31, 1997] 
 
Article 37 (Fair Competition Code)  
①Upon receiving a request for the examination of the Fair Competition Code as per Clause (5), Article 23 
(Prohibition on Unfair Business Practices) of the Act, the Fair Trade Commission shall notify the requester of 
the examination results within sixty days of receiving the request. <Amended on March 31, 1997> 
 
Article 43 (Publications Eligible for Resale Price Maintenance)  
“Publications specified in the Presidential Decree” as per Clause (2), Article 29 (Restrictions on Resale Price 
Maintenance) of the Act refer to those publications defined in Article 2 (Definitions) of the Copyright Act and 
designated by the Fair Trade Commission following consultations with the head of the relevant central 
administrative agency (including electronic publications). <Amended on March 31, 1997, March 31, 1999, 
March 31, 2005> 
 
Article 44 (Procedures for Designating Products Eligible for Resale Price Maintenance)  
①An enterpriser wishing to receive designation of eligibility for resale price maintenance as per Clause (3), 
Article 29 (Restrictions on Resale Price Maintenance) of the Act shall submit to the Fair Trade Commission an 
application specifying the following: <Amended on March 31, 1997> 
1. Nature of business 
2. Operating results for the previous year 
3. Nature of the product in question 
4. Distribution channel of the product in question and trends in the sales price of each distribution level for the 
previous year 
5. Organization of product sellers 
6. Reasons for the application for the designation of eligibility  
②The following documents shall be attached to the application described in Clause (1): <Amended on March 
31, 1997> 
1. Documents verifying that the resale price maintenance for the product in question does not unreasonably 
harm general consumer interests 
2. Documents verifying the satisfaction of all conditions outlined in the Items of Clause (2), Article 29 
(Restrictions on Resale Price Maintenance) of the Act 
 
[Appendix 1] <Amended on March 30, 2002> 
 
Types of and Criteria for Unfair Business Practices [related to Clause (1), Article 36] 
 
1. Refusal to deal 
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“Unreasonably refusing to transact” as stipulated in Item 1, Clause (1), Article 23 (Prohibition on Unfair 
Business Practices) of the Act pertains to the following: 
 
A. Collective refusal to deal 
Refusing to initiate business with a certain enterpriser or suspending transaction or significantly restricting the 
quantity or nature of commodities or service in a transaction with a certain enterpriser with which you have 
forged a continuous transaction relation without justifiable reason and in collusion with your competitors 
  
B. Other types of refusal to deal 
Unreasonably refusing to initiate business with a certain enterpriser or suspending transaction or significantly 
restricting the quantity or nature of commodities or services in a transaction with a certain enterpriser with 
which you have forged a continuous transaction relation 
 
2. Discriminatory treatment 
“Unreasonable discrimination against certain transacting partners” as stipulated in Item 1, Clause 1, Article 23 
(Prohibition on Unfair Business Practices) of the Act refers to the following: 
   
A. Price discrimination 
Depending on the transacting partner or transaction territory, unreasonably transacting at a highly favorable or 
unfavorable price 
  
B. Discrimination in the terms and conditions of transaction 
Unreasonable discrimination in the terms and conditions, e.g., quantity or quality in favor of or against a certain 
enterpriser 
  
C. Discrimination in favor of affiliated corporations 
Discrimination in trading terms and conditions such as price, quantity, or quality in favor of or against certain 
partners without justifiable reasons for the benefit of your affiliated corporations 
  
D. Collective discrimination 
A group unreasonably discriminates in favor of or against a certain enterpriser, thereby putting such enterpriser 
at a considerable advantage or disadvantage 
 
3. Elimination of competitors  
“Unreasonably excluding competitors” as stipulated in Item 1, Clause 2, Article 23 (Prohibition on Unfair 
Business Practices) refers to the following:  
 
A. Unjustifiable discounts 
Continuing to supply your commodities or services at a price that is considerably lower than the supply cost 
without justifiable reason or to supply such commodities or services at an unduly lower price, thereby 
threatening the viable existence of your competitors or those of your affiliated corporations 
 
B. Unjustifiably high-priced purchase 
Purchasing commodities or services at an unjustifiably higher cost than the normal transaction price, thereby 
threatening the viable existence of your competitors or those of your affiliated corporations 
 
4. Unfairly luring customers  
“Unreasonably luring customers of your competitors to deal with you ” as stipulated in Item 1, Clause 3, Article 
23 (Prohibition on Unfair Business Practices) of the Act pertains to the following: 
 
A. Luring customers by promising unjustifiable gains 
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Providing or promising to provide unjust or excessive gains in violation of normal business practices, thereby 
luring your competitor's customers  
 
B. Luring customers using fraudulent means 
Other than through labeling or advertising as provided for in Item 9, misleading your competitors’ customers by 
falsely claiming that the content, terms and conditions, or other transaction matters involving your commodities 
or services are considerably superior to or much more advantageous than they actually are compared to those of 
your competitors, or that the content, terms and conditions, or other transaction matters involving your 
competitor’s commodities or services are considerably less advantageous than or inferior to what they actually 
are compared to your commodities or services, thereby luring your competitors’ customers 
 
C. Luring customers through other methods 
Unduly hindering transactions between your competitor and its customers by impeding the execution of 
contracts or by encouraging such customers to breach their contracts, thereby luring them  
 
5. Coercion in dealing  
“Unreasonably coercing the customers of your competitors to deal with you” as stipulated in Item (1), Item 3, 
Article 23 (Prohibition on Unfair Business Practices) of the Act refers to the following:  
A. Tie-in sales 
Wrongfully forcing the transaction partner to purchase another commodity or service from you or an enterpriser 
you designated when supplying commodities or services in violation of normal business practices  
 
B. Forcing employees to purchase or make a sale 
Wrongfully forcing your officers or employees or those of your affiliated corporation to purchase or sell your 
commodities or services or those of your affiliated corporation 
 
C. Other types of coercion 
Offering the transaction partner undue terms and conditions and other disadvantages in violation of normal 
business practices, thereby forcing the transaction partner to transact with you or the enterpriser you designated  
 
6. Abuse of superior position  
“Unreasonably taking advantage of your superior position when transacting with others” as stipulated in Item 
(1), Clause 4, Article 23 (Prohibition on Unfair Business Practices) of the Act pertains to the following:  
 
A. Coercion to purchase 
Forcing the transacting partner to purchase commodities or services that the transaction partner does not wish to 
purchase  
 
B. Coercion to provide benefits 
Forcing the transacting partner to provide economic benefits such as money, commodities, or services  
 
C. Imposing a sales target 
Imposing a target on the transacting partner for transactions involving the commodities or services you supply 
and forcing the transaction partner to meet the target  
 
D. Offering disadvantages 
Establishing or modifying the transaction conditions to the disadvantage of the transacting partner or placing the 
partner at a disadvantage in the course of carrying out the transaction using methods other than those described 
in Items 1~3  
 
E. Interference in management 
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Interfering in the management activities of transaction partners by requiring them to obtain approval or 
directions from you when they hire or fire officers or employees or by restricting the manufacturing articles, 
scale of facilities, production quantity, or details of transaction  
 
7. Transaction based on restrictive conditions  
“Transacting with others under terms and conditions that unreasonably restrict business activities” as stipulated 
in Item (1), Clause 5, Article 23 (Prohibition on Unfair Business Practices) of the Act refers to the following: 
 
A. Exclusive dealings 
Wrongfully transacting with an enterpriser on the condition that the enterpriser does not deal with your 
competitor or those of your affiliated corporation 
 
B. Restriction on the transaction area or partner 
Transacting with a transaction partner on the undue condition that the partner limits its transaction area or 
partner(s) 
 
8. Interference in the business activities of other enterprisers  
“Acts that unreasonably disrupt the business activities of other enterprisers” as stipulated in Item (1), Clause 5, 
Article 23 (Prohibition on Unfair Business Practices) of the Act refer to any of the following acts:  
A. Unfair use of technology 
Unduly using the technology of the other enterpriser such that its business activities are seriously hampered 
 
B. Unfairly luring or hiring personnel 
Unreasonably luring or hiring the personnel of the other enterpriser such that its business activities are seriously 
hampered  
 
C. Interference in the change of transacting partner 
Unreasonably interfering in the change of transaction counterpart of the other enterpriser such that its business 
activities are seriously hampered  
 
D. Interference through other methods 
Interfering with the business activities of other enterprisers through unreasonable means other than those 
specified in Items 1~3 such that their business activities are seriously hampered  
 
9. Deleted <June 30, 1999> 
 
10. Undue financial, asset, and manpower support  
The following acts constitute the act of unreasonably "providing specially related persons or other corporations 
with temporary payment, loan, manpower, real estate, securities, intangible property rights, etc., or aiding a 
special related person or other corporations by trading under extremely favorable terms" as per Item (1), Clause 
7, Article 23 (Prohibition on Unfair Business Practices) of the Act: 
A. Undue financial support 
Aiding a specially related person or other corporations through the provision of excessive economic benefits by 
providing or transacting funds, e.g., temporary payment, loan, etc., at substantially high or low costs or by 
providing or transacting such funds in substantial amounts 
 
B. Undue asset support 
Aiding a specially related person or other corporations through the provision of excessive economic benefits by 
providing or transacting assets such as real estate, securities, intangible property rights, etc., at substantially high 
or low costs or by providing or transacting such assets in substantial volumes 
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C. Undue manpower support 
Aiding a specially related person or other corporations through the provision of excessive economic benefits by 
providing them with manpower at substantially high or low costs or by providing such manpower in substantial 
number 
 
 
 
THE UITED STATES  
 
The Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 
 
Section 1. Trusts, etc., in restraint of trade illegal; penalty 
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce 
among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any 
contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a 
felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding $100,000,000 if a corporation, or, if 
any other person, $1,000,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding 10 years, or by both said punishments, in the 
discretion of the court.  
 
Section 2. Monopolizing trade a felony; penalty 
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or 
persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, 
shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding 
$100,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other person, $1,000,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding 10 years, 
or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.  
 
 
The Clayton Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 
 
Section 3. Sale, etc., on agreement not to use goods of competitor 
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such commerce, to lease or make a 
sale or contract for sale of goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies, or other commodities, whether 
patented or unpatented, for use, consumption, or resale within the United States or any Territory thereof or the 
District of Columbia or any insular possession or other place under the jurisdiction of the United States, or fix a 
price charged therefor, or discount from, or rebate upon, such price, on the condition, agreement, or 
understanding that the lessee or purchaser thereof shall not use or deal in the goods, wares, merchandise, 
machinery, supplies, or other commodities of a competitor or competitors of the lessor or seller, where the effect 
of such lease, sale, or contract for sale or such condition, agreement, or understanding may be to substantially 
lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce.  
 
 
The Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 
 
Section 5. Unfair methods of competition unlawful; prevention by Commission 
(a) Declaration of unlawfulness; power to prohibit unfair practices; inapplicability to foreign trade  
(1) Unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or 
affecting commerce, are hereby declared unlawful.  
(2) The Commission is hereby empowered and directed to prevent persons, partnerships, or corporations, except 
banks, savings and loan institutions described in section 57a (f)(3) of this title, Federal credit unions described in 
section 57a (f)(4) of this title, common carriers subject to the Acts to regulate commerce, air carriers and foreign 
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air carriers subject to part A of subtitle VII of title 49, and persons, partnerships, or corporations insofar as they 
are subject to the Packers and Stockyards Act, 1921, as amended [7 U.S.C. 181 et seq.], except as provided in 
section 406(b) of said Act [7 U.S.C. 227 (b)], from using unfair methods of competition in or affecting 
commerce and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.  
(3) This subsection shall not apply to unfair methods of competition involving commerce with foreign nations 
(other than import commerce) unless—  
(A) such methods of competition have a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect—  
(i) on commerce which is not commerce with foreign nations, or on import commerce with foreign nations; or  
(ii) on export commerce with foreign nations, of a person engaged in such commerce in the United States; and  
(B) such effect gives rise to a claim under the provisions of this subsection, other than this paragraph.  
If this subsection applies to such methods of competition only because of the operation of subparagraph (A)(ii), 
this subsection shall apply to such conduct only for injury to export business in the United States.  
(4) (A) For purposes of subsection (a), the term “unfair or deceptive acts or practices” includes such acts or 
practices involving foreign commerce that—  
(i) cause or are likely to cause reasonably foreseeable injury within the United States; or  
(ii) involve material conduct occurring within the United States.  
(B) All remedies available to the Commission with respect to unfair and deceptive acts or practices shall be 
available for acts and practices described in this paragraph, including restitution to domestic or foreign victims.  
 
 
 
THE EUROPEA UIO 
 
Article 81 EC Treaty 
(1) The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market: all agreements between 
undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices which may affect trade between 
Member States and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition 
within the common market, and in particular those which:  
(a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trading conditions;  
(b) limit or control production, markets, technical development, or investment;  
(c) share markets or sources of supply;  
(d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing them at a 
competitive disadvantage;  
(e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of supplementary obligations 
which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts.  
(2) Any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to this Article shall be automatically void.  
(3) The provisions of paragraph 1 may, however, be declared inapplicable in the case of:  
- any agreement or category of agreements between undertakings;  
- any decision or category of decisions by associations of undertakings;  
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- any concerted practice or category of concerted practices, which contributes to improving the production or 
distribution of goods or to promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of 
the resulting benefit, and which does not:  
(a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not indispensable to the attainment of these 
objectives;  
(b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a substantial part of the 
products in question.  
 
Article 82 EC Treaty 
Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the common market or in a substantial 
part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market insofar as it may affect trade between 
Member States.  
Such abuse may, in particular, consist in:  
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair trading conditions;  
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of consumers;  
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing them at a 
competitive disadvantage;  
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of supplementary obligations 
which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts.  
 
 
JAPA  
 
Act on Prohibition of Private Monopolization and Maintenance of Fair Trade 
(Antimonopoly Act): Act o. 54 of 14 April 1947 
 
Article 1 
The purpose of this Act is, by prohibiting private monopolization, unreasonable restraint of trade and unfair 
trade practices, by preventing excessive concentration of economic power and by eliminating unreasonable 
restraint of production, sale, price, technology, etc., and all other unjust restriction on business activities through 
combinations, agreements, etc., to promote fair and free competition, to stimulate the creative initiative of 
entrepreneurs, to encourage business activities, to heighten the level of employment and actual national income, 
and thereby to promote the democratic and wholesome development of the national economy as well as to 
assure the interests of general consumers. 
 
Article 2 
(5) The term, “private monopolization” as used in this Act means such business activities, by which any 
entrepreneur, individually or by combination or conspiracy with other entrepreneurs, or by any other manner, 
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excludes or controls the business activities of other entrepreneurs, thereby causing, contrary to the public 
interest, a substantial restraint of competition in any particular field of trade. 
(6) The term, “unreasonable restraint of trade” as used in this Act means such business activities, by which any 
entrepreneur, by contract, agreement or any other means irrespective of its name, in concert with other 
entrepreneurs, mutually restrict or conduct their business activities in such a manner as to fix, maintain, or 
increase prices, or to limit production, technology, products, facilities, or counterparties, thereby causing, 
contrary to the public interest, a substantial restraint of competition in any particular field of trade. 
(9) The term, “unfair trade practices” as used in this Act means any act falling under any of following items, 
which tends to impede fair competition and which is designated by the Fair Trade Commission: 
(i) Unjustly treat other entrepreneurs in a discriminatory manner; 
(ii) Dealing with unjust consideration; 
(iii) Unjust inducing or coercing customers of a competitor to deal with oneself; 
(iv) Dealing with another party on such conditions as will unjustly restrict the business activities of the said 
party; 
(v) Dealing with another party by unjust use of one’s bargaining position; 
(vi) Unjustly interfering with a transaction between an entrepreneur in competition with it in Japan with oneself 
or a corporation of which oneself is a stockholder or an officer and another transaction counterparty; or, in case 
such entrepreneur is a corporation, unjustly inducing, instigating, or coercing a stockholder or a director of such 
corporation to act against the interests of such corporation. 
 
Article 3 
No entrepreneur shall effect private monopolization or unreasonably restraint of trade. 
 
Article 19 
No entrepreneur shall employ unfair trade practices. 
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GLOSSARY 
 
 
Chaebol: a form of Korean business groups or conglomerate. The word literally means a 
business group or a trust, and also refers to several large and family-owned business groups 
that are traditionally supported by the Korean government. Chaebols have played a major 
role in the state’s economic development since the 1960s. They own well-known 
international brands such as Samsung, Hyundai, and LG. Chaebols used to cooperate with the 
Korean government in the field of economic planning. However, after the Monopoly 
Regulation and Fair Trade Act legislation in 1980, the government has tried to encourage 
competition amongst Chaebols to avoid monopolies in the market. Chaebols are very similar 
to Zaibatsu in Japan, which were loose conglomerates. Chaebols’ affiliates benefited from 
group membership through sharing intangible and financial resources with other affiliated 
members. This indicates that various methods of internal business transactions, such as debt 
guarantee, equity investment, and internal trade, were widely used for the purpose of cross-
subsidisation for affiliates. The 30 largest Chaebols accounted for 40 per cent of Korea’s total 
output as of 1996. The diversification of the conglomerates through affiliates’ indebtedness, 
by means of internal loans and cross-shareholding, threatened to trigger chain bankruptcies 
throughout the group, especially in the 1997 Financial Crisis. The dynamic business activities 
of Chaebols’ expansion and growth raised efficiency and equity issues about the nature of 
government intervention, because state economic growth during 1960s and 1970s demanded 
sacrifices of SMEs and consumers. The Chaebols’ unlawful activities stressed relative 
disparities, and triggered the idea of Korean competition policy in 1980.  
 
Chicago School: one of the main economic schools which has influenced competition policy. 
Free market economic thinking has been associated with the Economics Department at 
University of Chicago. The Chicago School is an academic group of lawyers and economists, 
focusing on competition policy, whose pro-market, pro-competition, and anti-government 
views were influential during the 1970s and 1980s in the US. The Chicago School is strongly 
related with the idea that large firms are likely to have become large from efficient activities, 
and are therefore more profitable than their smaller competitors. Thus, sanctioning them 
because they are profitable is essentially the same as to punishing successes or efficiency. 
This assumes that unregulated actions of private firms are socially benign. The Chicago 
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School argues strongly against government intervention in markets, in order to promote 
competition. For that reason, it has tended to argue for lenient enforcement of competition 
policy, and has suggested that most monopoly problems are created by governments’ legal 
intervention. The Chicago School has also suggested that vertical restraints are harmless. 
 
Concentration Ratio: a ratio calculated to explain the degree to which a market or industry 
is dominated by a small number of firms, or many small firms, based on market shares held 
by firms. A better ratio for concentration is the Herfindahl-Hirshman Index (HHI) which is 
given by the sum of the squares of the market shares, i.e., HHI = Σn f 
2
n, where fn = market 
share of firm n.  
 
Contestability: the degree of difficulty with which firms can enter or exit a market. This 
considers a market made up of a small number of incumbent firms whose market power is 
constrained by potential entrants. Although the incumbents are few, the market entry may 
force them to set their prices at a low level. Even in a concentrated market, therefore, it is 
possible that incumbents can earn only a normal profit. A perfectly contestable market does 
not have barriers to market entry. Thus, perfect contestability tells us nothing about how 
many firms currently exist in the market. This theory was originally developed by the 
economist Baumol in the early 1980s. 
 
Cross-shareholding: cross-shareholding was conducive to redundant investment by 
Chaebols. Chaebols could often obtain control of their affiliates at a relatively low cost, by 
using small shares of their own assets to purchase substantial shares of affiliates. Moreover, 
Chaebols’ influence over major decisions of the affiliates exceeded their normal holdings 
through cross-shareholdings.  
 
Deadweight Loss: a particular loss in social welfare deriving from an action that has no 
consequent gain. It refers to total welfare loss from the fact that less output is produced under 
a monopoly than under perfect competition.  
 
Developing Country: a country that has neither reached the stage of economic development 
characterised by industrial growth, nor a level of national total income which is enough to 
yield the domestic savings for required investment for further state economic growth.  
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Duopoly: two suppliers of a product or service in a market. 
 
Economic Power: the capacity to control economic affairs and the assets of others, and to 
allocate society’s resources. This is power over price. In other words, it is the ability of a firm 
to raise prices above the competitive level without losing profits. Economic power can derive 
from a monopolistic or oligopolistic market. This power may be driven unilaterally or jointly, 
through agreements amongst competitors, or tacit collusion and conscious parallelism.  
 
Economies of Scale: factors that allow the average cost of producing a product to fall as 
output of the product increases.  
 
Economies of Scope: factors that make it cheaper to produce a range of related products than 
to produce each of them individually.  
 
Efficiency: there are three kinds of efficiencies as followings:  
(1) Allocative efficiency: existing products and services are allocated to those who value 
them most, in terms of their willingness to pay. Allocated resources are used in the best way. 
It refers to the condition of no waste of resources in production. Under the Pareto optimal, 
price equals marginal cost.  
(2) Productive efficiency: this notion focuses on a particular firm or industry, and considers 
whether a firm uses its resources in a way that it can exploit economies of scale, existing 
technology, and reduce all unnecessary costs, so that production is at minimum cost.  
(3) Dynamic efficiency: this concept is the measure of whether a firm has the ability to 
increase innovation, developing new products or reducing production costs, which can give 
benefits to consumers and the state economy as a whole. 
 
Entry Barrier: anything that puts a potential entrant at a competitive disadvantage. Entry 
barriers arise from the following four main sources: (1) blocked access by control of supply; 
(2) scale economy; (3) capital requirements; and (4) product differentiation. The definition of 
entry barrier has been controversial. However, there are two main theories: (1) Bain’s 
definition of entry barriers as allowing firms to raise prices without inducing entry; and (2) 
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Stigler’s definition, as those costs that a new entrant should face which were not incurred by 
incumbents when they entered the market.  
 
Five-Year Economic Development Plans: the Korean government’s policy outcome 
planned under President Park in the 1960-70s. These plans were made by the economic 
planning board, the finance ministry, and the ministry of commerce and trade. 
 
Harvard School: a school of competition analysis stemming from the structure → conduct 
→ performance (SCP) paradigm developed in the 1930s at Harvard University. This means 
that the structure of the market leads to firms’ performing in certain ways. In short, the 
number of firms and their market concentration determine the way in which the firms 
compete. This eventually determines their performance in the market. 
 
Keiretsu: a set of companies with interlocking business relationships and shareholdings. This 
literally refers to ‘link’, ‘affiliate with’ or ‘connect to’. Keiretsu is an informal term often 
used to mean various forms of inter-firm relationships. These firms tend to have close vertical 
integration between suppliers and buyers, called Suichoku (vertical) Keiretsu. There are two 
types of vertical Keiretsu: (1) Seisan (production) Keiretsu, in which suppliers and 
manufacturers are deeply related for a single end-product manufacturer, such as in the auto or 
electronics industries; and (2) Rutsu (distribution) Keiretsu, in which a single manufacturer 
supplies goods through a network of wholesalers and retailers that depend on the parent 
company. Keiretsu relationships are complex, multidimensional, and variable across 
enterprises. The major Keiretsu were each centred on one bank, which lent money to the 
Keiretsu’s affiliates. In the same Keiretsu group, the relationship between affiliates is much 
closer than a single supplier and buyer relationship.  
 
Market Power: the degree of a firm’s influence or control over the price and output in a 
market. In particular, monopolists often restrict output and charge higher prices than marginal 
costs.  
 
Market Share: either (1) the sales of the product of a firm as a proportion of the sales of the 
product of the market as a whole, or (2) the sales of a particular product of a firm compared 
with the total sales for the others. 
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ew Economy: narrowly, new business activities created by information and 
communications technology including computer hardware and software, telecommunications 
and other aspects of the digital revolution, such as the internet.  
 
Ordoliberalism: the idea of influencing competition policy to protect individual economic 
freedom of action as a value in itself, or vice versa, the restraint of undue private economic 
power. The principle of this theory was humanist rather than efficiency, or other pure 
economic concerns. It envisioned a society in which individuals were as free as possible from 
government intervention. From this perspective, private monopoly power threatens the 
competitive process, and the primary function of competition policy was to eliminate it, or at 
least prevent its harmful effects. In particular, the EC competition law played a central role in 
Ordoliberal theories of economic organisation. Ordoliberalism is not just a school of 
competition or economic theory, but an entire political and economic philosophy, due to its 
important implications for competition policy. This approach to competition policy leads to 
the protection of competitors and small firms, regardless of the effects on efficiency, rather 
than the protection of competition. It focuses on the freedom of market entities entering and 
competing in the markets. Korea seems to adopt Ordoliberalism although its implementation 
is not clear. 
 
Perfect Competition: a perfectly competitive market has six main characteristics: a large 
number of buyers and sellers; perfect knowledge; identical products; firms’ independent 
actions; free entry and exit; firms’ ability to sell as much output as they wish. Amongst these, 
there are four major conditions for perfect competition; (1) an absolutely homogenous 
product providing the same price; (2) a seller’s output increasing or decreasing, or its exit 
from the market does not affect the decisions of other sellers in that market; (3) all sellers 
have the same access to necessary input; and (4) all market entities have good knowledge of 
price, output and other information about the market. The closer a market comes to fulfilling 
these conditions, the more competitively it will perform.  
 
Post-Chicago School or ew Industrial Organisation Economics: a modern industrial 
organisation theory school whose theories focus less on market structure and more on 
strategic issues, and the strategic behaviour of firms based on game theory. 
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Rent Seeking Behaviour: a behaviour that improves the welfare of a particular entity in the 
market at the expense of the welfare of someone else. The most extreme case is that of 
protection of a certain group’s interest, which betters the group members without ensuring 
any welfare-enhancing outcome. 
 
Transaction Cost: a cost incurred in making an economic transaction. There are a number of 
transaction costs, such as search and information costs, bargaining costs, policing and 
enforcement costs. A transaction cost analysis often applies in vertical arrangements. Firms at 
up- and downstream level could be used to bring activity at successive interfaces into 
adjustment. Such an adjustment of contracts can be costly. The basic presumption of this 
incurred cost is the transaction cost. The transaction cost approach is concerned with the costs 
of running the economic system, especially the costs of adapting efficiently to uncertainty 
from negotiating new agreements. 
 
Zaibatsu: business conglomerates whose influence and size allowed for control over 
significant parts of the Japanese economy. This term was commonly used until the end of the 
Second World War. It was often used as a political expression referring to the estate of 
wealth. It refers to the large family-owned banking and industrial combines in Japan. 
Zaibatsu such as Mitsubish, Mitsui, Sumitomo, and Yasuda are the most historically 
significant Zaibatsu groups, having roots stemming from the Edo period of Japanese history. 
Most of the Zaibatsu were founded by political merchants who had close connections with 
the Hanbatsu (clansmen) of the early Meiji government. These Zaibatsu received a powerful 
incentive from the Japanese military and naval programmes. During the 1910s and 1940s, 
Zaibatsu increased their strength. There were six large business groups: Mitsubish, Mitsui, 
and Sumitomo which were based on the pre-war Zaibatsu, and the others, Fuyo, Sanwha, and 
Ichikan which were the new conglomerates rapidly developing in the post-war period. 
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